have made with any such railroad corporation, shall have a lien upon all the property, real, personal and mixed, of said railroad corporation : Provided, such sub-contractor, material man or laborer shall have complied with the provisions of this act ; but the aggregate of all liens hereby authorized shall not, in any case, exceed the price agreed upon in the original contract to be paid by such corporation to the original contractor: And, provided, further, that no such lien shall take priority over any existing lien.

[Drew v. Mason, 81 Ill. 498; Arbuckle v. Illinois Mid. Ry. Co., 81 Ill. 429; Cairo & St. L. R. R. Co. v. Watson, 85 Ill. 531; Cairo & St. L. Rý. Co. v. Cauble, 85 Ill.

555.

53. Notice of claim of lien. § 3. The person performing such labor, or furnishing such material, shall cause a notice, in writing, to be served on the president or secretary of such rail- [*672] road corporation, substantially as follows, viz. :

Το

: You

as a laborer (or and that I shall

president, (or secretary, as the case may be), of the are hereby notified that I am (or have been) employed by have furnished supplies, as the case may be), on or for the hold all the property of said railroad (or railway, as the case may be), company to se

cure my pay.

If there shall be a contract in writing between the original contractor and sub-contractor, material man or laborer, a copy of such contract, if the same can be obtained, shall be served with such notice and attached thereto, which notice shall be served at any time within twenty days after the completion of such sub-contract, or such labor: Provided, that no lien shall attach in favor of any person performing such labor or furnishing material until such notice shall have been served as above, or filed for record as hereinafter provided.

[Arbuckle v. Illinois Mid. Ry. Co., 81 Ill. 431; Cairo & St. L. R. R. Co. v. Cauble, 85 Ill. 557.

54. When notice filed with circuit clerk — copy to be mailed, etc. § 4. If neither the president or the secretary of such railroad corporation shail reside or can be found in the county in which the sub-contract was made, or labor performed, the laborer, or person furnishing labor or material, shall file said notice in the office of the clerk of the circuit court; and the clerk of the circuit court shall file and keep a record of said notice, and cause a copy of the same to be mailed to the president or secretary of said company, for which he shall receive the sum of twenty-five cents, and said clerk shall keep a list of the names of the persons so claiming lien, and the names of the corporation against which such liens are claimed.

[Cairo & St. Louis R. R. Co. v. Cauble, 85 Ill. 557.

55. Suit-transcript from justice. § 5. If the money due the person having given notice as aforesaid, shall not be paid within ten days after the money shall become due and payable, then such person may commence suit therefor, in any court having jurisdiction of the amount claimed to be due, against the corporation with which the original contract was made; or he may commence suit, as aforesaid, against such railroad corporation and original contractor jointly, and execution to issue

as in other cases. If execution, issued on judgment obtained before a justice of the peace, shall be returned not satisfied, a transcript of such judgment may be taken to the circuit court, and spread upon the records thereof, and shall have all the force and effect of judgments obtained in the circuit court, and execution issued thereon as in other cases.

56. Costs - attorney's fees. § 6. Whenever any suit, so brought, shall be determined in favor of the plaintiff, the court shall allow, if before a justice, $5, if in a court of record, $20, attorney's fees to be taxed as costs.

57. When original contractor fails to complete contract. 7. Should the original contractor in any case fail to complete his contract, any person entitled to a lien, as aforesaid, may file his petition in any court of record, in any county through which the road may be constructed, against the railroad corporation and the contractors, setting forth the nature of his claim, and the amount due as near as may be, [and] the fact that the contractor has failed to complete his contract. The clerk of said court shall thereupon cause a notice to be published for four successive weeks in a newspaper printed in the county, setting forth that said petition has been filed, and the time when the writ issued on the same shall have been made returnable, and all persons entitled to liens under this act may enter their appearance and interplead in said cause, and have their claims adjudicated; and it shall be the duty of the court, in case the petitioner or claimants, or either of them, establish their claims, to enter a decree against said corporation and original contractor, for the amount to which the persons so establishing their claims are respectively entitled, and such decree shall have the same force and effect as decrees in other cases.

58. Limitation. S. The lien hereby created shall continue for three months from the time of the performance of the sub-contract, or doing of the work or furnishing the material as aforesaid, except when suit shall be commenced, by petition as aforesaid, and in such cases all liens shall be barred by decree entered in such cause. $9, repeal, omitted. See " Statutes," ch. 131, § 5. [Arbuckle v. Illinois Midland Ry. Co., 81 Ill. 431.

AN ACT in regard to limitations. [Approved April 4, 1872. In force July 1, 1872. L. 1871-2, P. 556.]

1. Twenty years. SEC. 1. Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois, represented in the General Assembly, That no person shall commence an action for the recovery of lands, nor make an entry thereon, unless within twenty years after the right to bring such action or make such entry first accrued, or within twenty years after he or those from, by, or under whom he claims, have been seized or possessed of the premises, except as hereinafter provided.

[R. S. 1845, P. 349. $$ 6, 7; Borders v. Murphy, 78 Ill. 81; Lavalle v. Strobel, 89 111. 371; Ambrose v. Raley, 58 III. 506; Ewing v Burnet, 11 Peters, 41; Kerr v. Hitt, 75 Ill. 51; Paullin v. Hale, 40 Ill. 275; McClellan v. Kellogg, 17 Ill. 498; Goewey v. Urig, 18 l. 242: Rigg v. Cook, 4 Gilm. 351; Turney v. Chamberlain, 15 Ill 271; Woodward v. Blanchard, 16 Ill. 424: McCagg v. Heacock, 34 Ill. 481; Hinchman v. Whetstone, 23 ill. 189; Lull v. City of Chicago, 63 Ill. 518; Russell v Mandell, 73 III. 136; Austin v. Rust, 73 Ill. 491: Weber v. Anderson, 73 Ill. 439; Jackson v. Berner. 48 Ill. 203; Noble v. McFarland, 51 Ill, 227: Cook v. Norton, 48 Ill. 20; Dills v. Hubbard, 21 Ill. 328; Jacobs v. Rice, 33 Ill. 370; Hassett v. Ridgely 49 11. 198; Musham v. Musham, 87 Ill. 80; Vail v. Mix, 74 Ill. 127; Forbes v. Balenseifer, 74 ill. 183; 1. C. R. R. Co. v. I. & I. C. Ry. Co., 85 fil. 211.

2. Time, how computed. § 2. If such right or title first ac. crued to an ancestor or predecessor of the person who brings the action or makes the entry, or to any person from, by, or under whom he claims, the twenty years shall be computed from the time when the right or title so first accrued.

[Kerr v. Hitt, 75 Ill. 51; Collins v. Thayer, 74 Ill. 138.

3. When right of entry or to bring action accrues. 3. The right to make an entry or bring an action to recover land shall be deemed to have first accrued at the times respectively hereinafter mentioned, that is to say:

First-When any person is disseized, his right of entry or of action shall be deemed to have accrued at the time of such disseizin.

Second-When he claims as heir or devisee of one who died seized, his right shall be deemed to have accrued at the time of such death, unless there is a tenancy by the curtesy or other estate intervening after the death of such ancestor or devisor; in which case his right shall be deemed to accrue when such intermediate estate expires, or when it would have expired by its own limitations.

Third-When there is such an intermediate estate, and in all other cases when the party claims by force of any remainder or reversion, his right, so far as it is affected by the limitation herein prescribed, shall be deemed to accrue when the intermediate or precedent estate would have expired by its own limitation, notwithstanding any forfeiture thereof for which he might have entered at an earlier time.

Fourth-The preceding clause shall not prevent a person from entering when entitled to do so by reason of any forfeiture or breach of condition; but if he claims under such a title, his rights shall be [*674] deemed to have accrued when the forfeiture was incurred or the

condition was broken.

Fifth In all cases not otherwise specially provided for, the right shall be deemed to have accrued when the claimant, or the person under whom he claims, first became entitled to the possession of the premises under the title upon which the entry or the action is founded.

[Hubbard v. Stearns, 86 Ill. 35; Steele v. Gellatly, 41 Ill. 39; Higgins v. Crosby, 40 Ill. 260; Jacobs v. Rice, 33 Ill. 371; Shortall v. Hinckley, 31 Ill. 219; Voris v. Renshaw, 49 Ill. 425; Barber v. Trustee, etc., 51 Ill. 396; Castner v. Walrod, 83 Ill. 171.

4. Seven years with possession and record title, etc. 4. Actions brought for the recovery of any lands, tenements or hereditaments of which any person may be possessed by actual residence thereon for seven successive years, having a connected title in law or equity, deducible of record, from this State or the United States, or from any public officer or other person authorized by the laws of this State to sell such land for the non-payment of taxes, or from any sheriff, marshal or other person authorized to sell such land on execution, or under any order, judgment or decree of any court of record, shall be brought within seven years next after possession being taken, as aforesaid; but when the possessor shall acquire such title after taking such possession, the limitation shall begin to run from the time of acquiring title.

[R. S. 1845, P. 349, § 8; P. 350, § 11; Yoakum v. Harrison, 85 Iil. 202; Scott v. Delany, 87 Ill, 146; Jandon v. McDowell, 56 Ill. 53; Martin v. Judd, 81 Ill. 488; Wharton v. Bunting, 73 Ill. 16; Lender v. Kidder, 23 Ill. 50; Elston v. Kennicoti, 46 Ill. 189; Collins v. Smith, 18 Ill. 160; Williams v. Ballance, 3 Ill. 193; Jayne v. Gregg, 42 Ill. 413; Hubbard v. Kiddo, 87 III. 578; Walker v. Carrington, 74 Ill. 45.

5. Right extended to heirs, etc. 5. The heirs, devisees and assigns of the person having such title and possession, shall have

the same benefit of the preceding section as the person from whom the possession is derived. [R. S. 1845, P. 350, 10.

6. Seven years' payment of taxes, with color of title and possession. § 6. Every person in the actual possession of lands or tenements, under claim and color of title, made in good faith, and who shall, for seven successive years, continue in such possession, and shall also, during said time, pay all taxes legally assessed on such lands or tenements, shall be held and adjudged to be the legal owner of said lands or tenements, to the extent and according to the purport of his or her paper title. All persons holding under such possession, by purchase, devise or descent, before said seven years shall have expired, and who shall continue such possession, and continue to pay the taxes as aforesaid, so as to complete the possession and payment of taxes for the term aforesaid, shall be entitled to the benefit of this section.

[R. S. 1845, p. 104, § 8; Kruse v. Wilson, 79 Ill. 233: Nichols v. Padfield, 77 Ill. 253; Busch v. Huston, 75 Ill. 343; Whitney v. Stevens, 89 Ill. 53; Martin v. Judd, 81 ill. 488; L S. & M. S. Ry. Co. v. P. F. W. & C. Ry Co., 71 Ill. 38; Medley v. Elliot, 62 Ill. 532; Kane v. Footh, 70 Ill. 587 Mason v. Ayers, 73 Ill. 121; Rawson v. Fox, 65 Ill. 200; Hardin v. Crate, 78 Ill. 533; Hardin v. Gouverneur, 69 Ill. 140; Milliken v. Marlin, 66 Ill. 19; Russell v. Mandel, 73 Ill. 136; Dalton v. Lucas, 63 Ill. 337; Irwin v Miller, 23 Ill. 401; Ross v. Coat, 58 Ill. 56; Woodruff v. McHarry, 56 Ill. 218; Holbrook v. Dickenson, 56 Ill. 498; Hardin v. Crate, 60 Ill. 216; Chiles v. Davis, 58 Ill. 416; Brown v. Devine, 61 Ill. 260; Irving v. Brownell, 11 Ill. 403; Morrison v. Kelly, 22 Ill. 610; Hassett v. Ridgely, 49 I. 197; Schenck v. White, 53 Ill. 358; Cofield v. Furry, 19 Ill. 183; Darst v. Marshall, 20 Ill. 234; Fell v. Cessford, 26 Ill. 522; Jayne v. Gregg, 42 Ill. 413; Woodward v. Blanchard, 16 Ill. 432; Dawley v. Van Court, 21 Ill. 460; Holloway v. Clark, 27 Ill. 483; Morrison v. Norman, 47 Ill. 477; Huls v. Buntin, 47 Ill. 400; Dickenson v. Breeden, 30 Ill. 279; Cook v. Norton, 43 Ill. 391; Elston v. Kennicott, 46 i 188; Elston v. Kennicott. 52 Ill. 273; Chickering v. Failes, 26 Ill. 519; Chickering v. Faile, 38 Ill. 342; Laflin v. Herrington, 16 II. 301; Hinkley v. Greene, 52 Ill 223; Dolton v. Erb, 53 Ill. 289; Fritz v. Joiner, 54 Ill. 101; Shackleford v. Bailey, 35 Il 391; Bowman v. Wettig, 39 Ill. 428; Bride v. Watt, 23 III. 507; Rawlings v. Bailey, 15 Ill. 180; Spellman v. Curtenius, 12 Ill. 415; McConnel v. Street, 17 I. 254; Webster v. Webster, 55 Ill. 325; McCagg v. Heacock, 34 ll. 479; McCagg v. Heacock, 42 Ill. 153; Baily v. Doolittle, 24 Ill. 579: King v. Cushman, 41 Ill. 31; Frye v. State Bank, 11 Ill. 367; Choteau v. Jones, 11 Ill. 322; Voris v. Thomas, 12 Ill 442; Glancy v. Elliott, 14 Ill. 458; Barton v. Moss, 32 Ill. 50; Hinchman v. Whetstone, 23 Ill. 185; Keith v. Mafit, 38 Ill. 306; Rand v. Scofield, 43 Ill. 168; Allen v. Munn, 55 Ill. 491; Wettig v. Bowman, 47 II. 20; Dunlap v. Daugherty, 20 Ill. 398; Bride v. Watt, 23 Ill. 507; Lyon v. Kain, 47 Ill. 204; McConnell v. Konepel, 46 III. 519; Stearns v. Gittings, 23 Ill. 387; Hughes v. Streeter, 24 il. 650: Jacobs v. Rice, 33 Ill. 370; Newland v. Marsh, 19 Ill. 376; Owen v. Peacock, 38 Ill. 33; Hodgen v. Henrichsen. 85 III, 261; Foster v. Letz, 86 Ill. 412; Wray v. C. B. & Q. R. R. Co., 86 Ill. 424; Scott v. Delany, 87 Ill. 146; Lyman v. Smilie, 87 Ill. 259: Hubbard v. Kiddo, 87 Ill. 578; Payne v. Markle, 89 Ill. 66; Coleman v. Billings, 89 Ill. 183; Walker v. Carrington, 74 III. 45 Sloan v. Graham, 85 Ill. 27; Yoakum v. Harrison, 85 Ill. 202; Paris v. Lewis, 85 Ill. 597. 7. Seven years payment of taxes, with color of title to vacant land. $7. Whenever a person having color of titie, made in good faith, to vacant and unoccupied land, shall pay all taxes legally assessed thereon for seven successive years, he or she shall be deemed and adjudged to be the legal owner of said vacant and unoccupied land, to the extent and according to the purport of his or her paper title. All persons holding under such taxpayer, by purchase, devise or descent, before said seven years shall have expired, and who shall continue to pay the taxes, as aforesaid, so as to complete the payment of the