The facts that a defendant was in arrest, and secured by hand-cuff placed on one hand, and connected by a chain with a buggy in which he was riding with the officer who had in his pocket the warrant under which he had been committed to jail on a charge of larceny, do not of themselves constitute duress sufficient to exclude confessions made under such circumstances, there being no threat or advantageous offer to arouse hope or excite fear. Whitfield, 109-876.

JUDGE DECIDES WHETHER CONFESSIONS ADMISSIBLE-WHEN HE MAY BE REVIEWED. What amounts to such threats or promises as render confessions inadmissible as being not voluntary; what evidence the judge will hear to establish the facts of threats or promises, and whether there be any evidence to show that the confessions are not voluntary, are questions of law, and the decisions of the judge upon them are subject to review in the supreme court.

Whether the evidence, if true, proves the fact of threats or promises: whether the witnesses testifying to the court as to such facts are worthy of credit; and, in case of conflict, which of them is to be believed, are questions of fact for the judge, and his decision upon them is not subject to review. Andrew, 61 (Phil. Law), 205.

PROMISE TO MARRY DEFENDANT IF HE WOULD CONFESS.-The promise of a female to marry the prisoner on condition that he would confess his crime to her is not sufficient to exclude such confessions, since the promise is only of some collateral advantage entirely disconnected from the charge. Hardee, 83-619.

14. CONFESSION ON CROSS-EXAMINATION.

Where a person suspected of murder was arrested and brought before a jury of inquest as a witness and subjected to a rigid examination, his testimoney thus given can not be used against him on trial for the offense. Young 60-126.

15. COPY OF PUBLICATIONS.

Evidence that a copy of a magazine, of the same date as a copy of the same magazine found at defendant's house with two leaves torn out, contains the same matter on the pages corresponding in number with the pages alleged to have been cut from the magazine at defendant's house and found at the scene of the crime with which defendant is charged, is competent, without proving the unmutilated copy by the publishers. Dixon, 131–811.

16. CORPORATIONS.

Where a corporation is a party to an action it must be described by its corporate name exactly, but where it is simply referred to in an action to which it is not a party, it is sufficient to describe it in such a manner as to identify it. Rout, 10 (3 Hawks), 618.

17. CORROBORATION.

The former statements of a witness made without the sanction of an oath, similar to those made on the stand may be admitted in evidence, if he is impeached, to sustain the personal credibility of the witness, but not for the purpose of confirming his statement as to the facts sworn to on the trial. Such testimony is not admissible to confirm the statement of another witness testifying to the same effect. Parish, 79-610.

A witness who has been impeached may be corroborated by showing that he made similar statements at other times, and may prove the statements by himself. Rowe, 98-629.

It is competent to show that the prisoner made false and contradictory statements in reference to the crime with which he is charged. Ib.

Corroboration by proving consistent statements made at other times can not be considered as substantive evidence of the truth of the facts any more than other hearsay evidence. Parish, 79-610. Rowe, 98-629.

Even the witness impeached may testify as to consistent statements previously made. Whitfield, 92-831. Rowe, 98–629.

Corroborating evidence is not confined to cases where the adverse party produces evidence of statements made by the witness inconsistent with what he testified to on the trial, but such evidence may be offered at once by the party introducing the witness. Whitfield, 92-831.

Where the credibility of a witness is attacked, from the nature of his evidence, from his situation, from bad character, from proof of previous inconsistent statements, or from imputations directed against him on crossexamination, the party who has introduced him may prove other consistent statements for the purpose of corroborating him. George, 30 (8 Ired.), 324. March v. Harrell, 46 (1 Jones), 329. Twitty, 9 (2 Hawks), 449.

Where written orders are introduced on the trial as corroborative evidence, such orders need not be proved. Capps, 71–93.

It is competent to corroborate a witness whose credibility is attacked by the character of the cross-examination by showing by his own testimony that he made similar statements soon after the occurrence. Maultsby, 130-664.

18. CRIMINATING EVIDENCE.

Evidence of defendants taken before referees tending to criminate the defendants is not rendered incompetent like such evidence taken in supplementary proceedings. Mallett, 125-722.

19. DECLARATIONS OF OTHERS.

What was said by a third person in the presence and hearing of the defendant is admissible. Ludwick, 61 (Phil.), 401.

The state has a right to prove the whole of a conversation that took place between the witness and the accused, although in that same conversation the witness in answer to questions asked by the accused expresses the opinion that the prisoner committed the crime and gave his reasons for that opinion. Williams, 68-60.

On indictment for infanticide, testimony that the witness heard the mother of the accused say, in the presence of accused, that "she had a child this way before and put it away,' to which the prisoner made no reply, is inadmissible, since it is evidence of a distinct substantive offense. Shuford, 69– 486.

What bystanders said immediately after the commission of a homicide is not competent evidence. Dunlop, 65-288.

Evidence that the witness told defendant that defendant's daughter had told witness that defendant had stolen certain property is competent, since defendant was entitled to he benefit of any reply he made to the charge. Orrell, 75-317.

Where declarations made in the presence of the defendant are given in evidence, it is proper to leave it to the jury to say whether defendant heard such declarations; also to determine what value should be attached to the circumstance as proof of guilt and what defendant's conduct was at the time. Bowman, 80-432.

Evidence directly tending to show that a third party committed the crime is admissible for the defendant. Davis, 77-483.

But declarations of a third party that he committed the crime are not admissible. Boon, 80-461.

Where one of two defendants submits it is not competent to introduce the record of his submission on the trial of his co-defendant as evidence confirmatory of the prosecutrix. Queen, 66-615.

Evidence that the measurement of certain tracks had been applied to the brother of the defendant, who had been at first arrested for the offense, and that the measurement did not correspond, is not admissible. England, 78

552.

FLIGHT AND CONFESSION OF THIRD PERSON.-Evidence that after the commission of the crime another person living in the neighborhood fled, is not competent for defendant, nor is it competent for defendant to prove that such third person made a confession. May, 15 (4 Dev.), 328.

The declaration of the grandmother of one who is charged to be a person of color that his mother was the offspring of a white man and herself, is not competent on that question. Walters, 25 (3 Ired.), 455.

20. DEFENDANT'S DECLARATIONS.

Declarations of a party accused of a crime made in his own favor after the time of the alleged commission of the crime are not evidence for him. Hildreth, 31 (9 Ired.), 440. Brandon, 53 (8 Jones), 463.

What a man says when charged with crime is competent evidence for him. Worthington, 64-594.

Declarations of defendant, made after the commission of alleged perjury, repeating the statement made under oath, are incompetent, notwithstanding the state has introduced conflicting declarations. Rickett, 74-187.

Where a witness is impeached, either by contradictory testimony, or by an attack on his character, his declarations to a third person, made soon after the transaction, may be stated by himself and afterwards shown by such third person by way of corroboration. Staton, 114-813.

The declarations of a prisoner made immediately after and not during the transaction constituting the offense with which he is charged are not admissible in evidence, except as corroborative of his evidence if he has availed himself of the privilege of testifying in his own behalf. Edwards, 112–901. Defendant's own account of the transaction related immediately after it occurred is incompetent, though no third person was present. Tilley, 25 (3 Ired.), 424.

Where a person is charged with an offense, and this evidence is produced against him, he has a right to have what he said in response proven. Worthington, 64-594. Patterson, 63-520. McNair, 93-628.

The admission of a voluntary declaration of the defendant that if he ever got out of this scrape he would never get in jail again; that when he left jail before he did not intend to get back, and that he was in jail three years ago for killing a girl, is harmless, since it does not tend to prove or disprove the crime charged. Smith, 138-700.

21. DEFENDANT'S ACTS.

It is not error to permit a witness for the state to testify that, in consequence of statements made to him by the defendant, he and defendant went to a certain place in the woods when defendant pointed out to him the stolen hog. Lindsey, 78-499.

A defendant under arrest for stealing corn may be compelled by the officer having him in charge to put his foot in a track found in the field for the

purpose of comparison, and the result of that comparison is admissible evidence on the trial against the defendant. Graham, 75–646.

Evidence of the acts of persons accused of murder, as well as their declarations, may be excluded when the acts or confessions were the result of the influence of hope or fear, and where the record is silent on the point whether the trial judge determined the question preliminary to the admission of such evidence as to whether such acts or confessions were the result of hope or fear excited, it will be presumed that he admitted the evidence without a determination of the preliminary question, and his action will be reviewed. Crowson, 98-595.

The court has no right to compel a defendant to exhibit himself to the jury. Jacobs, 50 (5 Jones), 259.

SILENCE WHEN ACCUSED.-Where a person is charged with a crime and makes no denial, his silence is a circumstance which may be left to the jury. Swink, 19 (2 D. & B.), 1.

It is competent to show the condition of defendant's hand at the time of holding the inquest, she having declared it was burnt, when in fact it was not, though she was made to exhibit her hand by the coroner despite her objection. Garrett, 71-85.

A defendant under arrest for stealing corn may be compelled by the officer having him in charge to put his boot or shoe in a track found in the field for the purpose of comparison, and the result of that comparison is admissible evidence on the trial against the defendant. Graham, 74-646.

Silence when accused of a crime is a circumstance to be considered by the jury, together with other circumstances, in deciding the question of guilt. Swink, 22 (2 D. & B.), 9.

The state may show that defendant was seen at different places, by different witnesses, at short distances apart. Boggan, 120-590.

Evidence of footprints near the scene of the crime is admissible, though it is not shown that the defendant made tracks similar to those found. Daniels, 134-641.

A person accused of crime may be compelled to uncover and exhibit his hand alleged to have been burned, to put his foot in a track, or allow his foot to be measured, or to produce stolen goods, or disclose their hiding place, and the like, and witnesses may testify as to what was observed or discovered by such acts. Garrett, 71-87.

Evidence that defendant was present and saw the confusion manifested by his father when told that deceased was not yet dead is competent. Adair, 66-298.

22. DEFENDANT BOUND BY HIS TESTIMONY.

Statements of witnesses brought by the defendant in support of his defense are to be treated as his own account of the transaction. Augel, 29 (7 Ired.), 32.

23. DISCREDITING OWN WITNESS.

While a party may not discredit his own witness, still he can show the facts to be different from those testified to by such witness. Mace, 118

1244.

The state may discredit its own witness by showing that on former occasions he had made different statements to that in court. Norris, 2 (1 Hay.),

495.

Where a solicitor for the state, as upon affidavit, asserts upon the authority of a witness, who is present, any matter material to the issue, and afterwards such witness testifies differently, it is competent to introduce testimony to show the diversity to discredit the witness. McQueen, 46 (1 Jones), 177.

24. DYING DECLARATION.

Where a wounded person has been told by a physician that his injury is fatal, and states himself that the wound will produce death, his dying declarations are properly received in evidence. Finley, 118-1161.

A witness who proposes to testify as to dying declarations can refresh his memory by looking at a deposition of deceased, taken in his presence, although such deposition is not competent as evidence in chief. It is not essential that the witness should himself have written the deposition. Finley, 118—

1161.

A charge that dying declarations should be received “cautiously, not superstitiously," is a sufficient response to a prayer that they be received with caution. Whitson, 111-695.

Dying declarations written down at the time can be used only to refresh the witness's memory. Whitson, 111-695.

Although a conversation which took place between a witness and the deceased immediately after the latter was fatally wounded, in which he described the number and location of his wounds and the character of his sufferings and stated his belief that he was killed (it being in evidence that he died 48 hours after the wounds inflicted), was not a part of the res gestae, yet it, as well as the statement of what deceased said about the transaction, would have been competent as dying declarations. Whitt, 113-716.

Where deceased told his physician that he knew he was going to die, his declaration made afterwards is not rendered inadmissible by the fact that the physician told him that he thought deceased would die but hoped he would not, and that another person told him his physician had hopes for him. Caldwell, 115-794.

Declarations of deceased that he was poisoned by certain individuals, not made immediately previous to his death but at a time when he despaired of his recovery and felt assured his disease would prove fatal, are admissible. Poll, 8 (1 Hawks), 442.

An affidavit made by deceased before a magistrate immediately after wounds from which he subsequently died, was admissible as corroborative of declarations, made on the same afternoon, in contemplation of death, although he expressed no expectation of death at the time of making such affidavit. Craine, 120-601.

Where deceased made statements in contemplation of impending death, such declarations did not subsequently become incompetent because, contrary to his expectations, he lived five months afterwards. Craine, 120-601.

The exclamation of one who is killed made simultaneously with the infliction of the mortal wound and immediately preceding his death, in the presence of his slayers, is competent as a dying declaration, and also as a statement made in the presence of the accused. Mace, 118-1244.

WHEN JUDGE'S DECISION REVIEWABLE.-The decision of the trial judge as to the admissibility of the declarations of a deceased person, made just before death, comprises a decision both of fact and of law. Of fact, as to what were the declarations, and as to the circumstances under which they were made. Of law, as to whether the declarations were admissible alone or in connection with the circumstances. On the former his decision is final; on the latter it is subject to review. Williams, 67-12.

RESTRICTED TO THE ACT OF KILLING.-Dying declarations must be restricted to the act of killing and the circumstances immediately attending the act and forming a part of the res gestae. Shelton, 47 (2 Jones), 360.

ONLY ADMISSIBLE WHEN DECLARANT COULD HAVE TESTIFIED TO SAME THING. The dying declaration of the deceased, who was shot at night in a house from the outside through an aperture in the logs, that "It was E. W.