choice, which will do full as well as if they had made a wise one. Hence likewise the spirit of gaming, for luck may run on one side for a month together, and if it may why should it not? hence the fury of lotteries, for though the possibility of each ticket getting the great prize be no more than one in sixty thousand, yet by continual ruminating upon this little shrimp of a possibility, it is commonly swelled into a probability to be depended upon so far as to lay schemes for disposing of the produce. For the most part we are led to dwell upon suppositions by the pleasure they give the imagination; therefore it is a common observation, that men easily believe what they wish to be true, for they first suppose it to be true as matter of entertainment, until by frequency of supposal it grows into a persuasion: for we can very seldom trace our judgments up to their first principles, therefore the character of truth they have used to bear in our thoughts is an evidence of their being true, and it is not easy to remember whether such character was affixed by a continual amusing supposition, or by solid conviction. In some tempers imagination takes the contrary turn, they ruminate constantly upon the things they dread, and always suppose the worst that may happen this practice not only increases evils by drawing up their strongest colors, but likewise magnifies chances, raising a bare possibility into an imminent danger. Where either of these habits has been contracted, it is the hardest matter in the world to admit a supposal that does not tally with them: the sanguine man can scarce form an imagination of anything that may cross his desires, nor the melancholy man of anything that can give him comfort. But this stiffness of the faculty is a main obstacle against our following the golden rule, wherein we must be aided by a readiness of supposing ourselves in the condition and circumstances of another; it contracts our notions by rendering us incapable of entering for a moment into others of a different kind: it makes everything strange and absurd that we were not familiarly acquainted with before: and it retards our reasoning, which cannot effectually go on without giving opposite sentiments their turn to possess our imagination singly, until they come to their full color before we set them in comparison with their antagonists. Therefore it is a very valuable art, hard to be learned but well worth the pains of acquiring, to suspend our desires, our prepossions, our customary trains and former judgments for so long as is requisite, and be able to fix our attention upon things the most opposite to them: for without this we shall never attain a perfect impartiality nor true freedom of thought, and if we could accomplish this, though we might still remain liable to involuntary mistakes, we should never more pass a faulty judgment. However, as such entire command over imagination is not to be gained, it behoves us to be constantly suspicious of inclination and prejudice, to observe which way they draw, to make allowances for their attraction, and even to stir up a partiality against them which may suffice to counterbalance their weight. 5. But it may be asked, is there not a presumption in favor of old opinions? This I never have denied, nor would have them called in question upon every slight objection suggested, nor even cast aside when questioned, unless the opposite weights visibly preponderate; for while the balance hangs even, or keeps nodding to and fro, the presumption ought still to prevail. I do not pretend to lay down rules for directing when an examination ought to be entered upon, which perhaps might be impossible, at least is past my skill, therefore must be left to every man's discretion I only say that when he does think fit to enter upon it, he cannot keep his imagination too open for receiving every consideration his own sagacity or that of another person can suggest, and giving them room to expand with all the colors they are capable of exhibiting. During this operation the former judgments ought only to suspend their action, but not to lose their vigor, which will be wanted when they come to be called to mind again in order to make a fair comparison between them and their oppo : nents. For there is a defect in the faculty when it cannot distinguish between a supposition made to be examined into, and an approved truth, nor estimate the strength of opposite evidences confronted together in their full colors, nor can give fair play to one without its quite obscuring the other. Persons who labor under this infirmity are perpetually wavering; they have a hundred different opinions in a minute, or rather never have any opinion at all, but wander in a labyrinth of doubts without ever coming to a determination that they can confide in. But some confidence in our judgment is absolutely necessary in time of action, for else it will be of no use to us, nor shall we ever proceed steadily and vigorously to complete any design and in seasons of deliberation it ought not to be parted with during the time of deliberating, nor until some decision be maturely formed upon which we may place the like confidence. For if a suggestion occurs that the measures I have resolved upon may be wrong, I shall still presume them right until fully satisfied of the contrary; and if the business requires immediate despatch so that there is not time for obtaining such satisfaction, I shall pursue them without heeding the suggestion. Nor is it needful the judgment should be founded on demonstration to deserve our confidence, for this is very rarely to be found by the human understanding upon matters of greatest importance in prudence and practice: therefore it is expedient to study the art of judging accurately upon probabilities, which where they can be clearly discerned, are a sufficient ground for confidence to remain with them, until new lights break in or circumstances alter, whereon a new judgment may be formed with the like accuracy. It is the vain expectation of absolute certainty that keeps men continually wavering and irresolute, for being afraid of trusting to anything that has not such certainty, and being able to find it nowhere, they live in a round of doubts without settling upon any one point: but some courage as well as caution is requisite to secure a freedom of thought, and open a passage to proficiency in any science. But you must not always take people at their word when they talk much of doubting, for this language is often used as a civiller way of contradicting than telling you bluntly that you are in an error, which they would be ready enough to do if they were not afraid of putting you out of humor. If you observe those people who pretend to be fullest of doubts you will find them most fond of that positive phrase, I will venture to say, and they employ both expressions with equal propriety, for as they never doubt of a thing without being perfectly sure it is false, so they never venture to say, unless when confident they run no hazard of being confuted. I am apt to think there never yet has really been such a monster in the world as a thorough skeptic; but he that doubts of what is agreed to by everybody else, does it upon being fully possessed of notions that never found admittance in any other head: and there is an air of positiveness in all skepticism, an unreserved confidence in the strength of those arguments that are alleged to overthrow all the knowledge of mankind. 5. Thus partial judgment springs from a feebleness either to retain former decisions in their original vigor, or to give due consideration to matters opposite to them; the one renders us credulous, and the other incredulous. This weakness being natural can never be totally cured, but may be helped by good management, therefore the blame lies in not applying our diligence to work as much amendment as is feasible. The first care should be to make our decisions maturely, for it is common through mere laziness to take them up in haste before they are half formed, and then there always remains a latent suspicion which renders them unable to maintain their ground against any specious opposition: but where there is a consciousness of the best information possible having been taken, it fixes their colors. beyond hazard of being faded by the approach of other objects. Then with respect to such of them as are of importance in our conduct or our future reasonings, the next point is to habituate the imagination to cast them up spontaneously with the same lively vigor wherein they were delivered to her by the understanding, which is what I have called turning conviction into persuasion. By this means we shall become less credulous of other persons, of the suggestions of passion and fancy, or appearances of the senses. For avoiding the other extreme it will be expedient to bear in mind that our surest decisions may possibly have deceived us, for there is nothing so certain as that we know nothing with infallible certainty in the next place to accustom ourselves to observe and examine upon a fair opportunity offering, and acquire a readiness to depart from old notions upon cogent reasons: I know such practice may sometimes endanger the simple being imposed upon by artful persons, but there is something lying within the sphere of every one's observation, and if he does not exercise himself therein. he can never learn, because all learning implies some alteration of the judgment for a sense of our ignorance and an aptness to learn upon information suited to our capacity I take to be the two best preservatives against incredulity. But it will be needful to stand always upon the guard against passion, inclination, and every habitual bias, for they will bring on a distempered weakness upon the faculties more hurtful than the natural; and I conceive it is in the freedom from those, in an exemption from tenaciousness of old notions and fondness for new ones, that sound judgment and discretion consist. CHAP. XXXIII. EMPLOYMENT OF TIME. To know the sources of our enjoyments, what things are good and useful for us, and to acquire an habitual diligence in procuring them, are certainly very valuable attainments, because they supply us with aims and desires which strike the brightest colors of our lives; but something further is wanting to fill up the spaces between, and make the whole an entire piece. For our desires do not always find fuel to feed on, materials and opportunities are not always to be had for carrying on our pursuits, and when they are ended, the joy of having gained our point can entertain us but a little while, ere we want fresh matter to engage us. The busy mind of man cannot rest in a state of indifference; if it has not satisfaction it will fall into uneasiness, and every fleeting moment must have its distinct portion of one or the other: it avails nothing to me now, how much I was delighted an hour ago, or shall be delighted an hour hence, without some present reflection on the future, or some different object to engage in the interval. Therefore I have laid down, that intense pleasures are not so valuable as generally apprehended, unless when they give scope for a length of agreeable pursuit, or furnish materials to the imagination and briskness to the spirits for our better entertainment afterwards, because else the benefit we receive from them lies shut up within a very small compass of time: but happiness must be computed upon the whole balance of pleasures and pains compared together, so that great delights with large vacuities of uneasiness between, may still leave the condition miserable. Hence appears that the true secret of happiness lies in contriving to be continually pleased rather than highly pleased, and this is best effected by providing constant employment for our time; for so long as the thoughts are employed in anything just sufficient to engage our attention, the mind is satisfied; it is only when there is a stoppage of motion, when there is nothing more desirable to be done than omitted, when under some pain or want without means discerned on any side to do something for removing them, that the time passes irksome and heavy: for things insipid are always displeasing as well to the mental taste as to the palate. The world commonly seek for engagement of their thoughts from external objects, circles of pleasures and amusing ideas suggested to their imagination; all these may do very well while there flows in an uninterrupted supply of them, and so long as they con |