was, no doubt, heightened by recalling the soul-comforting peace that lingered around the tomb of his fathers. Overlooking the

river and the little city below, and in view of picturesque hills beyond (not unlike those bordering the valley of Hebron), yet these sights seem far away, and the blue heaven above, somewhat closer by! From Boone, the pioneer, to Hart, the sculptor, is a long and illustrious roll of Kentuckians that will be called among men until the Anglo-Saxon race and all it has achieved-like prehistoric man-shall be blotted from the chronicles of time.

APPENDIX.

NOTE A, PAGE 4.

GRANT FROM LORD FAIRFAX TO MARTIN HARDIN IN 1748.*

(NOTE I.)

The Right Honorable Thomas Lord Fairfax, Baron of Cameron, in that part of Great Britain called Scotland, Proprietor of the Northern Neck of Virginia: To all to whom this present Writing shall came, Lends Greeting. Know Ye that for good Causes for and in Consideration of the Composition to the paid and for the annual Rent hereafter reserved, I have given, granted, and confirmed, And by these presents for me, my Heirs and Assigns, do Give, Grant, and Confirm unto Martin Hardin, of the County of Prince William, a certain Tract of Waste and ungranted Land, lying in the Great Fork of the Rappahannock River, Orange County, and is Boun'ded according to a Survey thereof made by Mr. George Hume, as followeth: Beginning at a large Hickory and Red Oak Corner in a Line of Colonel Francis Thornton, and runs thence with the said Thornton's Lines So. 270, Wt. twenty-eight poles, to one red Oak and Hickory, So. 15°, Et. Forty-two Poles, to a Poplar, So. 48°, Et. Sixty-four Poles to a Red Oak, So. 76°, Et. Forty Poles to two Spanish Oaks, So. 32°, Et. Fifty Poles to one Hickory, one white Oak, and a red Oak Corner to the said Thornton's; thence leaving his line So. 8°, Et. Thirty-six Poles to one Hickory and three white Oaks in the line of another Tract of the said Thornton's, thence with the said Thornton's line So. 40°, Wt. Two Hundred Poles to one Hickory and two white Oaks Corner to the said Thornton and William Green, thence with the said Green's Line No. 70°, Wt. Sixty Poles to Two White Oaks and one red Oak Corner to the said Green and John Weatherhall, thence with the said Weatherhall line No. 40°, Wt. Three Hundred Poles to one red Oak, on a Ridge, thence North Sixty-two Poles to a Chestnut, Oak, and Hickory, at the foot of a Mountain; thence over the said Mountain East Two hundred and thirty-four Poles to the Beginning, containing Four hundred acres, Together with all Rights, Members, and Appurtenances thereunto belonging, Royal Mines excepted, and a full third part of all Lead, Copper, Lime, Coals, Iron Mines, and Iron Ore that shall be found thereon: To have and to hold the same Four hundred acres of Land, Together with all Rights, Profits, and Benefits to the same belonging or in anywise appurtaining, Except before Excepted. To Him, the said Martin Hardin, his heirs and assigns for Ever. He, the said Martin Hardin, his heirs and assigns, therefor, Yielding and Paying to Me, my Heirs and Assigns or to my certain attorney or attorneys, agent or agents, or to the certain attorney or attorneys of my Heirs or Assigns, Proprietors of the Northern Neck, Yearly and every Year on the Feast Day of St. Michael, the Archangel, the Fee Rent of One Shilling Sterling Money for every Fifty acres of Land hereby Granted, and So proportionably for a Greater or Lesser Quantity. Provided that if the said MarTranscribed from the original in possession of Hon. Horatio W. Bruce, of Louisville.

tin Hardin, his Heirs or Assigns, shall not Pay the before reserved annual Rent, So that the same or any Part thereof shall be behind or unpaid by the Space of Two whole Years, after the same shall become Due, if Lawfully Demanded. That then it shall and may be lawful for Me, my Heirs and Assigns, Proprietors as aforesaid, My or their certain attorney or attorneys, agent or agents, into the above Granted Premises to Reenter and Hold the same, so as if this Grant had never Pass'd. Given at my office, in the County of Fairfax, within my said Proprietary, under my Hand and Seal. Dated this twentieth day of June, in the Twenty-second Year of the Reign of our Sovereign Lord George, the second by the Grace of God of Great Britain, France, and Ireland, King, Defender of the Faith, the A. D. one thousand seven hundred and forty-eight.

Registered in the Proprietor's Office, in Book G, Fol. 70.

FAIRFAX.

SOME SCOTCH HARDINS.

(NOTE II.)

An ancestor of

Auld Wat's son

The name of Hardin was known in Scotland from an early period. Sir Walter Scott was known in border story as Auld Wat of Hardin. William, captured by Sir Gideon Murray of Elibank during a raid of the Scotts on Sir Gideon's lands, was, as tradition says, given his choice between being hanged on Sir Gideon's private gallows, and marrying the ugliest of Sir Gideon's three ugly daughters, Meikle-mouthed Meg, reputed as carrying off the prize of ugliness among the women of four counties. Sir William was a handsome man. He took three days to consider the alternative proposed to him, but chose life with the large-mouthed lady in the end, and found her, according to the tradition, which the poet, her descendant, has transmitted, an excellent wife, with a fine talent for pickling the beef which her husband stole from the herds of his foes. Meikle-mouthed Meg transmitted a distinct trace of her large mouth to all her descendants-Sir Walter, among others, thus betraying his pedigree.*

From this marriage sprang sons, who, by inexplicable coincidence, bore the names of John Hardin, Mark Hardin, and Ben Hardin. The reader will note that these are

family names among the Hardins of Virginia and Kentucky.

NOTE B, PAGE 108.

PREAMBLE, WRITTEN BY HON. JOHN ROWAN IN SUPPORT OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE RELIEF LAWS.

The late decision of the Court of Appeals, pronounced in the cases of Blair vs. Williams, and Lapsley vs. Brashear, having been referred to in the communication of the governor, demands the attention of the Legislature. In that decision, the existing remedial laws of the State are declared to be unconstitutional and void, in relation to all contracts made anterior to their enaction. The principle which it establishes, whether viewed in relation to its practical effects upon society, in its present embarrassed condition, or in relation to the exercise of legitimate power by the departments, Biography of Sir Walter Scott, by Richard H. Hatton.

according to its distribution and apportionment, in the Constitution of the State, is entitled to such calm and vigilant scrutiny of the Legislature, and if, upon that scrutiny, those laws should be found to have been enacted, in contravention of any provision of either the Constitution of the State, or that of the United States, they should be forthwith repealed, and their place supplied by valid enactions. But if, on the contrary, they should be found to be not in confliction with any restraint imposed upon legislative power, by either of the constitutions, and it should appear that the judges, in proclaiming them void, have transcended the limits assigned by the constitution to the exercise of judicial power, they should be informed of that fact, and admonished that their decision does not, as it ought not to, vacate those laws. Their concurrence was not, by the constitution, necessary to their enaction. Their veto can not vacate them; and they themselves have declared, in the case of Banks vs. Oden, that, while they would feel it their duty to pronounce any act of the Legislature void, which was manifestly in confliction with the constitution, they feel a strong disinclination to encroach upon the province of the Legislature, by attempting to narrow its sphere of action, or thwart its will. They can not do it by construction or intendment. The confliction of the law with the constitution must be obvious and palpable to induce them to make such declaration. (See I Marshall, 551.) There is, therefore, high authority against the arrival, by construction, at the conclusion that a law is unconstitutional. The impulses of charity and the dictates of reason, alike proclaim that the judges, when they entertain doubts as to the constitutionality of a law, should presume that those who enacted it were not less obliged than themselves to preserve the constitution inviolate, and should give effect to the law. All the judges concur in the opinion that the existing remedial laws are void, in relation to contracts which were in existence at the time of their enaction-one of them declares all laws to be void which authorize replevins, or sales on credit, in any case whatever. Each supports his opinion by his construction of the tenth section of the first article of the Constitution of the United States, which, in the latter clause of it, provides "that no State shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts."

It will, perhaps, subserve the purposes of this inquiry into the correctness of the decision, and accord better with correct notions of fitness, that it should be confined mainly to the reasoning of the chief-justice, as he is the official organ of that court. He inquires, first, what it is that constitutes the obligation of a contract? and, second, does the act of assembly impair that obligation? The act alluded to is that which allows a replevin of two years, when the endorsement that notes on the bank of the State, or Commonwealth, will be taken, is not made. In answer to the first question, he asserts, with the writers upon ethics, and the law of nature and nations, that obligations are, according to natural law, perfect or imperfect; and, with them, asserts that the obligation to gratitude and benevolence is of the imperfect sort, and invests the person who claims the performance of its duties, with no right to exact it by force; that the performance of obligations of the perfect sort, may be exacted by violence, on the part of the person to whom the obligation is incurred; that in civil society, the remedies afforded by the laws, are in substitution of the violence, which might, according to natural law, have been used for the enforcement of obligations of the perfect sort; and that, therefore, the obligation of a contract consists, alone, in the remedy afforded by the laws for its enforcement; or, in his own language, "the legal obligation of the contract, evidently consists in the remedy alone. It can consist in nothing else, for if the remedy is withheld or taken away, the contract has no legal obligation."

He illustrates his position by the effect which the statute of frauds and perjuries and the statute of limitations have upon the cases of contract, to which they apply; and

asserts that the statutory denial of remedy to those cases, leaves them without any legal obligation. He instances, also, the case of simple contract without consideration, upon which, at common law, no action will lie. In further illustration of his doctrine, he refers, also, to Evan's Pothier, part 2, chapter 1, as authority in its support.

The doctrine and the cases cited, and referred to for its illustration and support remain to be examined. The doctrine of the chief-justice, in relation to perfect obligations, and the right of enforcing them by violence, in a state of nature, according to natural law, is admitted to be correct, as is also his doctrine in relation to imperfec. obligations. But it is insisted that in the transition from a state of nature to the state of civil society, the obligatory force of moral obligations of the perfect sort is not canceled or annulled-on the contrary, the laws of nature, so far as they relate to moral obligations of that character, are incorporated in the municipal code by the social compact, ratified and enforced by the laws of society, as the best rules of action in social intercourse. Indeed, they could not be annulled by society. They were enacted by the great Law-giver of the universe, not for the temporary use of man while in a state of nature, but for the regulation of his conduct, in every state of association of which he is capable. They form a part of his moral sense, are identified with it, and have the sanction of that reason with which he was endowed by his beneficent Creator, as the rule of his conduct and his guide to happiness. His social propensities unite with his reason, in proclaiming the obligatory force of the laws of nature, of the obligations which they impose, and their irrevocable character. The laws of civil society, so far as they constitute the rules of right, are no other than laws of nature more explicitly defined, and suited, in their re-enaction, to the condition of the people who compose the society. Human laws, says Blackstone, are declaratory of the laws of nature.

Law, whether natural or municipal, is a rule of action, and its very existence implies the obligation, on the part of those on whom it is imposed as a rule, to conform to it. The obligation, which is denominated legal, results from and is imposed by the laws of civil society. But the laws of civil society are but declaratory of the laws of nature; therefore, the obligation which results from the laws of nature, results also from the laws of civil society. When considered as resulting from the former, it is binding only in conscience, and is denominated a moral obligation; but when considered as resulting from the latter, it is denominated a legal obligation, and is externally binding.

The purpose for which civil society is formed is the general security and the general interest of the whole and its several parts. Every man, therefore, by consenting to make himself a member of civil society, agrees, tacitly or expressly, that these purposes shall be carried on, and that he will concur in carrying them on, by such measures as the common sense and understanding of society shall approve of and prescribe. Thus far, he is engaged only in a compact, which obliges him, by means of his own immediate consent, without which he would be no party to it, nor be in any way concerned in its obligation. By this compact he gives society a legislative power over him. that is, he gives it a right to prescribe such rules for his conduct as the common understanding of society shall judge to be necessary, or conducive, to the general good. And, consequently, by the same compact, he obliges himself to observe these rules when they are so prescribed. Those rules of right, and of conduct, comprising the laws of nature, sanctioned by the compact, and proclaimed either by the re-enaction of them by society, or by their adoption by immemorial usage, become in society the rules of external obligation as to all the individual and social duties of man in a state of civil society, and are obligatory upon all its members.

The right which individuals possessed in a state of nature, to enforce the perform ance of obligations of a perfect sort, having, by their entering into the social compact,