THE present occasion is probably the first during the history of the last half century, in which Russia has been found openly and immediately faithless to the engagements which she has contracted at the close of a considerable war. This circumstance, far from being produced by any antecedent spirit of fidelity on the part of her government, springs from the fact that at no other period has she been compelled to an acceptance of terms so hostile to her political designs, and so repugnant to her military traditions. Her astuteness, in truth, had previously come to the help of her morality. This observation remarkably applies to the share which she possessed in the French Revolutionary war. Even her peace with England, after the battle of Copenhagen in 1801, and her peace with France, after the battle of Austerlitz in 1805, were not attended by degrading conditions. On the latter occasion only did her arms suffer in reputation. In 1807 her diplomacy contrived to turn the defeat of Friedland to such happy account, that the peace of Tilsit, by which that campaign was concluded, opened to her a prospect of almost unlimited conquest in the East. And when her next and last struggle with Napoleon broke forth in 1812, we all remember the effectual retribution which she imposed on France, both by treaty and by arms, for the invasion of her territory and the burning of her ancient capital.

concluded with the Ottoman Porte during a similar period. The treaty of Bucharest of 1812, the treaty of Akerman of 1826, and the treaty of Adrianople of 1829, were simply so many advances of dominion upon the shores of the Black Sea. The difficulties which then occasionally attended the accomplishment of the hard terms enforced by Russia upon Turkey became occasions of magnificent philippics by the former power, inveighing against the want of faith and honour alleged to be exhibited by the Porte. And although no government could have displayed a more signal dereliction of the obligations which it accepted than Russia herself in the subsequent relations of the two states, yet these derelictions were purely of an insidious character, and the Court of St. Petersburg contrived to carry out the terms that it had extorted by the sword with at least an outward show of justice and moderation. Hence the relations of Russia to her opponents are now without a precedent; and thus it has probably happened that an undue confidence has been reposed in her fulfilment of the obligations which she contracted in the Treaty of Paris.

VOL. XLIX. NO. CCLXXXIX.

give to Turkey the preponderance of which it had divested Russia. The modifications in the status quo ante bellum were consequently simply such as the security of Turkey and the freedom of commerce demanded.

the

By the terms of this treaty, mutual restitution of territory conquered in the war was agreed to without a single exception. Thus the Russians surrendered Kars, and the Allies evacuated the territory of which they were in occupation in the Crimea. Even the Asiatic frontier was to remain substantially as heretofore. The changes effected by the treaty were three-fold-they were military, political, and commercial. The first of these was accomplished in the stipulation which provided that no "military-maritime arsenals" should be re-established on shores of the Black Sea-although a controversy arose as to its application to the Sea of Azoff, and to the Port of Nicolaieff. The second, or political, class of changes referred to the future government of the Moldo-Wallachian Principalities, and to the civil rights to be guaranteed to the Christians of Turkey Proper. As, however, the latter of these questions was specially exempted from the jurisdiction or interference of foreign powers, the government of the Principalities became the only "political" question of an international character raised by the treaty. This subject will absorb its full share of our attention. Finally, the third, or commercial, class of changes involved at once regulations of customs in the Russian and Turkish ports of the Black Sea, and the question of the new Bessarabian frontier demanded of Russia in the Congress, from commercial rather than from territorial considerations, and with the view of excluding Russia from all communication with, or authority over, the mouths of the Danube. Hence, as we all know, has arisen the double question of the New Bolgrad, and of the Isle of Serpents.

We are entitled to say of this treaty of peace, that its provisions were in principle just, and even admirable. We may fairly add that whenever existing difficulties are removed, it will present a mighty scheme for the renovation of the East. These considerations, how

ever, must not blind us to two practical defects in its character, which are mainly the cause of the obstacles which have presented themselves to its accomplishment. We refer, first, to the actual process by which it was arranged, either in the treaty itself, or by an understanding ancillary to it, that the concessions therein made in theory should be carried out in fact. We refer, secondly, to the ignorance of the geography of the East under which the terms of peace were settled.

In regard to the former, we advert more particularly to the manner in which the evacuation of the conquered territory was pursued on either side. The obliquity and positive unfairness of this arrangement cannot have failed to have struck the most thoughtless reader of the newspapers. We were ourselves three thousand miles from the seat of war, France was nearly two thousand-by water; and by water all our troops and stores and artillery had gone. Russia, on the other hand, was fighting, at the close of the war, exclusively on her own territory, so far as hostilities in Europe were concerned; and the army of Mouravieff in the Pashalic of Kars was in direct and close communication with the Russian frontier. Austria, meanwhile, stood in precisely similar relationsher army in Moldavia and Wallachia was but the advanced corps of her Hungarian forces; and the retrocession of her rule within her hereditary dominions would have formed the work of a few weeks only. If, therefore, any difference were to have been made in the relative evacuations of the territories agreed to be surrendered by the peace, it is clear that the Austrians and the Russians ought to have first complied with the prescribed terms: the French next, and ourselves in the last instance.

This natural order of compliance with the terms of the treaty was, however, directly inverted. England was the first to withdraw; France followed in the track; and when all our positions in front of Sebastopol had been restored to the possession of our former enemy, the Russian army of Bessarabia was still upon the Danube; the Russian army of Tiflis was still at Kars; and the Austrian forces were fixed as firm as fate in the Princi