except the Bible, as unworthy of binding the consciences of men. If he means that we admit any other "authoritative test," it is a direct and shameful calumny; I shall therefore take it for granted this is not his meaning, and the only alternative is, that Mr. C. disclaims any reasoning which goes farther than to quote and explain scripture statements. Now, I think it reasonable to expect, that having thus laid down the authoritative test, he should be found strictly adhering to it, and studiously avoiding to rest his conclusions on any other basis. Yet in all he has said on the subject of "Compulsory Assessment," only two loose references are made to the word of God. But, perhaps, Mr. C. may have argued so abundantly and so clearly from these two texts, as to establish his conclusions beyond controversy. No, verily; he has reasoned none from them. All his reasonings on the subject are taken-strange to say-not from his authoritative test, but from the principle, as he calls it, of "political equity." I quarrel not with his attempts at reasoning on account of their being drawn from this principle; I only wish to notice the inconsistency of first professing to deduce his arguments directly and solely from the Scriptures, and afterwards reasoning exclusively from a principle in political philosophy.

I am convinced that "political equity," if rightly understood, will never be found at variance with any thing incul cated in the Word of God. But what are his ideas of political equity? He states them thus-"Every government is bound to confer equal privileges on all from whom it requires equal allegiance, and on whom it imposes equal burdens." And in the next page he thus states, and answers an objection that may be made against his definition of political equity:- "I am aware that in a country where nearly all classes have a regular ministry for their religious instruction, government may, in some measure, meet this difficulty by endowing all! But then we shall have fundamental truth and fundamental error receiving from the nation equal support." On this I have to offer two strictures. In the first place Mr. C. has here directly contradicted his own account of political equity. He has there maintained that "equal allegiance and equal burdens" were to be the grounds of equal privileges; and he has also brought it forward as a violation of political equity, that fundamental truth and fundamental error should receive equal support. Is fundamental truth necessary to allegiance? Is it necessary to the bearing of an equal share of the nation's burdens? The history of the

reign of Charles the First, and of the American Revolution, in which, of course, the American Independents bore their part, proves, that what Mr. C. regards, as fundamental truth, may be associated with rebellion, instead of allegiance? Hence, as far as allegiance to a government is concerned, the advocates of fundamental truth and fundamental error may be on a par, unless the government were to establish one form of religion, and decree all dissent to be disloyalty, which Mr. C. in writing against establishments, cannot maintain; and "in bearing the nation's burden," the government has it in its power to place them on a par. It follows, according to Mr. C.'s definition of political equity, that the government is bound to confer on them equal privileges! but this Mr. C. has already set down as an error and a violation of political equity. Therefore, in bestowing equal privileges on portions of the people who are equally loyal, and who contribute equally to the revenue, the government is both fulfilling and violating political equity!!! Such is Mr. C.'s logic. But he may perhaps evade this pushing of his assertions to their unavoidable consequences, by saying, that he would extend no privileges to either. This, however, will not save him; for his definition requires that a government should confer privileges and equal privileges-which, on no principle of interpretation, can mean that they are not to confer any privileges, but scrupulously to withhold them! There is another mode of relieving Mr. C. out of this difficulty-a mode he will probably not adopt. It is that his knowledge of the principles of the English language is so indefinite and scanty, that he often employs words not calculated to convey the ideas he intends.

Again, if it be politically unjust to confer equal support on fundamental truth and fundamental error, is it not similar injustice to withhold support equally from both? He may deny that they are or ought to be equally worthy in the view of government; but it will follow, that to subject both to equal privation, cannot be in accordance with any principle of justice. If he say they are not equally deserving, consistency will surely compel him to say they ought not to be treated alike, whether that treatment be endowment or privation. If he say they are equally deserving, he must, in the face of his own dogmatical assertions, admit the equity of endowing them alike! There must be something intrinsically erroneous in statements that thus, on every hand, involve a man in absurdity and contradiction.

But the most serious inconsistency I have yet to notice.

Mr. C. thinks it a direct violation of justice to impose a tax in support of religion. The ground of his objection is, that he is "opposed to all compulsory assessments for the support of religion;" and of consequence, that to demand such assessment of him and all of similar sentiments, is a direct violation of liberty of conscience. Liberty of conscience is a principle held sacred; and, intrenched behind such a bulwark, Mr. C. seems to dread no hostile attack. But where there is a traitor in the garrison, no fortress can secure it against the advances of the enemy. However excellent a man's principles, if he is unable to make an enlightened and consistent defence of them, his contradictions will present an unguarded side to the opponent. Particularly is this the case when a man's conduct and his controversial dogmata disagree. Mr. C. comes forward as the advocate of religious liberty in what he thinks its fullest sense-conduct so noble must surely rally round him all the intelligence and good feeling of his country, at least so far as the noise of his controversy spreads! Liberty, political and religious, is the theme poets have delighted to dwell upon, in strains of enthusiastic ecstacy. But who has not known examples of men whose voices were loud and eloquent in defence of their own civil or religious rights, and who yet could look on with the calmest complacence when those of their neighbours were wantonly violated? Mr. C.'s conscience is so tender, that he cannot forbear denouncing all taxes for the support of religion as flagrant injustice; and yet this same conscience allows him openly to advocate and justify a system of national education, to which he well knows a very large portion of his Protestant brethren are conscientiously opposed on religious grounds, and one which is also supported by what he professes to abhor-" compulsory assessment!!!" He is so feelingly alive to the supposed injustice of giving a legal support to the cause of Scripture truth and morality, that he has come before the public with the war-cry of extirpation against the whole system of religious endowments; and yet exquisitely sensitive though his conscience be on this one subject, it prompts him not to lift his voice in defence of the religious liberty of Quakers. It allows him to be silent while they are compelled to pay their quota of taxes for defraying the expenses of wars, to all of which they are conscientiously opposed! And it allows him to countenance the authoritative observance of the Christian Sabbath, by every family and individual in the land, though he knows many have no belief in the divine authority of such an institution. Could a more

complete specimen of inconsistency be exhibited before the public? Does not Mr. C. appear, in his pamphlet, as the advocate of civil and religious liberty merely for himself and his partisans; while, in his sentiments elsewhere uttered, and in his whole conduct, he is countenancing and upholding political and religious tyranny! It appears that, in religious matters, it is compulsion and barefaced injustice to enact or enforce any thing Mr. C. disapproves; but to compel men to submit to a number of other things about which his conscience is at ease, or at least silent-oh! this is the very refinement of enlightened religious liberty!!!

I come not forward with any direct defence of religious endowments at present, my object being simply to expose the imbecile attack made on them by Mr. C. The subject is too extensive, and too deeply involved in the mazes of intricate controversy, to be settled in a paragraph or two, as he has presumptuously attempted. I now proceed to consider his remarks on the Presbyterian system. In his "Comp. View," he thus represents the principle of Presbyterian eldership:-"Dividing the elders' into two classes, they argue for the jus divinum of preaching 'elders' or ministers-ruling or lay elders, and deacons," page 15. Here let me ask him, has he fairly represented the principles of Presbyterians in the use of the word "lay elders ?" When and where have Presbyterians adopted and sanctioned this term? This might be tolerated in reasoning against the scriptural authority of this office; but in a mere statement of principles, it is direct misrepresentation, Besides, he seems to represent Presbyterians as adopting the term "elders" as the translation of the scriptural term "geoBurago." This, however, is no part of the Presbyterian system. The Presbyterian system maintains the divine authority of three classes of church offices-teaching elders, ruling elders, and deacons. In this, all Presbyterians are agreed. Respecting the extension of the terms "geoßuTegos" and "ETICKOTOS," there is not the same agreement. Some Presbyterians denythe distinction between bishop and presbyter, and restrict both terms to the office of the pastor.

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Others

maintain that the term presbyter is more general than bishop, including both bishops and ruling elders. Others again apply both terms to the two offices equally, and place the distinction between them, not in the application of the terms, but in the difference of the respective duties. Mr. C. seems to think, that by proving both terms to belong to the office of the pastor, he has sapped the foundation of Presbyterianism; but this only

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displays his sad ignorance of the system he is opposing. Calvin (Inst. Lond. Ed. 1813, vol. 3. p. 62) confines both terms to the ministerial office, and rests the authority for ruling elders on other Scripture ground. That the same is the view of the elder Turretine, appears from his chapter, "De distinctione Episcopi et Presbyteri;" and though he says little respecting a distinct office of ruling, he differs radically from Independents, in his view of the power of synods and presbyteries, respecting confessions of faith, and of the magistrate's power "circa sacra," and in his holding the church to be, in one of its significations, a representative body. Brown ("Vindic. of Presb. Ch. Gov." p. 150) includes, under the term "elders," both those who teach, and those who rule. The same view is expressed in Anderson's Def. of Presb. Ch. Gov. In the form of church government appended to the Westminster Confession, the terms pastor and teacher or doctor, are ap plied to those who labour in word and doctrine; and another class of officers are mentioned, "which officers the Reformed Churches call elders." Here it is evident that the word "elder" is not identified with the scriptural term "presbyter," and that no specific use is made of the terms "presbyter" and "bishop.' They therefore manifestly take these to be both general names for the teaching and ruling officers in the church. Dr. Hill, in his lectures on divinity, distinctly asserts the identity of bishops and presbyters, but does not discuss the question of ruling elders. The London ministers, in their treatise on the divine right of church government, maintain the identity of bishops and presbyters, (p. 140, 141,) and yet apply the term " presbyter" both to teaching and ruling elders, (p. 151.)

For in

Here we have a number of expositors of the Presbyterian system, agreeing strictly as to the number and powers of church officers, but differing as to the meaning of the words bishop and presbyter. The question then is, are we warranted in pronouncing any of these not Presbyterians? stance, would we be warranted in asserting that those who make the words "bishop" and "presbyter," names for two classes of officers, have yet to learn the first principles of the system they defend? Yet this is what Mr. C. has asserted on this ground, of the reviewer. He is not a Presbyterian, forsooth, because he agrees with several of the authorities above referred to ! The amount of this assertion is that if, with the standards of his own church, the reviewer admit the scriptural authority of these church officers, he is not a Pres