be instructed in his craft, so we meet with an Egyptian who went to practise the very same trade in Greece; ̓́Απις γὰρ ἐλθὼν ἐκ πέρας Ναυπακτείας, ΙΑΤΡΟΜΑΝΤΙΣ ΠΑΙΣ ΑΠΟΛΛΩΝΟΣ, χθόνα Esch. IкET. p. 316. Stanl. ed. As to what is said of his being the son of Apollo, we must understand it in the sense of Homer, where he speaks of the Egyptian physicians in general: ΙΗΤΡΟΣ δὲ ἕκαστος ἐπιστάμενος περὶ πάντων ̓Ανθρώπων· ἡ γὰρ ΠΑΙΗΟΝΟΣ ΕΙΣΙ ΓΕΝΕΘΛΗΣ. P. 172. N. Nothing can be more unjust or absurd than the accusation of Joseph's making the free monarchy of Egypt despotic: for allowing it did indeed at this time suffer such a revolution, who is to be esteemed the author of it but Pharaoh himself? Joseph indeed was prime minister; but it does not appear that his master was of that tribe of lazy monarchs, who intrust their sceptre to the hands of their servants. Moses describes him as active, vigilant, jealous of his authority, anxious for his country, and little indulgent to his officers of state. But the terms in which he invests Joseph in his office, shew that office to be purely ministerial; Thou shalt be over my house, and according to thy word shall all my people be ruled, ONLY IN THE THRONE WILL I BE GREATER THAN THOU. [Gen. xli. 40.] i. e. thou shalt administer justice, but I will reserve to myself the prerogative of giving law. It is highly reasonable therefore, when we find, in so concise a history as the Mosaick, Joseph bidding the people give their money, their cattle, and their lands for bread, to suppose that he only delivered to them the words of Pharaoh, who would supply their wants on no other conditions. P. 173. O. This is the general sentiment of Antiquity; and as generally embraced by modern writers. Kircher makes it the foundation of his Theatrum Hieroglyphicum, and so consequently hath written a large volume full of the most visionary interpretations. The great principle, he goes upon, as he himself tells us, is this :-" Hieroglyphica Ægyptiorum doctrina nihil aliud est, quàm Arcana de Deo, divinisque Ideis, Angelis, Dæmonibus, cæterisque mundanarum potestatum classibus ordinibusque scientia, SAXIS potissimùm insculpta." Oedipus Ægyptiacus, tom. iii. p. 4. Dr. Wilkins follows the received opinion in the general division of his subject, in his Essay towards a real Character: For speaking of notes for secrecy, such (says he) were the Egyptian hieroglyphics.-Yet he adds, with his usual penetration,-it seems to me questionable whether the Egyptians did not at first use their hieroglyphics as a mere shift for the want of letters, as was done by the Mexicans, p. 12.—And this was all his subject led him to say of the Egyptian Hieroglyphics. Servius had gone further, and asserted the priority of hieroglyphics without a doubt. "Annus enim secundum Ægyptios indicabatur, ante inventas literas, picto dracone caudam suam mordente." Apud Virg. Æn. 1. v. ver. 85. P. 176. P. The ship and pilot, bearing this signification, would, of course, be much used in the descriptions of their mysteries, in which, as we have shewn, the knowledge of the Governor of the universe was part of the άrópóŋra: and so we find it more than once delineated in the Bembine Table. Kircher, according to custom, makes it full of sublime knowledge; but the plain truth is no more than this above.-Tacitus, speaking of the religion of the Suevians, says they worshipped Isis; he could not conceive how this came about, only the figure of a galley, under which image she was represented, shewed that the worship was imported from abroad. "Pars Suevorum et ISIDI sacrificat: unde causa et origo peregrino sacro, parum comperi, nisi quod signum ipsum, in modum LIBURNÆ figuratum, docet advectam religionem." De Morib. Germ. c. ix. The latter part of which period Mr. Gordon has thus translated, unless the figure of her image formed like a galley shewed, &c. But nisi quod does not signify unless, as implying any doubt, but saving only. So the same author, De Mor. Ger. c. xxv. "Occidere solent non disciplina et severitate, sed impetu et ira, ut inimicum, nisi quod impune." Tacitus could tell no more of the original than this, that the worship of Isis was imported, because her image was made in the figure of a galley. In this he was positive but for all this, not the less mistaken. It was indeed imported; but the galley was no mark of that original. Strabo tells us, in his fourth book, that, in an island near Britain, they performed the same mysterious rites to Ceres and Proserpine as were used in Samothrace. Ceres and Isis were the same. The Phenician seamen, without doubt, brought them thither, as likewise to the Suevians inhabiting the coasts of the German The governor of the universe was taught in these mysteries. Isis was represented by the later Egyptians to be the governor of the universe, as we have seen before, in a discourse on the metamorphosis of Apuleius. But the governor of the universe was delineated, in their hieroglyphics, by a ship and pilot. Hence, amongst the Suevians, Isis was worshipped under the form of a galley, and not because her religion was of foreign growth: And so amongst the Romans, which Tacitus did not advert to. For in the calendarium rusticum amongst the inscriptions of Gruter, in the month of March, an Egyptian holyday is marked under the title of ISIDIS NAVIGIUM. The ceremonies on this holyday are described in Apuleius Met. 1. ii.—It was a festival of very high antiquity amongst the Egyptians; and seems to be alluded to in these words of the Prophet Isaiah :-Wo to the land shadowing with wings-that sendeth ambassadors by the sea even in VESSELS OF BULRUSHES upon the waters, saying, Go ye swift messengers, &c. chap. xviii. ver. 1, 2. ocean. P. 177. Q. The original is, καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν διετύπωσεν τοὺς ἱεροὺς τῶν σTоIXEίWV XарAKTĥpas. There is a small fault in this reading; it should be τούς ΤΕ ἱερούς, with the conjunction: The corruption helped to mislead Cumberland, who translates,-and formed the sacred characters of the other elements [p. 38. of his Sanchoniatho's Phenician history]; which looks as if the learned prelate understood by oroixeiwv, the elements of nature; Cœlum or Ouranos having (as he supposed) been mentioned before, as delineated or engraved by Taautus: but ETOIXEION signifies the elements of hieroglyphic writing, and λov refers not to that, but to Seŵr just above; which further appears from what follows-roîs dè Xoioîs Seois; otherwise, only Dagon is left, for these words, rois λourtois Zeoîs to be applied to.-Sanchoniatho had said that Taautus represented the gods in a new invented hieroglyphic character; and then goes on to tell us that he invented other hieroglyphic characters, whether by figures or marks; for I apprehend that ἱεροὺς τῶν στοιχείων χαρακτῆρας principally designs that part of hieroglyphic writing which was by marks, not figures: for without doubt, at first, the Egyptians used the same method as the Mexicans, who, we are told, expressed in their hieroglyphic writing, those things which had form, * This EUSTATHIUS intimates in these words, speaking of the most ancient Egyptian hieroglyphics, Ζώδιά τινα ἱερογλυφοῦντες, καὶ λοιποὺς δὴ χαρακτῆρας εἰς σημασίαν ὧν Aéyew ¿CoÚλovTO.- In Iliad. vi. verse 168. by figures; others by arbitrary marks. See p. 175, note (†). But we shall see, that when the Egyptians employed this writing for the vehicle of their secrets, they then invented the forms of things to express abstract ideas. However, that this is the meaning of σroixeiwv is further evident from this place of Eusebius, where he speaks of a quotation of Philo's, from a work of Sanchoniatho, concerning the Phenician elements, Powikwv σTOXEίov; which work, as appears by his account of the quotation, treated of the nature of several animals. But we have shewn how much the study of natural history contributed to the composition of hieroglyphic characters. P. 177. R. At the time this account was first given to the public, the learned Dr. Richard Pococke coming fresh from Egypt, thought it incumbent on him to contradict that Egyptian learning which was only conceived at home. But as, by a common practice of prudent men, he had not mentioned me by name, it was thought I had no right to reply. Let the reader judge of one, by the other. This learned and indeed candid writer, in his book of travels, has a chapter, On the ancient hieroglyphics of Egypt; in which he expresseth himself as follows." If hieroglyphical figures stood for words or sounds that signified certain things, the power of hieroglyphics seems to be the same as of a number of letters composing such a sound, that by agreement was made to signify such a thing. For hieroglyphics, as words, seem to have stood for sounds, and sounds signify things; as for instance, it might have been agreed that the figure of a crocodile might stand for the sound that meant what we call malice: the children of the priests were early taught that the figure of a crocodile stood for such a sound, and, if they did not know the meaning of the sound, it would certainly stand with them for a sound; though, as the sound, it signified also a quality or thing; and they might afterwards be taught the meaning of this sound; as words are only sounds, which sounds we agree shall signify such and such things; so that, to children, words only stand for sounds, which relate to such things as they know nothing of; and, in this sense, we say children learn many things like parrots, what they do not understand, and their memories are exercised only about sounds, till they are instructed in the meaning of the words. This I thought it might be proper to observe, AS SOME SAY HIEROGLYPHICS STOOD FOR THINGS AND NOT FOR WORDS,-if sounds articulated in a certain manner are words. And though it may be said, that in this case, when different nations of different languages agree on common characters, that stand for certain things they agree on, that then such figures stand for things: this will be allowed; but then they stand for sounds too, that is, the sounds in each language that signify such things: and, as observed before, to children, who know nothing of the several things they stand for, to them they are only marks that express such and such sounds: so that these figures stand not for things alone, but as words, for sounds and things." * The design of this passage, the reader sees, is to oppose the principle I went upon, in explaining the nature of Egyptian hieroglyphics, that they stood for things, and not for words. But that is all one sees; for the learned writer's expression conforming to his ideas, will not suffer us to do more than guess at the proof which he advances: it looks, however, like this,That hieroglyphics cannot be said to stand for things only; because things being denoted by words or sounds; and hieroglyphics exciting the idea of sounds (which are the notes of things) as well as the idea of the things themselves, hieroglyphics stand both for sounds and things.-This seems to Pp. 228, 229, of a book intituled, "A Description of the East," &c. be the argument put into common English. But, for fear of mistaking him, let us confine ourselves to his own words. If hieroglyphical figures (says he) stood for words or sounds that signified certain things, the power of hieroglyphics seems to be the same as of a number of letters composing such a sound that by agreement was made to signify such a thing. Without doubt, if hieroglyphics stood for sounds, they were of the nature of words, which stand for sounds. But this is only an hypothetical proposition; let us see therefore how he addresses himself to prove it. For hieroglyphics, as wORDS, seem to have stood for sounds, and sounds signify things; as for instance, it MIGHT have been agreed that the figure of a crocodile MIGHT stand for the same sound that meant what we call malice. The propriety of the expression is suited to the force of the reasoning. 1. Instead of saying, but hieroglyphics, the learned writer says, for hieroglyphics; which not expressing an illation, but implying a reason, obscures the argument he would illustrate. 2. He says, Hieroglyphics, as words, seem to have stood for sounds. Just before, he said, hieroglyphics stood for words OR sounds. Here they are as words, or like words, and seem to stand For sound. What are we to take them for? are words sound? or, do they stand for sound? He has given us our choice. But we go on. 3. For, he corroborates this seeming truth by an instance, in which the possibility of its standing for a sound is made a proof of its so doing. It MIGHT (says he) have been agreed that the figure of a crocodile MIGHT stand, &c. But he is less diffident in what follows. The children of the priests were early taught that the figure of a crocodile stood for such a sound, and if they did not know the meaning of the sound, it would certainly stand with them for a sound. This indeed is an anecdote: but where did he learn that the children, before they could decipher the sounds of their own language, were taught hieroglyphics? 'Till now, hieroglyphics, when got into exclusive hands, were understood to be reserved for those instructed in high and mysterious science. But let us suppose that they were taught to children amongst their first elements: yet even then, as we shall see from the nature of the thing, they could never stand as marks for words or sounds. When a child is taught the power of letters, he learns that the letters, which compose one word, malice, for instance, express the sound; which, naturally arising from a combination of the several powers of each letter, shews him that the letters stand for such a sound or word. But when he is taught that the figure or picture of a crocodile signifies malice, he as naturally and necessarily conceives (though he knows not the meaning of the word) that it stands for some thing, signified by that word, and not for a sound: because there is no natural connexion between figure and a sound, as there is between figure and a thing. And the only reason why the word malice intervenes, in this connexion, is because of the necessity of the use of words to distinguish things, and rank them into sorts. But the veriest child could never be so simple as to conceive that, when he was told the figure of a beast with four short legs and a long tail signified malice, that it signed the sound of malice: any more than if he were told it signified a crocodile, that it signified the sound of the word crocodile. The truth is, the ignorant often mistake words for things, but never, things for words that is, they frequently mistake the name of a thing for its nature; and rest contented in the knowledge which that gives them : Like him who, on the sight of a pictured elephant, inquiring what the creature was, on his being answered, that it was the great Czar, asked no further, but went away well satisfied in his acquaintance with that illus trious Stranger. Yet I apprehend he did not understand his informer to mean that it signified only the sound of that word. Perhaps the learned writer will object, that the cases are different; that the elephant was a mere picture, and the crocodile a sign or mark. But I have shewn at large that the ancient Egyptian hieroglyphics were at first mere pictures; and that all the alteration they received, in becoming marks, was only the having their general use of conveying knowledge rendered more extensive and expeditious, more mysterious and profound; while they still continued to be the marks of things. To proceed; our author considers next what he apprehends may be thought an objection to his opinion. And though (says he) it may be said that, in this case, where different nations of different languages agree on common characters, that stand for certain things they agree on, that then such figures stand for things. To which he answers, This will be allowed; but then they stand for sounds too, that is, the sounds in each language that signify such things. He who can grant so much, and without injury to his system, need be under no fear of ever giving his adversary advantages. He may, if he pleases, say next, when disputing about the colour of an object, that it is black, will be allowed; but then it is white too. For a mark for things can no more be a mark for sounds, than black can be white. The reason is the same in both cases; one quality or property excludes the other: thus, if hieroglyphic marks stand for things, and are used as common characters by various nations differing in speech and language, they cannot stand for sounds; because these men express the same thing by different sounds; unless, to remove this difficulty, he will go farther, and say, not, as he did before, that one hieroglyphic word (to use his own language) stood for one sound, but, that it stands for an hundred. Again if hieroglyphic marks stand for sounds, they cannot stand for things not those things which are not signified by such sounds; this he himself will allow nor yet, I affirm, for those which are thus signified; because it is the sound which stands for the thing signified by the sound, and not the hieroglyphic mark. But all this mistake proceeded from another, namely, that WORDS stand both for sounds and things, which we now come to. For he concludes thus, So that these figures (viz. hieroglyphics) stand not for things alone, but, as words, for sounds and things. An unhappy illustration! which has all the defects, both in point of meaning and expression, that a proposition can well have. For, if by words, be meant articulated sounds, then the expression labours in the sense, as affirming, that sounds stand for sounds. And that he meant so is possible, because in the beginning of the passage quoted, he uses words for articulate sounds.-Hieroglyphics, says he, stood for words or sounds. But if, by words, he meant letters, (and that he might mean so is possible likewise, for he presently afterwards uses words in that sense too-Hiero· glyphics, as words, says he, seem to stand for sounds) then the proposition is only false the plain truth being this, letters stand for sounds only; which sounds they naturally produce; as sounds arbitrarily denote things. But to be a little more particular; as in this distinction lies the judgment which is to be made, if ever it be rightly made, of the controversy between us. All this confusion of counter-reasoning proceeds, as we observed before, First, from not reflecting that letters, which stand for words, have not, and hieroglyphics, which stand for things, once had not, an arbitrary, but a natural designation. For, as the powers of letters naturally produce words or sounds, so the figures of hieroglyphics naturally signify things: either more simply, by representation, or more |