P. 353. DDDDD. Let me here observe how this very circumstance in Moses's conduct, acquits him of all suspicion of that kind of FRAUD SO much in use amongst the best human Lawgivers of Antiquity. The Mosaic Dispensation had been treated by our Freethinkers with great liberties. It was therefore offered by the late learned and ingenious Dr. Middleton, as a means to rescue it from their contempt, and to solve the difficulties which attend it, without hurting the authority whereon it stands, to suppose SOME DEGREE OF FICTION in certain cases, in the Mosaic writings. And this he endeavoured to make credible, from the practice of the ancient Lawgivers. Now I think this supposition neither true nor probable. 1. If we consider what it was that induced the ancient Lawgivers to employ fiction, we shall find it arose, in part, from their false pretences to a divine Mission; and, in part, from the imaginary necessity of propagating Polytheism. As to the first, Moses's pretensions to a divine mission are here allowed. And it is notorious that he preached up the one true God, the Creator, in opposition to all kinds of Polytheism. No occasion therefore remained for the use of fiction. And we can hardly think he would employ it without occasion. What we have then to shew is, that the only cause why the ancient sages employed fiction (besides the support of a false mission) was to hide the absurdities of Polytheism. This indeed hath been already done for other purposes, in several places of this Work: So that I shall here confine myself to one single proof. Macrobius assures us, that the ancient sages did not admit the fabulous in all their disputations; but in those only which related to the SOUL, to the HEAVENLY BODIES, and to the HERO-GODS. "Sciendum est tamen non in omnem disputationem philosophos admittere fabulosa vel licita, sed his uti solent cum vel de animâ, vel de AERIIS ETHERIISVE POTESTATIBUS, vel de CETERIS DIS loquuntur." [in Somn. Scip. 1. i. c. 2.] On the contrary, when they discoursed of the FIRST CAUSE, then every thing was delivered exactly agreeable to the truth. "Ceterum cum ad SUMMUM ET PRINCIPEM OMNIUM DEUM-tractatus se audet attollere-NIHIL FABULOSUM penitus attingunt." [id. ib.] The reason of their using fiction or fable, in treating of their false Gods, was to hide the absurdities attendant on their Worship; a Worship thought to be necessary. Hence, as hath been shewn elsewhere, [vol. ii. of the Div. Leg. b. iii. sect. 6,] they were led from the absurdity and the necessity together, to conclude that utility, and not truth, was the end of Religion; and from another mistake there mentioned, that utility and truth do not coincide. From these two principles necessarily arose a third, that it was expedient and lawful to deceive for the Public good. And, on this last, was founded the practice of fiction above mentioned. Now the whole Religion of Moses being established on that very doctrine, in the handling of which the ancient Sages neither needed nor used fiction; and at the same time directly opposing that very superstition, for the sake of which, the fiction was employed; we conclude, with certainty, that Moses employed NO DEGREE OF FICTION in the composition or in the propagation of the Jewish Religion. But 2. That which he had no occasion to use, we think it impossible he should use, if his pretensions were (as is here allowed) real. We have, indeed, in order to display the wisdom of God's Dispensation, endeavoured to shew that he employed, in the contrivance of it, all those arts (though in an infinitely more perfect degree) which human Lawgivers are wont to use, in the legitimate exercise of civil Government for that, without forcing the Will, no other method was sufficient to accomplish the end designed. But this, we presume, is as different from fiction as truth is from falshood. Thus far, we think, GOD,

in his dispensations to men, would chuse to do, rather than to force the Will. But could we suppose a People, favoured with a divine Revelation, so absurdly circumstanced as to be incapable of being worked upon by common means, without the use of some degree of fiction, we should then conclude GOD would rather chuse miraculously to overrule the Will: because we conceive divine Revelation with human fiction to be a mixture of things utterly incompatible; that there can be no alliance between GoD and Belial; nor any union between the Spirit of Truth, and the Father of Lies.

P. 353. EEEEE. "Suppose" (says Dr. Stebbing) "a Deist should alledge that the Israelites learned this doctrine in Egypt where Moses himself also might have learnt it, How would you prove the contrary?" Examination, p. 33, 34.

Should a Deist allege this, as making any thing against my argument, or for his own cause, I should say he knew as little either of one or the other as Dr. Stebbing himself does: For my argument being addressed to the Deist, supposes that Moses and the Israelites might have learnt the doctrine in Egypt; and on that supposition, defies them to find a reason, exclusive of the extraordinary Providence, why Moses did not make so useful and necessary a doctrine (in favour of which his People were much prejudiced) the Sanction of his Laws. Their acquaintance with the doctrine in Egypt, I supposed: This acquaintance my argument required me to suppose and yet this Answerer of my Book knew so little of its contents, as to ask, How I wOULD PROVE THE CONTRARY? If the learned Doctor had any pertinent drift in this question, you can discover it only by supposing him to go upon this ridiculous assumption, that what the Jews once learned they could never either unlearn or forget, and therefore if they had learned the doctrine of a future state in Egypt, they could not be so ignorant of it as, I say, they were. But to clear up his conceptions in this matter he may have recourse, if he pleases, to the latter division of the fifth section of the fifth Book, of the Divine Legation.

P. 355. FFFFF. This was the character it bore even so late as the time of Jeremiah, who tells us, that the rebellious Israelites, frightened at the power of the king of Babylon, refused to stay any longer in Judea, saying, No, but we will go into the land of Egypt, where we shall see no war, nor hear the sound of the trumpet, nor have hunger of bread, and there will we dwell. chap. xlii. 14.

P. 359. GGGGG. This famous book (as is the fortune of all which bring new proofs for Revelation in a new way) hath undergone many heavy censures both from Jews and Christians. Those blame him for attempting to assign reasons for the Ceremonial ordinances; These for explaining Scripture on the principles of Aristotle. But both, as usual, expose their own ignorance and prevention. In this work, the excellent author studied the real honour of GOD, together with the good of those to whom his discourse was addressed. And because its end and design appears to be little understood, and depends on a curious piece of history, neglected by his editors and translators, I shall give the Reader a short account of it. In the first flourishing times of the Saracene Empire, (as we learn from William of Paris in his book De Legibus) a great number of Jews, devoting themselves to the study of the Aristotelian philosophy, (then cultivated by the Arabs with a kind of scientific fanaticism) and thereby contracting not only an inquisitive but a disputatious habit, set themselves to examine into the REASONS OF THE JEWISH LAWS; which being unable to discover, they too hastily concluded them to be useless,

absurd, and of human invention; and so apostatized, in great numbers, from the Religion of their Fathers.-" Postquam autem Chaldæis sive Babyloniis et genti Arabum commixti sunt, et miscuerunt se studiis eorum et philosophiæ; et secuti sunt opiniones philosophorum; nescientes legis suæ credulitates et Abrahæ fidem contra disputationes eorum et rationes defendere hinc est quod facti sunt in lege erronei, et in fide ipsius Abrahæ hæretici; maxime postquam regnum SARACENORUM diffusum est super habitationem eorum. Exinde enim æternitatem mundi et alios Aristotelis errores secuti sunt multi eorum. Hincque pauci veri Judæi (hoc est, qui non in parte aliquâ credulitatis suæ Saraceni sunt, aut Aristotelicis consentientes erroribus) in terrâ Saracenorum inveniuntur, de his qui inter philosophos commorantur. Dedit enim occasionem non levem apostasiæ hujusmodi ea quæ videtur multorum mandatorum absurditas vel inutilitas: dum enim apparet in eis absurditas et inutilitas, nulla autem præceptionis aut inhibitionis earum ratio, nulla observantiarum utilitas, non est mirum si ab eis receditur: sed tanquam onera supervacanea projiciuntur." fol. 18. In these times and under this Empire, our Author wrote. So that nothing could be more useful than to shew his apostatizing brethren that the SCRIPTURES might be defended, nay, even explained on the principles of ARISTOTLE, and that the precepts of the CEREMONIAL LAW were founded in the highest reasonableness and convenience-Maimonides, where, in his preface, he gives his reasons for writing this discourse, plainly hints at that apostasy-Vertiginosos vero quod attinet, quorum cerebrum est pollutum et vanis futilibusque ac falsis opinionibus repletum, quique sibi imaginantur se magnos esse PHILOSOPHOS, ac theologos, illos scio fugituros a multis, contra multa etiam objectiones moturos.-Deus vero benedictus novit, quantoperè timuerim conscribere ea, quæ explicare et consignare volui in hoc libro. Nam quia talia sunt de quibus nullus ex gente nostra in hac captivitate quicquam scripsit hactenus, quâ ratione primus ego prodire in hac palæstra audeo? Verum suffultus sum duobus principiis ; primo, quod de istius modi negotio dictum sit, Tempus est faciendi Domino: IRRITAM FECERUNT LEGEM TUAM, &c. secundo, eo quod sapientes nostri dicunt, Omnia opera tua fiant ad gloriam Dei.

P. 360. HHHHH. The learned author of the elegant and useful Letter from Rome has here taken to himself what was meant in general of the numerous writers on the same subject; and so has done it the honour of a confutation, in a postscript to the last edition of that Letter. But the same friendly considerations which induced him to end the postscript with declaring his unwillingness to enter further into controversy with me, disposed me not to enter into it at all. This, and neither any neglect of him, nor any force I apprehended in his arguments, kept me silent. However, I owe so much both to myself and the public, as to take notice of a misrepresentation of my argument; and a change of the question in dispute between us: without which notice the controversy (as I agree to leave it where it is) can scarce be fairly estimated." A paragraph in Mr. Warburton's Divine Legation of Moses obliges me (says Dr. Middleton) "to detain the reader a little longer, in order to obviate the prejudices which the authority of so celebrated a writer may probably inject, to the disadvantage of my argument.—I am at a loss to conceive what could move my learned friend to pass so severe a censure upon an argument which has hitherto been espoused by all protestants; admitted by many papists; and evaded rather than contradicted by any. But whatever was his motive, which, I persuade myself, was no unfriendly one, he will certainly pardon me, if, pursuing the full conviction of my mind, I attempt to defend an

established principle, confirmed by strong and numerous facts, against an opinion wholly new and strange to me; and which, if it can be supposed to have any force, overthrows the whole credit and use of my present work. He allows that the writers, who have undertaken to deduce the rites of popery from paganism, have shewn an exact and surprising likeness between them in a great variety of instances. This" (says he) "one would think, is allowing every thing that the cause demands: it is every thing, I dare say, that those writers desire.” * That it is every thing those writers desire, I can easily believe, since I see, my learned friend himself hath considered these two assertions, 1. The religion of the present Romans derived from that of their Heathen ancestors; and, 2. An exact conformity, or uniformity rather of worship between popery and paganism: He hath considered them, I say, as convertible propositions: for, undertaking, as his title-page informs us, to prove the religion of the present Romans derived from that of their Heathen ancestors; and having gone through his arguments, he concludes them in these words, "But it is high time for me to conclude, being persuaded, if I do not flatter myself too much, that I have sufficiently made good WHAT I FIRST UNDERTOOK TO PROVE, an exact conformity, or uniformity rather, of worship between popery and paganism." But what he undertook to prove, we see, was, The religion of the present Romans derived from their Heathen ancestors: That I have therefore, as my learned friend observes, allowed every thing those writers desire, is very likely. But then whether I have allowed every thing that the cause demands, is another question: which I think can never be determined in the affirmative, till it be shewn that no other probable cause can be assigned of this exact conformity between Papists and Pagans, but a borrowing or derivation from one to the other. And I guess, that now this is never likely to be done, since I myself have actually assigned another probable cause, namely, the same spirit of superstition operating in the like circumstances.

But this justly celebrated writer goes on-"This question according to his [the author of The Divine Legation] notion is not to be decided by facts, but by a principle of a different kind, a superior knowledge of human nature." Here I am forced to complain of a want of candour, a want not natural to my learned friend. For, whence is it, I would ask, that he collects, that, according to my notion, this question is not to be decided by facts, but a superior knowledge of human nature? From any thing I have said? Or from any thing I have omitted to say? Surely, not from any thing I have said (though he seems to insinuate so much by putting the words a superior knowledge of human nature in Italic characters as they are called) because I leave him in possession of his facts, and give them all the validity he desires; which he himself observes; and, from thence, as we see, endeavours to draw some advantage to his hypothesis :-Nor from any thing I have omitted to say; for, in this short paragraph where I deliver my opinion, and, by reason of its evidence, offer but one single argument in its support, that argument arises from a FACT, viz. that the superstitious customs in question were many ages later than the conversion of the imperial city to the Christian faith: whence I conclude, that the ruling Churchmen could have no motive in borrowing from Pagan customs, either as those customs were then fashionable in themselves, or respectable for the number or quality of their followers. And what makes this the more extraordinary is, that my learned friend himself immediately afterwards quotes these words; and then tells the reader, that my argument consists of an • Postscript, p. 228. † Letter, p. 224. 1 Postscript, p. 228.

HISTORICAL FACT, and of a consequence deduced from it. It appears therefore, that, according to my notion, the question is to be decided by facts, and not by a superior knowledge of human nature. Yet I must confess I then thought, and do so still, that a superior knowledge of human nature would do no harm, as it might enable men to judge better of facts than we find they are generally accustomed to do. But will this excuse a candid representer for saying, that the question, according to my notion, was not to be decided by facts, but a superior knowledge of human nature? However, to do my learned friend all justice, I must needs say, that, as if these were only words of course, that is, words of controversy, he goes on, through the body of his postscript, to invalidate my argument from fact; and we hear no more of a superior knowledge of human nature than in this place where it was brought in to be laughed at.

As to the argument, it must even shift for itself. It has done more mischief already than I was aware of: and forced my learned friend to extend his charge from the modern to the ancient church of Rome. For my argument, from the low birth of the superstitions in question, coming against his hypothesis, after he had once and again declared the purpose of his letter to be the exposing of the Heathenish idolatry and superstition of the PRESENT church of Rome; he was obliged, in support of that hypothesis, to shew that even the early ages of the church were not free from the infection. Which hath now quite shifted the subject with the scene, and will make the argument of his piece from henceforth to run thus, The religion of the present Romans derived from their early Christian ancestors; and theirs, from the neighbouring Pagans. To speak freely, my reasoning (which was an argument ad hominem, and, as such, I thought, would have been reverenced) reduced the learned writer to this dilemma; either to allow the fact, and give up his hypothesis; or to deny the fact, and change his question. And he has chosen the latter as the lesser evil. As to the fact; that the Churches of the first ages might do that on their own heads, which Moses did upon authority, i. e. indulge their Pagan converts with such of their customs as could not be easily abused to superstition, may be safely acknowledged. My learned friend has produced a few instances of such indulgence, which the censure of some of the more scrupulous of those times hath brought to our knowledge. But the great farraginous body of Popish rites and ceremonies, the subject of my learned friend's Letter from Rome, had surely a different original. They were brought into the Church when Paganism was in part abhorred and in part forgotten; and when the same spirit of sordid superstition which had overspread the Gentile world, had now deeply infected the Christian.