cess, commencing with the analysis of the intellectual faculties, we have established a complete system of morals. We would admit the force of the objection, were it proved that we are inadequate to estimate the weight of the testimonies, the miracles, the prophecies, and the other classes of evidence, by which the divine authority of the Scriptures is proved, or to feel the force of the evidences of the power, wisdom, and goodness of God so abundantly discernible in His works, without having first analyzed conscience, or settled the question of human accountability, or of the nature of virtue. But this would imply that natural theology and the evidences of revelation must not be entered upon at all, since the questions that are supposed necessarily to precede them, remain, and are likely, on principles of mere reason, for ever to remain undecided. Are we to understand that men cannot rationally believe in the existence of God, and receive the Scriptures as coming from Him until philosophers create moral principles in their minds, and on this basis rear a system of morals and of natural theology, or, at least, until they teach them how to use their moral principles ? This is the plain force of the objection. Suppose any one theory of virtue demonstrated to be true, would men be rendered in any degree more sensitive to the eternal line of demarcation between right and wrong? Not unless the philosopher should also demonstrate, to their general conviction, the actions which would in every case accord with the theory. Do those who deny the correctness of Paley's theory of virtue, contend that this failure vitiates the luminous and convincing train of reasoning that runs through his natural theology?-yet in accordance with their scheme, both should stand or fall together. May we not, by reasoning from the works of creation, come to the assured and legitimate conclusion, that God exists; that He is powerful, and wise, and just, and good; that He is a moral governor; and that He has given a revelation rightfully claiming our assent, without having first analyzed the principles of belief, or pointed out the nature of moral good and evil? We know the connexion between design and intelligence among men : precisely the same principle are we to trace it in the phenomena of material creation. We are conscious of some degree of power, and wisdom, and moral goodness in ourselves, and we know their existence in others; and from the marks of them inscribed on all created things, we come to the belief that they are possessed without limit by the Author of Nature. We may not be able scientifically to explain belief in testimony;

on

but having irresistible convictions of its power, are we not capable to enter into this part at least of the evidences of revelation at an early stage of our philosophic course? And can we not reason respecting the agreement of the various parts of Scripture, or the fulfilment of prophecy, without the preparation of a previous course of metaphysics and ethics? May not a knowledge of God be carried with us from the very commencement of our inquiries; and may we not reasonably inquire whether the present moral state of man indicates any need of a divine revelation, and whether it was likely such a revelation would be given? There can, therefore, be no wellfounded objection to the receiving of Scripture testimony on ethical subjects. It is not denied, that reason can enable us to ascertain many truths, and to make considerable attainments in morals; and as little is it disputed, that we cannot reasonably receive the Bible as coming from God until we have sufficient evidence of His existence. What we protest against, is the arrogant assumption, that reason is competent to make a full discovery of the whole of human duty; and that the Scriptures must not be permitted to speak on these subjects. While we rejoice in what our reasoning powers can accomplish, we maintain that, even in those trains of investigation which are most peculiarly the province of reason, Scripture makes known much that could not be known otherwise. After having proved, as clearly as reason can, the existence and attributes of God, will our reason be in any degree dishonoured, or our natural theology rendered less strict, by receiving the additional light that revelation sheds over them? Having satisfactory evidence which we can examine even at the outset of our inquiries of the authority of revelation, will our moral system be less scientific by availing ourselves of the precepts of heavenly wisdom? The Scriptures have spoken explicitly and fully on every subject of morals; and hence, to assert that they must not be heard, and that the whole science of morals must be made out independently of them, is to make the authority of philosophers paramount to that of God. We willingly receive the light of reason; but are we, therefore, to shut ourselves out from the flood of day that streams from above? On the contrary, as ardent, impartial inquirers, we ought to rejoice in having an unerring guide where reason has failed to lead to satisfactory and settled conclusions.

These remarks have been called forth by the work whose title we have transcribed. Amid the conflict of theories, and the unsettled conclusions of reasoners on the principle we have

deprecated, it is pleasing to the lovers of truth to find one of the author's well-earned celebrity applying himself to the investigation of these embarrassing topics. The work displays an intimate acquaintance with what has been thought and written on the subject, and every where we find marks of a penetrating mind, and of patient and well-conducted inquiry. To this we may add, that the chaste elegance of style, and the lofty tone of right feeling that characterize the volume, throw around it an attractiveness seldom possessed by ethical treatises. It claims our approbation, however, in a higher point of view, the author having taken what appears to us the true, though rarely followed mode of investigation. The two following extracts will illustrate our remarks, and point out one principle in which the author departs from the beaten path of writers on morals; they show the propriety of seeking evidence from every quarter, and vindicate the necessity of reference to revelation :

"Can any thing be more irrational, more unworthy of a mind that is really honest and in earnest in its desires after truth, than for him who professes to be in pursuit of it to allege, respecting any source of information or department of evidence, that he has nothing to do with it? No man of sound principle and enlightened judgment will ever sit down satisfied with a conclusion which he knows to have been formed on a partial investigation, or so long as there remains unexamined any accessible source of information or of proof which may possibly shake its stability-nay, for aught he knows, may even demonstrate its fallacy, and constrain its rejection. Every thing, without exception, should be regarded as pertaining to the province of the genuine philosopher that holds out any promise of conducting him to truth. This should be the ultima Thule of all his voyages of discovery. Like a skilful navigator, he will make use of every information that can enable him to chart out his course, so as to reach it with the greatest safety, directness, and speed. If he misses it in one direction, he will try another, availing himself of every wind and of every current that may bear him to his wished for destination.

"The application of these general principles will be already apparent. In the Bible, we possess a document, by whose contents a great variety both of facts and sentiments are materially affected. It professes to be of the remotest antiquity, and of the very highest authority. Suppose, then, that, by his own process of argumentation, a philosopher has arrived at a particular conclusion respecting the truth or falsehood of some fact or opinion. You say to him-'I find something very different from your conclusion in the statements of this book,' He answers, with all imaginable coolness-' It may be so; that does not come within my legitimate range; it belongs to the province of the divine. It is his business, the best way he can, to make out the consistency of the statements of the Bible with the decisions of philosophy. If there be a discrepancy, it is unfortunate; but I cannot help it :-the harmonizing of the two lies not with me, but with him.' But why so? What good

reason is there, why the onus of finding a principle of reconciliation should be made to rest entirely on the theologian? We cannot consent to this. We cannot quiescently permit philosophy to assume so lofty a bearing; to take her own decisions for granted, and, with the port and tone of a self-sufficient superciliousness, leave the divine to make what he can of their consistency with his Bible. We cannot allow the authority of this document to be thus unceremoniously left out of the account. We insist upon it, that, on every point respecting which it delivers a testimony, the proofs of its authority, or of its want of authority, are amongst the evidences, on that point, which every lover of truth-that is, every true philosopher-should feel himself under imperative obligation carefully to examine. As the philosophy is of no sterling worth, that conducts not to truth; if the authority of the document can be established, and the verity of its statements consequently ascertained, then it becomes, on all matters of which it treats, the only philosophy; unless we are determined to dignify with the Honourable appellation a system of falsehood. If any man is prepared to avow, that he would prefer falsehood, as the result of one process of inquiry, to truth, when ascertained by another,then may he, consistently, leave out of bis investigation the evidences on which the claims of this document rest. But should we call such a man a philosopher? It were a miserable misnomer; inasmuch as no procedure could be more thoroughly unphilosophical, than to refuse any light, be it what it may, that promises to conduct to what is the sole end of all rational inquiry.

"I have hitherto spoken hypothetically. Allow me now to assume the divine authority of the Bible, as having been established by satisfactory evidence. The next question is,-What, on this assumption, becomes our duty? And is there another answer than one, which, by any sound and sober mind, can be returned to this question? On the principles of common sense and of true science, who can hesitate? The supposition is, that the divine authority of the record has been satisfactorily ascertained :-What inquiry, then, can possibly remain, but the inquiry, 'What saith the Scripture? What are the lessons which the record teaches ? I am aware, that the nature of its lessons comes, to a certain extent, amongst the previous proofs for or against its authority;-but I am not now considering the process of argument by which the point of authority has been settled; I am proceeding on the assumption, that, by a harmony of external, internal, and experimental evidence, that point has been brought to a satisfactory decision. The sole object of investigation comes then to be, the meaning of the language in which the intimations of the Divine Oracles are conveyed. It must come to this. The questioning of any of their discoveries, as contrary to reason, and inconsistent with otherwise ascertained principles of truth, is then out of place. It ought to have been introduced in the investigation of evidence. The present assumption is, that such investigation is over, and has terminated in the decision, that the book is divine. In these circumstances, we must take high ground in behalf of revelation. Philosophy and theology stand, in this respect, on a widely different footing. The philosopher, as I have already said, having arrived at his conclusion, would, with all possible sang-froid, leave it to the theologian to reconcile that conclusion with the dictates of his Bible. But, on the supposition of this Bible having been ascertained to be from God, the sempiternal source of truth divine,'- -we must not only modify, but precisely reverse this position;

unless we would exalt the wisdom of the creature above that of the Creator. So far from its belonging to the divine, to harmonize the discoveries of this inspired document with the dogmata of the philosopher, it is incumbent on the philosopher, unless he can fairly meet and set aside the proofs of its inspiration, to bring his dogmata to the test of the document. What the divine has to do,-and this we admit to be incumbent upon him-is, to make good the authority of his standard; and, having established this, to elicit with clearness its decisions. To insist upon its being his province to reconcile these decisions with the contrary decisions (if such there be) of the philosopher, would be to assert the superior decisiveness of philosophical conclusions to that of divine intimations. We should be unfaithful to our God, and throw a disparaging insult on His name, were we thus to consent that the wisdom of the only wise,' should make its obeisance to the chair of human science;—or were we to admit, that he has left his word with less conclusive evidence in its behalf, than that by which the wise men of this world can vindicate the dictates of their own sagacity."

The next extracts preclude the necessity of any lengthened remarks of ours in defence of what, in our estimation, ought to form an essential element in every moral system, and the want of which must vitiate any such system, however excellent it may be otherwise. They allude to the fact of the universal depravity of human nature. It is surely an axiomatic principle, even leaving the authority of Scripture out of view, that no important phenomenon of mind should pass unnoticed in a system of mental science. Now nothing can be more clearly established by the inductive philosophy than the fact just adverted to. Whatever pretence there might be for passing over the doctrine of the fall as being matter of pure revelation, and therefore belonging to the theologian, there can be none for utterly neglecting so important a feature of the mind of man as his present moral condition; that being capable of the very clearest proof, independently of divine testimony, and influencing essentially as it does some of our ethical decisions.

"In the Lectures, the position has, to a great degree at least, been hypothetically assumed, that the nature of man is not now what it originally was;-that it is fallen, and in a state of alienation from God.

"It had been well, if, in certain questions closely connected with the subject of these lectures,-questions relative especially to the present character of human nature, there had been less of plausible, and often (it must be admitted) beautiful theorizing, and a more rigid observance of the inductive principle. Revelation would have nothing to fear from such a process, but every thing to hope. There would be found a correspondence between its statements and a larger induction of facts than can be brought to bear upon any other point whatever, in the whole range of natural and moral science; an induction, embracing a wider field of experiment, extending through a longer period of time, and yielding a more invariably uniform result, I am aware, indeed, that