presence of the court, and directly tending to interrupt its proceedings, or to impair the respect due to its authority.

2. Behavior of the like character committed in the presence of any referee or referees, while actually engaged in any trial or hearing pursuant to the order of any court, or in the presence of any jury while actually sitting for the trial of a cause, or upon any inquest or other proceeding authorized by law.

3. Any breach of the peace, noise or other disturbance directly tending to interrupt the proceedings of any court.

4. Willful disobedience of any process or order lawfully issued by any court.

5. Resistance willfully offered by any person to the lawful order or process of any court.

6. The contumacious and unlawful refusal of any person to be sworn as a witness, or when so sworn, the like refusal to answer any legal and proper interrogatory.

7. The publication of grossly inaccurate reports of the proceedings in any court, about any trial, or other matter pending before said court; made with intent to misrepresent or to bring into contempt the said court; but no person can be punished as for a contempt in publishing a true, full and fair report of any trial, argument, decision or proceeding had in court.

8. Misbehavior of any officer of the court in any official transaction.

The several acts, neglects and omissions of duty, malfeasances, misfeasances, and nonfeasances, above specified and described, shall be the only acts, neglects and omissions of duty, malfeasances, misfeasances and nonfeasances which shall be the subject of contempt of court. And if there be any parts of the common law now in force in this state which recognized other acts, neglects, omissions of duty, malfeasances, misfeasances and nonfeasances besides those specified and described above, the same are hereby repealed and annulled.

Any person adjudged to be guilty of contempt under this section shall have the right to appeal to the supreme court in the same manner as is provided for appeals in criminal actions: Provided, that such right of appeal shall not apply to the contempt described and defined in subsections one, two, three and six: Provided further, that such right of appeal shall not apply to the contempt described and defined in subsections four and five, if such contempt shall be committed in the presence of the court: Provided further, that in all cases where a rule for contempt is issued by any court, referee or other officer the solicitor shall appear for the court or

other officer issuing the rule, and in case of appeal to the supreme court the attorney general shall appear for the court or other officer by whom the rule was issued.

Code, s. 648; 1905, c. 449.

COSTS PRIMA FACIE GUILTY.-One who is prima facie guilty of a contempt in disobeying an order of court may be required to pay the costs, though he purge himself of any intentional disobedience to the order and the rule is discharged. Bond v. Bond, 69-97.

COUNTY COMMISSIONERS-MANDAMUS.-County commissioners can not be put in contempt for failure to pay a debt against the county in obedience to a writ of mandamus, when the fund raised by taxation is the full constitutional limit, and all of it is required to meet the necessary expenses of the county government. Cromartie v. Commissioners, 87-134.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED BY SUPREME COURT BECOMES FINAL.-After a judg ment of a subordinate court imposing a punishment for disobedience of its order has been affirmed by the supreme court it becomes final, and the superior court has no power to remit or modify it. Griffin, 98-225.

ADVICE OF ATTORNEY NO EXCUSE.-A party who intentionally violates an interlocutory judgment of the court is guilty of contempt, although he may have acted in good faith upon professional advice honestly given. Green v. Griffin, 95-50.

ALIMONY NOT A DEBT.-An allowance decreed to a wife pending an action by her against her husband for divorce is not a debt within the meaning of the constitution, and the defendant may be held to answer a rule for contempt in default of payment. Pain v. Pain, 80-322.

FINDINGS OF FACT BY JUSTICE NOT CONCLUSIVE.—Though on appeal from the superior to the supreme court the findings of fact by the superior court are conclusive, it is otherwise on appeal from a subordinate court to the superior court, since the case is to be heard in the superior court de novo, and it is the duty of the judge to review the findings of fact of the subordinate court as well as the rulings of law, and the judge, in furtherance of justice, may hear additional testimony, either orally or by affidavit, in making up his own findings of fact. Deaton, 105-59.

CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT REFUSING TO SEND TRANSCRIPT.-A clerk who willfully refuses to make out the transcript of a record on appeal may be attached for contempt. Te-gan-tossee v. Rogers, 2 Hawks, 567.

DISAVOWAL OF INTENT NOT SUFFICIENT, WHEN.-One who willfully disobeys a judicial mandate is guilty of contempt whether an indignity to the court or contempt of its authority was intended or not, and a disavowal of the imputed intent can not purge the contempt nor exonerate the defendant. The rule that a disavowal of the intent purges the contempt is confined to "the class of cases where the intention to injure constitutes the gravamen" of the offense. Baker v. Cordon, 86-116.

MISTAKE AS TO THE MEANING of Doubtful LANGUAGE AN EXCUSE.-A mistaken interpretation of doubtful language used in an order of court is a defense to a charge for contempt in disobeying the order, but where the language is plain and the attempt is made to escape the force and defeat the manifest purposes of the order by indirection, the penalty must be enforced, or the court would be unable to perform many of its most important functions. Baker v. Cordon, 86-116.

JURY NOT ALLOWED.-The defendant in contempt proceedings is not entitled to a jury trial upon the controverted facts, though the judge, in his discretion, may avail himseilf of a jury and have their verdict upon a disputed and doubtful matter of fact. Deaton, 105-59.

FAILURE TO PAY MONEY INTO COURT UNDER ORDER.-Where a party is ordered to pay money into court or be attached for contempt in failing to

do so, and swears that after every effort it is out of his power to pay it, the rule will be discharged, since the court will not require an impossibility nor imprison a man perpetually for a debt; but where, on a return to the rule, he does not swear that he can not borrow the money, but does show that he has some personal property, though exempt from seizure under final process for the payment of debts, the rule will not be discharged, since his personal property exemption is not more sacred than the money which he wrongfully withholds. Smith v. Smith, 92-304.

ASSAULT.-A person may be punished for contempt for an assault committed in the presence of the court, though he may have been already punished for the assault. Yancey, 1—133.

ABUSE OF PROCESS-EXTORTION.-An officer abusing process as by oppressing parties, or committing extortion, fraud or malpractice, may be punished for contempt. Yancy, 1-133.

LLBEL.-Libeling a party to a cause amounts to a contempt of court. Yancey, 1-133.

CONSTITUTION-TAMPERING WITH JURY.-Giving hand-bills, on a day before the beginning of a term of court, to a juror summoned to serve at such term when a case in which respondent is interested stands for trial, with a request to read the same and hand to the other jurors, said hand-bills containing an account of the suit prejudicial to the adverse party, does not constitute a contempt within the meaning of this statute; and the statute by confining such offense to the acts specified therein, and thus depriving the court of the inherent power to punish for contempt one who attempts, by improper influences brought to bear on a juror, to prevent the course of justice, is not in conflict with Const. N. C., art. 4, section 12, providing that "the general assembly shall have no power to deprive the judicial department of any power of jurisdiction which rightly pertains to it as a co-ordinate department of the government," since the power to punish by a criminal prosecution for an attempt to corruptly influence the administration of justice will afford as ample protection to the court as the exercise of the denied power to act summarily after the pepetration of an act not committed during a session of the court. Oldham, 89-23.

INABILITY TO COMPLY WITH AN ORDER OF COURT.-A rule was obtained for alleged contempt in not performing a judgment of court, based on an affidavit declaring a belief that the respondent "is able and has sufficient means" to do so, but which set forth no facts upon which such belief was grounded, and in answer the respondent made affidavit that his inability to perform the judgment resulted from his misfortune and necessitous condition, and that he had no intention or desire to injure the opposing party or disobey the mandate of the court: Held, that the rule should have been discharged. Boyett v. Vaughan, 89-27.

ANSWER-INTENTION MATERIAL.-In a rule to show cause why a person snall not be punished for contempt the actual intention of the respondent is material, in which respect it differs from an indictment for the like offense; therefore, where the respondent meets the words of the rule by disavowing upon oath any intention of committing a contempt of the court, or of impairing the respect due to its authority, the rule must be discharged. Ex parte Moore, 63-397.

DEFAULTING WITNESS MAY APPEAL.-From analogy to cases in which prosecutors are taxed with costs, an appeal from a judgment in a proceeding for contempt against a defaulting witness in a prosecution against R should. be entitled "State v. R.; appeal by A, defaulting witness." Aiken, 113—651. MAYOR MAY PUNISH.-The authority to punish for contempt given to justices by section 651 of The Code, is extended to mayors by section 3818 of The Code. Aiken, 113-651.

OFFICERS. An officer who refuses to obey an order of the court directing him to return the process on and bond on a ca. sa. on the first day of the

court, instead of the second, as the law requires, and who sends a contemptuous message to the court in reply to its order, may be fined for contempt. Ex parte Summers, 27 (5 Ire.), 149.

MAY BE DISCHARGED ON HABEAS CORPUS.-Where the court states the facts on which it acts in a proceeding for contempt, a revising tribunal may, on habeas corpus, discharge the parties, if it clearly appear that the facts do not amount to a contempt. Ex parte Summers, 27 (5 Ire.), 149.

CLERK REFUSING TO MAKE TRANSCRIPT.-Where the clerk of the superior court willfully refuses to make out the transcript on appeal, the supreme court will on affidavit and motion, grant a rule upon him to show cause why he should not be attached for contempt. Te-gan-tosse v. Rogers, 9 (2 Hawks),

567.

PRACTICE EXPLAINED.-The statute and punishment construed, practice explained, and the sufficiency of the return considered. Kane v. Haywood, 66-1.

APPEAL.—Â judgment imposing a punishment for contempt committed in open court is final, and can not be reviewed either by appeal or certiorari. The power to commit or fine for a contempt is essential to the existence of every court, and must necessarily be exercised in a summary manner. Woodfin, 27 (5 Ired.), 199.

Defendant has no right of appeal when the contempt is committed in the presence of the court. Mott, 49 (4 Jones), 439.

Where the contempt is committed in the presence of the court, or near enough to impede or interfere with its business, no appeal lies to any other court. Deaton, 105-59.

Sec. 139 (940). Punishment.

Punishment for contempt for matters set forth in the preceding section shall be by fine not to exceed two hundred and fifty dollars, or imprisonment not to exceed thirty days, or both, in the discretion of the court.

Code, s. 649.

Sec. 140 (941). Court may punish summarily.

Contempt committed in the immediate view and presence of the court may be punished summarily, but the court shall cause the particulars of the offense to be specified on the record, and a copy of the same to be attached to every committal, attachment or process in the nature of an execution founded on such judgment or order.

Code, s. 650.

Sec. 141 (942). Who may punish.

Every justice of the peace, referee, commissioner, clerk of the superior court, inferior court, criminal court, or judge of the superior court, or justice of the supreme court, or board of commissioners of each county, or corporation commissioner, shall have power to punish for contempt while sitting for the trial of causes or engaged in official duties.

Code, ss. 651, 652.

PROBATE COURT MAY PUNISH FOR CONTEMPT.—A public administrator, after order made for his removal and the appointment of another in his place, may be ordered to make return and settlement of estates in his hands, and a refusal to obey such order is a contempt which the probate court has the power to punish. Brinson, 73-278.

MAYOR MAY PUNISH FOR CONTEMPT.—The mayor of a town has jurisdiction to punish for contempt, though not named among the officers having that power as prescribed in this statute, since every court inherently possesses such power independent of statutory enactment, besides, under the Revisal of 1905, section 2934, a mayor is constituted an inferior court and given the powers of a justice of the peace. Deaton, 105-59.

WITNESS BEFORE REFEREE REFUSING TO ANSWER.-Where, in proceedings supplementary to execution, a witness is examined before a referee appointed to take and certify the examination of such witness and to make discovery concerning the property and effects of a certain corporation, the defendant in the execution, said witness being the treasurer and agent of the corporation, no trial can be said to take place before the referee, and a contempt in refusing to answer questions on such examination must be punished by the court making the reference. La Fontaine v. Southern Underwriters, 83–132. Sec. 142 (943). Order to show cause when not committed in presence of court.

Whenever the contempt shall not have been committed in the immediate presence of the court, or so near as to interrupt its business, proceedings thereupon shall be by an order directing the offender to appear, within reasonable time, and show cause why he should not be attached for contempt. At the time specified in the order, the person charged with the contempt may appear and answer, and, if he fail to appear and show good cause why he should not be attached for the contempt charged, he shall be punished as provided in this chapter.

Code, s. 653.

COURT CAN NOT FIND THE EXISTENCE OF AN INTENT DISAVOWED IN THE ANSWER. Respondent having been served with a rule to show cause why he should not be attached for contempt for failure, in obedience to a writ of habeas corpus, to produce the body of a child alleged to be in the custody of himself and its grandmother, answered on oath that if his course in the matter was wrong it was through ignorance and with no disrespect to the court nor disposition to disobey its orders. On the hearing the court found as facts that respondent, after service of the habeas corpus on him, sent notice to the grandmother in whose possession the child then was to enable her to avoid service of the habeas corpus on herself, and that, after being put under the rule for the alleged contempt, he aided in sending the child to another state and there instituted legal proceedings with intent to hinder, delay or prevent the execution of the orders of the court. Respondent never had possession and control of the child and his answer so averred: Held, that the court could not find an intent to disobey or prevent the execution of the orders of the court in sending notice to the grandmother or assisting in removing the child and instituting the suit, such intent being negatived by the answer. Walker, 82-95.

Sec. 143 (944). What constitutes offense punished as for contempt.

Every court of record shall have power to punish as for contempt, when the act complained of was such as tended to defeat,