nent lawyers, who may have taken no active part in politics, for the other positions. The newer practice has given satisfaction, for the administrative work of the executive departments was never more effectively performed than it is to-day. For these positions, the compensation is inadequate, being but $12,000 per year.

Ashley, Am. Fed. State, §§ 389-395.

331. Executive and Legislative. In considering the Relation of powers of Congress, we noticed how closely the administra- their duties. tion of law is related to legislation.1 In fact, a task which in one case is performed by Congress may be left in another to Cabinet officers, who prescribe the work to be done and the methods to be employed. This interrelation of legisla tive and executive duties has produced in England and some other European countries a more or less complete union of Union of the these branches of government. In Great Britain, for ex

two in Great Britain.

119-154.

ample, the executive department is the Cabinet, which is in reality a committee of Parliament. This Cabinet not only carries out the laws passed by Parliament, but it introduces Moran, Eng. all important bills. Moreover, when its policy is no longer Gov't, approved by the House of Commons, the more powerful chamber, the Cabinet is obliged to resign or call a new election for members of Parliament. This system insures responsibility and prevents unnecessary friction between the legislative and executive departments. For these reasons it has been highly recommended as suitable for this country, although our preference for a separation of the three great departments of government makes its adoption unlikely, and, in the opinion of most statesmen and students, unwise. The very separation of the departments is usually considered one of the wisest political devices adopted by our forefathers, and, although it has given us perhaps a less efficient government than that of England, it has probably been the safest and most satisfactory government we could have had.

332. Congress and the Executive Departments. The actual working relations of Congress and the departments are

1 Consult especially §§ 233, 238, 243–245, 267, 275–279.

Control of Congress over depart ments.

Common

wealth, abr. ed., 156-159.

Bryce, Am. comparatively simple and satisfactory. Congress organizes and has general oversight of the departments and their bureaus, while the secretaries are given a considerable amount of discretion in applying the laws whose administration belongs to them. Congress may hamper the work of any department, however, by a failure to make needed reforms or vote sufficient money. In each house there are appropriation committees whose especial duty is to examine the estimates sent in by the departments which they supervise. These committees, in a sense, form a connecting link between the departments and Congress. To a large degree, harmonious relations between the houses and the executive officials depend upon them, for they may prevent successful administration or required improvements.

Influence

of secretaries over Congress.

General.

The secretaries can influence Congress through their annual reports, and by personal appeals to leaders and to the chairmen of the committees which look after their departments. It has been proposed that members of the Cabinet should have seats in Congress with the right of speaking though not of voting, but the suggestion has not met with favor. Nevertheless, the heads of the executive departments have exerted a marked influence upon the important laws relating to their departments. For instance, during recent years the Secretary of War has been able to obtain colonial and military legislation that has followed the suggestions of his annual report to quite an extent, and the Secretary of the Treasury has many times possessed a similar influence (§ 336).

333. Discretionary Power of the Secretaries. A great deal of discretion is permitted by Congress or is exercised by a determined secretary in administering the work assigned to his department. This is due to the importance of the tasks performed by the heads of departments rather than the willingness of Congress to give the secretaries a free hand, for our scheme of government has been designed from colonial days to prevent the exercise of arbitrary power by

any executive official. This idea has been carried so far that even the President would have been hampered in the exercise of his powers, were his duties not of such a character that he is really a ruler and not simply a figurehead.

different

or subor

dinates.

The Department of State offers the best example of dis- Powers cretionary power exercised by a secretary, for Congress has exercised by no control over diplomatic relations, and the President, by secretaries custom, usually leaves the negotiation of treaties and other foreign affairs wholly to the Secretary of State. The same is true of the Secretaries of War and the Navy in time of war. Although Congress declares war and raises armies after war has been declared, the Secretaries control the movements of the military and naval forces, even when Congress objects to the war policy that is followed. Many historical examples of the great discretionary power of the Secretary of the Treasury might be cited, from the days when Secretary Hamilton in 1790 formulated and secured a financial policy for the new republic to recent years in which secretaries have decided questions of vast magnitude in determining whether bonds or notes redeemable in "coin" should be paid in gold or silver. The Secretary of the Interior has wielded vast power in deciding land questions involving millions of dollars, in selecting forest reserves1 (§ 278) or sites for the huge dams constructed by the reclamation department (§ 277). The work of the Secretaries of Agriculture and the Postmaster-general necessarily involves discretion (§§ 280-289). In coöperation with the President the secretaries may even carry into effect a policy that is opposed by Congress.

Action on important and unim

334. The President and the Heads of Departments. The control of most of the administrative duties belonging to each department is of necessity left entirely with its secre- portant tary, because such duties deal largely with matters of detail. subjects.

1 This power has since 1907 been reserved by Congress for itself. It was exercised before that time chiefly by the chief forester.