dence before me," said Story, J., "I incline strongly to the opinion, that the limits of the county of Suffolk, in this direction, not only include the place in question [between Lovel's Island, George's Island, and Gallop's Island], but all the waters down to a line running across from the light-house on the Great Brewster, to Point Alderton. In the sense of the common law, these seem to me to be the fauces terra, where the main ocean terminates." 1

§ 607. Probably the common law rule concerning the extent of counties into the sea does not apply to our great lakes; 2 so that over them the counties touch the limits of the State. Yet on this point we are guided only by general principles, having no specific adjudications. In New York, the counties bordering on lakes Ontario and Erie reach, by statutory provision, to the division line between the United States and the British dominions. The statutes of New York appear likewise to have drawn out the boundaries of the counties on the sea, within that State, so as to leave no territory not within some county.3 But on matters of this kind the reader is expected to consult for himself the laws of his own State.

§ 608. Every offence is committed in violation of the law either of a particular State or of the United States. To determine which law, consideration is given to the locality of its commission, to the person against whom cominitted, to the person committing it, and to the nature of the thing done. We are now examining the matter as concerns the place.

§ 609. We have already sufficiently seen, that, if the place is without the local limits of any State, the offence is against the United States. But suppose it is within the lim

1 United States v. Grush, 5 Mason, 290, 302. As to New York, see Manley v. People, 3 Seld. 295.

its, it may still be against the United States, in particular localities, when it would not be in others. Thus, "the judicial power of the United States shall extend," says the constitution, "to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; "1 and maritime jurisdiction is by our courts held, contrary to the English rule, to embrace locally, not only the high seas, but all the internal navigable waters, as rivers and lakes, on which commerce is borne.2 The United States have also constitutional power "to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes;" which power necessarily implies certain rights of creating, by legislation, offences against commerce committed on the public ways of the nation.

§ 610. Still the powers given thus to congress, by the constitution of the United States, over navigable waters within the States, slumber until legislation awakens them into practical life. And although congress may exercise these powers either concurrently with the States, or probably even to their exclusion if ever so unwise, yet, as to crimes, she has not to any considerable extent legislated concerning things done

VIU. S. Const. art. 3, § 2.

Genessee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 12 How. U. S. 443; Fretz v. Bull, 12 How. U. S. 466. Previously to these decisions, it was understood to extend only to tide-waters. The Thomas Jefferson, 10 Wheat, 428; Steamboat Orleans v. Phoebus, 11 Pet. 175; United States v. Coombs, 12 Pet. 72; Waring v. Clarke, 5 How. U. S. 441; Rossiter v. Chester, 1 Doug. Mich. 154. And see Steamboat New World v. King, 16 How. U. S. 469; The Huntress, Daveis, 82.

Const. U. S. art. 1, § 8; Vol. II. § 1065.

1 Waring v. Clarke, 5 How. U. S. 441; United States v. New Bedford Bridge, 1 Woodb. & M. 401. See Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge, 13 How. U. S. 518; Bailey v. Philadelphia Railroad, 4 Harring. Del, 389; Georgetown v. Alexandria Canal, 12 Pet. 91; People v. St. Louis, 5 Gilm. 351.

See Waring v. Clarke, supra. And see Rex v. Bruce, Russ. & Ry. 243, 2 Leach, 4th ed. 1093.

• Commonwealth v. Peters, 12 Met. 387.

'See People v. Sheriff of Westchester, 1 Parker, 659.

within the counties. Therefore, within the counties, the dominion of the States, and the common law jurisdiction of the State courts, are practically almost as exclusive as if congress had no constitutional authority extending to those particular places there.1 But some things are by acts of congress made punishable when done "upon the high seas; or in any arm of the sea, or in any river, haven, creek, basin, or bay, within, the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States, and out of the jurisdiction of any particular State;" the construction of which acts appears practically to be, that the words “out of the jurisdiction of any particular State" do not qualify the words "high seas," but do qualify the subsequent words: so that, if the offence is upon seas washing an open coast, and within the marine league belonging to the territory of the State, still it is punishable as committed against the United States; but not, if it is in a harbor or the like place, within the limits of a county. The consequence seems to be, that a man may commit a crime in the State on the open coast below the water-margin, and escape punishment; unless the case happens to fall within some act of congress, or unless the State has made, as Virginia has, some statutory provision for such localities; or hás extended over them her county: lines, as New York has done.4

4

A

United States v. Bevans, 3 Wheat. 336; Thompson v. Steamboat Morton, 2 Ohio State, 26. The States may regulate their own internal commerce. And a law forbidding citizens of other States from taking oysters from the waters of the State has been held to be constitutional. Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. C. C. 371. So of a law requiring from foreigners a license fee for the privilege of working the gold mines of a State. People v. Naglee, 1 Cal. 232.

2 United States v. Grush, 5 Mason, 290; Commonwealth v. Peters, 12/ Met. 387; United States v. Bevans, 3 Wheat. 336. And see further on this matter, United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76; United States v. Holmes, 5 Wheat. 412.

i

3 Commonwealth v. Gaines, 2 Va. Cas. 172. As to New York, see ante, $ 607.

* Ante, § 607.

§ 611. The words " high seas seem to admit of some contraction and expansion of meaning, according to the connection in which they are employed. In an English case, a British vessel, having crossed the ocean and being off Whampoa in China, stated in the case to be twenty or thirty miles from the sea on a river, and no evidence appearing whether or not the tide flowed there, was held to be on the high seas. Under the statutes of the United States, however, so extended a meaning has not been given to this term: it includes waters of our own and foreign coasts within the marine league of the shore, and therefore parts of the adjoining territory, when without the boundaries of counties; though not, on our own coast, when within such boundaries.3 And the supreme court of the United States has held, under our statutes, that an American vessel off the before-mentioned Whampoa, said in the case to be on the river Tigris thirty-five miles from its mouth, is not on the high seas.4 The same, in the circuit court for the district of Massachusetts, was held of the waters of a bay entirely landlocked and enclosed by reefs; also of an enclosed dock in a foreign port, Story, J., observing: "The admiralty has never held, that the waters of havens, where the tide ebbs and flows, are properly the high seas, unless those waters are without lowwater mark." 6 But an open roadstead is deemed a part of the high seas. And there appears to be a sense in which, relating to matters other than those we are here discussing,

Ante, § 156, 157.

12 Rex r. Allen, 7 Car. & P. 664, 1 Moody, 494:

United States v. Pirates, 5 Wheat. 184, 200; United States v. Smith, 1 Mason, 147; United States v. Ross, 1 Gallis. 624; United States v. Grush, 5 Mason, 290; Johnson v. Merchandise, 2 Paine, 601.

United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76.

5 United States v. Robinson, 4 Mason, 307.

6 United States v. Hamilton, 1 Mason, 152.

United States r. Pirates, 5 Wheat. 184, 200; United States v. Ross, 1

Gallis. 624. See United States v. Davis, 2 Sumner, 482.

the word sea comprehends all waters extending inland as far as the tide flows.1

IL The Jurisdiction arising from the Subject.

§ 612. The nature of the criminal thing done, though done within the exclusive local limits of a particular State, may make it an offence against the United States. Treason, therefore, is a crime against either the United States or an individual State, according as it aims at the overthrow of the one government or the other. But, as we have no common law national crimes, the thing cannot be deemed an offence against the general government, unless there is a statute, within the constitutional powers of congress, forbidding it, and probably also prescribing the punishment.5

§ 613. Some acts in their nature violate the duties due both to the United States and to a particular State. Some of these acts, moreover, are made offences against both, by the positive laws of each. On this subject the doctrine probably is, that, wherever congress has the power to make a particular thing punishable as a crime against the United States, it can declare its legislation to be exclusive of all other law touching the matter; but this proposition is not quite clear on principle. And, be the proposition correct

6

1 Thackarey v. The Farmer, Gilpin, 524; 1 Curt. Com. § 38. As to the meaning of the words "beyond seas," see Campbell v. Rankins, 2 Fairf. 103.

2 See, for illustrations, United States v. Coombs, 12 Pet. 72; The State v. Caroline, 20 Ala. 19; United States v. Bailey, 9 Pet. 238; United States v. Barton, Gilpin, 439.

I

3 Charge on Law of Treason, 1 Story, 614; People v. Lynch, 11 Johns. 549; ante, § 357,

Ante, § 51.

5 Ante, § 18.

Ante, § 610. See Fox v. Ohio, 5 How. U. S. 410; Commonwealth v. Fuller, 8 Met. 313; The State v. Pitman, 1 Brev. 32.