verted to fulfil the tasks of, let us say, infantry units. Practice has shown that this lowers the striking force of tanks and motorized infantry and cramps their maneuver; that is, in the final result it delays the solution of the main problem.

In one sector of the front a pause in the operations took place. Our units quickly regrouped, preparing for battle for an important railway line. The strength of our units, which had been fighting uninterruptedly until now, naturally had become exhausted, while the reserves were still on the way. To beat off the enemy, who had succeeded in concentrating in the direction of the main effort, a powerful force had been gathered by us at the expense of neighboring sectors.

Early in the morning, after a half-hour artillery preparation against three main centers of hostile resistance, the infantry units began to attack. At first their actions developed successfully. Infantry, after covering a distance of five to six kilometers, captured two inhabited places and a tactically important hill. But later the situation changed in favor of the enemy. The left flank of the attackers, defended by a small screening force, was broken through by a massed tank counterattack undertaken by the enemy at the moment when our units had just started to consolidate the occupied terrain. To be sure, antitank riflemen succeeded in knocking out some German tanks, but this did not stop the rest.

To parry the impending threat, the commander of the force of combined arms brought into action tanks which were standing in reserve, and which were intended for later exploitation. While two tank companies fought the hostile tanks, motorized infantry was ordered to attack the inhabited place from which the counterattacking hostile tanks came. Some accompanying guns and mortars, interspersed in the combat formations of motorized infantry, did not create fire of such density that the infantry could take the village without stopping to reorganize. Here was needed artillery of heavier caliber and in greater quantity. As a result, the motorized infantry was pinned down under strong enemy fire, and the tanks rushing up, having just repulsed the hostile tank counterattack, were not able to help the infantry to move forward.

The course of this battle shows that serious tactical mistakes were allowed to take place. It was not at all necessary in the given case to throw in the tanks which constituted the basis of the mobile reserve for exploitation. It was also undesirable to commit to the battle the motorized infantry without sufficient artillery and tank support. In the hands of the commander were units of tank-destroyer artillery. If the attacked flank had been protected by them, the enemy tank blow surely would not have had success. And this would have permitted our tanks and motorized infantry to act in cooperation in the direction of the main effort, to seize the fourth

and last enemy strongpoint, and to emerge in an area adapted to further operations.

Joint and prudent use of closely cooperating motorized infantry and tanks makes it possible first of all to conserve their combat ability to the end. It is not profitable, for example, to keep these types of troops in battle a long while, both during the period of breakthrough and in new positions in the rear of the hostile defense, if the progress of events is slow. Here it is necessary to bring into action ordinary infantry which wears down the enemy, while tanks and motorized infantry, after regrouping, inflict on him a new crushing blow.

It must be remembered that the suddenness of the blow of tanks and motorized infantry largely depends on the nature of the terrain. There was a case like this: A mobile group brought into the breakthrough, having moved about twenty kilometers, encountered very irregular terrain. Reaching steep ravines, the tanks stopped. It was necessary to send out some additional sapper units for the reconstruction of roads and the construction of temporary bridges. The element of surprise was lost, and the enemy was able to prepare for resistance. Consequently, choosing the direction of the main blow, it is necessary to provide for the uninterrupted movement of tanks in great depth. Especially, if natural obstacles cannot be by-passed the tank commander must have previously decided how he will overcome them and exactly where he will inflict the blow on the enemy. When a precise plan of action is made, based on accurate reconnaissance data, success will be assured.

One of our mobile groups consisting of motorized infantry and tanks, entering a breakthrough at the end of the first day of fighting, rushed forward. It traveled about fifty kilometers and encountered a powerful center of resistance at the crossing of two dirt roads. To find a detour anywhere near was impossible because the terrain was cut up by ravines and gullies, and besides, a wide river valley precluded the maneuver of auto transport. But the tank commander had previously foreseen this situation and made a corresponding plan of attack.

Tanks of the first echelon and attached tank destroyer artillery began to rake with their fire only the left flank of the center of resistance, where the terrain was especially rough. Soon the heavy artillery delivered its blow in the same direction. At this time the other tanks and motorized infantry were secretly concentrated in gullies opposite the center and right flank of the enemy. Seeing that our efforts were directed against their left flank, the Germans quickly moved there a large part of the organic infantry antitank guns from the neighboring sectors of the defense. This did not escape the attention of our reconnaissance.

At the appointed hour, the central part and especially the right flank of the center of resistance were

suddenly subjected to intensive air bombardment. After this, into the attack rushed tanks carrying atop them parties of tommy gunners who not only engaged the enemy, but also skilfully pointed out targets. When the leading tanks started fighting in the inhabited place, our main forces also attacked. They quickly seized the village, and, what was more important, the bridge and the river crossing. The important hostile center of resistance found itself in a semicircle of fire. To escape complete encirclement the enemy quickly retired, losing many men and much equipment.

We note that this battle produced good results not merely because it was carefully prepared and the commander organizing the battle succeeded in upsetting the enemy as to the main blow. The main thing was that tanks and the motorized infantry were not scattered, but were jointly and suddenly committed to action at the decisive moment.

The experience of many offensive operations teaches the following: the farther we penetrate into the depth of the enemy disposition, the larger will be his tank forces that will be thrown against the attackers. Supported by self-propelled artillery, the enemy tanks undertake counterattacks from the flanks, trying to cut off the communication lines of the attackers and isolate the attacking columns from the rear. Of course our tanks alone, breaking through far forward, will not be able to hold a definite sector of the terrain behind themselves. But by observing the principle of close cooperation between tanks and motorized infantry, it is possible to engage boldly in battle the counterattacking enemy forces.

In one sector of the front, our tanks commanded by Major Sergeyev were forced to go over to the defensive in order to protect the bringing up of our main forces. At first, the tanks acted alone and deployed for all-around defense in a populated place where several roads came together. Motorized infantry lagged behind, and could take part in the battle only the next day. Meanwhile the enemy, having felt out our tank wedge, undertook an encircling thrust against its right flank, committing in this place fifty tanks and up to a regiment of infantry. Superiority was on his side. Screening himself with three batteries of tank-destroyer artillery, Major Sergeyev formed a mobile group of ten tanks. The task of this group was to destroy the enemy infantry in case it broke through to the populated place.

During the first half day our artillerymen smashed eighteen German tanks. But the situation, improved only a little, remained, as before, extremely tense. The enemy chose as his method of action simultaneous blows from several directions in order to scatter our fire. To a certain degree the enemy succeeded in attaining this, and after a while his infantry, protected by armor, moved into one of the streets of the populated place.

But the situation abruptly changed at night, when

our motorized infantry moved up. It quickly cleaned the populated place of the Germans who had penetrated, organized its outskirts for all-around defense, and then seized advantageous heights lying beyond the inhabited place. This ended the threat of a flank blow.

The main conclusion from the experience of this battle is that the decision of the commander to seize objectives in the rear of the enemy defense must always be based on the rapid shifting of motorized infantry to the area of action. If the situation arises that the motorized infantry cannot move with the tanks, then it is necessary to take all measures so that the gap between them (in space and time) be as small as possible. Skilful agreement of actions. of tanks and motorized infantry, and maximum suddenness of their blows, always assures the success of operation of our mobile groups in depth of the hostile disposition.

Battle for a Hill

[Translated at the Command and General Staff School,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, from a Russian article by
Captain K. Andreyev, Soviet Army, in Krasnaya
Zvezda 4 November 1943.]

IN ONE Sector on the right bank of the Dnieper a battle took place, the experience of which deserves attention for a number of reasons. Characteristic are those enemy positions which had to be overcome here. They are extremely typical of German defense of a river line. Not without interest are the tactics of the defending local enemy garrison when it found itself under the threat of encirclement. Finally, of greatest interest are the operations of our advance detachments which forced the river in this place.

A reinforced German battalion occupied the height whose northern slopes descended steeply into the waters of the Dnieper. The eastern slopes of this height were also washed by the Dnieper. At the very edge of the bank a grove was situated. The most suitable place for forcing was here in the region of two islands directly east of the height. The other sector suitable for the crossing was situated to the north of the height. Thus the height dominated this entire Dnieper region. From the south the height was adjoined by a large village situated in the ravine behind which runs a ridge of small knolls. Westward is a smaller village separated from the height by a narrow dell. Such was the terrain upon which the Germans established a powerful strongpoint. The hostile artillery on the peak could employ direct fire upon the entire opposite bank, and naturally upon the river itself. Besides that, the enemy had artillery on the southern hills which covered the approaches to the hill from the south. It stands to reason that all the slopes of this height were defended by a system of machine-gun fire. Thus, on just one of the southeastern slopes of the height the scouts registered ten

heavy machine guns. In each of the villages the enemy kept a strong group of tommy gunners. Apart from all this, the enemy positions were defended by minefields.

Our advanced detachments, in spite of strong counteraction, were able to force the river in the sector of the two islands and landed near the height. In order to secure fully the crossing in that sector, it was necessary to liquidate the German strongpoint, and this before the approach of the main forces. The task of immediate seizure of the height was placed

on two detachments, commanded by comrades Tkachev and Vatyanov. An attack of the height straight ahead would have cost unnecessary sacrifices and promised a doubtful success. Therefore, it was decided to go through along its southern and northern slopes so as to encircle the German garrison.

According to the plan of battle the detachment of Tkachev was supposed to advance along the bank, i.e., the northern slope of the height. This appeared extremely risky. The enemy had created here the most powerful positions. However, the steepest of the slopes could not be covered by fire as intensively as the opposite bank. It was decided to make use of this circumstance. Tkachev's detachment was to proceed to the smaller village, capture it, and advance along the road on the south to the large village [road not shown on sketch]. Having concentrated on the outskirts of the grove he began to advance at the stipulated time, selecting one company for diverting operations on the side of the peak. This company at the same time covered the detachment from the flank. Vatyanov's detachment had to go around the height through the large village (from the south), capture it from the western outskirts and join the units of comrade Tkachev. In this manner it was planned to complete the encirclement of the German garrison. The detachment began to advance from the eastern outskirts of the large village, mainly along its central street. Here also, a distracting blow was delivered

by one company which covered the right flank of Vatyanov's detachment.

The artillery elements of the advance detachments were already transferred to the right bank and placed in firing positions. Guns were firing on the southern slopes of the height. With this fire it was intended to forestall any possible counterattacks from the side of the height. A portion of the artillery conducted fire on the hostile positions on the hill, and on the western outskirts of the large village. Later on, the artillery was to transfer the fire to the road which lay behind the height and which connected the two villages. It was supposed to set up an interdiction fire in case the Germans began a retreat.

In the plan of battle not a small role was played by the third detachment. True, it had its own special mission, but its successful accomplishment also promoted the seizure of the height. This detachment operated from the left, advancing to the south and engaging the attention of the hostile artillery which was situated on the ridge of small knolls.

In the beginning, the enveloping maneuver proceeded swiftly. Both detachments almost simultaneously reached the indicated points: the smaller village and the western outskirts of the larger village. It was necessary for Vatyanov's detachment to conduct a stubborn street fight which acquired an especially violent character on the very outskirts of the large village. Here the sub-unit of Ivannikov endured several counterattacks. This sub-unit actually conducted a battle for an outlet to the road on which the detachment had to unite with the neighbor who operated on the north.

On the north the sub-unit of comrade Kuchenko first went around the height and then broke into the smaller village. Here also took place a violent battle in the course of which it was possible to seize the entire smaller village and thereby capture a group of German soldiers. However, the effort to unite with the southern detachment and to complete the encirclement failed.

The Germans, having found themselves in pincers, began hastily to retreat from the height. The two companies that had been selected for operations toward the peak pressed on them. The enemy had considerably intensified his resistance on both flanks to the rear of the height to prevent our detachments from uniting. It was in this place that the enemy undertook a series of counterattacks. This is the essence of German tactics when they attempt to slip out of a ring which is beginning to close.

In such cases the entire matter is decided by the tempo. But the tempo, in the vast number of cases, is secured by the skilful use of fire. If the enemy succeeds by a series of counterattacks in holding back our units that are trying to close the ring even for only a few hours, they might withdraw, if not the entire main forces, then a considerable part of them. It is necessary to have this in mind when

setting up a plan of encirclément of a strongpoint. Correspondingly, it is necessary to organize cooperation, paying special attention to the proper utilization of the fire elements.

Falling into difficult situations, the enemy will be more stubborn in defense of those positions under whose cover it is possible to retire from the blow. It is necessary to foresee the development of the battle and attempt to determine such positions in order to concentrate here in time the main mass of fire. It is very likely that it will be expedient to expose these positions to a concentrated artillery fire long before our attacking units break through to them. In any case, it is necessary to have this in mind in order that the enemy should not be able to jump out of the bag. Besides this, it is necessary in the process of the battle to distinguish the more important areas in which it is necessary to develop success. At times, it is much more expedient to seize a section of a road, a dell, or even a bare field than a large village. Coming out on the eastern outskirts of the village, Tkachev's detachment was extremely swift in the battle for the final capture of the village, but was not sufficiently active in his advance to the south. Here the detachment lingered, which to a great extent permitted the enemy to play for time. Part of the German garrison succeeded in escaping through a narrow corridor (less than a kilometer) which remained for a certain time behind the height. Such is the lesson which must be derived from this altogether successful battle.

Employment of Assault Guns

On the Eastern Front

[Translated at the Command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, from a German article by Lieutenant Giese, German Army, in Artilleristische Rundschau August 1943.]

FOR THE last ten days the two companies of Silesian grenadiers, two platoons of antitank troops, and the assault-gun battery platoon consisting of three assault guns have been lying at the advanced strongpoint at G.

The blizzard howls about the miserable huts of this village of some twenty to thirty dwellings situated on the important highway to M. The snow is heaped high about the houses and it requires a great amount of exertion to beat one's way through the stinging flakes from one end of the village to the other. The village is situated in the midst of a clearing some three kilometers across, surrounded by dense, seemingly impenetrable forest.

For ten days now the village has been the central point of the defense in this sector. The Bolshevist is doing everything in his power to wrest this strongpoint from the German defense, for it lies like a barricade along the highway that leads far into the rear German areas. He hurls his masses of men supported

by artillery and tanks day and night against the firm German defensive wall. His attacks continue almost without interruption. The Russian woods continue to spew out new masses of men, but the attacks collapse time after time in front of our lines.

On the fifth day of these desperate defensive battles, the connections of the strongpoint with the rear are cut by Bolshevists who have infiltrated and, on the right and left of G, have broken through our lines. The little group of German grenadiers, antitank troops, and assault artillerymen hold like a wall of steel in the bitter snow storm against the assaults of the Bolshevists, in spite of a shortage of ammunition and food. Finally, on the evening of the tenth day the little group is relieved by portions of a grenadier regiment of soldiers from Lower Silesia who break their way from the west through the ring of hostile forces around G.

In the following paragraphs we give the day by day report of the artillerymen of the assault platoon during the last five days in the encircled village of G.

First day: We have now taken up quarters in the center of the village in order, when necessary, to be able to get to any point of our position in the shortest possible time. Since early this morning, when the last antitank cannon was knocked out by a direct hit of a mortar shell, we have been the only heavy weapons in G. For the first time this morning, we also heard the sound of Soviet motors and tanks from the west. But "Ivan" remains suspiciously quiet except for occasional mortar fire and a few heavy shells from his artillery.

We should never brag about the day till evening has come! The quiet of the forenoon has given place now, in the afternoon, to a raging barrage from the enemy (7.62 and 17.2-cm salvo guns). A few hours later the Bolshevists charge in several waves with the strength of about a battalion, from the southwest. As if on parade, five T-34's [type of Russian tank] came up to the edge of the woods to provide fire protection for their infantry. Inside of four minutes' time, the assault guns are ready for action. Fire is immediately opened on the tanks. After one of them has been hit and is burning on the edge of the woods, the other four turn around and disappear in the forest. In the meantime, the enemy infantry has arrived within 200 meters of the village. But we do not dare to fire. We have only eighty rounds of ammunition left for each assault gun, and who can tell how long we will have to hold out. Suddenly our infantry opens fire with machine guns and carbines. First the enemy stops; they begin to rush back. The attack has been repulsed.

The breech block of the second assault gun is so affected by the cold that it will not close. After it has been thawed out it is rubbed with glycerine (brake fluid) which has proven excellent as a protection against the effects of cold. During the evening the enemy fires constantly on the village. Strong groups

of assault troops attack the village and attempt to penetrate into it. Since we cannot shoot well at night, only two men of each assault gun crew remain with the gun for close defense-the driver and the gun commander. The gunner [literally, "pointing noncom"] and ammunition man are in the infantry position in the vicinity of the cannon to help stand guard with the tired and exhausted grenadiers.

Second day: Except for brief pauses, the artillery fire continued the whole night long. Since the break of dawn we again have been sitting with the assault guns. Strung out in a semicircle, the guns stand on the east edge of the village that the Bolshevist has been attacking with his infantry since 7:00 o'clock without pause. We have so little ammunition that we do not dare to fire and have to watch the attacks without doing anything. It is terrible. Toward noon the attacks let up a bit. The fire becomes weaker. Suddenly a messenger arrives, crying: "Tanks from the west!" One of the assault guns remains on the east side for security and two go to the west entrance of the village. Here they find five T-34's within 200 meters of the village, firing on our positions. Three of the tanks are knocked out and set on fire. The other two disappear into a depression and flee. Toward evening it finally becomes quieter. Again a few of our men are obliged to help keep guard with the grenadiers. The grenadiers have had casualties. At the end of this day, there are only forty-eight rounds of ammunition left for each assault gun.

Third day: The enemy has been laying heavy fire over the whole village since 6:00 o'clock. Combat outposts report enemy movements on the edge of the woods to the west. Again we mount our guns and wait for the Bolshevists. Suddenly the artillery fire becomes silent. An attack by the enemy supported by eight T-34's is reported from the west. We have scarcely arrived at the west side of the village when the third assault gun receives a direct hit with a 7.62-cm shell on the side of the motor compartment. It immediately catches fire. The crew are just able to make their escape. We permit the enemy tanks to approach to within 200 meters and knock five of them out. The sixth one remains stranded with a damaged tread, and is destroyed by a demolition squad during the following night. The two remaining tanks retire in the direction of the protecting woods while the attacking enemy forces who were following the tanks are repulsed by our grenadiers. About noon the snow begins to fall heavily. One cannot see more than twenty meters in front of him. In the protection of the falling snow flakes, the Bolshevist penetrates into the village with a powerful assault force. We run to our assault guns and make prisoners of a detachment of four Bolshevists who in the general melee had approached to within a few meters of our gun. In just about an hour's time most of the Soviets have been mowed down. The village is again free of the enemy. From the fall of darkness until far into the night we

are busy building snow walls and positions for our assault guns to hide them from the view of the enemy artillery observers who always bring artillery fire to bear on us whenever we show up on the edge of the village. We have just twenty-six rounds left now for each gun.

Fourth day: The night and morning pass by quietly. If we don't get any more motor fuel before evening, we'll not be able to move more than one assault gun. At noon we hear for the first time the sound of heavy fighting coming from the west. It is confirmed. by radio: "The -th Infantry Division is on the way to restore the old main line of resistance and to replace our forces." In the afternoon, with the help of an assault force of nine men, we drive the enemy out of a strongpoint which he has established during the night close to our positions. Two rounds fired from each of the assault guns suffices to insure success for

us.

Fifth day: Since yesterday evening, only one assault gun has been ready for action. The second one has no more motor fuel. The members of the crew who are now freed, reinforce the lines of the grenadiers which are growing thinner every day. The infantry has need of every available man. Even though the attacks have become less frequent, the continuous artillery and mortar fire take their daily toll of victims. Since the forenoon, the sound of fighting in the west has been growing more intense. It is coming closer and closer. During the last few hours, the enemy's fire has been decreasing. There is almost no more rifle fire. Shortly before noon, we of the assault gun in company with twenty-five grenadiers, make a plunge along the highway toward the west. We encounter no more resistance. After traveling a distance of four kilometers, we meet the first of the approaching German soldiers. After five days, we are finally freed.

Place of the Tank Unit
Commander in Combat

[Translated for the Command and General Staff
School, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, from a Russian
article by Colonel G. Maksimov, Soviet Army, in
Zhurnal Avtobronetankovikh Voisk (Armored Force
Journal) January 1943.]

THE SUDDEN and frequent changes in the situation in modern warfare require a flexible command. In order to control tank units effectively and react promptly to changes in the situation, the commander observes the battlefield personally and stays within the battle formation. What the commander does before going into action is only the beginning of his task of leading his unit in combat. It is his duty to follow the prepared plan and to overcome all obstacles in order to achieve his goal. To do this he observes the course of battle carefully and receives timely reports on all changes in the situation. He must also constantly and insistently restore any dis