preffed; and that in the New Testament it is expreffed with great plainnefs and perfpicuity, that he is GOD; and that, if the contrary of this were true, it might have been expreffed with great plainness and perfpicuity, that he is not GoD; fo that, on a fubject of this kind, there could be no room for difficulty or misunderstanding. Whatever may have been faid upon the fubject either on the one fide or the other, must be plain and intelligible; and it is impoffible, if the Sacred Writings fay that JESUS CHRIST is not GOD, that we should misunderstand their expreffion, as if they had faid he is God; or, if we should have been fo infatuated as to mifinterpret their expreffion, we ftill muft neceffarily have failed in our proofs. But, fo far are the Sacred Writings from denying our LORD's Divinity, that they pofitively affirm it; and the proofs of it we produce in plain unambiguous language, and call upon the adverfaries of this great truth to produce, I do not fay an equal number, but any one fingle paffage, which, in plain unambiguous language, declares, that JESUS CHRIST is not God; but no fuch paffage ever yet has been produced, and I am well perfuaded none fuch ever can; for the New Teftament contains none fuch. The requifition I apprehend, hath nothing of hardship or difficulty in it, when we call for a paffage in plain denial of the Divinity of JESUS CHRIST. When they call for paffages in proof of his Divinity, we find no difficulty in producing them. Would it not then be as

eafy

eafy to produce paffages which contradict it, if any fuch exifted? However, let us once more, and finally, take things their own way.

The doctrine of CHRIST'S Divinity it is impoffible to reconcile with our reafon, fo that it fhall not contradict it; and, as God has given us our reafon to be the standard of fuch truths as we receive, what contradicts our reafon we cannot receive as truth; and, as the doctrine of CHRIST'S Divinity certainly does contradict it, we, therefore, cannot admit it to be a truth.

Now all this feems to be very fair and plaufible. It certainly hath fome truth in it, but much of fallacy. For, undeniable it is, that we cannot receive as true what our reafon affures us is not true; and if the doctrine of CHRIST's Divinity depended merely on an appeal to our reafon and its judgement, I think there would be few or none found who could be prevailed upon to receive it as a true doctrine.

It is undeniable alfo, that God has given us our. reafon, to affift and to determine us in our judgement of what is, and of what is not truth. But, let it be remembered withal, that God hath not given it to us for the purpofe of judging, when he himfelf fpeaks to us, whether he fpeaks truth or not.. For, it is one of the firft and moft uncrring principles of our reason, that nothing but truth can come from

the God of Truth, fo that this primary judgement of our reafon renders all farther enquiry or judgement unneceffary and abfurd.

But it will be faid, if we are precluded from examining and judging of the doctrine by our reason, of what use is it that reason was given us in order to affift and determine us in the judgement of what is or is not truth? The communication of a doctrine to us is an appeal to our reafon, with which, if it does not correfpond, it may, and ought to be, rejected.

Here, then, in answer it is to be faid, that GoD in all his dealings with us, acteth with the utmost confiftency; that, in conformity with our primary established principle, that nothing but truth can come from him, when he communicates a doctrine. to us he ordains that we fhould have all the fatisfaction reason can require, that the perfon who communicates it has full authority, and really comes from himself. Hence he endows him with great and fupernatural gifts and powers, which he is to exhibit before us. From them our reafon is appealed to, to judge whether he indeed comes from God or not, and the decifion of true genuine reafon will be according to the evidence. If the evidence is full and copious, if it is such as to justify him to be a divine meffenger, reafon muft and will acquiefce, and acknowledge him to be a perfon fent from GOD for

the

the purpose of making a communication to us. If the evidence is otherwise, it will reject him, and, of course, pay no regard to any thing that he would communicate. It pays no regard to what he would communicate, because he has failed in his primary evidence of being a divine meffenger; which fhews plainly enough, that the primary evidence is the teft of the communication, and that the appeal to our reafon is in that, and not in the doctrine communicated; for, the doctrine communicated, if the primary evidence is established, reafon hath already determined must be true, because, by that evidence, it comes from the GoD of Truth. Now if reafon after this occupies itself in enquiring whether the doctrine thus communicated be true or false, it cannot but act not only with the utmost inconfiftency, but with the confummation of infolence and arrogance; for it then becomes neither more nor lefs than an enquiry whether the GoD of Truth may not be a deceiver, and communicate to us that which in itfelf is an actual falfehood; for, if it is otherwise, for what end is the enquiry made? It cannot be for the purpose of afcertaining the divine miffion of the perfon by whom the doctrine is communicated; for, that is already afcertained, and his divine miffion acknowledged; and, therefore, it can be for no other purpose but that which is here affigned. Should it be faid, that the enquiry into the doctrine communicated is made for the purpose of ftrengthening and confirming the primary evidence, and left

reafon fhould have erred, or been deceived in its judgement concerning it, this must be confidered merely as an evafion; for, if reafon could err or be deceived in its judgement of the primary evidence, fo likewife may it in its judgement of the doctrine communicated, and then what becomes of reafon as the standard of truth? If it can judge with certainty of the doctrine communicated, it can judge with certainty of the divine miffion; and if it cannot judge with certainty of the divine miffion, neither can it of the doctrine communicated. If reason, therefore, can judge with certainty in any cafe, it can judge with certainty of the divine miffion; and if it judges and determines the divine miffion to be true, and what it affumes to be, it, by that determination, judges its communications to be true likewife.

Now then, to apply this to our prefent purpose. If it is the determination of reafon that the writers of the New Teftament had the authority of a divine miffion for what they have written, it by that determination judges the doctrines which they have communicated to us to be true. Here, then, the queftion will turn upon this fingle point: What is it that they have written? Have they written, that JESUS CHRIST is GOD?

If they have, then reason pofitively has determined that he is GoD, because it has determined that what is written in the New Teftament is true; and therefore, after this, to urge

that