why should I act, or think of acting in the performance of duty, when my heart is not changed; and when I am assured if changed at all, it will be changed, either "in sleep," (p. 43,) or when my heart, and will, and all my thoughts, are directly resisting right action; and when, of course, I am acting in a manner fitted only to prevent the change?" "For the best reasons in the world," says Dr. Tyler. "Because God commands him to act-Because he is able to act-Because he will perish eternally if he does not act -And because if he does act as required, he will secure eternal life." p. 61. "True," says the sinner. "But then I know I never shall act as required; I shall only act selfishly and sinfully, and in a manner fitted only to prevent right action. There is no more reason to fear the loss of the soul by dismissing the subject from thought altogether, than by thinking of it. I may therefore as well wait without thought and without action, until my heart is prepared for right action, as to think and act in a manner which is not only useless, but fitted to defeat a change of heart." How would Dr. Tyler answer now? To us it seems, that he states " a fact," which authorizes the sinner's objection to the performance of duty, and then leaves it unanswered. For, as he says, "What else can

we do ?"

Dr. Tyler here asks, "Shall we deny the fact," i. e. that a sinner will never repent until he is renewed by grace? If Dr. Tyler means that he will never repent unless he repents through grace, we fully subscribe to the doctrine. But if he means, that the sinner will not act in the discharge of his duty, or in performing "the first moral act of the new-born soul," until his heart has first been changed and prepared to act thus, we do not believe it. We believe with Edwards, that while "God produces all, and we act all,"that "the effect (produced) is our act and our duty."

But says Dr. Tyler, "Shall we tell the sinner that he is not only able but willing to repent?" We are at a loss to determine what Dr. Tyler (who uses the word repentance to denote "the first moral act of the new-born soul,") intends by this question, and by such phraseology, as "he may repent if he will"-" he is able to repent if he will," etc. Repentance, or "the first moral act of the new-born soul," he admits to be a voluntary act. It would seem therefore that the sinner, in order to be able to will right, must first will to will right. If this is not his meaning, it must be, that the sinner can will right if he wills right. If this be his meaning, then the sinner has no ability to will right, until he does will right. If the former be his meaning, then what is necessary to a right act, is not merely the powers of a moral agent or natural ability, but a previous willing, to will right. Is the sinner to be persuaded in this way, that right action is a reasonable service?

Dr. Tyler proceeds, "Shall we undertake to convince him, that

his heart is not so wicked as he pretends?" We answer by no means. And yet Dr. Tyler seems to think this the only alternative, unless we join with him in statements, which (if our preceding remarks are just) serve only to countenance the sinner in stupidity and desperation in sin. We think however there is "a more excellent way;" even to assure the sinner, wicked as his heart is, and hopeless as his case is without the interposition of the grace of God; that it may prove to be the fact, that grace will be given him, and if he no longer remains inactive, his duty be done, when God is calling him to do it. "God, peradventure, will give them repent

ance." 2 Tim. ii. 25.

Dr. Tyler says, "Is it unreasonable for a sinner to act, when he is able to act?" What is this but playing on a double sense of terms? Every reader of the "Strictures" would conclude from this question, that we had denied the obligation of men to do their duty. But Dr. Tyler knows, that, in the very next statement to which he alludes, (pp. 704-5,) we expressly admitted that obligation. What we said was, that there is no "reason" for attempting to do a thing, when it is certain that it will not be done. The guilt may be the same, but the motive to action is rendered nugatory.

If to exhibit ability and obligation is all that is necessary to render immediate action in the performance of duty rational, then Satan and lost men, instead of sinking in despair under the prospect of endless sin and guilt, should, if they would act rationally, no longer regard the divine declaration, "he that is filthy, let him be filthy still;" but in defiance of it, should cherish the hope of assuming a perfect moral character, and set themselves to the work. Or, if Dr. Tyler denies that it would be rational to hope in their case; then, filled with despair as they are and must be, in respect to future holiness, the only rational course would be to set themselves to performing, what they must forever despair of performing.

Will it be said, that these beings are not called to repentance with the offer of pardon and life? But suppose that offer were made them, still we ask, what difference would this make, (we speak not of obligation) in respect to the reason for acting in the performance of duty; when they know on the authority of a divine declaration, that they never will thus act. What good reason is there, that one should act or even think of acting in a given manner, in given circumstances, when he infallibly knows that in those circumstances, he shall not act in that manner? He can act only under the influence of absolute despair. Was this ever done?

"I would ask," says Dr. T., "on what other ground can we urge upon the sinner the present performance of duty, except that he possesses all the powers of moral agency, which qualify him instantly to perform it?" p. 60. We would ask, why then are not devils and lost men VOL. II.

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urged to the performance of duty? Why is there not the same reason, and all the reason, for an embassy to the world of punishment to urge its despairing spirits to the performance of their duty, as in this world of hope? The beings in that world, though overwhelmed in despair, possess the powers of moral agency, no less than sinners in this. If then there is any good and sufficient reason for urging sinners in this world to repentance, rather than in that; that reason must be some other than this, that both are accountable moral agents. When Paul directed Timothy to instruct in meekness those that oppose themselves,' and assigned, the "peradventure," that God would give them repentance, as the reason for so doing, was not this a good reason? was it not a reason which does not exist for giving such instruction in the world of despair?

Dr. Tyler asks again, "What said Christ to the Jews? Ye will not come to me that ye might have life. Were his calls converted into mockery by this declaration?" When Dr. Tyler shall prove, that Christ assured these persons, that they never would come to him, even through grace, under any call to duty, and yet associated with this assurance the call to duty, then we will attempt to answer his question. The simple fact is, that our Lord stated the existing unwillingness of the persons addressed. He described a present state of mind, but uttered no prediction in respect to what would or would not take place in future.

Dr. Tyler asks yet again, "Would the reviewer direct the sinner to wait?" No, not a moment; much less assure him, that he will not perform his duty, even the next moment. "Or does the

reviewer," says Dr. Tyler, "mean to deny the doctrine of special grace?" Not at all. The grace that may attend any present call to duty, may be given in greater measure than any that preceded it; and in such degree, that it will in fact result in the performance of duty. Not only so, but the belief on the part of the sinner, that it may prove to be the fact, that his duty will be done, may in a multitude of cases, through grace, result in the performance of duty, when without it, he would infallibly have died in his sins.

Dr. Tyler further says, "Suppose that a man intends to murder his neighbor, and fully believes that he shall, why should he refrain or even think of refraining, from such a horrid deed?"-We answer he should refrain at least for two reasons. One is, that he can refrain. The other is, that though he believes that he shall murder his neighbor, God has not authorized the belief. But let us suppose God to have revealed the certainty, that the man will perpetrate the deed, and with the design to produce the belief. Would not the inference be rational, that God intended that the man should yield himself to the sin, in absolute desperation? Will Dr. Tyler maintain that such is the design of the gospel? Is this in fact, the rational mode which the God of mercy adopts, to se cure the return of sinners to duty and to life?

We had said, that "action in this case would be in the most absolute sense impossible." "And does the reviewer" says Dr. Tyler, "really believe, that there is no distinction between natural and moral inability." We fully believe in that distinction; and we believe also with Edwards, that "moral necessity may be as absolute as natural necessity." We believe that the known certainty of action, is consistent with blameworthiness. But we do not believe that men are called upon to act, or that they will ever think of acting, under an assurance from God, that they will not act.

Dr. Tyler says, p. 63, "If the reviewer really believes, that there is any other practicability of present duty, than natural ability to perform it, why does he not say so explicitly?" This again,

as in a former instance, is a play upon ambiguous language. We expressly admitted the practicability in the sense of natural ability. We defined our meaning of the term practicable, in that connection: "By this we mean, that the sinner is authorized to regard immediate compliance with duty, as an event which may in fact take place." How easy is it to see, that a sinner may possess all the constitutional powers of a moral agent, and yet (under the assurance that he shall never perform his duty,) have no conviction of its present practicability, or that it may now be in fact performed. Here then Dr. Tyler can see, why we represent some of "those who admit fully the sinner's natural power, as denying the practicability of present duty."

We shall examine in the fourth place, Dr. Tyler's objection to our views of moral action, as consisting in CHOICE or PREFERENCE. "But" says Dr. Tyler, "does complacency or delight in the character of God imply any such acts of consideration, comparison," etc. as are involved in preference? "And is not this a moral act?" p. 59. We have already answered this question. In accordance with the statements of the ablest divines, we have said, that the love of complacency is founded in the love of benevolence. Holy love is but one affection, though often spoken of under different appellations as benevolence, complacency, reverence, etc.

Dr. Dwight speaking of the love of complacency, says, "It is plainly not virtue or moral excellence in the original sense. This is unquestionably the love of happiness." Besides; we would ask Dr. Tyler whether holy complacency is not a supreme affection? But a supreme affection necessarily involves comparison and preference. The perfect excellence of God cannot be contemplated without perceiving its relations to ourselves and to the universe. Complacency in that excellence necessarily involves voluntary acquiescence in, or a preference of the fact, that God sustains this character, rather than any other. Herein, indeed consists the distinction between complacency as a holy exercise, and that constitutional sense or feeling of approbation, which every moral being whether sinful or holy must experience, in view of the di

vine character. There can be no moral excellence plainly, in any state of feeling toward the character of God, which does not involve the preference, that his character should be what it is, rather than any other character.

Dr. Tyler seems to suppose that acts may be voluntary, and yet not acts of preference. He says, "that every moral act is a voluntary act, is doubtless true." "But every moral act, is not necessarily an act of preference-that is a preference which implies a comparison of objects and a choice between them."

On this subject Dr. Tyler quotes a passage from Edwards, describing (as he supposes) voluntary states of mind, which are diverse from preference. Had he turned to Edwards' treatise on the Will, he could have put no such construction on that passage. "For the soul to act voluntarily," says that writer, "is evermore to act ELECTIVELY." Again he says, "in every volition there is preference." No comment can be necessary.

The last objection which we shall consider, "relates to the agency of the Holy Spirit in regeneration. The reviewer, if I understand him, says Dr. Tyler, maintains, that the Holy Spirit never operates directly on the mind." p. 39. We have never called in question the doctrine of an immediate or direct agency of the Spirit, on the soul, in regeneration. We have only maintained, that this agency neither creates any new constitutional properties in the mind, nor violates the laws of moral action. To that agency, we ascribe every stage in the progress of the soul, from the darkness and ruin of our fallen state, to the unmingled purity of the just made perfect.

But we still say, as we said before, that if there were nothing in the mind of the sinner to which the motives of the gospel can be addressed, except the selfish principle; the moral transformation of the soul would in our view be hopeless to omnipotence itself. For what is the impossibility in the case? It is this, that enmity itself should be made to love the very object which it hates; or that a being who has no capacity of feeling motives, should yet feel them, and act under their influence. And yet, admitting this very impossibility as the real impossibility in the case of sinners, Dr. Tyler sarcastically exclaims, "wo to the world! We be all dead men! Christ is dead in vain, and the Holy Spirit has been given to no purpose." p. 40. We ask however, whether this ironical inference of Dr. Tyler, is not, according to his own principles, sober verity? He maintains, that there is no susceptibility in the mind of the sinner, to which the motives to holiness can be addressed,—none which can in any way be reached or affected by these motives, except the selfish principle; and that to use truth or "light as the instrument to cure this disposition, is like using oil to extinguish fire." p. 44. Can Omnipotence then produce holy love in such a being? How? Not by causing enmity itself to love; for this is a contradiction in the nature of things. Not by