ATTACK OF RANA KAJEE.

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of the position lay between two mountain streams, the windings of which allowed the Nepaulese to penetrate sufficiently on either flank, so as to cut off the front and rear communications. The latter was left to the defence of a small body of irregular cavalry, and was consequently a weak point in a night attack.

The first attack was checked by our advanced guard; but the officer commanding finding himself pressed, requested the immediate assistance of a light gun from Captain Sibley, which was with his detachment. Sibley immediately brought it forward himself; but when placed in position, the cartridges unfortunately were found too large to enable it being served efficiently. The action had now commenced on both flanks, and Sibley found it necessary to return immediately, and on his way back was mortally wounded by a shot through the body from parties of the enemy, who, taking advantage of the winding of the mountain

streain, had come close upon our line of communication with the advance. His second

in command was now summoned to the front, and as the firing was heavy in his rear, he determined on taking his advance-guard with him. On reaching the line, he found that the Rana Kajee, while he had kept the detachment employed in front and flanks, had made his principal attack from the rear, and having overpowered the irregulars, had penetrated even to the officers' tents, and taken possession of the magazine and bazaar.

The 6-pounder with the detachment had been turned towards the rear by the artillery officer, and on the advance-guard joining, they formed square, and defended themselves as well as they could, but from the cover afforded the Nepaulese by the jungle, they picked off nearly all our artillerymen; and it now became apparent to both the officers, that unless they dislodged the Nepaulese from their position, they would be all annihilated, and on endeavouring

ACTIVITY OF THE NEPAULESE.

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to induce their men to charge, they found them disinclined, and expended nearly all their ammunition by firing at random.

A retreat now was determined on, which was effected with great difficulty by crossing one of the mountain streams at a place where it was barely fordable, but at a time fortunately when the Nepaulese were intent on plunder; many were thus saved, but the two guns, magazine, and stores of every kind fell into the enemy's hands and this detachment, originally consisting of five hundred fighting men, had three hundred and eighty-three of them killed and wounded in a very short time. The activity and enterprise of the Nepaulese in these attacks were so unexpected by General Marley, that he began to entertain serious apprehensions for his train of heavy artillery then coming up from Betteah.

Having, however, strengthened his post, the general himself determined upon making a westward movement to cover his train, and further, beginning to consider his force insufficient, at once abandoned all idea of penetrating the hills

in the manner indicated in his instructions. His two brigadiers, however, agreed with him in reporting the force under his command not sufficient for offensive measures in the hills. The Marquis of Hastings was grievously disappointed at all these untoward occurrences, and strained every nerve to increase the strength of all the divisions, but particularly this one, from which so much was expected. All the military

stations in Upper and Lower India were drained of troops to furnish reinforcements; but although troops were available, it was found a more difficult matter to restore confidence in the mind of the commander.

General Marley, notwithstanding the high state of the equipments of his army, and the daily approach of fresh troops, remained totally inactive during the whole of January; he did indeed perform a few marches in the open Turai, but never once ventured into the forest. Almost daily orders arrived from head-quarters, urging that some effort at offensive measures should be at once made. When, however, he began

DISGRACE OF BHUGET SING.

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to deliberate upon the plan he ought to adopt, he became distracted by the different opinions entertained by those he was in the habit of consulting, and came in the end to no resolution. A similar fatality, we might add, but only with more dreadful results, attended the chief and his council in later disasters in Affghanistan.

In the meantime, the Nepaulese, growing daily more insolent, burnt several villages belonging to us, at no great distance from our camp, besides threatening immediately to attack. Baraghuree, where we had upwards of a thousand men cantoned. They threw up a stockade at Soofee, a short distance from the post, and had become so self-confident from the hesitation on the part of their commander, and their past successes, that orders were issued under the red seal for an immediate attack. Their commander however, Bhuget Sing, was better informed than the council at Khatmandoo, and very wisely for them refrained; the Court, however, were dissatisfied with his reasons, charged him with cowardice, and summoned him to the capital

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