these two considerations rendered necessary, it is the result of failure in practice to accomplish what I fully intended.

It would require a volume, instead of an essay, to go into the details and minutiae of systematic theology, respecting the doctrine of imputation at large. All its essential features, however, may be exhibited within a narrower compass; and I would hope that I have not left them out of view in the present discussion.

Will the reader bear patiently with me while I philologize? It will tax his patience in some measure, to follow the details of a full philological exhibition. Yet the result must be, if the matter is properly managed, a more full and confidential persuasion as to the real state of the subject in the Bible. I have undertaken, first of all, to show how the words in the Hebrew and Greek Scriptures, which signify impute, are employed in all the cases in which they are used. Fully to accomplish this purpose I must of course exhibit every instance in which they are employed in the Scriptures. If any one example is omitted, (I hope and trust there is none), it is the result of mere oversight and not of intention.

Having performed this task, which of course requires philological detail (although not a very protracted one), I proceed next to the inquiry, whether the doctrine of imputed sin or righteousness is indirectly taught, i. e. implied by, or to be justly and properly inferred from, other classes of texts in the Scriptures, which are usually adduced for the purpose of supporting it.

When this inquiry is finished, I shall conclude the piece with such remarks on the doctrine in question, and on the practical consequences of earnest and severe controversy respecting it, as the nature of the case and present circumstances seem to me to require.

I have every where spoken my views with freedom, i. e. without any reserve or attempt to conceal them, or in any case to employ diloyia. The ingenuous and noble minded, who may differ from me in opinion, will not set down this against me. I do not design to write an Irenicum in such a manner as shall promise to bring contending parties together, by speaking a language which both can interpret in their own way, and yet both hold their old opinions to their full extent. It must ever be merely a hollow peace which is made in this way; the 'wound of the daughter of God's people can be healed but

slightly' by such efforts. But a real Irenicum, i. e. an exhibition of scriptural truth as it is, is the high and holy object of my wishes. Imperfect, no doubt, are my efforts to attain this end; but, if I know myself, they are sincere. The Bible will triumph at last, come what may in the interim, over all the errors and misconceptions of men, over all that has been or may be taught contrary to it, and over every thing supererogatory which has been added to it. This is the true Irenicum-a judge to end strife, from which there ultimately can be no appeal.

One thing is certain in relation to the present Essay. Those who dissent from its conclusions are at full liberty to examine and discuss them. They will of course appeal to no Presbyteries, Synods, Councils partial or ecumenical, Systems of Theology, Fathers in the church of the patristical ages or of those of the reformation, Fathers Genevan or Hollandic, of Westminster or of Dort; to no Symbols ancient or modern, covered with the dust of ages or scoured bright by modern use. To all-all this, I demur at the outset. The Bible-and nothing but the Bibleis what the times, the Protestant religion, and the great Head of the Church demand.

Besides; I should not be examined, in such a case, upon the ground that I have taken. My appeal is to Scripture-to the unerring declarations of heaven. All else is church history, or doctrinal history; nothing more. It would only be telling what men fallible and uninspired have said and thought, and how they have argued and decided and symbolized. This may be a matter of interest, yea of great interest in its proper place. But here we go for the whole. We make our appeal to the highest court at the outset ; fully believing that all contention before the lower courts will only increase the expense, exhaust the resources, aggravate the difficulties, and embitter the spirit, of the litigant parties.

The field is open-this field-to any or all who may differ from me. At present I have only to say, that I do not utter a syllable of this, in order to provoke or challenge controversy. I have a sincere and hearty aversion to dispute. But I say it merely to shew, that I most cheerfully concede to all others the same liberty that I take myself. I arrogate nothing; Homo sum, et nihil alieni ab hominibus puto.

Have I said enough (most readers will probably think I have said too much) to explain my design, and vindicate my

motives? I have been forced by the times to re-examine the subject before us. In doing this, I have of course been obliged to extend my reading to the systematic treatises of theology upon it, and to doctrinal history; but the result at large of such reading, cannot find a proper place in this Miscellany. I begin my scriptural exhibition, first, with the passages in the Old Testament; in the second place, I shall proceed to those of the New.

§ 2. Use of the verb

in the Hebrew Scriptures.

The reason why this verb is chosen as the subject of investi gation, is, because it is the word in the Hebrew which most directly of all corresponds to our English words reckon to or impute.

It is proper to remark here, that I have not confined myself to the phraseology of our English version, in many of the quotations throughout, which are exhibited in the sequel. I have given a new version, however, only in those cases in which I supposed the shape of the original would in this way be made plainer to the reader. In a disquisition like the present, such a liberty will be cheerfully conceded by all who well understand the nature of the case. The question is not, what our English version says, but what do the original Scriptures affirm?

The primary and proper force of the word generically considered, seems to be to think, in any or every way; and then, secondly, to reckon or compute; (cogitare et supputare). So the word is employed in Chaldee, Syriac, Arabic, and Aethiopic; in all of which languages it exists, and is employed after the general manner of its usage in Hebrew. Scarcely any word in the Shemitish languages has better evidence of a widespread and altogether intelligible meaning than this one.

From the original or first and most generic signification, to think (cogitare), may easily and naturally be derived all the various shades or gradations of thinking, which are designated by English words that differ specifically from each other; e. g. (2) To think out, i. e. to devise or plan by thinking. (3) To think of, i. e. to regard with esteem, or to value. (4) To suppose, i. e. to regard in our thoughts any thing as possessing this or that quality, or to be like this or that, which is the same as to count, account, or reckon it as being this or that; and therefore we may, in such cases, properly translate by count,

In this

account, make account of, reckon, etc. (5) As kindred to these last meanings, to count to, to reckon to, to impute to. last case, however, the particle to which here follows these English verbs, is not properly contained in itself, (as it might seem to be from this representation), but is designated in Hebrew by the usual preposition before the Dative (), which signifies to, and which is prefixed to the noun that follows the verb

Thus in Gen. 15: 6, ib, and he counted (or imputed) it righteousness To him, i. e. as his righteousness. These various gradations and modifications of the original meaning of a (to think), are as many as appear to be necessary, in order fully to explain the force of this verb in all cases in which it is employed. We might indeed easily employ a greater variety of English phrases than is here exhibited; but in such a case, they would be nothing more than mere synonymes or equivalents for those terms which are here employed. My object is not to exhibit all the possible modes of expression in English, by which we may designate the idea conveyed by ; but to give the reader an exact account of all the real meanings which may properly be attached to this Hebrew word.

So deeply are the usual meanings of impressed upon it, that conjugation (passive forms only excepted, which merely turn the common active into a passive meaning), has none of the usual effect upon it. In Piel, for example, where it would be almost a matter of course to expect a modification of the meanings conveyed by the Kal form, there is a mere repetition of these meanings, for the most part, without scarcely the slightest apparent change; unless we say that Piel (from its reduplicate forms) asserts more intensely than Kal. Even this common modification is hardly warranted in full, by the examples that Piel affords in respect to the word before us. So much however may be said, viz., that no instance actually occurs, in which the meaning reckon to or impute is conveyed by a Piel form. But as all the other shades of meaning in Kal are designated by this conjugation, there can scarcely be room to doubt, that here too Piel might be employed in full accord with the meaning of Kal. The fact that we do not find an instance of it thus employed in the present volume of our Hebrew Scriptures, can hardly be reckoned as an argument against such a possible meaning of Piel, under circumstances like those which have been stated.

In endeavouring fully to exhibit the Scriptural use of an, I shall follow the natural order of meanings as exhibited above, first producing the examples of its primitive and generic signification, and then of the various modifications in succession under which this makes its appearance.

I. The verb means TO THINK, (COGITARE). Not simply the logical or theoretical meaning of this, however, is to be understood, viz. the exercise of the cogitative powers of the mind; but the actual forming of an opinion in the mind, the entertaining of this or that idea respecting any thing; like the δοκέω, δόξα, λογίζομαι, λογισμός, of the Greeks.

Of this generic signification the examples are not very numerous in the Hebrew Scriptures; but they are so plain that no doubt can well be raised respecting them. They are as follows:

Ps. 73: 16, When I thought to know this ;' i. e. when I formed an opinion that I could come to a satisfactory knowledge of it.*

Ps. 119: 59, 'I thought upon my ways;' in which case the verb (in Piel) may well be understood as denoting repetition of thought, i. e. reflection or reiterated thought.

Ps. 140: 5, 'Who think to thrust aside my feet;' i. e. who imagine or suppose that they shall be able to do it.

Is. 10: 7, 'His heart does not think or imagine so.'

Jer. 18: 8. 26: 3. 36: 3, 'The evil which I thought or intended to do to them.'

Jer. 29: 11, The thoughts which I think concerning you... are thoughts of peace.'

Jer. 49: 20. 50: 45, The thoughts which he has thought concerning you;' or these texts may be put to No. II. by rendering thus: The devices which he has devised.'

* When the number of chapter and verse is the same in Hebrew and English, the reader will find the passages cited, both in the English and Hebrew Bible, according to the references given. When there is a difference in the enumeration, the reference to the English Bible stands first, that to the Hebrew stands in a parenthesis immediately following it. The words printed in Italics, in the quotations, are those which correspond to some form of a in the original. I thought it unnecessary to repeat the Hebrew verb itself, in all the various quotations; as it would add nothing to the plainness or definiteness of the representation or proof.