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proper title the claimant as plaintiff and the adverse party defendant. Rawalt v. Brewer, 16 Neb. 444 (20 N. W. 391).

41. (1898.) A plaintiff has the right, before final submission of his cause of action, to dismiss the same, but this right does not control defendant's right to proceed to trial of a set-off or counter-claim properly pleaded in the answer. Adams v. Osgood, 55 Neb. 766 (76 N. W. 446).

42. (1907.) Upon appeal to the district court from a judgment against a plaintiff upon a set-off rendered in a justice of the peace court, the plaintiff cannot defeat the judgment by a dismissal of his action. Hess v. Hess, 78 Neb. 347 (110 N. W. 999). Questions determined on motion to dismiss. 43. (1902.) The liability of plaintiffs moving to dismiss their action of contest of a probated will to attorneys, who had a contract to prosecute such action to the end on a contingent fee, and who had expended considerable money in the prosecution of the suit, for the value of their services cannot be litigated or determined on a motion to dismiss. Williams v. Miles, 63 Neb. 851 (89 N. W. 455).

Reinstating cause.

44. (1889.) The supreme court, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, has no authority to reinstate a cause in the district court which has been there voluntarily dismissed by the plaintiff. Where it is claimed that a dismissal was obtained by fraud, an application to reinstate must be made in the court where the cause was pending at the time the dismissal was entered.. Grimes v. Chamberlain, 27 Neb. 605 (43 N. W. 395).

45. (1901.) The denial by a district court of a motion to reinstate an action, voluntarily dismissed at the same term at which the motion is made, will not be reversed in the absence of evidence that the party making the application was laboring nder some mistake or misaprehension of act at the time of the dismissal. Tighe v. Vinger, 2 Unof. 155 (95 N. W. 1053). Dismissal in county or probate court. 46. (1877.) The dismissal of actions in he probate courts, now county courts, is overned by the rules applicable to cases efore justices of the peace. Banks v. Uh', Neb. 145.

47. (1877.) The voluntary dismissal by he plaintiff, of a cause in the county court,

practically disposes of the case. Banks v. Uhl, 6 Neb. 145.

48. (1877.) The plaintiff in an action brought in the probate court could, at any time before the case was finally submitted, and on his own motion, dismiss it. And the failure to pay the costs that had then accrued will not prevent him from exercising this right. Banks v. Uhl, 6 Neb. 145.

49. (1877.) It is no objection to a dismissal of a cause in a county court, by plaintiff, that it is done in order to enable plaintiff to proceed with another action concerning same subject-matter, fraudulently instituted in another county. Banks v. Uhl, 6 Neb. 145.

II. INVOLUNTARY.

Jurisdiction to dismiss suit pending in another county.

50. (1898.) A district court has no jurisdiction to render a judgment in an action pending in one county dismissing such action from the district court of another county. Lefferts v. Bell, 57 Neb. 248 (77 N. W. 680).

51. (1898.) An order of dismissal rendered by the district court of one county dismissing an action pending in the district court of another county, is void. Lefferts v. Bell, 57 Neb. 248 (77 N. W. 680). Notice of motion to dismiss.

52. (1888.) In the district court, where a motion is filed to dismiss an action for want of prosecution, it is the duty of the moving party to serve notice of such motion upon the adverse party. If the action is dismissed for want of prosecution without notice, the appellant may have the cause re-instated. Berggren v. Berggren, 24 Neb. 764 (40 N. W. 284). Grounds for dismissal.

Fraud by plaintiff during trial. 52a. (1907.) Fraud or imposition upon the court and against defendant, practiced by a plaintiff during the progress of the trial of his cause, does not justify the dismissal of his action without a determination of its merits. Fitch v. Martin, 80 Neb. 60 (113 N. W. 796).

Disobedience of order of court.

53. (1907.) Under section 430 of the code, it is within the sound discretion of the district court to dismiss a petition without prejudice for disabedience by the plaintiff of a reasonable order concerning the proceedings in the action. Howell v. Malmgren, 79 Neb. 16 (112 N. W. 313).

Restraint of action by federal court. 54. (1991.) It is no valid ground for the dismissal of an action brought by the state against a corporation that the federal court has granted an injunction to restrain the attorney general from the prosecution thereof. State v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 62 Neb. 123 (87 N. W. 188).

Failure to plead.

55. (1891.) Where new matter is set up in the answer, and no reply is filed by plaintiff, a motion to dismiss should be sustained. Hamilton Loan & Trust Co. v. Gordon, 32 Neb. 663 (49 N. W. 699).

55a. (1902.) In an action for an accounting, wherein the answer in addition to a general denial pleads a final settlement between the parties, and plaintiff demurs to such answer on the ground that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a defense, and after an adverse ruling elects to stand on his demurrer, refusing to plead further, a judgment of dismissal by the trial court is proper. Brown v. Houghton, 2 Unof. 425 (89 N. W. 251).

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57. (1889.) A cause was instituted in the district court, by a non-resident of the state, who failed to give security for costs at the commencement of the action. Upon motion of the defendant to dismiss the carse for that reason, the district court, upon an application of plaintiff, entered an order permitting plaintiff to file the necessary security for costs within thirty days. "and in default thereof the cause to stand dismissed." The required security was not given until after the expiration of the thirty days. The cause was placed upon the docket of the next term of the district court, when defendant moved to strike it therefrom, for the reason that the action had been dismissed by the prior order of the court, and the default of the plaintiff, which motion was sustained. Held. That the decision of the district court was erroneous. King Bros. v. Jackson, 25 Neb. 466 (41 N. W. 448).

58.

(1892.) Under the common law. where an action is dismissed for want of prosecution, at the costs of the plaintiff, the plaintiff is required to pay such costs before prosecuting a second action for the same cause. In equity procedure, however, this rule is not enforced. A court of equity wil be governed by the circumstances of each case, and where there is a valid excuse giver for the failure to pay the costs in the former suit, will not compel such payment as a condition of permitting the second to proceed. Union P. R. Co. v. Mertes, 35 Neb 204 (52 N. W. 1099).

Defects of pleadings or filings.

59. (1877.) Failure to sign and verify a petition is not grounds for dismissing at action. Fritz v. Barnes, 6 Neb. 435.

60. (1886.) Failure to entitle papers a case, or properly entitle them, if it is ap parent to what case they relate, is not suf cient to justify a dismissal of the cause Jansen & Co. v. Mundt, 20 Neb. 320 (3) N W. 53).

Transfer of plaintiff's interest.

61. (1882.) A transfer by a plaintif of his interest in the action to a co-plaintif during the pendency of the suit will not justify a court in dismissing the action Magemau v. Bell, 13 Neb. 247 (13 N. W 277).

Defect as to parties.

62. (1890.) Where a demurrer is SUStained on the ground of non-joinder of parties defendant, the court should not dismiss the action without giving the plaintif an opportunity to bring in the absent party. Alexander v. Thacker, 30 Neb. 614 (46 N. W., 828).

63. (1894.) An action should not be dismissed because the plaintiff's full first name is omitted from the title of the cause until an opportunity has been given the party to correct the defect by amendment. Real v. Honey, 39 Neb. 516 (58 N. W. 1356.

64. (1895.) A suit by an heir and dev isee against an executor for the construetion of a clause in a will devising real estate may be dismissed, where it appears that the latter has no interest in the adjudication and that an interpretation will not assist him in administering the estate. Kennedy v. Merrick, 46 Neb. 260 (64 N. W. 960).

· Defect of process. 65. (1891.) A motion objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of

the defendant on the grounds: "First, that no service of summons has been made upon the defendant as required by law; second, that no return of summons has been made as required by law," is too general to be considered. Forbes v. McHaffie, 32 Neb. 742 (49 N. W. 721).

Requisites and sufficiency of motion to dismiss.

66. (1891.) When a party files a motion objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, he must specifically state in his motion the grounds of objection. Forbes v. McHaffie, 32 Neb. 742 (49 N. W. 721). Operation and effect.

67. (1883.) Where an action is dismissed by the court, without a hearing upon the merits, the order of dismissal will not be a bar to a future action. Cheney v. Cooper, 14 Neb. 415 (16 N. W. 471).

68. (1901.) Where a defendant is sued and summons served on her by her true full name, and she is also mentioned in the pleadings and summons by the initials of her given name, the court does not lose jurisdiction over her by dismissing the action as to the person named and designated by the initial letters of the defendant's given name. Nebraska Loan & Trust Co. v. Kroener, 63 Neb. 289 (88 N. W. 499). Questions determined on dismissal.

69. (1905.) A court has no power or jurisdiction, upon dismissing a cause without prejudice to a new action, to adjudge that such new action shall not be subject to the defense that it is Larred by the statute of limitations. Linton v. Cooper, 75 Neb. 167 (106 N. W. 170).

Setting aside and reinstating.

70. (1872.) A petition to reinstate a cause dismissed at a term prior to filing the same for want of prosecution, alleging as excuse a change by general statute of the time of holding the court, of which the petitioner had no knowledge, does not show unavoidable causualty or misfortune entitling him to relief. Smith v. Pinney, 2 Neb. 139.

71. (1872.) In an appeal from a justice's judgment to the district court, the defendant's death was suggested, and his administrator substituted, and the

cause con

tinued. At next term, the plaintiff neither filed his petition, nor appeared; and. on defendant's motion, the cause was dismissed for want of prosecution. At the fol

lowing term, the plaintiff filed his petition to reinstate, alleging that he was ignorant of the time at which the preceding term was held, the same having been changed by recent statute not published, although grand and petit jurors were summoned from the body of the county, and all the machinery of a court put in operation. Held, That a case was not alleged. Smith v. Pinney, 2 Neb. 139. 72. (1390.) On a contingent and alternative agreement between attorneys of record to an action pending in a county court, fcr the continuance of the cause for trial to a day certain, by which the plaintiffs' attorneys were misled as to the consent and fact of postponement of the trial, which was called in their absence and dismissed, and a motion to reinstate the case upon affidavits of the facts, and of merits, overruled, and which was subsequently reversed on error in the district court, held, that the evidence presented to the county court was sufficient to sustain the last judgment. Brusa v. Sandwich Mfg. Co., 28 Neb. 827 (45 N. W. 250).

73. (1892.) Where a case is dismissed for want of prosecution on the first regular call, and a new action would be barred as to many of the claims, a motion to reinstate, supported by two uncontradicted affidavits, should be sustained. Flannagan v. Elton, 34 Neb. 355 (51 N. W. 967).

74. (1892.) When affidavits filed in support of a motion to reinstate a case are not denied, for the purpose of the motion they will be taken as true. Flannagan v. Elton, 34 Neb. 355 (51 N. W. 967).

75. (1893.) In the district court, on motion of defendants, and in absence of plaintiff and his attorney, the suit was dismissed for want of prosecution. On the same day, counsel for plaintiff, as soon as he learned of the order of dismissal, moved to set the same aside and reinstate the suit, supported by affidavit, which is uncontradicted, showing that he was not guilty of laches in failing to appear and prosecute the cause when called for trial, and that plaintiff had a meritorious case. Held, That the showing was sufficient to entitle plaintiff to have the judgment of dismissal vacated and the case reinstated. Lundgren v. Erik, 38 Neb. 363 (56 N. W. 992).

76. (1896.) Where there was a stipulation for a continuance, and a dismissal at the same term, the order of dismissal can

not be reviewed in absence of a record showing the grounds of the court's ruling. School District v. Bishop, 46 Neb. 850 (65 N. W. 902).

77. (1901.) A suit in equity may be maintained for the purpose of reinstating a case erroneously dismissed, when there is no adequate legal remedy therefor. Edney v. Baum, 2 Unof. 173 (96 N. W. 167).

78. (1901.) After his employment had been terminated, an attorney who had been employed to bring an action dismissed it contrary to his client's desire. The statutory

period of limitation for actions of that nature had elapsed pending suit. Held, That a motion, made at the same term, to set aside the order of dismissal and reinstate the case should have been sustained. Steinkamp v. Gaebel, 1 Unof. 480 (95 N. W. 684.

79. (1905.) Where neither the plaintiff nor his attorney are in attendance when the cause is reached for trial, a judgment of dismissal should not be set aside, in the atsence of a showing of due diligence. Pog gensee v. Feddern, 75 Neb. 584 (106 N. W 654).

DISORDERLY HOUSES.

CROSS-REFERENCES.

See, also, Prostitution.

Effect of ordinance against by second ordinance, see Municipal Corporations, § 130.

1. (1880.) Where a city passed an ordinance to "restrain, prohibit, and suppress" houses of prostitution while a former ordinance to suppress such houses was in full force and effect, the second does not repeal the existing ordinance. In re Hall, 10 Neb. 537 (7 N. W. 287).

2. (1883.) To authorize a conviction under section 210 of the criminal code, for permitting a house to be used as one of ill-fame or for purposes of prostitution, it must be shown that the house is a house of ill-fame in fact, or, in other words, a house resorted to for purposes of prostitution; that the prisoner was the owner, or had control of the house, and that he knowingly permitted it to be occupied as a house of illfame. Drake v. State, 14 Neb. 535 (17 N. W. 117).

3. (1883.) The bawdy character of the house may be shown by its general reputation and that of the persons frequenting it, together with other facts and circumstances which lead satisfactorily to that conclusion. It is not necessary to show particular acts of prostitution. Drake v. State, 14 Neb. 535 (17 N. W. 117).

4. (1895.) Evidence examined, and held to sustain a conviction under section 210, criminal code, for the knowingly owning, using, and occupying of a house in this state for the purpose of prostitution. Wright v. State, 45 Neb. 44 (63 N. W. 147).

5. (1893.) Before a person can be law fully convicted of being an inmate of a house of prostitution there must be introduced in evidence a valid ordinance forbidding per sons from being inmates of such houses Perry v. State, 37 Neb. 623 (56 N. W. 315).

6. (1893.) The mayor and council of a city of the second class have authority to prohibit by ordinance persons from being inmates of houses of prostitution, and to punish them for the violation of such or dinance. Perry v. State, 37 Neb. 623 (56 N. W. 315).

DISQUALIFICATION.

Of officer to take acknowledgment, see Acknowledgment, §§ 16-21.

Of judge, see Judges, $$ 15-19.
Of jury, see Jury, $$ 58-64; 94-277.
Public officer, see Officers, §§ 10-41.
Witness, see Witnesses.

DISSOLUTION.

Of attachment, see Attachment, §§ 274391 Of corporation, see Corporations, §§ 455465.

Of partnership firms, see Partnership §§ 283-332.

DISTRESS. Collection of taxes by distress, see Tare tion, $$ 501-504.

DISTRICT ATTORNEY. See County Attorneys.

DISTRICT COURTS.

See Courts, §§ 150-153.

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