T

HE INVASION of Italy was partly for military and partly for political reasons. The plan adopted was developed gradually. It was influenced by current events affecting the general international situation.

In this article the basic outlines of the plan are explained. Also the enemy's reaction as far as now known. Tactical operations are not discussed.

THE BEGINNINGS OF THE PLAN UP TO THE
INVASION OF SICILY

According to the speech of Prime Minister Churchill of 10 November 1942, while that gentleman was at Washington in the last week of December 1941 President Roosevelt suggested an invasion of North Africa by American troops. Mr. Churchill stated that he fully shared the view that North Africa was a specially suitable sector for American intervention in the western theater.

At his press conference on 7 November 1942, President Roosevelt stated that some time after the foregoing conference he had invited Mr. Churchill to return to Washington at the end of May, or the first part of June, 1942, to consider the issue of an offensive on a very large scale across the Channel around the middle of 1943; or of an offensive on a smaller scale, but starting in 1942. After discussion, and with the aid of the Combined Chiefs of Staff Board, by the end of June a general agreement was arrived at for a North African offensive in 1942. This occurred on 8 November.

Mr. Churchill, in his speech to the Congress on 19 May 1943, stated: "At the time we [Mr. Roosevelt and himself] planned the great joint African operation we hoped to be master of Tunisia before the end of last year." This hope was not realized. There then resulted the Casablanca conference which ended on 24 January 1943.

The decision there arrived at as given by Mr. Churchill was "to complete the conquest of Tunisia, and meanwhile to make all preparations for invading Sicily." The mission of the proposed invasion, as further explained by Mr. Churchill on 11 February 1943, was:

"The dominating aim which we set before ourselves . . . was to engage the enemy's forces on land, sea, and air, and at the earliest possible moment. The importance of coming to ever closer grips with the enemy and intensifying the struggle outweighed a number of other considerations [not stated], which ordinarily would be decisive in themselves.

try to draw the enemy, and the enemy air force from the Russian front was accepted as the first of our objectives once the problems of the U-boat war had been met in such a way as to enable us to act aggressively."

Preparations for the invasion of Sicily immediately began, and were well advanced by mid-May 1943 when Tunisia finally fell.

By this time other ideas had come forward. A new conference was held at Washington in May 1943 between President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill. It was decided to endeavor to detach Italy from the Axis.

In furtherance of this mission, President Roosevelt on 11 June 1943 openly invited the Italian people to overthrow Premier Mussolini and the Fascist Party and expel the Germans so that Italy could be restored to a respected position in the European family of nations. Otherwise the United Nations had no alternative but to prosecute the war against Italy to a complete victory. He assured the Italians that the United Nations were agreed that when German domination had ended and the Fascist regime had been thrown out, we could promise them complete freedom to choose a non-Fascist, non-Nazi kind of government.

On 30 June Mr. Churchill threatened the Italians with forthcoming events unless they abandoned their then government and yielded to the Allies. On 10 July the invasion of Sicily commenced.

THE AXIS REACTION

Alarmed by the obviously approaching conquest of Tunisia, Chancellor Hitler of Germany and Duce. Mussolini of Italy conferred on 7 April 1943. The two Axis leaders were accompanied by their respective military advisers who for four days discussed the situation.

Most of the decisions arrived at are yet unknown. But it was decided to go ahead with the war. No major changes were made as to Italy, but coast defenses were to be strengthened.

Immediately following the invasion of Sicily, which was accompanied by bombing of Italian cities, Mussolini asked Germany for a conference between their respective military chiefs. Germany agreed, and the conference convened at Feltre in north Italy on 17 July. It lasted through the 19th. On the latter day Mussolini arrived on the night train and stayed all day. Hitler arrived later by plane, and stayed less than three hours.

At this conference the Italian General Staff is reported to have submitted proposals asking for fortynine German divisions and 3,000 planes. According

to their estimates this was what was necessary to protect the Italian peninsula from invasion. The Germans are said to have replied that they only had two divisions and 300 planes available. They suggested, as an alternative, the abandonment of south and central Italy and withdrawal to a defensive zone across the neck of the peninsula from the general vicinity of Spezzia to around Rimini.

The proposed line was of great natural strength. It was difficult mountains of considerable depth. It could be made into a strong defensive zone. There were few Italian industries south of this line, and not many resources. Economically the area to be abandoned was a liability on account of the need of feeding a large population. Withdrawal need not occur until the enemy forced it.

But in the meantime preparations were to be made without delay. All industries and their workers were to be removed to any sites within Axis territory where conditions were favorable. Transportation of all kinds-railroad, motor, animal-were to be moved north immediately, and also all stocks of munitions, food, and other supplies.

Mussolini accepted the proposition. Some accounts state that Hitler talked in a blue streak without giving Mussolini a chance to get in a word. It is more probable that the German and Italian staffs in the preceding two days had worked out a plan. All Hitler and Mussolini had to do was to approve it. As soon as they had done so the conference adjourned.

Mussolini went back to Rome on the night train. He arrived on the morning of 20 July. Rome had just been bombed for the first time. It was in great agitation. Disregarding this condition, Mussolini, who was himself the head of most of the ministries, sent for the assistant ministers. He acquainted them with the decision arrived at. The assistants are said to have raised an outcry at abandoning a large part of their country. They believed that before such an important decision was carried out the Fascist Grand Council should be convened to authorize it and get back of it. Mussolini agreed, and the Council was ordered to assemble at 8:00 PM, 24 July.

On that date the Grand Council of twenty-five members met for the first time since 7 February 1939. Since they had not been consulted during the intervening eventful period, the members supposedly were in a resentful mood. They were determined, now that the opportunity was present, to assert themselves.

Mussolini addressed the Council in a forceful speech and submitted his estimate of the situation, which he described as entirely satisfactory. He reported on the Feltre conference and explained the decision to abandon south and central Italy, including Rome, and withdrawing to the Spezzia-Rimini line. He requested a vote of confidence expressing agreement with the Government's program.

Opposition immediately arose. Count Dino Grandi, one of the members, took the floor. He claimed, according to reports, that during the recent conference between Mussolini and Hitler he had concealed himself on the premises, from where he was able to overhear what was said. Reading from notes, which he alleged he had taken, he pointed out that Mussolini's report had been incomplete and was misleading. He had failed to explain that the Germans would furnish only two divisions and 300 planes instead of the forty-nine divisions and 3,000 planes which the General Staff believed were absolutely necessary. The situation was not satisfactory, and he accused Mussolini with having made a one-sided, purposely incomplete, and in fact a false official report. A vote then taken was six for Mussolini and nineteen against.

A general uproar resulted, during which Mussolini withdrew. The other members continued to discuss the situation all night long. There was much hard feeling and no majority could be found for any plan.

On 25 July the King conferred with certain individuals, among them Count Dino Grandi who repeated the charges which he had openly made the night before as to Mussolini's making a false official report.

After an all-day discussion it was decided that, since Germany would not furnish the troops necessary to defend Italy, there was no sense in going on with the war. Advantage would be taken of the offer of President Roosevelt of restoring Italy to a respected place among the European nations. As understood, this involved the overthrow of Mussolini and the Fascist Government and abandoning Germany.

About 4:00 PM, the King sent for Mussolini. Mussolini arrived at the Quirinal Palace unaware of what had passed. He was surprised to find Grandi there. The King is reported to have informed Mussolini that he was aware of the false official report which he had made and of the events connected therewith. His usefulness as a Prime Minister had ceased. He handed him a prepared letter of resignation. Mussolini declined to sign it. The King replied that the resignation was good and was accepted, regardless of whether it was signed or not. He then dismissed Mussolini. As Mussolini stepped out of the Palace, the guard placed him under arrest and drove him off to confinement.

The King appointed Marshal Pietro Badoglio as Head of the Government. The latter undertook to ascertain from the Allies their terms for Italy's withdrawal from the war. These terms were broadcast from the Rome radio station on 3 August, with the statement that they were considered too hard. How these terms were ascertained is not known. They were substantially the same as those finally agreed upon for the Armistice just one month later.

THE GERMAN REACTION

The sudden fall of Mussolini surprised Germany. Hitler foresaw the coming desertion of Italy. He immediately convened a council to consider the situation. This met at German GHQ on 29 July, and sat until 5 August. The members included not only the military, naval, and air leaders, but the heads of important civilian ministries. No Italian was present, but the Japanese ambassador was. During the conference the Rome broadcast of 3 August confirmed the suspicions that Italy was preparing to desert the Axis.

At this time, German divisions were fighting in Sicily. Two or three divisions were in central and north Italy, too small a force to control that country. Italians occupied southeast France and formed the larger part of the garrisons in the Balkans and in the Aegean Islands. The decision, according to reports,

was:

a. Withdraw the German troops from Sicily to the vicinity of Naples, with a rear guard to the south.

b. Reinforce the troops in central and north Italy and take over the country when Italy deserted.

c. Rearrange the German troops in France so as to disarm the Italians there at the proper time.

d. Same as to the Balkans and the Aegean Islands. But as there were not enough German troops there, reinforcements would be required.

To obtain troops for the new situation, the strategic defensive was adopted in Russia. Time was needed, however, for redistribution of divisions. For this reason, steps were taken not to alarm the Italians by indicating that Germany was aware of her negotiations with the Allies. Italians were rated as poor fighters. It was believed that by aggressive action, Italian divisions could be disarmed by a smaller number of Germans.

The order for the German withdrawal from Sicily was received there on or about 1 August. It was completed within two weeks. Practically all personnel, including wounded and prisoners, and all field equipment successfully reached the mainland.

THE SECESSION OF ITALY

Following the invasion of Sicily, the Allies judged that Italy could be forced away from the Axis. On 16 July President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill, in a joint message, stated:

"The sole hope for Italy's survival lies in honorable capitulation to the overwhelming power of the military forces of the United Nations. If you continue to tolerate the Fascist regime which serves the evil power of the Nazis you must suffer the consequences of your choice."

After Mussolini's fall on 25 July, the Allies continued with operations in Sicily, but the bombing of Italian cities was temporarily suspended. No results being apparent, Allied GHQ in Algiers on 31 July broadcast this message:

"Italians, you know that on July 25 we let up on the aerial bombardment of Italy. We hoped thereby to give Italy a breathing space wherein to unite for peace and freedom. But the Germans, too, have used that breathing space to strengthen their own position, and for that full and sole responsibility rests with the new government at Rome. Had that government acted speedily, Germany by now would be in full retreat. But instead the new government temporized. It missed the opportunity. It permitted the Germans to recover. Italians, we can not tolerate this."

It then announced that bombing of Italy would be resumed in earnest. It was.

The details of the negotiations between Italy and the Allies did not affect the strategical situation and are omitted from this account. Italy accepted the terms of the Allies on 2 September, and an Armistice was signed next day. It was not announced until 8 September.

The results of the Armistice as to the military forces of Italy were:

Army:

9 divisions, which were in south Italy, Sardinia, or Corsica, joined the Allies..

10 divisions in the Balkans surrendered their arms and equipment to guerrillas.

43 divisions in north and central Italy, in south France, and in the Balkans, were disarmed by the Germans.

62 divisions in all.

Navy:

6 battleships, 8 cruisers, 27 destroyers, 19 submarines, and 48 small craft joined the Allies.

1 battleship was sunk by the Germans in action. 1 battleship (unfinished), 10 cruisers, 10 destroyers, 10 to 50 submarines, and 450 small craft unaccounted for, are presumed to be in German hands.

On 12 September Mussolini escaped from confinement and entered German-held territory. He thereupon organized a new Fascist Government in alliance with Germany.

THE INVASION OF THE ITALIAN MAINLAND The plan apparently was to land a secondary force at the south tip of Italy and there attract the enemy's main body. After allowing a few days for this, the main force would land to the north in rear of the enemy, cut his communications, and trap him. Presumably, it was believed that there were not many German divisions in Italy, and that if the plan succeeded, a march northwards to the valley of the Po could follow quickly.

Pursuant to this idea, the British 8th Army landed at the toe of Italy on 3 September, and shortly afterwards near the heel. They met minor opposition from a weak German division. The mission of the latter