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for disobedience of orders, and on his arrival made him appear in open Durbar attired in woman's clothing, as wanting the spirit and courage of a Goorkha. The Nepaulese, however soon found that British petticoats were very deceptive, although to the mortification of our troops, and not much to the credit of the British commander, they continued to insult us with impunity for nearly a month longer.
In the middle of February, General Marley unable longer to endure the irksomeness of his situation, and feeling himself unable to carry out the wishes of his Commander-in-chief, determined upon the sudden and extraordinary resolution of at once leaving his force, and set off before daylight in the morning without notifying his intention to the troops, or even taking any means for providing for the ordinary routine of command during his absence. Lord Hastings had, however, fortunately previously appointed another commander for this force ; but the unaccountable step adopted by General Marley seemed to him to demand his imme
mediate and permanent removal from the staff; he, however, kindly permitted him to invalid.
General George Wood was now ordered up from the Presidency to succeed General Marley ; in the meantime the senior Brigadier assumed the command until his arrival. Our operations so far had been a series of disasters; the gallant Ochterlony alone had not been foiled: he was steadily pursuing his plans by slow but certain measures, but had as yet gained no signal advantage over his cautious antagonist. General Martindell's division had failed three times, twice before Kalunga, and the third time before Jythuk. Moreover, the total loss sustained by this division amounted to nearly a third of its numbers that originally took the field from Meerut. The force assembled at Goruckpore had allowed itself to retire before the enemy under circumstances amounting almost to a defeat, and as recorded the Behar division, which was thought strong enough to have penetrated to Khatmandoo, had lost two detach
ments of five hundred men each, without an equivalent success of any kind.
On the Oude frontier too, our armies wer completely held in check on the outside of th forest, while our territory was insulted with impunity, and most extravagant alarms spread throughout the country. We had lost nothing, it is true, on the Purneah frontier ; on the contrary the co-operation of the Sikhim Rajah had been gained, the communication had been opened by an overture on his part, accompanied by a request to be supplied with military stores. In this quarter, also, the attempt made by the Goorķha commander in the Morung, to cut off our outpost stationed there, had failed, and their repulse was highly creditable to our officers and troops; but as the position was evacuated the following day, we had therefore little to boast of in the victory.
Major Latter indeed was led by the vigorous nature of the attack to solicit the aid of some reinforcements, then on their way to the Sarun force, and thus by withholding them from their destination,
ALARM OF THE AUTHORITIES.
yielded the enemy some advantage from the attack, notwithstanding its failure.
The alarms of the civil authorities of Tirhoot had produced a similar diversion in that quarter, and it was not until the beginning of March, that the division destined for the main attack was augmented to the full strength proposed for it.
THE WAR CONTINUED.
The uniform success which had hitherto attended the Nepaulese, produced in the beginning of 1815 an effect on the public mind, in the independent portion of India, which is more easily imagined than described, although naturally jealous of our preponderance and suspicious to a degree of any relinquishment of our pacific policy, the generality of the native powers had so little knowledge of the strength and resources of the Nepaulese, that the war at first excited but little attention, they regarding it as a mere affair with a troublesome frontier Rajah. As