of gaming, or lent or advanced at the time of any gaming, to a person then actually engaged in it, shall be Void.-WHITE V. WILSON'S ADMR., Ky., 37 S. W. Rep.

677.

39. CONTRACT - Mechanics' Liens.-A subcontractor is affected with knowledge of the terms of the contract between the owner and original contractor, and such subcontractor is not entitled to an enforcement of his lien in such a manner as to defeat the conditions of the contract lawfully made by the owner and contractor.-MCCRARY V. BRISTOL BANK & TRUST CO., Tenn., 37 S. W. Rep. 543.

40. CONTRACTS - Mechanics' Liens.-Where a party agreed, in consideration of real property being placed in the hands of his agent, by whom the rents and profits therefrom arising were to be collected, and paid out, as stipulated, to certain holders of liens on such property, among whom was the aforesaid party to said agreement, such agreement will be enforced according to its terms, though thereby the otherwise existing rights of said party are modified or impaired. -ROGERS V. CENTRAL LOAN & TRUST Co., Neb., 68 N. W. Rep. 1048.

41. CONTRACTS-Performance-Estoppel.-Where the building contractor substantially performs his contract, the owner, by accepting the building without objection, and expressing his satisfaction with the work, is estopped to assert a non-compliance with the contract in order to prevent the recovery, on a common count, of the contract price.-STROME V. LYON, Mich., 68 N. W. Rep. 983.

42. CONTRACT-Release of Vendor's Lien.-A vendor engaged an attorney to sue for a purchase-money note, which he had transferred, secured by vendor's lien, by contract transferring to the attorney, in case of recovery of the note, one-half thereof in excess of a certain amount: Held, that the contract simply transferred to the attorney an interest in the note, and that, it having been recovered, and the vendor having sued thereon, the relief to which the attorney, intervening, was entitled, was a judgment for the amount of his interest against those liable on the note, and enforcement of the lien for that amount.-MAYS V. SANDERS, Tex., 37 S. W. Rep. 595.

43. CONTRACT OF SALE-Forfeiture-Option of Vendor. -Plaintiff, in consideration of a cash payment and a certain sum to be paid in installments, evidenced by notes falling due in two, four, and seven months, sold to defendant the right to sell a book published by plaintiff in a certain county. The contract provided that, "in case of failure to make any of said payments and interest as specified, or any part thereof, when due, then this contract becomes null and void, and all previous payments forfeited without further notice:" Held, that upon the failure of the defendant to make the first payment provided for, it was in the option of the plaintiff to annul the contract and declare a forfeiture of the cash payment, or to affirm the contract, and bring action on the notes.-DORAN V. O'NEAL, Tenn., 37 S. W. Rep. 563.

44. CORPORATIONS · Contract as to New Stock.-A corporation was organized to take over the business and assets of another older corporation, and contracted with the older corporation and its stockholders, in consideration of receiving such business and assets, to issue to each of the old stockholders certifi cates of stock in the new company, upon surrender of those in the old, share for share. In a suit by a holder of a certificate of stock in the old company against the new company for specific performance of this agreement, held, that the suit could be maintained by a single stockholder without making the old company or either of its stockholders parties defendant, or declaring that the suit was brought for the benefit of such of the old stockholders as might come in and be made parties.-FLETCHER V. NEWARK TELEPHONE CO., N. J., 35 Atl. Rep. 903.

45. CORPORATIONS - Injunction. There being a law under which an association can be incorporated, and

the existence de facto of the corporation being estab. lished by a colorable compliance with the law, and an exercise of the rights claimed under it, a private person cannot maintain suit to enjoin it or its officers and agents from carrying on its business on the ground that its incorporation is illegal, or that its franchises have been forfeited, or that it is dissolved, till it has been so adjudged in proceedings by the State for that purpose.-SUPREME COURT OF INDEPENDENT ORDER OF FORESTERS OF CANADA V. SUPREME COURT OF UNITED ORDER OF FORESTERS, Wis., 68 N. W. Rep. 1011.

46. CORPORATIONS Invalid Stock.-Under the Wisconsin statute, if an issue of stock as collateral for a debt of the company is illegal, the stock is void, and the holder thereof is not liable to corporate creditors who were not especially misled by his conduct.-ANDREWS V. NATIONAL FOUNDRY & PIPE WORKS, U. S. C. C., Seventh Circuit, 76 Fed. Rep. 167.

47. COUNTY SEAT - Petition for Election.-Electors who have signed a petition for the removal of a county seat have the absolute right to demand of the board of county commissioners, at any time before it has completed its action on the petition, that their names be withdrawn therefrom. But such demand cannot be made of the county auditor. It can only be made at a session of the board called to consider the petition.-STATE V. GEIB, Minn., 68 N. W. Rep. 1081.

48. COURTS-Duration Term - Sunday.-Under Code, § 910, and statutes amendatory thereof, which provide for courts to begin on a Monday named, and to last for one week, the term embraces the following Sunday, unless the term is sooner adjourned.-TAYLOR V. ERVIN, N. Car., 25 S. E. Rep. 875.

49. CRIMINAL EVIDENCE-Corpus Delicti.-In a prosecution for murder, the identity of the remains of the person charged to have been murdered, as well as any other of the facts constituting the corpus delicti, may be established by circumstantial evidence.-LAUGHLIN V. COMMONWEALTH, Ky., 37 S. W. Rep. 590.

50. CRIMINAL EVIDENCE-Good Character.-Evidence of the general reputation for truth of one accused of having made a false deposition is competent to estab lish a general character inconsistent with his guilt; and it is error to exclude such testimony, upon the theory that it should be offered only after the defendant has testified, to strengthen his testimony.-EDG INGTON V. UNITED STATES, U. S. 8. C., 17 S. C. Rep. 72. 51. CRIMINAL LAW Assault with Intent to Kill.Where the charge clearly distinguishes between the assault and the intent, directs specifically that each must be proved, and that the intent is to be deduced from all the circumstances of the case, nowhere stat. ing that the assault itself necessarily proves the intent, a recital that "you may take the act itself as done, and from it you may find that it was willfully done," is not error.-ACERS V. UNITED STATES, U. S. S. C., 17 S. C. Rep. 91.

52. CRIMINAL LAW - Burglary-Sufficiency of Indict ment. In an indictment for burglary, the charge as to the intent to commit theft was connected with the charge of breaking, etc., by merely the word "and," the phrase "then and there" being omitted: Held, that the allegation as to the time and place was sufficiently extended to the succeeding averments by the conjunction.-SMITH V. STATE, Tex., 37 S. W. Rep. 743. 53. CRIMINAL LAW-Conduct of Trial.-On a trial for burglary, it was not error to compel another person, separately indicted for the same burglary, to sit by defendant, during his trial, for the purpose of identi fication. McIVER V. STATE, Tex., 37 S. W. Rep. 745.

54. CRIMINAL LAW-Disqualified Juror.-To make the disqualification of a juror in a criminal case ground for a new trial, defendant must show that the service of such juror was calculated to Injure his rights, and did probably produce such injury.-MAYS V. STATE, Tex., 87 S. W. Rep. 721.

55. CRIMINAL LAW - Failure to Prevent Crime.-An Indictment under Gen. St. § 701 (providing that "an

accessory during the fact is a person who stands by, without interfering or giving such help as may be in his power to prevent a criminal offense from being committed"), which merely states that defendant, on the occasion of a robbery, stood by, without interfering and without giving such help as was in his power to prevent its commission, and fails to show what it was in his power to do without placing himself in dan. ger, is insufficient.-FARRELL V. PEOPLE, Colo., 46 Pac. Rep. 841.

56: CRIMINAL LAW-Failure to Prosecute.-Where the State neglected for about seven months, and during three general terms of the court, after an indictment was found, to arraign the defendant or call for her appearance or forfeit her bail, and for this reason the court dismissed the indictment, held, the fact that the county attorney and sheriff had heard and believed that she had left the state did not excuse the delay, and it was error to set aside the order of dismissal.STATE V. RADOICICH, Minn., 69 N. W. Rep. 25.

57. CRIMINAL LAW False Pretenses Worthless Check. The defendant was charged with obtaining property by false representations and pretenses that he had money in a certain bank, and that a check thereon which he gave was good, and would be paid on presentation, whereas it was never paid, and when in fact he never had any money there, nor any account with the bank: Held, that it is not necessary to a conviction to allege or prove that the defendant was insolvent.-STATE V. MCCORMICK, Kan., 46 Pac. Rep. 777. 58. CRIMINAL LAW - Homicide - Circumstantial Evidence. The fact that the testimony in a criminal case is largely of a circumstantial character does not necessarily weaken its strength, if the circumstances are closely clustered together in one unbroken chain of criminating facts, all pointing with unerring certainty to the accused as the author of the alleged crime. Circumstantial evidence may be quite as con. clusive as direct evidence, but it is incumbent upon the prosecution, not only to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the alleged facts and circumstances completing the chain are true, but they must also be such facts and circumstances as are incompatible, upon any reasonable hypothesis, with the innocence of the accused, and incapable of explanation upon any reasonable hypothesis other than that of the defendant's guilt.-STATE V. HAYES, Utah, 46 Pac. Rep. 752.

39. CRIMINAL LAW-Homicide-Impeachment of Defendant as a Witness.-That a defendant is under other indictments, for assault and battery or for carrying weapons, cannot be shown to impeach his testimony as a witness, the offenses charged, being misdemean. ors not involving moral turpitude, and not legitimately affecting his credibility.-BRITTAIN V. STATE, Tex., 37 5.W. Rep. 758.

60. CRIMINAL LAW - Indorsement of Indictment. Under Mill & V. Code, § 6083, subd. 7 (providing that on an appeal from conviction there should be no reversal because the clerk omitted to enter the return of the indictment by the grand jury into court, if the indictment shows it is a true bill), where the record shows that the grand jury came into court, "and returned into court the following indictment" and the certified copy of the indictment shows it indorsed, 'A true bill" it is sufficient.-CANUFF V. STATE, Tenn., 37 S. W. Rep. 547.

61. CRIMINAL LAW-Infants-Criminal Liability.-Evidence merely that a child knew its act in stealing was wrong does not show that it understood the nature and illegality of the act (Pen. Code, art. 34), so as to warrant its conviction.-ALLEN V. STATE, Tex., 87 S. W. Rep. 757.

2. CRIMINAL LAW-Instruction-Reasonable Doubt. -The refusal of an instruction giving the well-estab lished and approved definition of a reasonable doubt, and the giving, instead, of one stating that such doubt mast be one based on "common sense," is erroneous. -PEOPLE V. PAULSELL, Cal., 46 Pac. Rep. 734.

63. CRIMINAL LAW-Interstate Extradition - Indictment. In interstate extradition proceedings, the indictment or affidavit accompanying the requisition is sufficient if it substantially charges the commission of a crime against the laws of the State from whose justice the assured is alleged to have fled. With its suffciency as a pleading in other respects the courts of the State in which the accused is found have no concern.-SMITH v. Goss, Minn., 68 N. W. Rep. 1089.

64. CRIMINAL LAW-Joint Trial of Defendants.-It is within the sound discretion of the court to direct that two defendants, who have been indicted separately, each for adultery with the other at the same time and place, shall be tried together without their consent; the mere fact that a joint trial may prejudice the defendants somewhat in the exercise of their right of challenge not being sufficient reason for directing separate trials.-COMMONWEALTH V. SEELEY, Mass., 45 N. E. Rep. 91.

65. CRIMINAL LAW-Larceny-Felonious Intent.-On a trial for larceny, an instruction that if the hogs described in the indictment were the property of F, and they strayed to the premises of defendant, and defendant then took them, and sold them, and appropriated the proceeds to his own use, and they were of the value of $30, then defendant is guilty of grand larceny, though he did not know who was the owner of the hogs, is erroneous, in that it does not require a felonious intent.-STATE V. LACKLAND, Mo., 37 S. W. Rep. 812.

66. CRIMINAL LAW-Perjury.-Testimony by a husband, before a grand jury, that a certain person, whom he accused of rape of his wife, submitted, through another, a proposition to pay him a certain sum, if he would drop the matter, and say no more about it, was material, and could be assigned as perjury.-BUTLER V. STATE, Tex., 37 S. W. Rep. 746.

67. CRIMINAL LAW-Record.-Where the record in a criminal case plainly shows what the offense is of which the defendant was convicted, and the language shows that the sentence was the judgment of the court, and of the law, pronounced upon the defendant on account of his conviction upon the indictment, there is a sufficient judgment for all purposes. WHITE V. UNITED STATES, U. S. S. C., 17 S. C. Rep. 38.

68. CRIMINAL LAW-Theft-Bailment.- Pen. Code 1895, art. 877, declaring guilty of theft "any person having possession of personal property of another by virtue of a contract of hiring, or borrowing, or other bailment, who shall without the consent of the owner fraudulently convert" it to his own use, with intent to deprive the owner of the value thereof, authorizes a conviction for such conversion in any case of bail. ment; the term "bailment" having such a well understood meaning that it is not necessary for the article to define it, and not being restricted by the article to cases of hiring or borrowing.-MALZ v. STATE, Tex., 37 S. W. Rep. 748.

69. CRIMINAL LAW-Verdict.-Where an indictment charged defendants in one count, with the forgery of a certain instrument, and in the second with the uttering of such instrument, a verdict that "We, the jury, find the defendant guilty, and assess his punishment," etc., in that it did not show which of the two offenses defendant was convicted of.-STATE V. PIERCE, Mo., 37 S. W. Rep. 815.

70. CRIMINAL LAW-Witnesses-Prisoner in Penitentiary. Where a material witness for a defendant charged with a felony is confined in the penitentiary, and is not disqualified from testifying, the defendant is entitled, under the bill of rights, to compulsory proc. ess to enforce his attendance, and the court has power to make an order requiring the warden to produce the witness in court to testify.-HANCOCK V. PARKER, Ky., 37 S. W. Rep. 594.

71. CRIMINAL PRACTICE - Bribery-Indictment.-An indictment for a statutory offense is sufficient if it alleges the commission of the crime in the words of the statute, if by that means all that is essential to consti

tute the offense is directly charged. But, if the statute does not set forth all of the elements necessary to constitute the offense intended to be punished, an indictment which simply follows the words of the statute is not sufficient. It must, in such case, allege the particular facts necessary to bring the case within the intent and meaning of the statute.-STATE V. HOWARD, Minn., 68 N. W. Rep. 1096.

72. CRIMINAL PRACTICE - Information-Duplicity.An information charging that a defendant did feloniously make an assault upon a female child, and did then and there feloniously ravish, carnally know, and abuse such child, is not demurrable on the ground that it charges an assault as a distinct offense.-STATE V. ELSWOOD, Wash., 46 Pac. Rep. 727.

73. DEATH BY WRONGFUL ACT-Right to Damages.Under Act 1883, ch. 160 (Mill. & V. Code, § 3134), providing that, where death is caused by the fault of another, the party suing, if entitled to damages, shall have the right to recover for the suffering and loss of time resulting to the deceased, as well as damages resulting to the persons for whose benefit the right of action survived, the right to damages for the death of a married woman caused by the fault of another, is vested in the surviving husband, to the exclusion of the next of kin.CHATTANOOGA ELECTRIC RY. Co. v. JOHNSON, Tenn., 37 S. W. Rep. 558.

74. DECEIT Contract with Attorney Fraudulent Representations.-False representations by an attor. ney to an inexperienced client, as to the value of certain land which the attorney undertakes to recover for his client, whereby the latter is induced to execute a note for an exorbitant fee for the attorney's services, constitute positive fraud.-MANLEY V. FELTY, Ind., 45 N. E. Rep. 74.

75. DEDICATION OF STREET.-Where a grantor of land, after delivery of the deed, makes and records a plat of it as a part of a city, there is no dedication to public use of the land in the streets described in such plat.-HAWTHORNE V. MYERS, Ky., 37 S. W. Rep. 593.

76. DEED-Construction-Vested Remainder.-A quit claim deed, after reciting the parties, consideration, and description of the property conveyed, continued, in terms: "Reserving to myself (grantor) the right to occupy said premises for myself and my family so long as I shall desire so to do. To have and to hold the aforegranted premises to the said grantee for the full term of his natural life, and after his death to the heirs of my body; to have and to hold to their use and behoof forever, so that neither I, the said (grantor), nor my heirs, nor any other person or persons claiming from or under or in the name, right, or stead of me or them by any way or means, have any estate, right, title, or interest of, in, and to the aforesaid premises, with the appurtenances:" Held, that on the death of the grantor before the death of the grantee the heirs of the body of the grantor would take the remainder as of the death of the grantee.-WASON V. RANNEY, Mass., 45 N. E. Rep. 85.

77. DEED-Delivery.-A parol agreement to convey land, followed by the execution of a deed which is never delivered, vests no title in the grantee.-ROGERS V. EICH, Ind., 45 N. E. Rep. 93.

78. DEED-Homestead.-A deed [of the homestead, invalid as a conveyance of the homestead interest, for fallure of the husband to sign, is yet valid as a convey. ance of all interest in the land in excess of the value of $1,000, the homestead being by statute limited to that value.-DESPAIN V. WAGNER, III., 45 N. E. Rep. 129.

79. DEED-Estate Conveyed.-A deed to a trustee, to hold as the "absolute" property of the grantor's wife, "that she may have a permanent home for her life, and his children by her a pittance after her death," conveys the wife a fee simple, and not merely a life estate with the remainder to the children.-FACKLER V. BERRY, Va., 25 S. E. Rep. 887.

80. DEED Negative Covenant.-A provision in a deed "that the premises hereby conveyed are not to be used for saloon or dramshop purposes" is a nega

tive covenant, and not a condition.-STAR BREWERY Co. V. PRIMAS, Ill., 45 N. E. Rep. 145.

81. DEED-Wife's General Estate.-The mode of conveyance by deed jointly executed by husband and wife, accompanied by the private examination of the wife, substituted, under the act passed in North Carolina in 1715, instead of fine and recovery at common law, has remained unchanged by subsequent legisla tion. Hence, a separate deed of her general estate in land, executed by a wife to her husband, is void though her privy examination be taken.-GIFFIN V. GIFFIN, Tenn., 37 S. W. Rep. 710.

82. DEED OF TRUST - Foreclosure.-Under a statute directing that foreclosure proceedings shall be subject to and governed by the law "regulating proceedings in civil cases," whether a proceeding to foreclose a trust deed is at law or in equity must be determined by the circumstances of the particular case, as disclosed by the pleadings and the relief to be granted.BRIM V. FLEMING, Mo., 37 S. W. Rep. 501.

83. DIVORCE-Alimony.-Under Rev. St. ch. 40, § 18, providing that, where a divorce has been decreed, the court may, on application, make alterations in the allowance of alimony, a petition of the beneficiary for assistance in collection of alimony puts the whole mat. ter before the court, so as to authorize it to make changes in regard to prospective alimony.-CRAIG V. CRAIG, Ill., 45 N. E. Rep. 153.

86. ELECTIONS-Ballot Law Nominee by Petition.Under the provision of the ballot law (St. § 1453) that, "if any political party entitled to nominate by convention shall in any case fail to do so, the names of all nominees by petition for any office, who shall be designated in their petitions as members of and candidates of such party, shall be printed under the device and title of such party on the ballots, as if nominated by convention," before a clerk can be compelled by mandamus to print the name of a nominee by petition under a party device and title it must be shown that such party has made no nomination by convention, and that the candidate is in fact a nominee by petition of that party.-SOUTHALI. V. GRIFFITH, Ky., 37 S. W. Rep. 577.

87. ELECTRICITY-Priority of Rights.-A franchise to operate a telegraph line over any part of the United States domain, or any military or post road, acquired under Act Cong. July 24, 1866, when accompanied by occupancy thereunder, confers rights superior to those of a company subsequently constructing a line for transmitting electricity both for lighting purposes and for propelling machinery, and hence the latter line must be constructed so as not to interfere with the former.-WESTERN UNION TEL. Co. v. LOS ANGELES ELECTRIC CO., U. S. C. C., S. D. (Cal.), 76 Fed. Rep.

statute to condemn land covered by water, for reservoir purposes, after respondent demands a jury, and enters on the trial, it is too late to ask for the appointment of commissioners under the statute to determine whether or not a necessity exists for the condemnation of the land.-SIEDLER V. SEELY, Colo., 46 Pac. Rep. 848.

90. EMINENT DOMAIN-Public Use.-A lumbering company, organized also for the construction of a railroad. which has constructed and has in operation a few miles of road for the use and benefit of the general public in carrying freight and passengers, may exercise the power of eminent domain for condemning right of way, though the road is built through a sparsely settled country, without any towns or other railroad at its termini, and though the road has not been equipped with coaches, and no fare has been charged passengers.-BRIDAL VEIL LUMBERING Co. v. JOHNSON, Oreg., 46 Pac. Rep. 790.

91. EMINENT DOMAIN - Right to Compensation.-In this State, private property cannot be taken or damaged for public use without compensation therefor, and this rule applies to municipalities and counties exercising the right of eminent domain.-HODGES V. BOARD OF SUP'RS OF SEWARD COUNTY, Neb., 68 N. W. Rep. 1027.

2. EQUITY Party to Fraudulent Transaction.-An heir, who was part owner of property left by his deceased father, subject to the life estate of his mother as dowress, who knew of and acquiesced in a scheme by his brother to acquire the entire title, as against the other heirs, by the purchase of the property at tax sale, has no standing in a court of equity to recover his share of the property from the brother after the death of their mother.-LAWTON V. ESTES, Mass., 45 N. E. Rep. 90.

38. EQUITY JURISDICTION.-As a general rule, a court of equity will not interpose an objection to its own jurisdiction on the ground that the plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law, but will retain the cause and award the relief to which the parties would have been entitled in a court of law.-TAYLOR V. AINSWORTH, Neb., 68 N. W. Rep. 1045.

94. ESTOPPEL-Indorser of Note and Mortgage.-The owner of a note secured by a trust deed on personal property, who indorsed and delivered both to a third person, is estopped to deny the title of a bona fide purchaser from his indorsee, or the right of such purchaser to enforce the security.-GROSS V. OTIS, Miss., 20 South. Rep. 843.

95. ESTOPPEL IN PAIS.-A grantee holding under a deed, the record of which has been destroyed, is, as against a subsequent mortgagee, estopped to assert his title, where he aided the mortgagor, his grantor, to secure the loan, without disclosing to the mortgagee his title.-SHATTUCK V. CAULEY, N. Car., 25 S. E. Rep. 872.

5. EVIDENCE-Admissions of Coparty.-In an action by children for the death of their father, a statement by one plaintiff, after the killing, that she cautioned decedent to look out for the train by which he was killed, is admissible against her, as a declaration against interest, to show negligence on the part of decedent, but is hearsay as to the others.-ST. LOUIS S. W.RY. CO. OF TEXAS V. BISHOP, Tex., 37 S. W. Rep.

764.

97. EVIDENCE-Book of Account.-It is not error to refuse to admit in evidence, as a book of account, a Test-pocket book, used for making memoranda in regard to any matter of which the owner wished to make note.-RILEY V. BOEHM, Mass., 45 N. E. Rep. 84.

18. EVIDENCE-Books of Science.-Books of science are generally inadmissible as evidence to prove the opinions contained in them; but, if a witness refers to them as an authority for his own opinions, they may be received for the purpose of contradicting him. Evidence showing that the plaintiff's predecessor in title had, by his conduct while he held the title, dis

avowed the claim now set up by the plaintiff under the title, is competent against the plaintiff.-NEW JERSEY ZINC & IRON Co. v. LEHIGH ZINC & IRON CO., N. J., 35 Atl. Rep. 915.

99. EVIDENCE- Breach of Marriage Promise.-On a trial for breach of marriage promise, an article published over defendant's signature, attacking plaintiff's character, and an insulting letter addressed by defendant to plaintiff, both written after the commencement of the action, are admissible to prove the animus of defendant in refusing to perform the marriage contract, and may be considered in aggravation of damages.OSMUN V. WINTERS, Oreg., 46 Pac. Rep. 781.

100. FEDERAL COURTS-Diverse Citizenship.-Diverse citizenship, to sustain federal jurisdiction, must be such that all the parties on one side of the controversy are citizens of different States from all those on the other side; and, in determining the question of jurisdiction, the parties are to be arranged on one side or the other, as their interests require.-CONSOLIDATED WATER CO. v. BABCOCK, U. S. C. C., 8. D. (Cal.), 76 Fed. Rep. 243.

101. FEDERAL COURT - Following State Decision.Where a contract or obligation has been entered upon before there has been any judicial construction of a State statute upon which the contract or obligation depends by the highest court of the State, a federal court obtaining jurisdiction of a question touching the validity, effect, or obligation of such a contract will, while leaning to an agreement with the State court, exercise an independent judgment as to the validity and meaning of such contract, and will not necessarily follow opinions of the State court construing such statute, if such decisions were rendered after the rights involved in the controversy originated.-LOUISVILLE TRUST CO. v. CITY OF CINCINNATI, U. S. C. C. of App., Sixth Circuit, 76 Fed. Rep. 297.

102. FEDERAL COURTS Jurisdiction - Criminal Appeals.-Act Feb. 9, 1893, § 8, gives to the Supreme Court of the United States jurisdiction to review, on appeal or writ of error, any final judgment or decree of the court of appeals of the District of Columbia, where "the matter in dispute, exclusive of costs, shall exceed the sum of $5,000:" Held, that this jurisdiction does not extend to criminal cases.-CHAPMAN V. UNITED STATES, U. S. S. C., 17 S. C. Rep. 77.

103. FEDERAL COURTS-Jurisdiction-Intervention.The federal circuit court, having jurisdiction of an action, and the custody or control of the fund or property in controversy, may entertain a petition of intervention, and try the issues thereon, without regard to the citizenship of the parties in the main action, or to the amount in controversy under the petition.-PEOPLE'S SAV. INST. OF ERIE COUNTY, PA., V. MILES, U. S. C. C. of App., Eighth Circuit, 76 Fed. Rep. 252.

104. FEDERAL COURTS - Jurisdiction-Irrigation Dis. tricts.-A decision by the supreme court of a State, adverse to the claim made in that court by one of the parties to the action, that proceedings by the board of supervisors in organizing an irrigation district in accordance with the statute operated to deprive him of his property without due process of law, involves a federal question.-TREGEA V. BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF MODESTO IRRIGATION DIST., U. S. S. C., 17 S. C. Rep.

52.

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105. FEDERAL COURTS Jurisdiction of Supreme Court. The supreme court has no jurisdiction to re view, upon writ of error, the action of a circuit court of appeals in affirming the judgment of a circuit court rendered in a suit to recover damages for infringement of a copyright, where the plaintiff had claimed no right under the copyright laws of the United States, but had maintained the action wholly upon the right given by the common law.-PRESS PUB. Co. v. MONROE, U. S. S. C., 17 S. C. Rep. 40.

108. FRAUDS, STATUTE OF - Oral Contract. Where an oral contract is capable of being completed within a year, it is not within the statute of frauds, though the parties may have thought it probable that it would, as it did, extend over a longer period.-SMALLEY V. MITCHELL, Mich., 68 N. W. Rep. 978.

109. FRAUDS, STATUTE OF-Parol Promise as to Will.A contract to make no will which will deprive one of property which she would take as heir if there was no will, having relation to real estate and personalty, and being within the statute as to the former, and not being divisible is wholly void.-DICKEN V. MCKINLAY, Ill., 45 N. E. Rep. 134.

110. FRAUDS, STATUTE OF-Trusts.-Under the statute of frauds, § 9 (1 Starr. & C. Ann. St. p. 1200), providing that all declarations of trust shall be void unless manifested by some writing signed by the party enabled to declare such trust, or by his last will, a will executed by the grantor long before the conveyance in trust, and afterwards revoked, is insufficient to take the case out of the statute.-DAVIS V. STAMBAUGH, Ill., 45 N. E. Rep. 170.

CONVEYANCE

111. FRAUDULENT Knowledge of Grantee. A mortgage given to secure a pre-existing debt will not be declared void from the fact alone that the mortgagee, at the time of its execution, had notice of an intention on the part of the mortgagor to defraud creditors of the latter. In order to avoid the security in such case, the mortgagee must have participated in the fraudulent purpose of the mortgagor. -GROSSHANS V. GOLD, Neb., 68 N. W. Rep. 1031.

112. FRAUDULENT MORTGAGE - Gift to Wife - Insolvency of Husband.-The married woman's act being for the purpose of extending, and not contracting or limiting, the rights of married women in this State, will not be held to have abrogated the equitable rule which upheld gifts from husbands to wives, made when the husband was solvent, and which did not impair the existing rights of creditors.-DAYTON SPICE-MILLS CO. V. SLOAN, Neb., 68 N. W. Rep. 1041.

In the

113. HIGHWAY Assessment of Damages. making of an alteration in a public road by surveyors of the highways appointed under the road act by vacating a part thereof, and laying out a new road in lieu of the part vacated, a return of surveyors that they had made an assessment of the damages to the respective owners of the land taken for the laying out of the aforesaid road, laid out by them to take the place of the part of said road thereby vacated, was held to be defective and insufficient, as not conforming to the statute, which requires, in such case, that the assessment be made for the damages the landowner shall sustain by the altering of said road.STATE V. LARABEE, N. J., 35 Atl. Rep. 911.

114. HIGHWAY - Dedication.-In an action to recover the statutory penalty for obstructing a public road never laid out by the public authorities, running through defendant's land, it appeared that the public commenced using the road about the year 1849, when the land was owned by H, who died in 1856; that after his death the land was owned by two other persons for 18 or 20 years before it was sold to defendant. There

116. HUSBAND AND WIFE - Antenuptial Contract.Under an antenuptial contract the intended husband reserved to himself, as his own separate property, a certain lot, of which, after his death, his wife was to have full control during her life and widowhood. She was also "to receive as dower" from his estate $500 annually, during her life and widowhood. He died intestate, after the marriage, leaving his wife, but no child or children, nor descendants of a child: Held, that such agreement did not cut off the widow's interest in his estate as his heir, under 1 Starr & C. Ann. St. p. 879, § 1, cl. 3.-CHRISTY V. MARMON, Ill., 45 N. E. Rep.

150.

117. HUSBAND AND WIFE - Contracts Between. - An agreement, after marriage, between husband and wife, that each should retain his or her separate prop. erty, and that the increase should remain separate property, is void.-ENGLEMAN V. DEAL, Tex., 37 S. W. Rep. 652.

118. HUSBAND AND WIFE Joint Tenancy-Estates in Entirety. Where a wife, who is one of the owners of an estate in entirety in a homestead, states in her will that she owns an estate as tenant in common with her husband, each owning the undivided one-half thereof, and bequeaths a life estate to him, and her interest in such homestead after such life estate to another, and also in the same will bequeaths all of her household goods and other property to the same lega. tee: Held, that this is not a sufficient contract or conveyance upon her part to divest her of the estate in entirety, and create the estate of tenant in common as to her.-WILSON V. JOHNSON, Kan., 46 Pac. Rep. 833. 119. INFANCY-Note Ratification.-In an action on a note made by defendant while a minor, he testified that after his majority he said to the plaintiff's agent that it was a just debt, and he would pay it "if I ever got so that I could without inconvenience to myself;" that the agent then asked him if he could not fix some time at which he would pay it, and he replied that he would not promise to pay the note in one year, nor in ten years, nor at any time: Held, that the evidence did not show ratification.-BRESEE V. STANLY, N. Car., 25 S. E. Rep. 870.

120. INSOLVENCY-Title of Assignee.-The title of the assignee of an insolvent debtor to the property of such debtor, duly vested in him by proceedings in the court of insolvency, is not affected by subsequent proceedings against an assignee of the insolvent partnership of which such debtor is a member. - JAQUITH V. FUL LER, Mass., 45 N. E. Rep. 54.

121. INSURANCE - Breach of Policy - Waiver.-A loss having occurred under a fire policy, the insured was examined under oath by the adjuster of the company, and disclosed facts which entitled the company to forfeit the policy. The adjuster, however, made no claim of forfeiture, but told the insured to get up his bills and proofs of loss. In a subsequent letter this was repeated, with a qualification that the company, in mak ing the suggestion, did not intend to waive any of its rights. The insured forwarded to the company his proofs of loss. After some delay the company ad. vised the insured that his proofs were insufficient, but did not point out the deficiency: Held, that the action of the company in requiring proofs of loss after hav