of the court of common pleas, who is only authorised to preside in or be present in the court of oyer and terminer as a judge thereof, when a justice of the supreme court or a circuit judge does not constitute one of the members of the court. This is the only intelligible construction which I have been able to put upon the language of the statute; and as the second associate judge of the common pleas has no other powers in relation to the court of oyer and terminer, than such as were vested in the first judge, it follows of course, that the court which commenced the trial in this case was not legally organized; as it appears by the record that it was held before two persons who were not authorised to hold it conjointly. This is unquestionally an objection more of form than of substance, as it is not probable that the rights of the prisoner were really prejudiced thereby; though the decision of the court upon any question of law that arose, might have been been left undecided, if the court were equally divided in opinion. In a case involving the life of a fellow being, I do not feel myself authorised to disregard the legal objection to the organization of the court before which he was tried. I must, therefore, vote for a reversal of the judgment, so that the prisoner may have another trial for his life before a tribunal properly constituted for that purpose." No distinct resolution having been adopted by the court upon this question, it is of course uncertain whether or not the views taken by the chancellor were sustained by the majority of the court. To obviate a similar embarrassment, it seems proper to declare, by what officers, in conjunction with a judge of the supreme court, the court of oyer and terminer may be held in the city and county of New-York. In practice, it was invariably held, under the old constitution, by circuit judge with two of the aldermen; and under the present constitution, it is uniformly held by a judge of the supreme court with two of those officers. The judges of the common pleas are also omitted as presding judges of the court, in conformity with what appears to be the meaning of the constitutional provision that any one of the judges of the supreme court may preside in the courts of oyer and terminer in any county. Const. art. 6, sec. 6. § 30. The court of oyer and terminer must be held at the same place and commenced on the same day with the circuit in the county; and must be continued as long as the public interests require, whether the circuit remain in session or not. TITLE IV. OF THE COURTS OF SESSIONS. CHAPTER I. The courts of sessions, in general. II. The courts of sessions, other than in city and county of New-York. CHAPTER I. THE COURTS OF SESSIONS, IN GENERAL. SECTION 31. Court of sessions in each county. § 31. There is in each of the counties of this state, a court, denominated a court of sessions, with the jurisdiction conferred by the next two chapters, and no other; but nothing contained in this section affects its jurisdiction in actions or proceedings now pending therein. CHAPTER II. THE COURTS OF SESSIONS, OTHER THAN IN THE CITY AND COUNTY OF NEW-YORK. SECTION 32, 33. Their jurisdiction. 34. Indictments for offences punishable with death, to be sent to oyer and terminer. 35. Other indictments may be sent to oyer and terminer. 36. By whom held. 37. When and where held, and their duration. § 32. The courts of sessions embraced in this chapter have jurisdiction, 1. To inquire, by the intervention of a grand jury, of all public offences committed or triable in the county: 2. To try and determine indictments found therein, or sent thereto by the court of oyer and terminer of the county, for public offences not punishable with death: 3. To remove justices of the peace, police justices, and justices of justices' courts, in their respective counties, and their clerks, after due notice and an opportunity of being heard in their defence, for causes to be stated in the order of removal: 4. To hear and determine appeals from orders of justices of the peace, under the provisions of this code, respecting the support of bastards: 5. To examine into the circumstances of persons committed to prison as parents of bastards, and to discharge them in the cases provided by this code: 6. To hear and determine complaints under the provisions of this code, respecting masters, apprentices, and servants: 7. To review the convictions of disorderly persons actually imprisoned, and to execute the powers conferred and duties imposed by this code, in relation to those persons: 8. To continue or discharge the recognizances, undertakings and bonds of persons bound to keep the peace or to be of good behavior, or both; and to inquire into and determine the complaints on which they were founded: 9. To compel relatives of poor persons and committees of the estates of lunatics, to support such persons and lunatics, in the cases and manner prescribed by this code: 10. To exercise the powers conferred by this code, in relation to the estates of persons absconding and leaving their families chargeable to the public: 11. To exercise the powers conferred upon them by other provisions of this code. The courts which have been heretofore known as courts of general session, (but which are denominated in the code, courts of sessions, in conformity with the constitution, which uniformly designates them by that name,) are retained with substantially the same powers as at present, except in one important particular. As they at present exist, the jurisdiction of these courts is confined to cases not punishable with death or imprisonment in a state prison for life; or in other words, where the utmost punishment prescribed by law is imprisonment for ten years; 2 R. S. 3d ed. 374, sec. 5, subd. 2; except that in the city of New-York, the juris.iction of the court of sessions extends to all except capital cases. The reason of this difference is, that when it had its origin, the only one of these courts, in which the presiding judge was required to be a member of the legal profession, was that in the city of New-York; while in the other counties, he need not, and very frequently did not, possess this qualification. It was, therefore, deemed wise by the legislature, to provide that in cases requiring a high degree of punishment, the defendant should not be subjected to a trial, except where the presiding judge was a judge of the supreme court or a circuit judge. It is unnecessary to discuss the soundness of the ground on which this distinction rested; but assuming it to have been just, a sufficient reason is found against its further continuance, in the fact that the responsibility of the selection of competent judges has been, under our present constitution, assumed by the people. If we may judge by the past, there is but little ground of apprehension for the future, that this high responsibility will be lightly regarded, or carelessly or indiscreetly exercised. The selection of the present county judges has resulted in placing upon the bench of the court of sessions, in every county, men of ability and integrity, amply fitting them for the discharge of the duty which will be thrown upon them by the change referred to; and it is not to be doubted, that when their powers are increased, at least an equal degree of discrimination will be exercised in their selection. Secondary to this argument,-for the Commissioners admit that it is not of primary importance, is the necessity which exists, for relieving the judges of the supreme court from duties which can be as conveniently and safely performed by the county judges as by them. The legislature need not be informed, that this necessity has arisen from the great pressure of business in the supreme court in some of the judicial districts. As a consequence of its existence, the duty seems to be imperative, to devolve, at least in those districts, the portion of their duties connected with the courts of oyer and terminer, upon the courts of sessions; and thus leave the judges of the supreme court to the performance of that portion which demands their whole time and efforts, and which cannot constitutionally be performed by others. An additional consideration, not without its weight in this connection, is that the jurisdiction of the courts of sessions will thus be rendered uniform throughout the state. In the city of New-York, the jurisdiction proposed, now exists in the court of sessions; and while it is not to be denied that some exceptions to the structure of the courts throughout the state, as well as in the modes of procedure, must exist in reference to that city, the Commissioners submit that it is not proper to multiply those exceptions beyond the peculiar exigencies by which they are demanded. The jurisdiction of this court is also extended by the third subdivision, to the removal of justices of the peace, &c. Under the constitution of 1821, justices of the peace, and the special justices and assistant justices in the city of NewYork, and their clerks, were removeable by the county courts, |