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wares, or merchandise, in any vessel upon any navigable river," the word goods was construed not even to extend to dollars, or Portugal money, not current by proclamation; the reason appearing to be, that, as this word stood connected in the clause with "wares or merchandise," the latter limited its meaning.1 Yet on the other hand, there is reason for the opinion, that "goods and chattels " embrace all coin, though circulating as money, which would be the subject of larceny at common law; and, in the United States Circuit Court for the District of Massachusetts, it was decided, that the term "personal goods" in the act of congress of 1790, c. 36, § 16, should be so construed. The court in this case even intimated, contrary to what we have just seen to be the general doctrine, that under the phrase goods and chattels may be comprehended bank-bills, since they circulate as currency; but not other choses in action, as promissory notes.2 With the exceptions already pointed out, the words under discussion seem to include every thing of a personal nature. Thus oats, rye, and corn, the produce of a man's farm, and lying in his barn, are "goods, wares, and merchandise; "3 the luggage of a passenger going to a steamboat is "goods and merchandise;" and a railroad passenger ticket is a "chattel; "5 as are also sheep, fowls, and other animals."
one case, if an act of parliament vests the property of "goods, chattels, furniture, clothing, and debts" in certain persons, the property in money and securities for money is not thereby transferred. Rex v. Beacall, 1 Car. & P. 310, 454. In Ohio, the doctrine of the text seems not to be followed. Hall v. The State, 3 Ohio State, 575.
1 Rex v. Leigh, 1 Leach, 4th ed. 52; note, 2 East P. C. 647, Foster, 79, note.
Rex v. Grimes, 1 Leach, 4th ed. 53,
And see Rex v. Dean, 2 Leach,
* United States v. Moulton, 5 Mason, 537. 4th ed. 693, 2 East P. C. 749; Rex v. Mead, 4 Car. & P. 535.
The State v. Brooks, 4 Conn. 446.
Rex v. Wright, 7 Car. & P. 159.
Reg. v. Boulton, 1 Den. C. C. 508, 2 Car. & K. 917, 13 Jur. 1034.
Asses and pigs have been held to be "cattle," within
§ 220. But the words goods and chattels, in these criminal statutes, may include not only coin, but choses in action also, as promissory notes, bank-bills, and the like, when there are other words or other statutes, which, on all being taken together, fairly require such interpretation. Thus where the stealing of promissory notes was a statutory larceny, and a subsequent enactment made it a misdemeanor to "buy or receive any goods or chattels knowing the same to have been stolen," the judges of Ireland held, that promissory notes fell within the latter act;2 yet substantially a contrary doctrine was laid down in New Jersey in an exceedingly well considered and ably reasoned case, and there may be grave doubts whether the latter is not the true view. In England, the halves of county bank-notes, sent in a letter, are held to be goods and chattels;5 and a bank-note is within the words "money, goods, chattels, wares, or merchandise," of Stat. 12 Anne, c. 7, concerning stealing from a dwelling-house; but the Virginia court denied that such note was to be included under words similar to those last mentioned. On the whole, these terms are not so well defined in the criminal law as we might wish they were; the cases are at several points conflicting; and the careful practitioner will not advise in a matter of doubt, without first making a particular examination both of the decisions at large, and of the statute law of his own State.
§ 221. Money. The word money means, in these statutes,
1 Ante, § 66, 72, 76.
Rex v. Crone, Jebb, 47. And see Anonymous, 1 Crawf. & Dix C. C. 152. See People v. Kent, 1 Doug. Mich. 42; Hall v. The State, 3 Ohio State, 575.
The State v. Calvin, 2 Zab. 207.
See the various cases cited to the last section.
Rex v. Mead, 4 Car. & P. 535.
Rex v. Dean, 2 Leach, 4th ed. 693, 2 East P. C. 646, 749.
* Commonwealth v. Swinney, 1 Va. Cas. 146, 151. And see Rex v. Hill, Russ. & Ry. 190.
See Vol. II. § 297, 524, 693.
only that which is a legal tender.1 It does not therefore include bank-bills, though they pass current; 2 neither does it include United States treasury warrants,3 nor county claims,+ nor mere promissory notes, nor bills of exchange. But the Maryland court held, that the deposit of a note of the bank of Virginia, as a wager or bet, is a deposit of "money" within the Maryland act of 1838, c. 392.7 Some other distinctions are stated in a section of our second volume.8
§ 222. Jewelry. This word occurs in a Massachusetts statute against peddling certain enumerated articles. The court once observed, that the legislature "intended to employ it as a generic term, of the largest import, including all articles under the genus;" and, without undertaking to define its meaning, adjudged plain gold rings and ear-knobs not to be included within the term as used in the statute.9
V. The Proceedings.
§ 223. Conviction. This word ordinarily signifies the finding of the jury, by verdict, that the prisoner is guilty. When
1 1 East P. C. 147, 149. And See Hale v. The State, 8 Texas, 171; Colson v. The State, 7 Blackf. 590. In England, foreign coin is considered mere bullion, unless made current by proclamation, 1 East P. C. 149. As to "bullion," see also 1 East P. C. 188.
2 The State v. Jim, 3 Murph. 3; Rex v. Hill, Russ. & Ry. 190; Cor monwealth v. Swinney, 1 Va. Cas. 146, 151; McAuly v. The State, 7 Yerg. 526; Johnston v. The State, Mart. & Yerg. 129. But a bank-note is a "valuable thing." Rex v. Robinson, 2 Leach, 4th ed. 749, 2 East P. C. 1110, 1114. As to the meaning of the word "bank-note," in a statute, see Pomeroy v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. Cas. 342.
3 Williams v. The State, 12 Sm. & M. 58.
Tucker v. The State, 16 Ala. 670.
The State v. Foster, 3 McCord, 442; Tate v. The State, 5 Blackf. 174.
• Rex v. Major, 2 East P. C. 1118.
Doyle v. Commissioners of Baltimore County, 12 Gill & J. 484. And
see Rex v. Dean, 2 Leach, 4th ed. 693, 2 East P. C. 646, 649.
Vol. II. § 524.
• Commonwealth v. Stephens, 14 Pick. 370.
it is said, there has been a conviction, or one is convict, the meaning usually is not that sentence has been pronounced, but only that the verdict has been returned.1 Yet the word sometimes denotes the final judgment of the court.2 It has likewise some other significations; according to one of which, "a conviction is defined to be a record of the summary proceedings upon any penal statute, before one or more justices of the peace, or other persons duly authorized, in a case where the offender has been convicted and sentenced." 3
§224. Term of Years. This expression, in a statute relative to the punishment, has been defined to mean not less than two years; and, on the other hand, to include a sentence for life.5
§ 225. The reader will find various other words and phrases explained in these volumes; and, if he desires to see the explanations out of their order, he can do so by the help of the indexes.
1 4 Bl. Com. 362; United States v. Gibert, 2 Sumner, 19, 40. And see The State v. Valentine, 7 Ired. 225; Commonwealth v. Williamson, 2 Va. Cas. 211; Skinner v. Perot, 1 Ashm. 57; The State v. Fuller, 1 McCord, 178; Reg. v. Faderman, 4 New Sess. Cas. 161, Temp. & M. 286, 1 Den. C. C. 565; Co. Lit. 390 b.
2 Dwar. Stat. 2d ed. 683.
Holthouse Law Dict., Conviction.
Ex parte Seymour, 14 Pick. 40.
5 Commonwealth v. Evans, 16 Pick. 448.
THE GENERAL DOCTRINE.
§ 226. In no one thing does criminal jurisprudence differ from civil more than in its different doctrine concerning the intent. The law, seeking justice between man and man, frequently holds one to the civil consequences of his act, though he neither intended the act, nor suffered himself to be influenced by an evil mind, producing it unintended; because, when one has done a thing injuring another, he may properly be made to bear the loss, rather than the other, under many circumstances in which we attach no blame to him. But the different nature of the criminal law admits of no such distinction; for crime proceeds only from a criminal mind, and the question of loss to individuals belongs not to this department of jurisprudence. This general doctrine will be further illustrated in the present chapter; and, in subsequent chapters of this book, will be brought to view some particular doctrines, growing out of this one, and forming of it a part.
§ 226 a. The doctrine of the intent, as it prevails in the criminal law, is necessarily one of the foundation principles