or charged, shall be fined not exceeding $1,000 or confined in the county jail not exceeding one year, or both. [As amended by act approved May 22, 1877. In force July 1, 1877. L. 1877, p. 89.

*273. Injuring ice. § 273. Whoever willfully or maliciously injures, mars, floods or otherwise damages or destroys any ice forming, formed or being upon any waters within this State from which ice is or may be taken as an article of merchandise, whereby the taking thereof is hindered or the value thereof diminished for that purpose, or whoever willfully and maliciously incites or procures another so to do, shall be fined not exceeding $500, or confined in the county jail not exceeding one year, or both, according to the nature and aggravation of the offense. [Added by act approved June 18, 1883. In force July 1, 1883. L. 1883, p. 76.

DIVISION IL

GENERAL PROVISIONS.

273. Attempt to commit an offense. SEC. 1. Whoever attempts to commit any offense prohibited by law, and does any act towards it but fails, or is intercepted or prevented in its execution, where no express provision is made by law for the punishment of such attempt, shall be punished, when the offense thus attempted is a felony, by imprisonment in the penitentiary not less than one, nor more than five years; in all other cases, by fine not exceeding $300, or by confinement in the county jail not exceeding six months.

[Coates v. People, 72 Ill. 303; Cox v. People, 82 Ill. 192; Walsh v. People, 65 Ill. 58.

ACCESSORIES.

274. Before the fact. § 2. An accessory is he who stands by, and aids, abets, assists or who, not being present, aiding, abetting or assisting hath advised, encouraged, aided or abetted the perpetration of the crime. He who thus aids, abets, assists, advises or encourages, shall be considered as principal, and punished accordingly.

[R. S. 1845, p. 153, § 13; Coates v. People, 72 Ill. 303; White v. People, 81 Ill. 337: Brennan v. People, 15 Ill. 511; Kennedy v. People, 40 Ill. 488; Baxter v. People, 2 Gilm 580; Bell v. Mallory, 61 Ill. 170; Williams v. People, 54 Ill. 426; Barron v. People, 73 Ill. 256; Develing v. Sheldon, 83 Ill. 390; Baxter v. People, 3 Gilm. 368 Dempsey v. People, 47 Ill. 323; Van Meter v. People, 60 Ill. 168; Stinson v. Peo ple, 43 Ill. 401; Miller v. People, 39 Ill, 464; Smith v. People, 74 III. 144; People, 81 Ill. 333; Johnson v. People, 83 Ill. 431.

White v.

275. May be punished independently of principal. 3. Every such accessory, when a crime is committed within or without this State by his aid or procurement in this State, may be indicted and convicted at the same time as the principal, or before, or after his conviction, and whether the principal is convicted or amenable to justice, or not, and punished as principal.

276. After the fact. 4. Every person not standing in the relation of husband or wife, parent or child, brother or sister to the offender, who knows the fact that a crime has been committed, and conceals it from the magistrate, or who harbors, conceals, maintains or assists any principal felon, or any accessory before the fact, knowing him to be such, shall be deemed an accessory after the fact, and shall be punished by imprisonment not exceeding two years, and a fine not exceeding $500.

[R. S. 1845, P. 153. § 14; Reynolds v. People, 83 Ill. 479; Yoe v. People, 49 Ill. 414.

[*394] DEFINITION OF OFFENSES-WHO CAPABLE OF COMMITTING DISABILITIES.

277. Felony. § 5. A felony is an offense punishable with death or by imprisonment in the penitentiary.

[Halliday v. People, 83 Ill. 479.

278. Misdemeanor. 6. Every other offense is a misdemeanor. Where the performance of any act is prohibited by any statute, and no penalty for the violation of such statute is imposed, the doing of such act is a misdemeanor, and may be punished by fine not exceeding $100, or imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding six months, or both, in the discretion of the court. [R. S. 1845, p. 182, § 169.

279. Infamous crimes. 7. Every person convicted of the crime of murder, rape, kidnapping, willful and corrupt perjury or subornation of perjury, arson, burglary, robbery, sodomy, or other crime against nature, incest, larceny, forgery, counterfeiting or bigamy, shall be deemed infamous, and shall forever thereafter be rendered incapable of holding any office of honor, trust or profit, of voting at any election, or serving as a juror, unless he is again restored to such rights by the terms of a pardon for the offense, or otherwise according to law.

[See Penitentiary,'' ch. 108, § 49; R. S. 1845, p. 182, § 164; Foreman v. Baldwin, 24 III. 306; Holliday v. People, 5 Gilm. 214.

280. What constitutes an offense. § 8. A criminal offense consists in a violation of a public law, in the commission of which there shall be a union or joint operation of act and intention, or criminal negligence.

[R. S. 1845, p. 152, §1; Smith v. Shultz, 1 Scam. 490; Phelps v People, 55 Ill. 334; Murphy v. People, 37 Ill. 447; C. B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Triplett, 38 Ill. 487.

281. Intention. 9. Intention is manifested by the circumstances connected with the perpetration of the offense, and the sound mind and discretion of the person accused. [R. S. 1845, p. 152, 2.

282. Sound mind. $10. A person shall be considered of sound mind who is neither an idiot nor lunatic, nor affected with insanity, and who hath arrived at the age of fourteen years, or before that age if such person know the distinction between good and evil. [R. S. 1845, P. 152, 3.

283. Infant. II. An infant under the age of ten years shall not be found guilty of any crime or misdemeanor. [R. S. 1845, P. 152, 4.

284. Insanity. § 12. A lunatic or insane person, without lucid intervals, shall not be found guilty of any crime or misdemeanor with which he may be charged; Provided, the act so charged as criminal shall have been committed in the condition of insanity. If, upon the trial of a person charged with crime, it shall appear from the evidence that the act was committed as charged, but that, at the time of committing the same, the person so charged was lunatic or insane, the jury shall so find by their verdict, and by their verdict shall further find whether such person has or has not entirely and permanently recovered from such lunacy or insanity; and in case the jury shall find such person has not entirely and permanently recovered from such lunacy or insanity, the court shall cause such person to be taken to a State hospital for the insane, and there kept in safety until he shall have fully and permanently recovered from such lunacy or insanity; but in case the jury shall find by their verdict that

such person has entirely and permanently recovered from such lunacy of insanity, he shall be discharged from custody.

[R. S. 1845, P. 152, § 5; Fisher v. People, 23 Ill. 283; Chase v. People, 40 Ill. 358; Hopps v. People, 31 Ill. 394.

285. Becoming insane. § 13. A person that becomes lunatic or insane after the commission of a crime or misdemeanor shall not be tried for the offense during the continuance of the lunacy or insanity. If, after the verdict of guilty, and before judgment pronounced, such per son become lunatic or insane, then no judgment shall be given while such lunacy or insanity shall continue. And if, after judgment and before execution of the sentence, such person become lunatic or insane, then in case the punishment be capital, the execution thereof shall be stayed until the recovery of said person from the insanity or lunacy. In all of these cases it shall be the duty of the court to impanel a jury to try the question whether the accused be, at the time of impaneling, insane or lunatic. [R. S. 1845, p. 153, § 12.

286. Idiocy. § 14. An idiot shall not be found guilty or punished [*395] R. S. 1845, p. 152, §6. for any crime or misdemeanor with which he may be charged.

287. Counseling infant, idiot or lunatic to commit crime. 15. Any person counseling, advising or encouraging an infant under the age of ten years, lunatic or idiot, to commit any offense, shall be prosecuted for such offense when committed, as principal, and, if found guilty, shall suffer the same punishment that would have been inflicted on such person counseling, advising or encouraging as aforesaid, had he committed the offense directly, without the intervention of such infant, lunatic or idiot. [R. S. 1845, p. 152, § 7.

288. Married women acting under threats. § 16. A married woman acting under the threats, command, or coercion of her husband, shall not be found guilty of any crime or misdemeanor not punishable with death; Provided, it appear, from all the facts and circumstances of the case, that violent threats, command or coercion were used; and in such case the husband shall be prosecuted as principal, and receive the punishment which would otherwise have been inflicted on the wife if she had been found guilty. [R. S. 1845, p. 152, § 8.

289. Committing crime under compulsion. § 17. A person committing a crime or misdemeanor not punishable with death, under threats or menaces which sufficiently show that his life or member was in danger, or that he had reasonable cause to believe, and did believe, that his life or member was in danger, shall not be found guilty; and such threats and menaces being proved and established, the person compelling by such threats or menaces the commission of the offense, shall be considered as principal, and suffer the same punishment as if he had perpetrated the offense. [R. S. 1845 p. 152, § 11.

290. Misfortune or accident. 18. Acts committed by misfortune or accident shall not be deemed criminal, where it satisfactorily appears that there was no evil design or intention, or culpable negligence. [R. S. 1845, p. 152, § 10.

291. Drunkenness. § 19. Drunkenness shall not be an excuse for any crime or misdemeanor, unless such drunkenness be occasioned

by the fraud, contrivance or force of some other person, for the purpose of causing the perpetration of an offense; in which case, the person so causing said drunkenness, for such malignant purpose, shall be considered principal, and suffer the same punishment as would have been inflicted on the person committing the offense, if he had been possessed of sound reason and discretion.

[R. S. 1845. P. 152, § 9; McIntyre v. People, 38 Ill. 521; Rafferty v. People, 72 Ill. 38; Rafferty v. People, 66 Ill. 118; Bates v. Ball, 72 Ill. 109.

PROSECUTION AND PUNISHMENT.

292. Of offenses herein defined. 20. All offenses herein defined shall be prosecuted, and, on conviction, punished as by this act is prescribed, and not otherwise; and all offenses not provided for by statute law, may be punished by fine or imprisonment, in the discretion of the court; Provided, the fine shall in no case exceed $500, and the imprisonment one year.

[R. S. 1845, p. 182, § 169; Johnson v. People, 22 Ill. 316; Smith v. People, 25 Ill. 17; Walsh v. People, 65 Ill. 58.

293. Civil remedy preserved. 21. Nothing in this act contained shall be so construed as to prevent the party injured from having and maintaining a civil action for all damages and losses that he may have sustained in consequence of the commission of any criminal offense herein provided for; and no court shall allow or entertain the plea that the private injury is merged in the crime, or in any manner affected thereby; Provided, however, the record of conviction shall not be used as evidence in any civil action brought on any forged writing, or to recover the damages and losses sustained by the commission of any such criminal offense. [R. S. 1845, p. 181, § 164.

DIVISION III.

[*396]

BAILABLE OFFENSES-RECOGNIZANCES-PROCEEDINGS

THEREON.

294. Bailable offenses. SEC. 1. All persons shall be bailable before conviction, except for capital offenses where the proof is evident or the presumption great. [See Const. 1870, art. 2, § 7.

295. Recognizance-form. § 2. All recognizances in criminal cases shall be taken to the people of the State of Illinois, and when not taken in a court of record in open court, shall be signed by the persons entering into the same, and approved and certified by the judge, justice of the peace or other officer taking the same.

[R. S. 1845, p. 191, 205; Shattuck v. People, 4 Scam. 477; Bacon v. People. 14 Ill. 313; Solomon v. People, 15 Ill. 292; Mix v. People, 26 III. 34; Lawrence v. People, 17 Ill. 174; Slaten v. People, 21 Ill 28; Chumasero v. People, 18 Ill. 406; Wheeler v. People, 39 Ill. 432; Banta v. People, 53 Ill. 437; Farris v. People, 58 Ill. 28; Passfield v. People, 3 Gilm. 406; Peacock v. People, 83 Ill. 331.

296. Recognizance in open court. 3. When a recogni zance is taken in a court of record, it may be done in open court, and when so taken, need not be signed by the persons entering into the same, [R. S. 1845, p. 191, § 205.

297. Condition of recognizance. 4. The recognizance, except when otherwise provided, shall be so conditioned as to bind the accused or witness personally to appear at the court having jurisdiction of the offense, on the first day of the next term thereof, to be holden in the county (specifying the time and place of holding the same), or if the court is then sitting, on some day of the term to be designated therein, and from day to day, and from term to term, and from day to day of each term, until the final sentence or order of the court, to answer for the offense charged (or if an indictment has been found or information filed, to answer such indictment or information, or if the person bound is a witness, to testify in the case,) and to abide such final sentence or order, and not depart without leave.

[R. S. 1845, p. 183, § 175; p. 191, § 204; Mooney v. People, 81 Ill. 134; Gallagher v. People, 88 Ill. 337; l'eople v. O'Brien, 41 Ill. 303; Landis v. People, 39 Ill. 80; Norfolk v. People, 43 Ill. 11; Peacock v. People, 83 Ill. 331.

298. Recognizance to appear before a justice. § 5. When a recognizance is taken for an offense cognizable by a justice of the peace, it shall be conditioned for the appearance of the accused before the justice of the peace taking the same, or before some other justice of the peace of the county where the offense was committed, on the day appointed by the justice for the trial of the offense.

[R. S. 1845, p. 191, § 205 ; Ogden v. People, 62 Ill. 65.

299. Recognizance of prisoner in vacation. § 6. Where any person shall be committed to jail on a criminal charge, for want of good and sufficient bail (except for treason, murder, or other offense punishable with death), or for not entering into a recognizance to appear and testify, any judge or any two justices of the peace may take such bail or recognizance in vacation, and may discharge such prisoner from his imprisonment.

[R. S. 1845, P. 191, § 206; People v. McKay, 40 Ill. 387; Lynch v. People, 38 Ill. 497.

300. Sufficiency of bail. 7. Each of the bail shall be worth the amount of bail expressed in the recognizance over and above the amount exempt from execution, but the court, judge, justice of the peace or officer, in taking bail, may allow more than two bail to justify severally in amounts less than that expressed in the recognizance, if the whole qualification be equivalent to two sufficient bail.

301. Proof of sufficiency of bail. 8. The court, judge, justice of the peace or officer may examine the bail, on oath, touching their sufficiency, and may receive other evidence for or against the same, in such manner as he may deem proper.

302. No recognizance voidable for want of form. $9. Every recognizance taken or attempted to be taken in pursuance of this act, shall, by all courts in this State, be held and adjudged to have been entered into voluntary, and shall not be set aside or adjudged insufficient for want of form, either in the recognizance or in the certificate of the officer taking the same.

[R. S. 1845. p. 183, $175; Shattuck v. People, 4 Scam. 477; McFarlan v. People, 13 Ill.9; People v. Watkins, 19 ill. 120; Besimer v. People, 15 Ill. 439; People v. Baughman, 18 Ill. 153; Young v. People, 18 Ill. 567; People v. Race, a Brad 567.

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