THREATENING ASPECT.

271

one reverse, however, followed another, speculation became more rife, and the events of the campaign became a subject of greater interest, until at last more than one of the then independent native courts began seriously to think the time had arrived for taking advantage of our reverses.

Runjeet Sing, the ruler of the Punjaub, kept a large army at Lahore, and seemed to threaten us on the N. W., while Ameer Khan collected his Pitan battalions, and made an ambiguous offer of his services from a point only a few marches from Agra. The tone, moreover, assumed in Scindia's Durbar and at Poonah, was anything but conciliatory, and the intrigues then set on foot throughout the whole independent parts of India, and which led eventually to such important results, date their commencement from this period; and in proportion as their existence manifested themselves, it became the more necessary that we should conquer the subsisting difficulty in the hills, for the supremacy of the British

government was now felt to be committed on the issue. The Marquis of Hastings, however, never once doubted the ultimate success of the campaign, and despite the unfavourable aspect of affairs at the commencement of 1815, there were abundant reasons for a just confidence with those who looked beyond the surface, for every check our arms had experienced was clearly owing to a want of due precaution in those who directed the operations, and this was an error as surely remedied as felt. Our several encounters although often unfavourble in their result brought more strength in the lessons of prudence they inculcated than any physical loss we sustained. It must be remarked, the Sepoys at this time had been for a considerable period unused to war, and although open to the influence of panic occasionally from the strangeness of the scene, and the novelty of their situation amidst the forests and mountains of this extraordinary region, soon recovered their want of nerve. The Nepaulese, on the other hand, were

SALUTARY LESSONS.

273

perfectly satisfied with repulsing an attack or cutting off an outpost; they never pushed heir success beyond this, and were too deficient in military science as well as in physical means to assume a superiority in the campaign, or even act offensively on a large scale against any one of our divisions; their tactics in their hills were entirely defensive, SO much SO that however severely their assailant might suffer from the indiscretion of his first attack, they left him ample time to re-collect his force and approach again with more caution. To the officers of the Bengal army, in particular, the lessons taught in this war were very salutary; precipitancy and want of caution were qualities bred in them by an uninterrupted course of victory, from the days of Clive to those of Lord Lake, they had only to shew themselves and march straight against their enemy to ensure success; they consequently carried into the hills the same contempt of the foe, which their victories in the plains had engendered, and were taught only by dear

bought experience to make sufficient allowance for the entire change of circumstances in this new field of action. It must be allowed, however, that the Nepaulese were a brave enemy, besides having had considerable experience, for they had been continually waging war in their hills for upwards of fifty years, and knew well how to turn everything to the best advantage: caution and judgment were therefore more required against them, than boldness of action or decision.

It must here be remarked, that little advance was made in this campaign, until we had learnt to turn the same advantages to account against the enemy, by which they foiled us so often at the commencement, for with all our experience in Indian warfare, combined with the professional science of Europe, our officers found yet something to learn from the Nepaulese; from them we adopted the plan of stockading posts, which the nature of the campaign frequently rendered it necessary to place beyond the limit. of prompt support. Had we adopted this plan

from the first, the detachments of Sibley and Blackney might have been saved. Sir David Ochterlony has the credit of first adopting it in our service, as the source, however, of prudence which occurred to his mind, and not disaster as was the case with others.

A few words will describe our operations on the Goruckpore frontier. General Wood succeeded Marley in February, and singular enough, an event occurred only the day before, that completely paralysed the Nepaulese, giving considerable confidence to our troops. Young Pickersgill, a very active officer in the intelligence department, discovered, while out reconnoitering, a party of about five hundred Nepaulese at no great distance from the British camp; he immediately informed the senior officer, who assumed the command on General Marley's departure, and remained himself with a small escort to watch them. Colonel Dick strengthened Pickersgill's party with some irregular cavalry, following himself with all his picquets, in the hope of cutting off this detachment.

The