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ALSO PURSUED A LIBERAL POLICY IN INVITING OBSERVERS TO THEIR INDIVIDUAL MANEUVERS. WARSAW PACT STATES HAVE INVITED OBSERVERS TO ONLY TWO OF THE SIX MAJOR MANEUVERS HELD SINCE BELGRADE, AND TO ONLY SIX OF THE 11 WHICH HAVE BEEN HELD SINCE AUGUST 1975. UNTIL 1977, WARSAW PACT STATES ONLY INVITED OBSERVERS FROM

A LIMITED NUMBER OF STATES IN THE GEOGRAPHIC PROXIMITY OF THE MANEUVER. MORE RECENTLY, HOWEVER, THE GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF INVITATIONS HAS BEEN BROADENED. WESTERN OBSERVERS, INCLUDING THOSE FROM THE UNITED STATES, WERE INVITED TO THE LAST TWO MAJOR U.S.S.R. MANEUVERS. IN GENERAL, OPPORTUNITIES PROVIDED TO OBSERVERS AT MANEUVERS OF WARSAW PACT STATES REMAIN SEVERELY RESTRICTED IN COMPARISON WITH OPPORTUNITIES AVAILABLE AT BOTH NATO AND NNA MANEUVERS. GRAPHIC PROOF OF THIS WAS EVIDENT AT THE MOST RECENT NOTIFIED SOVIET MANEUVERS, CALLED "NEMAN", HELD IN JULY 1979, IN LITHUANIA. THE UNITED STATES DECLINED THE INVITATION TO OBSERVE THE EXERCISE, BUT OTHER OBSERVERS WHO ATTENDED WERE SHOWN DEMONSTRATION RATHER THAN ACTUAL EXERCISE ACTIVITY.

PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MILITARY MOVEMENTS

NO SIGNATORY STATE HAS GIVEN NOTIFICATION OF A MAJOR MILITARY MOVEMENT NOT ASSOCIATED WITH AN EXERCISE. THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER NATO ALLIES, AS WELL AS SOME NNA STATES, HAVE PROVIDED INFORMATION ON MOVEMENTS IN THE CONTEXT OF CERTAIN MANEUVER NOTIFICATIONS. THE UNITED KINGDOM NOTIFICATION FOR "KEYSTONE," IN SEPTEMBER 1979, AND THE NORWEGIAN NOTIFICATIONS FOR "COLD WINTER," IN FEBRUARY 1979 AND "ARCTIC EXPRESS," IN JANUARY 1978, MENTIONED THE DEPLOYMENT PLANS OF THE UNITS INVOLVED BEFORE AND AFTER THE EXERCISE. AUSTRIA, IN ITS OCTOBER 1979 MANEUVER NOTIFICATION, INCLUDED INFORMATION ON THE ABSENCE FROM GARRISON OF EXERCISE UNITS.

EXCHANGE OF MILITARY VISITS

SIGNATORY STATES ARE ENCOURAGED BY THE FINAL ACT TO PROMOTE EXCHANGES AMONG THEIR MILITARY PERSONNEL. ALL CSCE SIGNATORIES HAVE MADE EFFORTS TO IMPLEMENT THIS PROVISION IN THE PERIOD SINCE THE BELGRADE MEETING. SOME MORE RECENT EXAMPLES INVOLVING THE UNITED STATES INCLUDE: THE VISIT OF TWO U.S. NAVY SHIPS TO CONSTANTA, ROMANIA, JUNE 22-25, 1979; THE VISIT OF TWO U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE STUDENTS TO POLAND, HUNGARY AND ROMANIA DURING SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER 1979; AND THE VISIT OF A GROUP OF 20 STUDENTS FROM THE U.S. ARMY RUSSIAN INSTITUTE TO THE G.D.R. AND POLAND DURING APRIL AND MAY 1979.

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AT THE JUNE 1979 VIENNA SUMMIT MEETING, HIGH-LEVEL DEFENSE OFFICIALS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE U.S.S.R. HELD BILATERAL MEETINGS FOR THE FIRST TIME. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE BROWN, ALONG WITH CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF GENERAL JONES, MET WITH SOVIET MINISTER OF DEFENSE USTINOV AND ADMIRAL OF THE NAVY MARSHALL OGARKOV TO DISCUSS FURTHER POSSIBILITIES OF HIGH-LEVEL MILITARY CONTACTS.

QUESTIONS RELATING TO DISARMAMENT

THE FINAL ACT MAKES NO PROVISION FOR ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS, BUT DOES EXPRESS THE BELIEF OF THE SIGNATORIES IN THE NECESSITY FOR EFFECTIVE ARMS CONTROL. A MAJOR STEP IN THIS DIRECTION WAS TAKEN WHEN PRESIDENTS CARTER AND BREZHNEV SIGNED THE SALT II TREATY AT THE VIENNA SUMMIT JUNE 18, 1979. RATIFICATION OF THE TREATY BY THE SENATE, HOWEVER, HAS BEEN DELAYED BY A NUMBER OF FACTORS, INCLUDING THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN.

THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER NATO ALLIES CONTINUE TO WORK WITH THE WARSAW PACT STATES IN THE MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTION (MBFR) NEGOTIATIONS IN AN EFFORT TO REDUCE FORCE LEVELS WITHOUT DIMINISHING THE MILITARY SECURITY OF EITHER SIDE. THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER SIGNATORY STATES ARE ALSO INVOLVED IN NEGOTIATIONS AND DISCUSSIONS ON A COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST BAN, A PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS, ANTISATELLITE SYSTEMS, LIMITATION OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS AND OTHER ARMS CONTROL ISSUES.

IN ADDITION, THESE COUNTRIES ARE PARTICIPATING ACTIVELY IN THE WORK OF OTHER MULTILATERAL FORUMS, SUCH AS THE U.N. FIRST COMMITTEE AND THE U.N. DISARMAMENT COMMISSION.

CONCLUSION

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IN THE PERIOD SINCE THE BELGRADE MEETING, MOST HELSINKI SIGNATORY STATES HAVE IMPLEMENTED THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AS INTEGRAL ASPECTS OF THEIR NORMAL DEALINGS IN THE INTERNATIONAL SPHERE. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE SOVIET UNION BY ITS INVASION AND OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN, ITS ILLEGAL OCCUPATION OF LATVIA, LITHUANIA AND ESTONIA, AND ITS CONTINUING DISRUPTION OF INTERNATIONAL MAIL HAS FAILED TO LIVE UP TO THE BASKET I PROVISIONS IN THE FINAL ACT.

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ALL CSCE STATES HAVE ABIDED BY THEIR MINIMAL COMMITMENTS IN THE AREA OF CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES. THE NATO STATES, UNLIKE THE WARSAW PACT STATES, HAVE VOLUNTEERED TO GO BEYOND THIS, AND HAVE UNDERTAKEN SOME OF THE DISCRETIONARY STEPS ENCOURAGED BY THE FINAL ACT.

CHAPTER THREE - BASKET I
(PRINCIPLE VII: HUMAN RIGHTS)

INTRODUCTION

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IDEOLOGY

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PRINCIPLE VII THE BROADEST EXPRESSION OF INDIVIDUAL HUMAN RIGHTS -- IS A UNIQUE COMPONENT OF THE HELSINKI FINAL Act. FOR HELSINKI SIGNATORIES, PRINCIPLE VII REPRESENTS A GOVERNMENTAL COMMITMENT TO THE CONCEPT THAT ALL CITIZENS REGARDLESS OF SHOULD BE FREE TO EXERCISE THEIR CIVIL, POLITICAL, SOCIAL, RELIGIOUS, CULTURAL AND ETHNIC RIGHTS. FURTHERMORE, PRINCIPLE VII ALSO COMMITS HELSINKI SIGNATORIES TO THE NOTION THAT AN INDIVIDUAL HAS AS MUCH CLAIM TO KNOW AND ACT ON HUMAN RIGHTS AS DOES THE STATE. IN THIS WAY, PRINCIPLE VII ADDRESSES A CENTRAL ISSUE: THE PROPER RELATIONSHIP OF GOVERNMENT TO THE GOVERNED. THIS ISSUE ALSO IS THE HEART OF OPPOSING EAST-WEST CONCEPTS OF HUMAN RIGHTS. FOR WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES, THE STATE IS THE ULTIMATE ARBITER OF HUMAN RIGHTS; FOR THE WEST, THE INDIVIDUAL HAS INALIENABLE CIVIL LIBERTIES.

SINCE PRINCIPLE VII IS ONE OF THE PRINCIPLES GUIDING RELATIONS BETWEEN HELSINKI SIGNATORIES, IT HAS BECOME RECOGNIZED AS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT IN WHAT HAS COME TO BE CALLED THE HELSINKI PROCESS. THE 1977 BELGRADE CONFERENCE, THE FIRST SCHEDULED CSCE REVIEW MEETING, FURTHER ESTABLISHED HUMAN RIGHTS AS A LEGITIMATE ALTHOUGH CONTROVERSIAL ISSUE FOR DISCUSSION AMONG HELSINKI

SIGNATORIES.

AN INTEGRAL ELEMENT IN SUCH PERIODIC REVIEWS OF IMPLEMENTATION IS A DETAILED CASE-BY-CASE REVIEW. SUCH A REVIEW, TO BE FAITHFUL TO THE SPIRIT AND OBJECTIVES OF THE FINAL ACT, MUST INVOLVE SPECIFIC COUNTRIES, GROUPS AND INDIVIDUALS AS A MEANS OF ILLUMINATING LARGER PROBLEM AREAS. ALTHOUGH POLEMICAL EXCHANGES CERTAINLY ARE NOT THE AIM OF SUCH EXAMINATIONS, ANY SERIOUS REVIEW OF HUMAN-RIGHTS IMPLEMENTATION MUST DEAL WITH SPECIFICS IF THERE IS TO BE ANY REAL HOPE FOR IMPROVING THE SITUATION OF THE THOUSANDS OF INDIVIDUALS WHOSE RIGHTS ARE BEING VIOLATED

SYSTEMATICALLY.

ANY EXAMINATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WARSAW

PACT COUNTRIES SHOULD NOT IGNORE THE SEVERE POLITICAL RESTRICTIONS ON THE CIVIL LIBERTIES OF ALL CITIZENS IN THESE COUNTRIES. THE FOLLOWING STUDY, HOWEVER, FOCUSES ON THOSE INDIVIDUALS WHO KNEW THEIR HELSINKI RIGHTS AND DECIDED TO ACT ON THEM.

PRINCIPLE VII HAS BECOME IN EFFECT-- IF NOT IN PRACTICE -AN INTERNATIONAL CODE OF HUMAN-RIGHTS CONDUCT FOR ALL HELSINKI STATES. AS DEFINED UNDER THIS CODE OF CONDUCT, HUMAN-RIGHTS PRACTICES IN WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES VARY IN SCOPE AND DEGREE FROM THE RELATIVE TOLERANCE OF HUNGARY TO THE INCREASINGLY REPRESSIVE ATMOSPHERE OF THE SOVIET UNION. HUMAN-RIGHTS PRACTICES IN OTHER CSCE SIGNATORY STATES ARE MANIFESTLY MUCH CLOSER TO THE PRECEPTS OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT, ALTHOUGH THERE IS STILL ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT, IN VARYING DEGREES, IN MANY OF THESE COUNTRIES AS WELL. THE U.S. RECORD ON HUMAN RIGHTS, INCLUDING AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT, HAS BEEN DETAILED IN THE COMMISSION'S 1979 REPORT: "FULFILLING OUR PROMISES: THE UNITED STATES AND THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT."

HUNGARY

HUNGARY CONTINUES TO HAVE A CREDIBLE RECORD IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PRINCIPLE VII OF THE FINAL ACT. THE KADAR REGIME GENERALLY HAS FOLLOWED A POLICY OF "LIVE AND LET LIVE" ACCORDING TO TESTIMONY OF PROFESSOR RUDOLF TOKES BEFORE THE COMMISSION IN MARCH 1980, AND HAS CONCENTRATED ON IMPROVING THE STANDARD OF LIVING IN HUNGARY.

AS IN OTHER SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, CITIZENS' RIGHTS, INCLUDING POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS, ARE PROCLAIMED IN THE CONSTITUTION OF THE HUNGARIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC, BUT QUALIFIED BY THE INTERESTS OF "SOCIALIST SOCIETY." ACCORDING TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, EXPRESSION OF POLITICAL VIEWS IS STILL TIGHTLY CONTROLLED AND SIGNIFICANT PARTICIPATION IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS IS IMPOSSIBLE WITHOUT APPROVAL OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY. THE SECRET POLICE -- ITS PROSECUTORIAL POWERS AND METHODS -- IS HELD IN RELATIVE CHECK BY THE REGIME. CITIZENS MAY SUE THE POLICE FOR BRUTALITY AND IN 1979 ONCE SUED SUCCESSFULLY. GENERALLY, HOWEVER, CITIZENS ARE FREE FROM ARBITRARY ARREST AND ARE PROTECTED FROM ILLEGAL HOUSE SEARCHES AND ARRESTS.

CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS

AFTER 1956, TWO OPPOSITION GROUPS EMERGED: ONE GROUP OF "NEW LEFT" MARXIST INTELLECTUALS PRIMARILY CONCERNED WITH POLIT

ICAL AND SOCIAL RIGHTS, SUCH AS THE DIFFICULTIES OF HUNGARIAN WORKERS AND POLITICAL REPRESSION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA. THE OTHER MAIN GROUP, COMPOSED LARGELY OF INTELLECTUALS CONCERNED WITH THE COLLECTIVE INTERESTS OF THE INTELLIGENTSIA, IS MORE INVOLVED WITH QUESTIONS SUCH AS FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN HUNGARY OR THE ETHNIC RIGHTS OF THE 500,000 HUNGARIAN MINORITY IN NEIGHBORING SLOVAKIA. SO HEATED ARE THE POLEMICS BETWEEN THESE TWO GROUPS, HOWEVER, THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOT BEEN OVERLY CONCERNED WITH DOMESTIC DISSENT AND HAS CONCENTRATED ON TRYING TO IMPROVE THE HUNGARIAN STANDARD OF LIVING.

ON JULY 1, 1979, A NEW PENAL CODE WAS ADOPTED WHICH FURTHER LIMITS THE POLITICAL ACTS DEFINED AS CRIMES AND REDUCES PENALTIES IN SOME CASES. HOWEVER, THE NEW CODE DOES RETAIN AN ARTICLE ON "INCITEMENT" PERMITTING PROSECUTION ON A WIDE RANGE OF STATEMENTS. ACCORDING TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, THERE WERE 230 CASES OF INCITEMENT IN 1977; IN 1978, THERE WERE 214 SUCH CASES.

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, IN ITS 1979 ANNUAL REPORT ON HUNGARY, INDICATED THAT HUNGARIAN AUTHORITIES ADMIT THAT THERE ARE POLITICAL "INCITEMENT" CASES, BUT STRESS THAT 96 PERCENT OF THE STATEMENTS MADE, WHICH RESULTED IN CONVICTION, OCCUR WHILE THE INDIVIDUAL WAS UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL. IN ITS 1978 REPORT ON HUNGARY, AMNESTY REPORTED THAT HUNGARIAN OFFICIAL STATEMENTS REFLECT A POSITIVE TREND SINCE "MANY OF THOSE CONVICTED OF INCITEMENT RECEIVE SUSPENDED SENTENCES." SOME REPORTS REVEAL THAT SIX MONTHS IS THE AVERAGE TERM FOR INCITEMENT. AN ARTICLE BY THE SOCIALIST DISSIDENT WRITER MIKLOS HARASZTI IN IRODALMI UJSAG (PARIS) GIVES A FIGURE OF 140 POLITICAL PRISONERS IN HUNGARY IN MID-1979.

IN 1977, THREE HUNGARIANS, LED BY 25-YEAR-OLD GYORGY HAJAS, WERE SENTENCED FOR ATTEMPTING, INTER ALIA, TO FORM A HELSINKI MONITORING GROUP IN HUNGARY. EVA SZIJJ, HAJAS' DIVORCED WIFE AND BELA HAJAS, GYORGY'S HALF-BROTHER, RECEIVED LIGHTER SENTENCES OF FIVE AND SEVEN MONTHS RESPECTIVELY. EVA SZIJJ WAS SENTENCED FOR TYPING A SHORT STATEMENT WRITTEN BY GYORGY WHICH DOCUMENTED ALLEGED OFFICIAL VIOLATIONS OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND MOVEMENT. BELA WAS CONVICTED OF COMPLICITY WITH GYORGY.

ACCORDING TO AMNESTY, WHO ADOPTED ALL THREE AS PRISONERS OF CONSCIENCE, GYORGY. HAJAS WAS CONVICTED ON CHARGES OF INCITEMENT: FOR WRITING THE STATEMENT MENTIONED EARLIER; ATTEMPTING TO DISTRIBUTE THIS STATEMENT TO THE HUNGARIAN AUTHORITIES AND TO DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN NEWSPAPERS; TRYING TO FORM A HELSINKI MONITORING GROUP; QUESTIONING THE EFFECTS OF THE SOVIET ARMY'S 1956 ACTION AGAINST HUNGARY; STORING IN HIS APARTMENT EIGHT

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