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somewhat changed by a statute which provides, that maiming shall consist "in unlawfully disabling a human being, by depriving him of the use of a limb or member, or rendering him lame, or defective in bodily vigor." 1 In some other States, also, there are statutory definitions of the offence of mayhem.2 The English judges have held, that pouring acid into the eye of a mare, and thereby blinding her, is a maiming within Stat 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 30, § 16, which makes it felony to "unlawfully and maliciously kill, maim, or wound any cattle."
§ 195. Slit the Nose. These words are answered by any division, perpendicular or transverse, of the flesh or gristle.4
§ 196. Greivous Bodily Harm. “Grievous bodily harm is a generic term, which may comprehend severe wounds or hurts of various kinds; but they are not required to be such as are likely to produce a permanent injury;" 5 much less need they put the life in hazard. For example, to cut the private parts of a female child, and thus enlarge them for the time, the wound being neither deep nor dangerous, and the hymen not being ruptured, is a grievous bodily harm.7
IV. The Objects acted upon and the Instrumentalities.
§197. Tool Instrument - Implement. These words are generally found together in statutes. In meaning they are
1 Baker v. The State, 4 Pike, 56.
The State v. Briley, 8 Port. 472; The State v. Simmons, 3 Ala. 497. As to the word "disfiguring," see The State v. Smith, Cheves, 157.
* Rex v. Owens, 1 Moody, 205.
1 Rex v. Carroll, 1 Leach, 4th ed. 55, 1 East P. C. 394. Archb. New Crim. Proced. 264.
6 Reg. v. McNeill, 1 Crawf. & Dix C. C. 80. And see Rex v. Phillips, 1 Crawf. & Dix C. C. 164; Reg. v. Caruthers, 3 Crawf. & Dix C. C. 391; Rex v. Hunt, 1 Moody, 93; Roscoe Crim. Ev. 786.
'Rex v. Cox, Russ. & Ry. 362.
nearly alike, but probably not exactly so;1 and they denote some inanimate thing, which, ordinarily, can be handled and used with the hands. A game-cock, therefore, being a live animal, is not an implement of gaming. And a printingpress with the types and forms is not a tool, within statutes specifying what property of a debtor is exempt from attachment. Neither is a mill-saw, worked by water power; nor are cart-wheels, and other parts or the whole of vehicles drawn by horses or by oxen; nor are the moulds of a paper manufacturer; nor is a portable machine, of the kind used in factories for spinning and manufacturing cloth, even though propelled by the hand; nor, it has been held, is a peg-machine, used by a single person and operated by hand power,8tool within these statutes. So, in the criminal law, a crucible or other pot for melting or boiling is not a tool or instrument for counterfeiting. But a press for coinage,1o as also a mould,11 has been held to be such tool or instrument, within the English statutes; in which statutes, however, the meaning of these words may perhaps be enlarged by the connection in which they are used. So the English judges unanimously held, that a collar, as it was called, employed for marking the edge of a counterfeit coin, the process being to force the coin through the collar by machinery, is an edger, edging tool, instrument, or engine.12 Of course, if the statute speaks of an
1 See Atwood v. De Forest, 19 Conn. 513; Coolidge v. Choate, 11 Met. 79. 2 Coolidge v. Choate, supra.
* Buckingham v. Billings, 13 Mass. 82; Danforth v. Woodward, 10 Pick. 423; Spooner v. Fletcher, 3 Vt. 133. Contra, Patten v. Shepard, 4 Conn.
✦ Batchelder v. Shapleigh, 1 Fairf. 135.
Daily v. May, 5 Mass. 313.
Burbank v. Reed, cited 2 Vt. 406.
Kilburn v. Demming, 2 Vt. 404.
8 Knox v. Chadbourne, 28 Maine, 160.
The State v. Bowman, 6 Vt. 594. See Wetherby v. Foster, 5 Vt. 136.
10 Rex v. Bell, 1 East P. C. 169, Foster, 430.
"Rex v. Lennard, 2 W. Bl. 807, 1 Leach, 4th ed. 90, 1 East P. C. 170. 12 Rex v. Moore, 1 Moody, 122, 2 Car. & P. 235.
instrument for a particular purpose, it is not within the act unless the possessor of it intends to employ it for the purpose; yet there is no need the instrument should be adapted only for that use. Keys, therefore, are instruments of housebreaking, or not, according to the intent of the person having them.1 But these words are all probably somewhat elastic, to be compressed and enlarged by the accompanying words, and the subject to which they relate. And the word instrument, for example, has sometimes in law a meaning different entirely from the one now under consideration; as where we speak of an instrument in writing.
§ 198. Deadly Weapon- Dangerous Weapon. A deadly weapon is one likely to produce death or great bodily injury.2 The question, whether a particular weapon is deadly or not, is one of law for the court, not of fact for the jury.
Reg. v. Oldham, 2 Den. C. C. 472, 14 Eng. L. & Eq. 568. And see Rex
v. Palmer, 1 Moody & R. 70; Rex v. Johnson, Russ. & Ry. 492.
2 The State v. Jarrott, 1 Ired. 76, 87.
The State v. Collins, 8 Ired. 407; The State v. Cæsar, 9 Ired. 391; The State v. Craton, 6 Ired. 164. Such is the general proposition; but the question is often a complicated one of law and fact. Thus, Curtis, J., left it to the jury, under directions from the court, to determine whether a belaying pin was a "dangerous weapon," as actually used. He said: "I think, as actually used, the weapon must have been dangerous to life. Thus a small pistol, when loaded, is undoubtedly a dangerous weapon; and, if pointed towards a person within striking distance, with a present intention of discharging it, an assault with a dangerous weapon is committed. But if not loaded, and used only to push or strike with, a small pistol could not be considered a weapon dangerous to life. So the thing said to be used by the defendant may, in the hand of a strong man, be capable of endangering life by a blow on the head; but not dangerous to life if the arm or leg be struck with it. And if it be so, then an assault on a person by striking at, or attempting to strike at, his head with this instrument, being within striking distance, would be an assault with a dangerous weapon; while an attempt to strike his arm with it would not be such an assault. In many cases it is practicable for the court to declare, that a particular weapon was, or was not, a dangerous weapon, within the meaning of the law. And when it is practicable, it is matter of law, and the court must take the responsibility of so declaring. But when the question is, whether an assault with a dangerous
an indictment, under a statute of the United States, for robbing the mail and putting in jeopardy the life of the mail carrier, it was considered that a sword or pistol in the hand of the robber, through terror of which the robbery is effected, is a "dangerous weapon," though the sword is not drawn or the pistol is not pointed.1 And a pistol may be regarded as a dangerous weapon, even without proof of its having been loaded.2
§199. Loaded Arms. A pistol loaded with gunpowder and ball, yet having its touch-hole so plugged that it cannot possibly be fired, is not "loaded arms" within the English statute of 9 Geo. 4, c. 31, § 11, 12; the words of which are,
"shall, by drawing a trigger, or in any other manner, attempt to discharge any kind of loaded arms at any person." And where one sent to another a tin box, with three pounds of gunpowder in it, and two detonators to ignite the gunpowder when the box should be opened, intending to destroy the person opening the box, the court held, that this was not an attempt to discharge loaded arms at him.4
§ 200. Offensive Weapon. These words occur in several present and repealed English statutes, which forbid the doing of certain things, "armed with fire-arms or other offensive arms or weapons," 5 "carrying offensive arms or weapons," 6
weapon has been proved, and the weapon might be dangerous to life, or not, according to the manner in which it was used, or according to the part of the body attempted to be struck, I think a more general direction must be given to the jury; and it must be left for them to decide, whether the assault, if committed, was with a dangerous weapon." United States v. Small, 2 Curt. C. C. 241, 243. See also The State v. Jarrott, 1 Ired. 76; Rex v. Grice, 7 Car. & P. 803.
1 United States v. Wood, 3 Wash. C. C. 440.
2 United States v. Wilson, Bald. 78.
Rex v. Harris, 5 Car. & P. 159.
Rex v. Mountford, 7 Car. & P. 242, 1 Moody, 441.
59 Geo. 2, c. 35, § 10; 6 Geo. 4, c. 108, § 56. 6 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 53, § 60.
with an "offensive weapon or instrument," and other like expressions. No exact definition has been given to the words offensive weapon; yet they are understood to include, not only guns, pistols, daggers, and instruments of war; together with bludgeons, properly so called, clubs, and other things used only as weapons; 2 but also heavy walking-sticks, crutches, and the like, which latter are deemed offensive weapons or not, according to the intent with which the person uses or carries them.3 On the other hand, a common horsewhip; bats, being long poles employed by smugglers with which to convey away tubs of spirits; 5 and large sticks, some three feet long, with knobs at the ends, and with some prongs, the natural growth of the timber; have severally been held not to be offensive weapons: the impression indeed seems to have prevailed, that, to be offensive, they must be what the law calls dangerous.7
$201. Weapon drawn. A snead has been deemed a weapon drawn; 8 so also has a pot, thrown at another.9
§ 202. Destructive Matter. Boiling water is destructive matter, within Stat. 1 Vict. c. 85, making it felony, under cir
1 7 Geo. 2, c. 21.
2 Cosan's case, 1 Russ. Crimes, Grea. Ed. 119, 1 Leach, 4th ed. 342, note.
Rex v. Palmer, 1 Moody & R. 70; Rex v. Johnson, Russ. & Ry. 492, 2 East P. C. 488, 1 Russ. Crimes, Grea. Ed. 120; Rex v. Fry, 2 Moody & R. 42; ante, §197.
* Rex v. Fletcher, 1 Leach, 4th ed. 23, 342, note, 2 Stra. 1166.
Rex v. Noakes, 5 Car. & P. 326.
Rex v. Ince, 1 Leach, 4th ed. 342, note.
And see 1 Russ. Crimes, Grea. Ed. 119, 120; Rex v. Grice, 7 Car. & P. 803.
Keat's case, Skin. 666, 668.
Rex v. Hunter, 3 Lev. 255.
"But when he had thrown it out of his
hand without hurt, and out of his reach, he had no weapon drawn." Ib. p.