sing the resembling qualities, or common properties, the very terms used by Mr. Stewart, and other nominalists. We see not how Dr. Brown and Mr. Payne are to avoid this alternative. If, for the sake of keeping clear of nominalism, they affirm that a common name stands for nothing but a relation, this involves the absurdity, that the word tree, ship, or city, for instance, does not stand for a thing; but only for the resemblance of one thing to another. If they explain this away, by saying that they mean by resemblance, the resembling qualities of objects; they are brought back to the ground of nominalism; and must resign their pretensions to originality in the case.

From this charge of aspiring to be thought original, to which we think some of the Scotch philosophers have exposed themselves, we would expressly except Mr. Stewart; who, though he may not be so acute as Dr. Reid, or so splendid as Dr. Brown, appears to be mainly intent upon coming at the truth, wherever he can find it ; even if it has first been discovered, on the other side of the Tweed. He is "fully aware, that whoever, in treating of the human mind, aims to be understood, must lay his account with forfeiting, in the opinion of a very large proportion of readers, all pretensions to depth, to subtilty, or to invention."

Our admiration of original genius is such, that we would scrupulously render to every one the full merit of all his discoveries; and for the same reason, would we be cautious of bestowing applause, where it is not fairly due. But although a correct discrimination between real and pretended claims to improvements in philosophy, is a matter of justice to authors; it is a point of minor importance to the public, compared with unsettling our opinions and habits of thinking, by the introduction of theories which are new only in appearance. The truth is, that in by far the greater portion of their philosophical doctrines, leaving out of account differences of phraseology and arrangement, Locke, and Reid, and Stewart, and Brown, are agreed. Yet the impression is not unfrequently made on the mind of the reader, that if he adopts the system of one of these writers, he of course rejects those of the others. Can it be, that with all our boasted advances in mental science, during the last two centuries, nothing is yet settled; that we have only been exchanging one visionary theory for another; that schemes of philosophy, like forms of apparel, are to be considered as mere matters of fashion? Are we never to arrive at a knowledge of the truth?

One of the prominent features of the modern systems of philosophy, especially of that which Mr. Payne has copied from Dr. Brown, is the commanding importance which is given to mental analysis; the resolving of the complex operations of the mind into their more simple elements. We estimate highly this branch of

philosophical investigation, when left to occupy no more than its due proportion of the widely extended field of inquiry. And we think that Dr. Brown has furnished some admirable specimens of refined and delicate analysis; perhaps too refined, in some instances, to admit of satisfactory demonstration. We are inclined to believe, that this is the particular department, in which his powers of discrimination appear to the greatest advantage. But we do not admit, that analysis comprises the whole of intellectual philosophy; that when we have resolved the mental faculties and operations into their elementary principles, we have exhausted the subject. Much less can we affirm, with Mr. Payne, that " nothing is, correctly speaking, a power of mind, which is capable of being resolved into any thing else." Payne. 237. The chimist, when he has decomposed water and atmospheric air, and exhibited their constituent elements, has rendered an important service to physical science. But does this supersede the necessity of any further investigation of their properties as compounds? Are gun-powder and steam destitute of powers, because they are not simple substances? In the material world, it is frequently more important to know the properties of a compound, than the ingredients of which it is composed. We have vastly more to do with lime and soda, than with their metallic bases. The same is true, in the intellectual world. It is rarely if ever the case, that the simplest powers of the mind are called into exercise alone. The laws of their combined operation constitute the most valuable portion of mental philosophy. But if we open the works of Dr. Brown, or Mr. Payne, for practical instruction on the faculties of memory, attention, perception, etc., we find these subjects dispatched very summarily, by resolving them into more simple powers. Conception, and memory, and abstraction, and imagination, are explained to be modifications of suggestion. Even judgment, reasoning, etc., are resolved into relative suggestion. When all the mental faculties have been put into the metaphysical crucible, and have gone through the refining process, there seems to be little remaining, but sensation, suggestion, and desire. Allowing this analysis to be correct, we should have been still farther indebted to these writers, if they had given us more full explanations, of the laws of these elements, when combined and modified in memory, imagination, reasoning, The chimist would not think he had exhausted the subject of water, when he had resolved it into oxygen and hydrogen. He would re-compose it, and exhibit the properties of the compound, as well as of the ingredients.

etc.

As we have frequent occasion to speak of complex mental operations, it is important that distinctive names be assigned them. But Mr. Payne seems to object even to this. "It is surely," he says, "not to throw light upon mental science, to call the combined ope

ration of two distinct powers of the mind, as they are considered, a third power, and to give to that operation a specific name." p. 237. Are we, then, to abandon the use of the terms memory, perception, imagination, reasoning, etc., because they represent complex operations of the mind? Are we, for a similar reason, to reject the terms water and air; and whenever we speak of these substances, call the one oxygenated hydrogen, and the other oxygenated nitrogen?

Nearly allied to the subject of analysis, is that of classification. This also has some importance in mental philosophy, as well as in the other sciences. But a degree of consequence is sometimes attached to it, to which it is not fairly entitled. It is a matter of convenient arrangement. Different plans of classification may be substantially correct; and yet every one which can be formed, will be in some respects imperfect. It will not answer equally well for all purposes to which it may be applied. Every proper arrangement of objects, is intended to bring into the same class those which resemble each other; and to keep distinct those which differ. But resemblances and differences are endlessly varied. To separate all the mental operations between which there is any difference, would be to make almost as many classes, as there are individual acts. That is the best classification, which is founded on the most prominent resemblances and differences; those to which we have most frequent occasion to recur, in philosophical discussions, and in the conduct of life. In arranging the powers of the mind, we must be determined by the acts which proceed from them. Strictly speaking, there are as many mental powers, as there are diversities of thought and feeling. We embrace, however, under a general name, those which more or less resemble each other. Though different classifications of the mental faculties, might originally have been equally proper; yet when any one which is tolerably correct, has been established by customary use, it ought not to be set aside, on the ground of some slight inconvenience to which it is subject. For we may be sure, that a substitute which is perfect can never be found. And the confusion of classes and their denominations, from the different systems of arrangement, is endlessly perplexing. We regard some of the changes introduced by Dr. Brown, and adopted by his admirer Mr. Payne, as needless innovations.

In the ancient division of the mental faculties into the understanding and the will, it is admitted there is an imperfection; but one which, it would seem, might be easily remedied; not by rejecting these terms, but by making an addition to them. There are at least three varieties of mental exercises; which may be denominated thoughts, volitions, and emotions. If the first of these be viewed as belonging to the understanding, we may either place the VOL. II.

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other two under the general head of the will, making afterwards a subdivision; or we may confine the term will to volitions, and consider emotions as constituting a third primary class. Whichsoever of the two methods is adopted, it is important that the distinction should be marked between emotions, and those acts of the mind which are appropriately called volitions. The latter term, so far as we have observed, is, by European writers, confined to those acts which, in this country, have been called imperative acts of the will, ordering some motion of the body or state of the mind which which is dependent on volition, and which is expected immediately to follow it. In this sense, a man's wishing to possess an ample estate is not a volition. The money will not come at his bidding. But if he determines to make an effort to obtain the object of his desire, this is volition. Willing, in the European sense, is choosing to do something. But in this country, there has been a vagueness in the use of the term will, volition, etc., occasioning a great want of distinctness in our metaphysical inquiries. The question has been formally discussed," whether the will and affections are the same." It cannot surely be maintained, that all the affections or emotions are imperative acts of the will; i. e. volitions in the European sense. Wishing to be President of the United States, is not the same as making efforts to obtain that office. If the inquiry is merely, whether emotions and volitions both belong to the will, this is a question of classification; not in itself essential, but important to be settled by general agreement. Between the two, there is sufficient resemblance, to justify us in placing them under one general head. But there are differences also, which ought to be marked, either by a primary or a subordinate division.

The term voluntary is used with the same indistinctness, as the corresponding word will; being sometimes extended to the affections generally; and sometimes confined to imperative acts. There is also another ambiguity in the use of this term: It may be applied either to volitions, or to actions dependent on volitions. These ought never to be confounded. When Dugald Stewart advances the opinion, that our voluntary operations are suspended in sleep, he distinctly states, that the power of volition is not suspended; but merely the influence of the will over the body and the mind. Stewart Vol. I. 185, 316. Bodily motions are said to be voluntary, when they proceed from choice. But choice itself is frequently spoken of, especially in New-England, as a voluntary act. Much of the controversy on the subject of liberty and necessity, turns on the ambiguity here mentioned.

Dr. Brown objects to the division of the mental faculties into the understanding and the will, on the ground that these are not always opposed to each other, but exercised together. "We reason, and plan, and invent," he says, "at least as voluntarily, as we esteem,

or hate, or hope, or fear." Vol.I. 242. But is not the same objection equally applicable to his own division of the internal affections of the mind, into intellectual states and emotions? p. 251. Are these always opposed to each other? Do emotions suspend the operations of the intellect? So far from it, that Dr. Brown himself admits, that they very frequently concur. p. 256. "Pity may coexist with reasoning. But we have little difficulty," he adds, "in separating them in our reflection." And can we not, in the same manner, separate between acts of the understanding and acts of the will? But in Dr. Brown's classification, how does he dispose of volitions? Evidently under the head of emotions; for he resolves volition into desire, and speaks of desire as the "most general of all emotions." Vol. I. 520. But what is an emotion? According to Dr. B. a "vivid feeling." And is every volition, for instance, the willing to move a finger, a vivid feeling?

In treating of the leading faculties of the mind, as well as throughout the work before us, Mr. Payne has generally adopted the peculiar phraseology of Dr. Brown. In some instances, this may be considered as an improvement upon the language previously in use. But in many cases, very little has been gained by the exchange, so far as we are able to see, except an appearance of originality. What important service has been rendered to the cause of truth, by substituting the word suggestion for the familiar and well established phrase association of ideas? If the term idea is too limited in its signification, to answer the purposes of Dr. Brown, association taken by itself is sufficiently extensive. It may be applied to emotions, as well as to acts of the understanding. We dread to see any addition made to the confusion of terms already so formidable, in the science of the mind. When a new word is found to be necessary for distinctness of illustration, we would give it a welcome admission. But it is far better to admit of slight imperfections, in the use of terms which are familiar and well understood; than to involve us in the mazes of a new system of technical phraseology. We are aware that the language of mental philosophy, in its present state, has too little precision for the purposes of nice discrimination. We almost despair of seeing existing controversies brought to a termination by fair discussion, while the vagueness of the phraseology furnishes to the combatants numberless facilities for evasion and misapprehension. The remedy is to be sought, not in giving us a new language to be learned, every time we open a new work on intellectual philosophy: but by cautiously explaining the terms now in use; sometimes, on due notice, enlarging, and sometimes restricting the common signification; and especially by pointing out distinctly the various meanings of the same word, that a writer may show, by the connection in which he uses it, the precise sense in which he wishes it to be un