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25. (1882.) An affidavit must state facts, not mere conclusions of law; the affidavit must state the time and place of performance. Howard v. Lamaster, 13 Neb. 221 (13 N. W. 211).

26. (1900.) A general motion to strike certain affidavits from the files, on the ground that they contain certain objectionable statements, is rightly overruled if such affidavits contain material evidence regarding the subZimmer v. Freject under consideration. mont Nat. Bank, 59 Neb. 661 (81 N. W. 849). Waiver of defects.

27. (1897.) Objection to defects in form or substance of an affidavit are waived if the adverse party answer to the merits and go to trial without making objections. Hudelson v. First Nat. Bank of Tobias, 51 Neb. 557 (71 N. W. 304).

Use in evidence.

28. (1880.) Where affidavits filed in another case are erroneously admitted in evidence the party introducing them are bound by the material facts which are established. Campbell v Crone, 10 Neb. 571 (7 N. W. 334).

29. (1893.) Ex parte affidavit referred to in the opinion held inadmissible under the rules of evidence, and that it was properly excluded from the jury. Barton v. McKay, 36 Neb. 632 (54 N. W. 968).

30. (1895.) Affidavits by a party purporting to contain statements of jurors made during deliberations by the jury, are admissible in aid of impeaching the verdict, when affidavits of the jurors would not be received. Peterson v. Skjelver, 43 Neb. 663 (62 N. W. 43).

CROSS REFERENCE.

31. (1895.) If the officer making the jurat or certificate had authority to administer oaths, the affidavit may be read in evidence as the oath of the party who the officer certifies made the oath. Bantley v. Finney, 43 Neb. 794 (62 N. W. 213).

32. (1901.) Affidavits cannot be consid ered unless made part of bill of exceptions and covered by its certificate. Newtson v. Walker, 1 Unof. 118 (95 N. W. 470).

33. (1902.) An affidavit taken before a notary of a sister state or foreign government, is properly received in support of a motion in the courts of this state. Browne v. Palmer, 66 Neb. 287 (92 N. W. 315).

34. (1906.) Under the provisions of section 370 of the code, affidavits are admissible in evidence to impeach the return of an officer to the service of a summons in proceedings for revivor. Johnson v. Carpenter, 77 Neb. 49 (108 N. W. 161).

35. (1907.) Section 371 of the code, providing that an affidavit may be made before any person authorized to take depositions, cannot inferentially be construed as requir ing that objections to affidavits as evidence shall be made in the manner provided by statute for the filing of objections to depositions. Malcom Savings Bank v. Cronin, 80 Neb. 231 (116 N. W. 150).

AGE.

See, also, Infants; Marriage; Seduction. Competency of witness to testify as to, see Witnesses, §§ 48-52.

As affecting right to serve as juror, see Jury, § 62.

AGENCY.

See Principal and Agent.

AGISTMENT.

See Animals.

AGRICULTURE.

Irrigation of agricultural lands, see Water and Watercourses, VIII, B.

Definition.

1. (1892.) Agricultural societies are not corporations within the ordinary meaning of the term, but rather agencies adopted by the state for the purpose of promoting the interests of agriculture and manufacturing.

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Right to inherit.

1. (1901.) A "resident alien," mentioned in section 25 of the bill of rights, is one who resides in the state of Nebraska. Glynn v. Glynn, 62 Neb. 872 (87 N. W. 1052).

2. (1901.) Chapter 58 of the Session Laws of 1889, providing that non-resident aliens shall not inherit land in this state, is but the re-enactment of the common law; and the proviso of the act, that its provisions should not apply to any real estate lying within the corporate limits of cities and towns, is by implication a legislative determination that the common law doctrine of inheritance should not be applied to lands within the corporate limits of cities and towns. Glynn v. Glynn, 62 Neb. 872 (87 N. W. 1052).

3. (1903.) Sections 70-73, chapter 73, Compiled Statutes (chapter 58, Session Laws, 1889) regarding the right of an alien to inherit land in this state, as construed in Glynn v. Glynn, supra, are not unconstitutional as being broader than the title of the act, nor as special legislation. Dougherty v. Kubat, 67 Neb. 269 (93 N. W. 317).

Naturalization.

Competency of courts.

4. (1878.) A court without any clerk, distinct from the judge of such court, is not a court "having a clerk" within the meaning of section 2165 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, providing for the naturalization of aliens, and such court is not competent to naturalize aliens. State, ex rel. Fossler, v. Webster, 7 Neb. 469.

Time naturalization dates from. 5. (1891.) Where an alien is naturalized under the naturalization laws, his citizenship dates from the time the order of the court is made admitting him to citizenship, and does not relate back to the time he made his declaration of intention. State,

ex rel. Thayer, v. Boyd, 31 Neb. 682 (48 N. W. 739).

6. (1891.) The alien inhabitants of the territory of Nebraska at the time of its admission as a state, did not become citizens of the United States by virtue of the acts of congress admitting the state into the Union. State, ex rel. Thayer, v. Boyd, 31 Neb. 682 (48 N. W. 739).

Effect of declaration of intent.

7. (1897.) Though a declaration of intention to become a citizen may constitute a resident alien an elector, this status does not extend to his son because the declaration was made before the son attained his majority. Haywood v. Marshall, 53 Neb. 220 (73 N. W. 449).

Evidence.

8. (1891.) The fact that an alien has for many years voted at elections held in this state, and filled important public offices, does not establish the fact that he is a citizen of the United States. State, ex. rel. Thayer, v. Boyd 31 Neb. 682 (48 N. W. 739).

9. (1891.) The order of a court admitting an alien to citizenship is a judicial act,

in the nature of a judgment. Such proceedings are required to be made a matter of record. The record must be pleaded and proved the same as any other judicial record. Naturalization cannot be established by pa rol. State, ex rel. Thayer, v. Boyd, 31 Neb. 682 (48 N. W. 739).

ALIMONY.

See Divorce, §§ 124-210.

ALLOWANCE.

Of appeal or writ of error, see Appeal and Error, III.

Of claims against county, see Counties. §§ 604-625.

Of claims against estate, see Executors and Administrators, §§ 97-174.

Of claims against cities, see Municipal Corporations, XII.

To surviving wife and children, see Executors and Administrators, III.

ALLONGE.

On promissory note, see Bills and Notes. §§ 8, 9.

ALTERATION OF INSTRUMENTS.

Definition, § 1.

ANALYSIS.

Materiality of alteration.

Parties, §§ 2-4.

Endorsements, §§ 5, 6.

Payments, § 7.

Consideration, §§ 8-10.

Kind of payment, § 11.

Removal of conditions and memorandum, §§ 12-15.

Place, time, and date, §§ 16-18.

Filling blank, § 19.

Addition of surety, §§ 20, 21.

Ratification, §§ 22-25.

Effect on rights of parties.

As to guarantor, § 26.

Promissory notes, §§ 27-31.

Note and mortgage, §§ 32-36.

Recovery on original notwithstanding alteration, §§ 37, 38.

Alteration by stranger, §§ 39-42.

Assignment of altered note, § 43.

Enjoining collection or transfer, § 44.
Evidence.

Presumption, § 45.

Burden of proof, §§ 46, 47.

· Admissibility, §§ 48-56.
Sufficiency, §§ 57, 57a.

Question for the court, §§ 58-62.
Question for the jury, §§ 63-67.

CROSS REFERENCES.

See, also, Cancelation of Instruments. Alteration of bond of public officer, see Officers, §§ 169-171.

Release of surety by alteration of instrument, see Principal and Surety, §§ 73-81.

Definition.

1. (1877.) An alteration is an act done upon an instrument by which its meaning or language is changed. Oliver v. Hawley,

5 Neb. 439.

Materiality of alteration.

Parties.

2. (1892.) An unauthorized alteration of a non-negotiable promissory note by the payee, after the execution thereof, by the insertion of the word "bearer" after the name of the payee, is a material alteration, which will nullify the instrument. Walton Plow Co. v. Campbell, 35 Neb. 173 (52 N. W. 883; 16 L. R. A. 468).

3. (1895.) The fraudulent erasure of the name of the original payee of a promissory note, after its execution, by a party to the instrument and the substitution of another, without the consent of the maker, is a material alteration. Erickson V. First Nat. Bank of Oakland. 44 Neb. 622 (62 N. W. 1078; 48 Am. St. Rep. 753; 28 L. R. A. 577).

4. (1895.) The fraudulent erasure of the name of the original payee of a note invalidates the paper as to the maker, who has not assented to, or ratified, the change, even in the hands of a bona fide holder for value. Erickson v. First Nat. Bank of Oakland, 44 Neb. 622 (62 N. W. 1078; 48 Am. St. Rep. 753; 28 L. R. A. 577).

Endorsements.

5. (1903.) Writing the words "for value received, we hereby guarantee the payment of the within note, and waive presentment for payment, demand and notice of protest," over an indorsement in blank on the back of a promissory note is a material alteration of the liability of the indorser, and if done without his knowledge or consent releases him from his obligation as such. Harnett v Holdrege, 5 Unof. 114 (97 N. W. 443).

6. (1903.) Writing the words "This note to be exchanged for consolidated mortgage bonds of Nebraska and Northwestern Irrigation Company when issued at 90," across the face of a promissory note after it has been indorsed in blank, without the knowledge or consent of the indorsers, is a material change of the note, and releases such in

dorsers from any liability thereon. Harnett v. Holdrege, 5 Unof. 114 (97 N. W. 443). Payments.

7. (1902.) Indorsements of payment entered by mistake or inadvertence on a note do not become a part of the instrument and their erasure does not avoid the note. Lau v. Blomberg, 3 Unof. 124 (91 N. W. 206). Consideration.

8. (1879.) Where the payee in a note changed it from $217.36 to $208.12, and transferred it before maturity to an innocent purchaser, such alteration vitiates the note and there can be no recovery thereon. State Savings Bank v. Schaffer, 9 Neb. 1 (1 N. W. 980; 31 Am. Rep. 394). 9. (1882.) Where by the terms of a promissory note it was not to draw interest, if the payee, without the consent of the maker, adds the figure "7" to the note to indicate the rate of interest, it is a material alteration, and voids the note. Davis v. Henry, 13 Neb. 497 (14 N. W. 523).

10. (1894) The insertion of the figures "10" in a promissory note, thereby making the instrument draw interest at ten per cent, when no rate of interest was originally specified, is a material alteration. Hurlbut v. Hall, 39 Neb. 889 (58 N. W. 538).

Kind of payment.

11. (1902.) The unauthorized insertion of the word "gold" before the word "dollars" in an instrument, after its execution and delivery, is a material alteration. For worthy v. Colby, 64 Neb. 216 (89 N. W. 800; 62 L. R. A. 393)..

12.

Removal of conditions and mem

orandum.

(1876.) The fraudulent removal of a memorandum, written under a negotiable instrument and qualifying it, vitiates the instrument, even in the hands of a bona fide purchaser. Palmer v. Largent, 5 Neb. 223 (25 Am. Rep. 479).

13. (1876.) The removal of the words "this note is given upon condition," there being nothing to show what the condition was, does not vitiate the instrument in the hands of a bona fide purchaser. Palmer v. Largent. 5 Neb. 223 (25 Am. Rep. 479).

14. (1882.) A contract upon the same paper with a negotiable promissory note, which contract modifies and qualifies it, if detached, the note will be invalid even in the hands of an innocent purchaser. Davis v. Henry, 13 Neb. 497 (14 N. W. 523).

15. (1901.) In a contract for the conditional sale of books, the deferred payments being evidenced by the promissory notes of the vendee, it was claimed a material alteration had been made by the interlineation of the words "interest at six per cent. on notes remaining over a year." Held, Such words to be only descriptive of the notes referred to and in the nature of a memorandum reference, and that such words did not constitute a material alteration of the contract of sale, the notes referred to being the instruments which determined the rate of interest they bore. Edward Thompson Co. v. Baldwin, 62 Neb. 530 (87 N. W. 307).

Place, time and date.

16. (1877.) After an instrument is completed and delivered, no alteration can be made therein except by consent; an alteration of the date, whether it hasten or delay the time of payment, is a material alteration, and if made without the consent of the party sought to be charged extinguishes his liability. Brown v. Straw, 6 Neb. 536 (29 Am. Rep. 369).

17. (1880.) Where a note is altered so as to make it payable at a particular place, when in fact it was payable generally, an indorser is thereby released. Townsend v. Star Wagon Co., 10 Neb. 615 (7 N. W. 274; 35 Am. Rep. 493).

18. (1903.) Merely indorsing by the notary on the back of a contract by husband and wife for the sale of the wife's real estate, of an extension of time for making the first payment, which extension was not authorized by the wife, does not destroy the contract as really made, nor warrant the wife in repudiating it. Johnson v. Weber, 70 Neb. 467 (97 N. W. 585).

Filing blank.

19. (1904.) The alteration of a negotiable promissory note after delivery, by filling in blanks left therein, where there is nothing on the face of the note to indicate such alteration, will not invalidate the note in the hands of a bona fide endorsee, for value, before maturity, and without notice of such change. Humphrey Hardware Co. v. Herrick, 72 Neb. 878 (101 N. W. 1016).

Addition of surety.

20. (1891.) The addition of the name of a surety to a promissory note, after its delivery to the payee, without the knowledge or consent of the maker, is not such an alteration of the instrument as will discharge

the maker. Barnes v. Van Keuren & Floyd, 31 Neb. 165 (47 N. W. 848).

21. (1896.) The addition of the name of a surety to a note after delivery to payee without the knowledge of the maker, is not such an alteration as will release the latter. Royse v. State Nat. Bank of St. Joseph, 50 Neb. 16 (69 N. W. 301).

Ratification.

22. (1895.) The maker's ratification of a note after a material alteration must be pleaded when relied upon by the holder of the note. Erickson v. First Nat. Bank of Oakland, 4 Neb. 622 (62 N. W. 1078; 48 Am. St. Rep. 753; 28 L. R. A. 577).

23. (1898.) When the holder of a note had notice that it had been altered by chang ing the amount, and with such notice sued upon it in its altered condition, and endeavored to recover thereon, held, that he thereby ratified the act of alteration, and that the court did not err in refusing to per mit him, after trial, to amend by counting on the note as originally made. Perkins Windmill & Ax Co. v. Tillman, 55 Neb. 652 (75 N. W. 1098).

24. (1902.) It seems that ratification of an altered instrument does not require a new consideration, but it must be made intentionally with respect to the very alteration relied on as a defense. State v. Paxton, 65 Neb. 110 (90 N. W. 983).

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26. (1902.) In an action for money paid by plaintiff as a guarantor of a note, where defendant claims that the note had been altered, and that he was only surety thereon, an instruction that a material alteration of the note, if shown, would be available to the defendant only in case the jury found that he was surety, and that the plaintiff, when making the alteration, knew that fact, held erroneous, but binding upon the jury. Ball v. Beaumont, 66 Neb. 56 (92 N. W. 170).

Promissory notes.

27. (1877.) An alteration of a promissory note in any material part renders it invalid as against a party not consenting thereto, even in the hands of an innocent

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