Classics in Game TheoryHarold William Kuhn Princeton University Press, 6 февр. 1997 г. - Всего страниц: 362 Classics in Game Theory assembles in one sourcebook the basic contributions to the field that followed on the publication of Theory of Games and Economic Behavior by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern (Princeton, 1944). The theory of games, first given a rigorous formulation by von Neumann in a in 1928, is a subfield of mathematics and economics that models situations in which individuals compete and cooperate with each other. In the "heroic era" of research that began in the late 1940s, the foundations of the current theory were laid; it is these fundamental contributions that are collected in this volume. In the last fifteen years, game theory has become the dominant model in economic theory and has made significant contributions to political science, biology, and international security studies. The central role of game theory in economic theory was recognized by the award of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Science in 1994 to the pioneering game theorists John C. Harsanyi, John Nash, and Reinhard Selten. The fundamental works for which they were honored are all included in this volume. |
Содержание
Equilibrium Points in nPerson Games PNAS 36 1950 4849 | 3 |
The Bargaining Problem Econometrica 18 1950 155162 | 5 |
NonCooperative Games Annals of Mathematics 54 1951 286295 | 14 |
An Iterative Method of Solving a Game Annals of Mathematics 54 1951 296301 | 27 |
Equivalence of Games in Extensive Form RAND Memo RM759 1952 | 36 |
Extensive Games and the Problem of Information Contributions to the Theory of Games II 1953 193216 | 46 |
A Value for nPerson Games Contributions to the Theory of Games II 1953 307317 | 69 |
Stochastic Games PNAS 39 1953 10951100 | 80 |
The Bargaining Set for Cooperative Games Advances in Game Theory 1964 443477 | 140 |
Existence of Competitive Equilibria in Markets with a Continuum of Traders Econometrica 34 1966 117 | 170 |
The Core of an nPerson Game Econometrica 35 1967 5069 | 192 |
Games with Incomplete Information Played by Bayesian Players Part I The Basic Model Man Sci 141967 159182 | 216 |
Part II Bayesian Equilibrium Points Man Sci 14 1968 320334 | 247 |
The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game Man Sci 14 1968 486502 | 268 |
The Big Match Ann Math Stat 39 1968 159163 | 289 |
On Market Games JET 1 1969 925 | 296 |
Recursive Games Contributions to the Theory of Games III 1957 4778 | 87 |
Von NeumannMorgenstern Solutions to Cooperative Games without Side Payments Bulletin AMS 66 1960 173179 | 119 |
A Limit of Theorem on the Core of an Economy International Economic Review 4 1963 235246 | 127 |
Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games Int J Game Th 4 1975 2555 | 317 |
List of Contributors | 355 |