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and in whose possession the article to be searched for is supposed to be; it shall be made returnable as other criminal process is by law required to be, and the proceedings thereupon shall be as required in other cases of criminal complaint.

Code, s. 1172; 1868-9, c. 178, subc. 3, s. 39.

NOTE. For search warrant for seamen, see Crimes, s. 3557.

SEARCH WARRANT, WHEN GRANTED.-A search warrant in this state is to be granted only when a larceny is charged to have been committed. McDonald, 14 (3 Dev.), 468.

Before a search warrant can be granted oath must be made before the justice that a felony has been committed, and that the party complaining has probable cause to suspect that the stolen goods are in such a place, and the affidavit should show his reasons for the suspicion. McDonald, 14 (3) Dev.), 468.

SECRET POLITICAL SOCIETIES.

Sec. 938 (3439). Secret political societies.

If any person, for the purpose of compassing or furthering any political object, or aiding the success of any political party or organization, or resisting the laws, shall join or in any way connect or unite himself with any oath-bound secret political or military organization, society or association of whatsoever name or character, or shall form or organize or combine and agree with any other person or persons to form or organize any such organization, or as a member of any secret political or military party or organization shall use, or agree to use, any certain signs or grips or passwords, or any disguise of the person or voice, or any disguise whatsoever for the advancement of its object, and shall take or administer any extra-judicial oath or other secret, solemn pledge, or any like secret means, or if any two or more persons, for the purpose of compassing or furthering any political object, or aiding the success of any political party or organization, or for circumventing the laws, shall secretly assemble, combine or agree together, and the more effectually to accomplish such purposes, or any of them, shall use any certain signs, or grips, or passwords, or any disguise of the person or voice, or other disguise whatsoever; or shall take or administer any extra-judicial oath or other secret, solemn pledge, or if any persons shall band together and assemble to muster, drill or practice any military evolutions except by virtue of the authority of an officer recognized by law, or of an instructor in institutions or schools in which such evolutions form a part of the course of instruction, or if any person shall knowingly permit any of the

acts and things herein forbidden to be had, done or performed on his premises, or on any premises under his control, or if any person being a member of any such secret political or military organization shall not at once abandon the same and separate himself entirely therefrom, every person so offending shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and fined not less than ten nor more than two hundred dollars, or be imprisoned, or both, at the discretion of the

court.

Code, s. 1095; 1870-1, c. 133; 1868-9, c. 267; 1871-2, c. 143.

Sec. 939 (3354). Seduction.

SEDUCTION.

If any man shall seduce an innocent and virtuous woman under promise of marriage he shall be guilty of a felony, and upon conviction shall be fined or imprisoned at the discretion of the court, and may be imprisoned in the state's prison not exceeding the term of five years: Provided, the unsupported testimony of the woman shall not be sufficient to convict: Provided further, that marriage between the parties shall be a bar to further prosecution hereunder.

1885, c. 248.

INDICTMENT. An indictment for seduction under promise of marriage, under Revisal, section 3354, alleging that defendant feloniously seduced prosecutrix, an innocent and virtuous woman, under promise of marriage made by the defendant to prosecutrix, is not defective on the ground that it does not allege a marriage contract. Whitley, 141-823.

SUPPORTING TESTIMONY.-The testimony of the prosecutrix is sufficiently supported by testimony of the mother of the prosecutrix that defendant admitted in her hearing both the promise and seduction. Raynor, 145-.

WOMAN MUST BE VIRTUOUS AS WELL AS INNOCENT.-The prosecutrix must not only be innocent but virtuous, and this implies something more in her conduct than mere innocence of illicit sexual intercourse; she must be pure and chaste as well as innocent, and if she willingly surrenders her chastity, prompted by her own lustful passions, or any other motive than that produced by a promise of marriage, she is in pari delicto, and the mere promise of marriage would not make it seduction. Ferguson, 107-841.

It is not error to refuse to add to the definition of a virtuous woman as one "who has never had illicit intercourse and who is chaste and pure," the words "and she must have a mind free from lustful and lascivious desires." The law looks at conduct, and motive only as shown by conduct, and not at thoughts undisclosed and natural impulses not acted on. Crowell, 116— 1052.

EVIDENCE. Evidence that the prosecutrix, on one occasion before the alleged seduction, was seen to be intoxicated is inadmissible. Garland, 95-671.

Evidence that the prosecutrix made statements repugnant to her testimony to an elder in the church of which she was a member, who visited her in his official capacity to investigate the charge of seduction against his pastor, is competent. Ib.

Parol evidence of the contents of a note written by the prosecutrix appointing an assignation with a third person is competent for the purpose of attacking the character of the prosecutrix, since the contents of the note are purely collateral. Ferguson, 107—841.

One H testified for the defense that he had sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix prior to the date of the alleged seduction. One U for the state testified that in a conversation with him the said H had stated in reply to a question that he had never had illicit intercourse with the prosecutrix and that she was a lady. Another witness for the state was allowed to testify that he was near H and U at the time of the conversation, and that, hearing the name of the prosecutrix mentioned, he went near to the parties and heard H say, "It is not so. I always found her to be a lady." The latter testimony was objected to as fragmentary: Held, that the testimony was competent since it contained the whole matter in dispute and nothing H could have said could have explained it to mean anything other than that the prosecutrix was a virtuous woman so far as he knew. Robertson, 121–551.

It is competent for the state to show that there was sexual intercourse between the parties subsequent to the first alleged act. Robertson, 121-551.

For the purpose of corroborating the prosecutrix, it was competent for her mother to testify that the prosecutrix told her that she was going to marry the defendant, but that he could not marry her then, as he was in trouble with another woman. Kincaid, 142—657.

Evidence offered by the state before the defendant had become a witness, of his declarations to the prosecutrix acknowledging the obligation to marry her, but giving his relations with another woman as an excuse for postponing the ceremony, was competent. Kincaid, 142-657.

It was competent to ask a state's witness, on cross-examination, who had not testified as to the general character of the prosecutrix, whether there was not a report in the neighborhood derogatory to her character. Whitley, 141–

823.

Statements made by the prosecutrix to her mother after the seduction that defendant had promised to marry her, and that she loved him, were competent to corroborate her testimony on the trial. Whiley, 141-823.

It was competent for the prosecutrix to testify under what inducements and circumstances she yielded to defendant. Whitley, 141-823.

It is competent for the prosecutrix, in answer to a question as to why she yielded, to say that she could not help it, and that defendant said he was not going to fool her, but was going to marry her. Raynor, 145-.

The court, in its discretion, may allow prosecutrix to repeat her testimony that she yielded on account of defendant's promise to marry her. Raynor,

145-.

It is competent to ask the defendant on cross-examination if he had not transferred his property to avoid the result of the indictment. Kincaid, 142

657.

DEFINITION OF INNOCENT AND VIRTUOUS-HARMLESS ERROR.-The court correctly charged that a virtuous woman is one who has never had illicit intercourse with any man, and that an innocent woman means that, although there may have been a marriage contract, yet if the prosecutrix yielded on account of lust or from any other motive than of the promise of marriage she would not be innocent within the meaning of the statute. Whether or not his Honor did not interchange the words virtuous and innocent, the defendant can not complain of a harmless error. Whitley, 141-823.

PROMISE NEED NOT BE EXPRESS.-It is not necessary for the state to show the defendant directly and expressly promised prosecutrix to marry her if she would submit to his embraces, but it is sufficient if the jury, under the evidence, can fairly infer that the seduction was accomplished by reason of the promise, giving to the defendant the benefit of any reasonable doubt. Ring, 142-596.

PROMISE OF LONG STANDING.-Where the evidence shows that the prosecutrix trusted to the defendant's pledge that he would never forsake her and to his promise of marriage when she permitted him to accomplish her ruin, a conviction was proper, and the mere fact that the promise existed long before the seduction can make no difference, if he afterwards took advantage of it to effect his purpose. Ring, 142–596.

DEFENDANT'S RELATIONS WITH ANOTHER WOMAN.-The defendant's illicit relations with another woman, proved by his declarations to the prosecutrix, were properly the subject of comment by counsel. Kincaid, 142-657.

INDECENT FAMILIARITIES.-The court correctly charged the jury that prosecutrix permitted familiarities not amounting to incontinence in fact was a matter to be considered by them in passing upon the question whether she was a virtuous woman. Whitley, 141-823.

CHARGE.-Defendant asked an instruction beginning: "If the jury believes the testimony" of a witness. The instruction was modified as follows: "If the jury believe from the testimony" of the witness: Held, no error. Horton, 100-443.

PROMISE OBTAINED BY FRAUD.-The statute embraces a seduction under a promise of marriage in the nature of a deceit, though if the intercourse is by force the statute does not apply. Horton, 100–443.

CONSENT. Consent of the female to the illicit intercourse is no defense. Horton, 100-443.

CHARGE EVIDENCE.-Where the evidence is that prosecutrix had a child which resembles defendant; that he admitted a promise of marriage, but said he did it only for "devilment," and that prosecutrix's character is good, it is not error to refuse a request to charge the jury that there was no evidence to support the indictment. Horton, 100-443.

CHILD MAY BE EXHIBITED.-Where the prosecutrix has had a child which resembles the defendant, the child may be exhibited to the jury. Horton, 100-443.

THE PROMISE.-It is the seduction under promise of marriage which constitutes the crime, and as to the promise to marry, it is not sufficient that the prosecutrix should be corroborated, but she must be supported by independent facts or circumstances. Ferguson, 107-841.

PUNISHMENT. The statute does not authorize both fine and imprisonment. Crowell, 116-1052.

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.-Deceit being the very essence of the offense, the statute exempting certain crimes, including deceit, from the two years limitation, applies to the offense of seduction. Crowell, 116-1052.

SELLING DISEASED ANIMALS.

Sec. 940 (3295). Contagious disease, having, sold.

If any person shall sell, or offer for sale, or shall use, or expose, or cause or procure to be sold or offered for sale, or to be used or exposed, any horse or other animal having the disease known as

glanders or farcy, or any other contagious or infectious disease known by such person to be dangerous to life, or which shall be diseased past recovery, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction shall be fined not more than fifty dollars or imprisoned not more than thirty days.

Code, s. 2488; 1891, c. 65; 1881, c. 368, s. 7.

SELLING DISEASED MEAT.

Sec. 941 (3442). Diseased animals, meat of.

If any person shall knowingly and willfully slaughter any diseased animal and sell or offer for sale any of the meat of such diseased animal for human consumption; or if any person knows that the meat offered for sale or sold for human consumption by him is that of any diseased animal he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and fined or imprisoned, or both, in the discretion of the

court.

1905, c. 303.

SELLING WEAPONS TO MINORS.

Sec. 942 (3832). Weapons to a minor.

If any person shall knowingly sell or offer for sale, give or in any way dispose of to a minor any pistol or pistol cartridge, brass knucks, bowie-knife, dirk, loaded cane, or sling-shot, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.

1893, c. 514.

SEPARATION OF JURY.

It is not a separation for the jury to go in a body, under the care of the officer, a mile and a half into the country for recreation. Perry, 44-330.

Where two jurors in a capital case left the rest of the jury for fifteen or twenty minutes, but did not speak to any one about the prisoner or his trial, nor hear any one speak of them, the trial judge having refused a new trial on this ground, the supreme court will affirm the judgment. Hester, 47-83.

SEPARATION OF WITNESSES.

A witness who has been in court and heard the examination of the other witnesses may be examined, notwithstanding an order has been made for a separation of witnesses, and that they be sent out of the hearing of the court. Sparrow, 7 (3 Murph.), 487.

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