Tully, at fome particular periods, and occurs more frequently in fome of his works, than in others; not, as it fhould feem, from any peculiarities in the fubjects themselves, but from the mere fondnefs which the writer felt for this phrafeology at the precife moment of ufing it. The fame kind of temporary partiality toward this or that mode of expreffion, may be traced in many other eminent writers. We shall establish the juftness of our remark upon Cicero, by adding, that the phrafe, of which we have been speaking, occurs rarely in the three books De Oratore, that in the Orator it is found five times, and in the Brutus fixteen.

In the Preface, we did not obferve any Anglicifms; but we are fenfible, how many expreffions incur this reproachful appellation, which may be juftified by examples from the best Roman writers. Henry Stephens has collected many inftances, in which the French idiom coincides with the Latin. Vorsius has done the fame in regard to the German language, and we should be happy to find that a fimilar work refpecting the English were undertaken by fome countryman of our own. We have loft, it is true, a Markland, a Toup, and a Tyrwhitt; but the cause of literature will yet find the moft able fupporters in those who are ftill living ornaments of the age; and whofe modefty we will not on this occafion wound, by prefenting their names to the Public.

The Editor feems to be not lefs familiarly acquainted with the writings of Cicero, than was Bellendenus. He fometimes applies paffages from the Epiftolary and Philofophical works of that writer. He frequently draws expreffions from the Orations: -but his chief fource feems to be the Rhetorical writings. Our Editor does not however confine himself to Cicero; but readily admits any expreffion fuited to his purpofe, in Cæfar, Salluft, V. Paterculus, Quintilian, and other approved Roman authors.

Though the Editor has derived his phrafeology from poetry as well as profe, and from writers who flourished in what is called the filver, as well as the golden age of Latinity, yet he has preferved a very becoming uniformity of ftyle. On him who writes in languages no longer spoken, the practice of drawing expreffions from writers of different degrees of merit, is impofed by neceffity. It is warranted by the example of scholars, who prefer real perfpicuity to falfe elegance. It has been vindicated by the pointed raillery of Erafmus, and the folid reafoning of T. F. P.cus, Politian, and Budæus. It cannot therefore be arraigned at the tribunal of manly and liberal criticifm. The prefent Editor, perhaps, does not ftand in need of this defence. But we have written it in oppofition to thofe puerile and pedantic opinions, which the German scholars of this century have induftri

10

oully

oully combated with great variety of erudition, and with foundnefs of argument yet greater.

In the application of brilliant paffages from Greek and Roman authors, the Editor is often happy. His allufions to ftriking facts and marked characters, recorded by the writers of antiquity, are numerous and appofite. He has, with great propriety, apologized for inferting fo much Greek in a Latin text, and we are difpofed to pardon this motley appearance, for the fake of the intrinfic beauties which fhine in the quotations, and of the confummate judgment with which many of them are introduced.

On political topics we allow to all writers that freedom which we ourselves exercife, in judging of public men and public meafures. We do not, however, discover, either in Mr. Pitt, or his affociates, those defects, which our Editor fo acrimonioufly condemns; nor do we believe his favourite triumvirate, poffeffed of that unfullied and tranfcendent merit which he fo highly extols. But it falls not within the limits or the plan of our Review, to controvert every political tenet to which we do not entirely accede. It is not our wish to dispute the fincerity or the difinterestedness of the Editor, in forming his own opinions. But it is our duty and our right to exprefs fome difapprobation of the fierce and imperious fpirit, with which thofe opinions are fometimes maintained.

Whatever may be the excentricities of this unknown writer as a partizan, he certainly is intitled to much praife as an editor and as a fcholar. The ftubbornness of his political prejudices, and the afperity of his personal invectives, are, in a great measure, compenfated by his candour toward the failings of learned men; by his admiration of their talents; and by his endeavours to perpetuate the memory, and to extend the utility, of their works.

ART. X. Sermons. By Samuel Charters, Minifter of Wilton. 8vo. 5s. Boards. Edinburgh, printed for Creech, &c. ; fold in London by Cadell. 1786.

IKE the celebrated Sermons of Dr. Whichcote, thefe va

luable difcourfes feem to be only hints, on which the preacher delivered himfelf more at large from the pulpit; but, like them too, they contain many good thoughts, which may ferve as materials for more regular compofitions. Of the author's manner a fhort fpecimen may fuffice to give a competent idea.

In enumerating the fources of evil-speaking, he mentions ignorance, idleness, wit, and pride. Of wit he fays:

'One who has wit is often fo enamoured of it, fo captivated with the attention the praise and the courtship it procures him, that he

L14

cannot

cannot allow himself to moderate or correct it; he goes on indulging it in that train which takes best and raises the loudeft laugh. There is fo much of ill-will and felf-conceit in the world, as gives a relish to ill-natured jokes. There is often in the characters of wits themfelves fuch defect in more material accomplishments, and fo much envy as to bend their own inclination to the malicious abuse of their talent. On thefe accounts it is no wonder fo much fcandal is spoke in the form of wit. Much of that which may feem innocent is not fo. The moment one is held forth in a ridiculous point of view, a prejudice fprings up against him. Wit embitters an evil report, and is a mean of spreading it. Thoughtless people fpread it for the fake of a laugh.

One of the first liberties which the witty affume, when they give way to evil speaking, is to break in on the limits of truth. They often find this neceffary to make their ftory palatable. The mirth which it excites reconciles them to the impropriety of it, or rather diverts them from thinking it at all improper. The most of us are too apt to fall in with this; to confider the wit of a story that is falfe, and the mirth which it occafions as an apology for its falfehood; forgetting that truth is facred, and that a good name is facred.

Another liberty which they affume, in process of time, is to turn virtue itself into ridicule. They are happy to ridicule that virtue which they cannot imitate, and which is a perpetual reproach. The modeft and diffident, who are thus evil spoken of on account of their virtue, may be tempted to conceal or to abandon it.

It were eafy to show how the witty, who give way to evil fpeaking, are gradually betrayed into the worst kind of it, and how it produces the worft effects both on themselves and others. Every one against whom they employ their malicious wit becomes an enemy. Their paffion for wit grows fo violent, that they fometimes facrifice a friend to it. Even those who court, admire, and flatter a witty man, dare not truft him. His ill-natured affections get quite the better of the focial and kind. hat talent which at first made him known and fought, which heightened focial enjoyment, and made him the general favourite; has now, by an unhappy abuse, estranged him from the genuine pleasures of fociety. He is now a melancholy proof, that even in this life judgments are prepared for the fcorner.

Perfons of wit, who regard their own character and comfort, will carefully avoid this channel of evil fpeaking. It is not the way to be trufted, it is not the way to be honoured, it is not the way to be useful.'

This abrupt ftyle being fo different from the modern taste in writing, we are apprehenfive, that even folid and useful obfervations (and there are many, very many fuch in the work) will fcarcely be able, in fuch an unusual dress, to obtain that audience from the public, to which real merit, in whatever garb, is juftly entitled.

ART.

ART. XI. The Elements of the Science of Ethics, on the Principles of Natural Philofophy. By John Bruce, A. M. Profeffor of Philofo... phy, and Fellow of the Royal Society at Edinburgh. 8vo. 5s. Cadell. 1786.

MORALITY, being a fubject of great importance, has al

ways engaged the thoughts of the learned; and has produced, in every age and country where philofophy has been cultivated, many curious and ingenious fpeculations. To the univerfal defire of becoming acquainted with the nature and faculties of our own mind, we owe the valuable productions of a Plato, an Ariftotle, and a Cicero, among the ancients; a Locke, a Clarke, a Hutchefon, and a Smith, among the moderns. It is no wonder that the fubject fhould have engaged the attention of these great men, fince it is in itself a pleafing enquiry, and an investigation which muft ever be productive of fingular benefits to mankind, independent of that natural propenfity and laudable curiofity, which incites the inquifitive mind to explain the many and apparently infurmountable difficulties, with which the fubject of Ethics has been furrounded.

The Author of the prefent performance has followed a different path from that which has been purfued by any of his predeceffors. He has endeavoured to reduce the fcience of morals to the fame certainty that attends other sciences. He has attempted to diffipate the clouds which obfcure it, by fubjecting it to the fame rules that are obferved in natural philofophy.

The fcience of Phyfics has always proceeded on a natural hiftory, or analyfis of phenomena; and by a fcient fic ute of experiments and evidence, conclufions and inductions have been eftablished which defcribe the laws of nature relative to material objects. Thus, experiment and obfervation were the means by which attraction was firft discovered; and a careful attention to various phenomena led the contemplative philofopher to form a fyftem agreeable to the laws of nature, and to eftablish a science on the fame bafis as that on which nature herself is founded, namely on the immutable and everlafting principles of truth.

Mr. Bruce, confidering the different fituations of these two sciences, and that the subject of each of them is nature, was induced to attempt applying the method of ftudying natural philofophy to the science of ethics.

He begins with explaining the objects of philofophy, and, obferving that they are all to be found in nature, he marks out the specific diftinctions of each, and fhews how the objects to which ethics relate, may be obferved with as much certainty and advantage, as thofe of the material world, which engage the attention of the natural philofopher.

The

The first part of this work is employed in giving a history of ethics. Our Author, confidering ethics as an art, is induced to treat largely on art in general, which he defines to be the application of rules to the purposes of life.' It would be in vain, he thinks, to feek for the origin of arts in the defaced veftiges of antiquity; he therefore traces the origin of arts from the characters of the human mind in the progreffive fituation of man from rudeness to refinement. The love of life, of pleasure, and of novelty, are, in his opinion, uniform propenfities in the mind, which impel it to the invention and improvement of the arts. These propenfities are feparately treated, and the progrefive methods, by which they create or improve, respectively, the neceffary, the fine, and the liberal arts, are pointed out. Mr. Bruce then fhews how thefe fame propenfities produce the ethical arts, or those which regulate our conduct; thefe he divides into neceffary, useful, and liberal. The first appearance of ethics, as an art, is visible in the rude forms of fubordination and jurifdiction; ethics, as an art, he thinks, is obfervable in the proverbs and maxims of every early and rude people, but more efpecially in thofe collections of proverbs, made by wife men and diftinguished characters, and in the inftruction given by allegories and fables; but above all, in the arrangement of the cardinal virtues by the Greek moralifts. Our Author takes a very extensive view of the feveral ftages of the art, and dwells long on the improvements it underwent by the Greeks, who referred all the maxims of morality to the duties which we owe to ourfelves, comprehended under the three great divifions, Temperance, Fortitude, and Prudence; and to the duties which we owe to mankind, included under the very general term of Justice.

Mr. Bruce then proceeds to confider ethics as a science. In this part of the work the reader is prefented with a concise and comprehenfive hiftory of the moral philofophy of the ancients; and with many fenfible remarks on the caufes which retard the progrefs of science in general, but more especially the science of the human mind.

In the next chapter, our Author, confidering the fate of ethics both as an art and a fcience among the moderns, enters into a paticular detail of the tenets of most of the modern moralifts: the opinions of Hobbes, Malebranche, Cudworth, Clarke, Hutchinfon, Hume, and Smith, are feparately examined.

The fecond part of this work is entitled Of the Principles of Natural Philofophy. Mr. Bruce here fhews the neceffity of method in the ftudy of nature; but he is fomewhat defective in the practice of that accuracy which he recommends. It is uni

*The Author means Hutchefon, Profeffor of Moral Philofophy at Glasgow.

verfally