PETER R. LANGDON

v.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS.

Filed at Ottawa June 12, 1890.

1. EXTRADITION-practice in obtaining requisition-duplicates filed in office of Secretary of State. It seems to be the custom in the office of the Secretary of State, to require duplicates of the papers necessary to secure a requisition for the return of a fugitive from justice. One draft of the petition, with its indorsed certificates, and one copy of the complaint, are kept on file in the Secretary's office, and the other draft and copy accompany the warrant which is delivered to the messenger.

2. CRIMINAL LAW-forgery-of the indictment-innuendo as to person intended to be injured. An indictment alleged that the defendant forged the name of a county judge to a certificate to the Governor of this State, for the purpose of procuring a requisition of the Governor upon the Governor of another State for the arrest of one Lou M. Hayward, and that such forgery was done with intent to deceive, prejudice, damage and defraud the said Lou M. Hayward. The name given in the certificate was Lou M. "Hayord:" Held, that the indictment was not bad for want of a proper innuendo that the "Hayord" named in the forged certificate was the same person as the “Hayward” named in the indictment.

3. SAME-forgery by procuration. A person who procures another to forge the name of one, is as guilty as if he had done it himself.

4. SAME-evidence-proof of handwriting of the forger. On the trial of one for forgery in signing the name of another, proof that the signature is not in the handwriting of the defendant is entitled to but little weight or reliance, for the reason that a forger seeks to disguise his own handwriting and to imitate that of the one whose name he forges.

5. SAME-signature forged-variance in name-middle initial. An indictment charged that the defendant forged the signature of Thomas Sawyer, a public officer, to a certain instrument of writing. The name to the instrument was Thomas W. Sawyer, while the evidence showed that the officer's name was Thomas S. Sawyer: Held, that there was no variance, the middle initial of a name being, in law, no part of the name. 6. CONFESSION-as to a criminal charge-as evidence. It has long been settled in our law, that while a free and voluntary confession of guilt is of the highest order of evidence, one extorted is never received. So where one, on his arrest for the forgery of the signature of a public officer to papers necessary to procure a requisition of the Governor for

Syllabus.

the return of another charged with crime, was told he was arrested on that "requisition business," replied, "I have done the whole thing, and am willing to suffer the consequences," it was held, that such statement was admissible on the question of his guilt of the charge of forgery.

7. INSANITY-as a defense-in criminal prosecution-presumption of sanity-evidence in rebuttal. Every man is presumed to be sane until the contrary is shown. This may be rebutted by proof of his commitment in an insane asylum by the county judge, on due examination. And the discharge of a patient from such asylum may be regarded as evidence of his recovery, and the presumption of his insanity arising from his being in the asylum ought to cease.

8. SAME-insanity established—presumption of its continuance. After a person has been found insane by inquest properly held, the presumption of insanity may continue until it is rebutted by evidence of sanity. But a finding of an inquest is not the only proof of insanity which will give rise to the presumption of continuing unsoundness of mind. As a general rule, when insanity is proven as existing at a particular period, it will be presumed to continue until disproved. This rule, however, is subject to several qualifications.

9. One of these qualifications is, that the insanity shown to have existed prior to the commission of the act must be of a permanent type or of a continuing nature, or possessed of the characteristics of an habitual or confirmed disorder of the mind, or its peculiarities must have been exhibited for a long series of years. It is not sufficient that there be proof of a temporary or spasmodic mania.

10. Another qualification of the rule that the insanity of a party, when once established, will be presumed to continue until it is disproved, is, that too long a period of time must not be shown to have elapsed between the proved insanity and the act of crime charged.

11. SAME-commitment to asylum—as affecting the presumption of continued insanity. An instruction which assumes that the confinement of a defendant in the hospital for the insane at Anna, in 1878 or 1879, was such an establishment of insanity as to raise the presumption of its continuance, is properly refused when the evidence fails to show any proper finding, on inquest, of insanity, or insanity of a permanent character.

12. The insanity which authorizes the removal of a convict from the penitentiary to an asylum for the insane, is not necessarily an insanity of a permanent kind. It may be assumed, or pretended, or merely temporary. The removal is not based upon insanity that is determined by an inquest or legal adjudication, but because the attending physician or warden advises it.

13. SAME reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt of the sanity of one accused of crime, at the time of its commission, must acquit.

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14. SAME-evidence-letter of prisoner to third person-mode of obtaining possession. A letter written by a prisoner while in jail, to a third person, was introduced in evidence by the prosecution, to show that the defendant was not insane, which was objected to. The defense was allowed the privilege of showing that the letter was improperly obtained, but failed to establish such fact: Held, that the court properly admitted the letter in evidence.

15. SEARCHES-SEIZURES-section 6 of the Bill of Rights-extent of the immunity of the citizen. Where a prosecuting officer obtains a search warrant in strict conformity to law, to search the office of a party in prison on a charge of forgery, and certain papers bearing on the question of the party's guilt are found, they may be used in evidence against him on his trial without violating the constitutional right of the party to be secure in his papers and effects against unreasonable search and seizure.

16. Where a search warrant is issued upon probable cause, and is supported by affidavit, and particularly describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized, it will be such as is required by section 6 of the Bill of Rights.

17. Section 2 of division 8 of the Criminal Code authorizes search warrants to be issued "to search and seize counterfeit or spurious coin, forged bank notes, and other forged instruments, or tools, machinery or materials prepared or provided for making either of them." The words "other forged instruments," are broad enough to cover a forged certificate.

18. The constitution does not prohibit all searches and seizures of a man's papers or other possessions, but such, only, as are "unreasonable," and the foundation of which is not previously supported by oath or affirmation. Among the things that may be searched for and seized without violation of the Bill of Rights, are “books and papers of a public character, retained from their proper custody, and forged

bills or papers." The search warrant may issue for a requisition of the Governor of the State for the apprehension and return of a fugitive, a paper of the Governor appointing one as agent of the State to bring back the fugitive, and a forged certificate of a county judge to the Governor in respect to such fugitive.

19. Search and seizure may be made in special cases, when that which is the subject of the crime is supposed to be concealed, and the public or the complainant has an interest in it or in its destruction.

20. INSTRUCTIONS—drawing conclusions of fact from the evidence. An instruction is clearly erroneous which attempts to draw conclusions of fact from the evidence for the jury, instead of leaving it to them to draw their own conclusions. It is error to say to the jury that the evidence admits only of a particular construction.

Brief for the Plaintiff in Error.

21. SAME assuming facts. An instruction which assumes an important fact which has no evidence in its support, is properly refused, as being erroneous.

22. An instruction on behalf of one on trial for an alleged crime, which assumes that all the evidence of his guilt is purely circumstantial, where there is proof of confessions made by him, is properly refused. Proof of confession is not circumstantial evidence.

23. NEW TRIAL-newly discovered evidence. A new trial will not be granted on the ground of newly discovered evidence, when it appears that such evidence was known to the party and within his reach at the time of the trial, and is merely cumulative.

WRIT OF ERROR to the Circuit Court of Kankakee county; the Hon. N. J. PILLSBURY, Judge, presiding.

Messrs. HALEY & O'DONNELL, and Mr. STEPHEN R. MOORE, for the plaintiff in error:

Lou M. Hayward is the name of the party whose arrest on requisition was sought, while in the forged certificate it was Lou M. Hayord, and the name of the county judge was Thomas W. Sawyer, instead of his true name, Thomas Sawyer. Each count of the indictment was bad, for the want of proper innuendoes explaining and connecting the name of Hayord with the name Hayward, and showing that the name Hayord in the certificate was intended by the defendant to designate Lou M. Hayward, and also because there is neither innuendo nor averment that Thomas W. Sawyer is the Thomas Sawyer who was alleged to be the county judge.

When the words of a document are essential ingredients of the offense, as in forgery, etc., the document should be set out in words and figures. Wharton on Crim. Pl. and Pr. 167.

The omission of a word in an indictment for forgery is fatal. United States v. Harriman, 1 Baldw. 292.

The defendant's papers, obtained from his custody by an illegal search warrant while he was in jail, were erroneously admitted in evidence against him. Bill of Rights, sec. 3; Wall v. State, 5 W. Va. 532; Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616.

25-133 ILL.

Brief for the People.

Verbal confessions of guilt are to be received with great caution. 1 Greenleaf on Evidence, sec. 214.

As to the question of insanity, see Rev. Stat. chap. 38, div. 2, secs. 338, 339; Chase v. People, 40 Ill. 358; Hopps v. People, 31 id. 385; Dunn v. People, 109 id. 643; Hoge v. People, 117 id. 44; Rev. Stat. chap. 108, sec. 42.

After proof of general derangement, the burden of proof is changed to the prosecution, who must show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the accused was sane at the time he committed the act. Archy v. Stephens, 8 Ind. 411; Cunningham v. State, 56 Miss. 269.

A man is presumed to be of sane mind till the contrary is shown. But if derangement or imbecility be proved or admitted at any particular period, it is presumed to continue till disproved. Peaslee v. Robbins, 3 Metc. 164; 1 Greenleaf on Evidence, sec. 42.

Mr. WILLIAM R. HUNTER, State's Attorney, for the People:

A communication made to the State's attorney, as such, is absolutely privileged. Vogel v. Granz, 110 U. S. 311; Worthington v. Scribner, 109 Mass. 487.

Though papers may be illegally taken from the possession of the party against whom they are offered, it is no valid objection to their admissibility if they are pertinent to the issue. The court will not take notice of how they were obtained. 1 Greenleaf on Evidence, (Redfield's ed.) sec. 254; Gates v. People, 14 Ill. 433.

In criminal trials, from motives of public policy, and upon the general principle of the convenience of public justice, the names of persons employed in the discovery of crime and collection of evidence are not permitted to be disclosed any further than is essential to a fair trial of the question of the guilt or innocence of the accused. 1 Greenleaf on Evidence, sec. 250. The middle initial letter is no part of the name. Miller v. People, 39 Ill. 457; Tucker v. People, 122 id. 583.