REVIEW. THE DIVINE LAW OF THE TEN COMMANDMENTS, Explained according to both its Literal and its Spiritual Sense; in a series of Sermons, &c. &c., by the Rev. S. NOBLE, author of "An Appeal in behalf of the Doctrines of the New Church;" "Lectures on Important Doctrines," &c. &c. London: SIMPKIN, MARSHALL, and Co. 1848. THESE Sermons, we think, cannot fail to be highly useful. We have read them with delight, and we trust with profit. They convey affectionate admonition and sound advice to the young; while they fail not to give also wise counsel to the aged. It is true that here and there we have met with some statements at which we have hesitated, some few arguments which we think not quite correctly stated, or not perhaps sufficiently developed; but upon the whole we have seldom read a work with more satisfaction, or which we think more calculated to benefit society, whether within or without the New Church. The Ten Commandments," observes Mr. Noble, page 338, "deliver the most fundamental principles upon which all human society is constituted, and without a regard to which it cannot be held together; consequently they must be, and they are, as to their substance, incorporated into the laws of all regular governments, as involving the most indispensable of the duties required of the subject or citizen." 66 In regard to the First Commandment, Protestants very generally treat of it in reference to the Church of Rome, to which, as is well known, they impute the worship of idols. How seldom does either church think of applying it to its own doctrine of the Tripersonality! "There is a universal influx," observes Swedenborg, "from God into the souls of men, teaching them that there is a God and that he is One." The very same influx that teaches men that there is a God, teaches that He is one; and therefore to reject the idea of the Unity of God, or to inculcate any doctrine which tends to contravene the Divine Unity, must proportionally tend to dissipate a belief in the very existence of the One True God. Indeed we have been astonished at the observations of some Tripersonalists upon this subject. They see that a belief in the strict Unity of God is directly opposed to their doctrine of Tripersonalism. They see, indeed, a unity of design extending throughout all creation; but this unity of design, they affirm, does not argue a single designer; it is no more than might result from a single plan agreed upon by a multitude of designers, just as we see a single decree of the church ordained by a whole council. Therefore they tell us that natural religion, as it has been called, never can prove the Unity of God; that Polytheism is, in fine, just as reasonable in the abstract as simple Theism, if not much more so, as the experience of mankind, they say, has proved; that we know nothing of the Unity of God, but from the Scriptures, and that we are bound to believe only in such a Divine Unity as they represent. Having gone thus far, they have prepared the mind for any such doctrine of the Divine Unity as they are disposed to introduce; and no Tritheism, however gross, is, according to them, abstractedly objectionable, inasmuch as from the unity of design in creation we can infer only a single plan, not a single designer; for that, according to natural religion, Polytheism is as rational as simple Theism. They pretend, indeed, to maintain the Unity of God; still, it is only such a unity as they consider to be Tripersonal, but others Tritheistical. Although divines, therefore, have generally professed to believe in the Unity of God, yet it is melancholy to see how the doctrine of the Tripersonality has been tacitly at work, in enfeebling, confusing, or confounding the commonest arguments in favour of there being only one God. Take an example from Bishop Burnet and Dr. Fiddes. The former observes in his Thirty Nine Articles, page 30, on the proposition that THERE IS BUT ONE GOD: "As to this, the common argument by which it is proved, is the order of the world; from whence it is inferred that there cannot be more Gods than one, since where there are more than one there must happen diversity and confusion.* This is by some thought to be no good reason; for if there are more Gods, that is, more beings infinitely perfect, they will always think the same thing and be knit together with an entire love. It is true that in things of a moral nature this must so happen; for beings infinitely perfect must ever agree. But in physical things capable of no morality, as in creating the world sooner or later, and the different systems of beings, with a thousand other things that have no moral goodness in them, different beings infinitely perfect might have different thoughts. So this argument seems still of great force to prove the unity of the Deity." This great force appears to us to be what has been called the forcible feeble. In things of a moral nature, it is said, infinitely perfect beings must agree; but in things of a physical nature they might not agree. Why they should necessarily agree in morality and only possibly disagree in physics, the worthy Bishop has not stated. At all events he has so worded the argument as really to make it favour a plurality of Gods; inasmuch as no true system of morals can prove God to be one, for that several Gods, or infinitely perfect beings, must in ethics perfectly agree. In physical things, it is true, they might not agree! Indeed! but what * See Mr. Noble's Sermons, page 342, &c. if they might agree? In this case neither physics nor morals furnish any arguments in proof that God is One; they prove only that the Gods are agreed. But the worthy, and in many respects eminent, Bishop thus continues; and, as we think, in a more rational manner :- "The other argument from reason to prove the unity of God is from the notion of a being infinitely perfect. For a superiority over all other beings comes so naturally into the idea of infinite perfection, that we cannot separate it from it. A Being, therefore, that has not all other beings inferior and subordinate to it cannot be infinitely perfect; whence it is evident that there is but one God." Let us hear now what may be considered as Dr. Fiddes' comments upon these observations of Bishop Burnet. In his Body of Divinity, vol. 1, page 97, he remarks: : "We grant no government can be preserved without order, yet it does not follow, in the reason of the thing, that order cannot be preserved in any government but where one person solely presides; especially when there may be an entire conformity in the designs and measures of the persons supposed to govern; which it is very reasonable to presume, among beings infinitely wise; and upon this account, admitting more Gods than one, I argued the possibility of their interfering, rather from the free and independent acts of their goodness, than from the resolutions of their wisdom, wherein their perfect unanimity and concurrence seems with much greater facility deducible. As to that part of the argument which makes supremacy a necessary character of an all-perfect being, it seems to carry still less weight and evidence in it. Supremacy cannot be an absolute or essential character of the divine nature; because it is a relative term, and only supposes that when God has made any thing, he has a right of dominion over it; but it does not follow that if he had never proceeded to make any thing, or to operate externally, this attribute could, in a proper sense, have belonged to him. To say that he must have been supreme, without his creating any thing dependent on him, is plainly to beg the question, and proves nothing against the possibility of other independent beings, equal in power and every other perfection to him." We shall make no other remarks upon these two quotations-the one from Bishop Burnet, the other from Dr. Fiddes-than merely this, that the only rational argument which Bishop Burnet uses to shew that there is only one God, Dr. Fiddes attempts to undermine; while on the other hand, the argument of Bishop Burnet tending to shew the possibility of more Gods than one, Dr. Fiddes confirms. Such tampering with the proofs of the unity, if not the very existence of God, cannot fail to be, to every true Christian, a subject of the most melancholy consideration; and if, as Mr. Noble so justly observes, the Ten Commandments are the fundamental principles on which all human society is constituted, we cannot but think that arguments which tamper with the unity and existence of God, in the same proportion tamper with the unity and existence of society. In both cases it is a species of treason; and hence in the former Mr. Noble has appropriately called it spiritual high treason. The Infinity of God, again, is a subject beautifully treated of by Swedenborg, and when viewed from the doctrine of degrees, is both clearly apprehensible and distinctly cognizable. But as treated of in the received theology, nothing can be more unsatisfactory. Let us take, for instance, the following observation from Colliber's Impartial Inquiry into the Existence and Nature of God, page 200, where it is observed :— "Whereas the more ancient philosophers generally and with reason contented themselves with saying,-That is infinite beyond which nothing is; he (i. e. Aristotle) thinks fit to correct them by saying,―That only is infinite which has always something beyond it. Which, I take it, can import no less, than that it is the very nature of a proper infinity never to be complete." These two definitions seem to refer us to what has been denominated two kinds of infinity, namely, absolute and relative. Relative infinity is such as we find in what, in algebra, is called an infinite series, i e. a series not absolutely infinite, but such as that no one term can be assigned beyond which there does not exist another; and this, as it is said, ad infinitum. Now this is a view of the infinity of God which has very generally prevailed, and which was advocated by Locke. But it is remarkable, that this idea of infinity relates to quantity, not to quality; and when applied to quality, signifies only the quantity of the quality. It is only the doctrine of degrees, as explained by Swedenborg, that leads us out of all the fallacies to which this kind of reasoning is liable. No doctrine of quantity, applied to the human mind and its attributes, can ever lead us to a true idea of the One True God, any more than when applied to the material human body it can give us a true idea of the SUN. We must, however, apologise to the reader for drawing his attention hitherto rather to topics suggested by Mr. Noble's Sermons, than to the actual statements of the author himself. In our remarks, however, upon the Second Table of the Ten Commandments, we proceed to exhibit some of the statements of the author himself, and which we are sure will not be read without the greatest interest. They relate in the present instance to the subject of capital punishment in the case of MURDER, a subject which, it is well known, has recently occupied considerable attention. Mr. Noble observes, page 159: "That any circumstances should ever arise which make the taking away of the life of a fellow-creature necessary, is deeply to be deplored; but that such cases may and do exist, it seems to be only pseudo-philanthropy, and a high degree of fanaticism that can deny. Thus, as just noticed, the punishment of death for great offences is most indisputably allowable; nor does it appear that any advantage can accrue, either to society or to the criminal, by not awarding it. There are some crimes which so close the interiors of the human mind, shut out the influences of heaven, and induce, consequently, such callousness of feeling and hardness of heart, that it is next to impossible that the person who has been guilty of them should ever be reformed; but, in general, continuance in life would only be applied by such a being to further confirmation in evil, and to the opening in his soul of lower and lower depths of iniquity; thus connecting him with and finally sinking him into a more direful hell. Nor can the reformation of any person take place, or have its first commencement in any state, which is not one of perfect liberty; but would it be wise or justifiable in any government, for the sake of the very slight probability of a great criminal's reformation, to let him loose again upon the public, to see whether or not he would repeat his former crimes? Would it be right, for instance, to allow a person who had committed the crime which our law calls murder, being the same that is chiefly meant in the literal sense of this commandment,-which is the deliberately and with previous malice, destroying the life of another-ever again to go at large, affording him again the opportunity of destroying the lives of the unoffending members of society? No speculator, I believe, in theories of legislation, has ever carried his tenderness to criminals so far as this; but many have recommended that the greatest of criminals, even the most desperate murderers, instead of being put to death, should simply be condemned to perpetual imprisonment,-which some would make solitary confinement. The incongruity is rather palpable, which supposes that a person who has committed the most irreparable of crimes, by depriving an innocent fellow-citizen of his life, and has thus rendered it impossible that he can ever again be admitted within the pale of society, should, ipso facto, and as if he were the injured party, have acquired a title to support, at the public expense, for the rest of his days; much more just and reasonable does it appear to be, that the community should undertake the maintenance of the widow and children of the innocent man, who has been exposed to be murdered through the inefficiency of its police regulations. But leaving out of the account the consideration of expense,-(though it may well be doubted whether there is not something radically defective in all those forms of intended punishment, which, while they entail a continued heavy expense upon the public, in too many instances only operate to the perfecting of criminals in their arts, and as a bonus upon the commission of crime; but leaving out of the account the consideration of expense)—it is doubtful whether the supporting of the murderer in prison would be any real charity to the wretched culprit. Our doctrines evince most clearly, that no real repentance-such repentance as changes the heart-can be commenced in a state of constraint; and however, in such a state, a man may profess contrition, and persuade others, and even himself, that he is an altered character, still, set him at liberty, and the state of mind and of superficial reformation, induced during confinement, will speedily wear off, and, in a little time, the state will return in which he was prior to his apprehension, and the individual will be again just what he was before. If indeed a man, after having been guilty of a crime, begins truly to repent and become a reformed character, before he is brought to answer for it to the law, thus while he is in a state of freedom, his repentance and reformation may be confirmed and advanced during his confinement afterwards; it will also, whether he continues here or not, greatly affect his state in the other life; but if amendment had not begun before, it cannot efficiently be afterwards produced. A state of constraint quite closes the interiors of the mind, so that any change which might be commenced in such a state affects the |