leave no chance of doubt. If, under such conditions, the resurrection were effected, a probability almost equal to certainty would be established. As, however, it ought to be possible always to repeat an experiment to do over again [that] which has been done once; and as in the order of miracle there can be no question of ease or difficulty, the thaumaturgus would be invited to reproduce his marvellous act under other circumstances, upon other corpses, in another place. If the miracle succeeded each time, two things would be proved: first, that supernatural events happen in the world; second, that the power of producing them belongs, or is delegated to, certain persons. But who does not see that no miracle ever took place under these conditions? but that always hitherto the thaumaturgus has chosen the subject of the experiment, chosen the spot, chosen the public; that, besides, the people themselves-most commonly in consequence of the invincible want to see something divine in great events and great men create the marvellous legends afterwards? Until a new order of things prevails, we shall maintain, then, this principle of

historical criticism, that a supernatural account cannot be admitted as such; that it always implies credulity or imposture; that the duty of the historian is to explain it, and seek to ascertain what share of truth or of error it may conceal.

1

There is here, in all the leading features of the argument, an entire identity with that which we have already disposed of; there is the same appeal to 'experience,' which is quietly assumed to be 'universal;' there is the same insinuation that the miracles of the gospel stand on a level with modern pretensions to the supernatural, and founded on that, the same refusal even to investigate their claims; while, after all, in the imaginary case that is put before the reader, there is the same virtual abandonment of the principle on which the objection is based; without, however, let us do Renan the justice of adding, the same qualifying limitation which Hume imposed. Still, as there are some specific differences, designed, as it would seem, to adapt the argument to our own days, we may profitably spend a little time in its dissection.

First, let us look at the assertion, that observation, which has never once been falsified, teaches us that miracles never happen but in times and countries in which they are believed, and before persons disposed to believe them.' We do not think that it would be difficult to find instances from among the miracles of the New Testament to which these words would not apply, and perhaps before we finish this investigation we may direct attention to one of the kind; but, meanwhile, we ask our readers to take notice of the general principle which he designs to insinuate under this apparently harmless statement. He means to convey the idea that a miracle would be more credible to him, and should be more credible to others, if at the time when it was wrought it was disbelieved by those who witnessed it. But is this true? Would not M. Renan himself be the first to reject a miracle which was not attested by the experience of those to whom at first it was submitted? Would he not at once allege, that if those who were present at the time did not believe it, it is preposterous to ask that we should admit its reality? Besides, does not this render it im

possible to establish any miracle? For it must either have been believed or rejected by those who were present with the miracle-worker. If it were believed by them, then our author is ready with his assertion, that 'miracles are ordinarily the work of the public much more than of him to whom they are attributed;"1 if it were not believed by them, then, of course, it would be said that the testimony even of those who were present conclusively settled that they were spurious. Thus on both sides is he armed. Offer him proof, and he replies, "The witnesses were credulous, and more than half the miracle was in their desire to see it.' Tell him that those before whom it was wrought did not receive it, and he will immediately retort, 'On what principle am I asked to do what they, with their ampler opportunities for examination, refused to do?' What, then, would he have? and how can he be satisfied? Truly such a spirit as this recalls the Master's words, 'Whereunto shall I liken the men of this generation? and to what are they like? They are like children sitting in the market-place, and 1 Life of Jesus, as before, p. 196.

unto you,

calling one to another, and saying, We have piped and ye have not danced; we have mourned unto you, and ye have not wept. But Wisdom is justified of her children." There must therefore be some other course than this if we would follow wisdom.

But it may be said that he has qualified his assertion, inasmuch as in the latter part of the sentence he speaks of the persons not only as having actually believed, but also as having been disposed to believe them; and there is no doubt a wide difference between the two, but the distinction will not help him. For the New Testament contains numerous instances of miracles performed before those who, so far from being disposed to believe them, actually sought out grounds on which to reject them. Of this sort were the opening of the eyes of the man born blind, John ix.; the healing of the lame man at the Beautigate, Acts v. 16, 17; the raising of Lazarus, John xi. 46; and, as we shall presently make evident, the resurrection of the Lord himself. Now, in the face of these and other similar cases,

ful

1 Luke vii. 31, 32, 35.