ploys a liberal interpretation for statutes which operate beneficially upon those whom they immediately concern.1 But enactments of the opposite character, taking away rights, or working forfeitures,2 or creating hardships of any kind, it construes strictly.3

§114. The law delights in the life, liberty, and happiness of the subject; and deems statutes which deprive him of these, or of his property, however necessary they may be, in a sense odious. Therefore and for kindred reasons, as well as for the.

penal. But this difference is here to be taken: where the statute acts upon the offender, and inflicts a penalty, as the pillory or a fine, it is then to be taken strictly; but where the statute acts upon the offence, by setting aside the fraudulent transaction, here it is to be construed liberally." 1 Bl. Com. 88. To the last point is also Cumming v. Fryer, Dudley, Ga. 182.

Bac. Ab. Statutes, I. 7, 9.

Bac. Ab. Statutes, I. 6, 7; Salters v. Tobias, 3 Paige, 338; Smith v. Spooner, 3 Pick. 229; Sewall v. Jones, 9 Pick. 412; Sullivan v. Park, 33 Maine, 438; post, § 114.,

* See further, as to these distinctions, Jortin v. Southeastern Railway, Eq. Rep. 281, 24 Law J., N. s., 363, 1 Jur., N. s., 813, 31 Eng. L. & Eq.

320.

"The rule, that penal laws are to be construed strictly, is perhaps not much less old than construction itself. It is founded on the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals; and on the plain principle, that the power of punishment is vested in the legislative, not in the judicial, department. It is the legislature, not the court, which is to define a crime, and ordain its panishment. It is said, that notwithstanding this rule, the intention of the lawmaker must govern in the construction of penal as well as other statutes. This is true. But this is not a new, independent rule, which subverts the old. It is a modification of the ancient maxim, and amounts to this, that, though penal laws are to be construed strictly, they are not to be construed so strictly as to defeat the obvious intention of the legislature. The maxim is not to be so applied as to narrow the words of the statute to the exclusion of cases which those words, in their ordinary acceptation, or in that sense in which the legislature has obviously used them, would comprehend. The intention of the legislature is to be collected from the words they employ. Where there is no ambiguity in the words, there is no room for construction. The case must be a strong one indeed, which would justify a court in departing from the plain meaning of words, especially in a penal act, in search of

reason that every man should be able to know certainly when he is guilty of a crime,1 statutes which subject one to a punishment or penalty 2 or forfeiture,3 or to a summary process1 calculated to take away his opportunity of making a full defence, or in any way depriving him of his liberty, are to be construed strictly. And the degree of strictness will depend

an intention which the words themselves did not suggest. To determine that a case is within the intention of a statute, its language must authorize us to say so. It would be dangerous indeed to carry the principle, that a case which is within the reason or mischief of a statute is within its provisions, so far as to punish a crime not enumerated in the statute, because it is of equal atrocity, or of kindred character, with those which are enumerated. If this principle has ever been recognized in expounding criminal law, it has been in cases of considerable irritation, which it would be unsafe to consider as precedents forming a general rule for other cases." Marshall, C. J., in United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76, 95, 96. "Where a law imposes a punishment which acts on the offender alone, and not as a reparation to the party injured, and where it is entirely within the discretion of the lawgiver, it will not be presumed that he intended it should extend further than is expressed; and humanity would require, that it should be so limited in the construction." Johnson, J., in The State v. Stephenson, 2 Bailey, 334. And see Commonwealth v. Loring, 8 Pick. 370; United States v. Wigglesworth, 2 Story, 369.

32.

Beccaria on Crimes, c. 11; Livingston, J., in the Enterprise, Paine,

* Andrews v. United States, 2 Story, 202, 213; Commonwealth v. Martin, 17 Mass. 359; Commonwealth v. Keniston, 5 Pick. 420; Carpenter v. People, 8 Barb. 603, 605; The State v. Upchurch, 9 Ired. 454 ; Van Rensselaer v. The Sheriff, 1 Cow. 443; Seaving v. Brinkerhoff, 5 Johns. Ch. 329; Courteen's case, Hob. 270; Searle v. Williams, Hob. 288; Hall v. The State, 20 Ohio, 7; Warner v. Commonwealth, 1 Barr, 154; The State v. Solomons, 3 Hill, S. C. 96; Bettis v. Taylor, 8 Port. 564; Van Valkenburgh v. Torrey, 7 Cow. 252; Hughes v. The State, 1 Eng. 131; Reed v. Davis, 8 Pick. 514, 517. A statute giving a party double damages is to be construed strictly. Smith v. Causey, 22 Ala. 568.

3

* Ante, § 313; United States v. Eighty-four Boxes of Sugar, 7 Pet. 453; The State v. Dill, 2 Sneed, 414.

4

Logwood v. Planters and Merchants Bank, Minor, 23; Childress v. McGehee, Minor, 131; Crawford v. The State, Minor, 143; Yancey v. Hankins, Minor, 171; Hale v. Burton, Dudley, Ga. 105.

Pierce's case, 16 Maine, 255.

somewhat on the severity of the punishment they inflict.1 In like manner all statutes in derogation of common law rights are strictly construed.2 Such, for instance, is a statute allowing a party to testify in his own cause for himself.3

§ 115. Such statutes are to reach no further in meaning than their words; no person is to be made subject to them by implication; and all doubts concerning their interpretation are to preponderate in favor of the accused.5

§ 116. Revenue laws, too, come within this rule of strict interpretation; for, though their primary object is not the punishment of crimes, but the collection of duties, yet, as they impose fines, work forfeitures, and deprive men of their property, they are within the same reason as other penal statutes.7

1 See Randolph v. The State, 9 Texas, 521; post, § 119.

. Sibley v. Smith, 2 Mich. 486; Sugar v. Sackett, 13 Ga. 462; Rathbun v.. Acker, 18 Barb. 393.

'Hotaling v. Cronise, 2 Cal. 60. So of a statute granting a franchise, as a turnpike charter. The State v. Clarksville & R. Turnpike, 2 Sneed, 88. See also Academy of Fine Arts v. Philadelphia, 10 Harris, Pa. 496. So of one taking the land of individuals for the public use. Sharp v. Speir, 4 Hill, N. Y. 76; Sharp v. Johnson, 4 Hill, N. Y. 92. See also Rathbun v. Acker, 18 Barb. 393.

The State v. McOmber, 6 Vt. 215; Rex v. Mitchell, 2 East P. C. 936, 937; Rex v. Hammond, 2 East P. C. 1119, 1 Leach, 4th ed. 444; Leonard e. Bosworth, 4 Conn. 421; The State v. Sumner, 10 Vt. 587; The State v. Sanford, 1 Nott & McCord, 512, 515; Rex v. Parker, 2 East P. C. 592, 1 Leach, 4th ed. 320, note; Rex v. Hickman, 1 Leach, 4th ed. 318, 2 East P. C. 593; United States v. Wigglesworth, 2 Story, 369; Rawson v. The State, 19 Conn. 292; United States v. Wilson, Bald. 78, 102; Schooner Harriet, 1 Story, 251; Bell v. Dole, 11 Johns. 173; post, § 134.

The Enterprise, Paine, 32; United States v. Wigglesworth, 2 Story, 369; The People v. Howell, 4 Johns. 296; Commonwealth v. Macomber, 3. Mass. 254; Kent v. The State, 8 Blackf. 163; post, § 133.

And see

United States v. Twenty-eight Packages, Gilpin, 306, 326. Attorney-General v. Radloff, 10 Exch. 84, 26 Eng. L. & Eq. 413. United States v. Eighty-four Boxes of Sugar, 7 Pet. 453; United States. v. Wigglesworth, 2 Story, 369; Dwar. Stat. 2d ed. 642; Rex v. Hymen, 7

§ 117. The doctrine of strict interpretation extends no further than the reasons on which it rests support it; and so those parts of a criminal statute which exempt from punishment are not to be strictly construed. Indeed, the same principles which require a statute to receive a close interpretation as against defendants, demand that it be construed openly and liberally in their favor.1 And as those principles sometimes unite with others calling also for a liberal interpretation, it may happen, that a criminal statute is thus expanded further beyond its words than any other.2 Nor does the rule of strict construction apply to all criminal statutes, even as against defendants. Thus it is of little consequence to one arraigned for crime, in what county he is tried, and so legislative acts determining the venue, that is, the place of trial, are not to be construed strictly. It seems also, that a similar view has been taken of statutes defining the rights of officers to make arrests in criminal cases; for the English statute of 29 Car. 2, c. 7, § 6, having restrained arrests on the Lord's day, "except in cases of treason, felony, or breach of the peace," these words were extended by judicial exposition to include all indictable offences. Yet the court refused, in another particular, to extend the somewhat similar statute of 2 & 3 Vict. c. 94; Pollock, C. B., observing, "In a case in

T. R. 536; Walwin v. Smith, 1 Salk. 177. And see The Mayor v. Davis, 6 Watts & S. 269; Taylor v. United States, 3 How. U. S. 197.

"In expounding penal statutes, it is an established rule that the construction must be strict as against the defendant, but liberal in his favor.” Gould, J., in Myers v. The State, 1 Conn. 502. "Penal statutes are construed strictly against the subject, and favorably and equitably for him.” 1 Hawk. P. C., Curw. Ed., p. 90, § 8. And see The State v. Upchurch, 9 Ired. 454, and the observations of Lord Mansfield in Rex v. Parker, 2 East P. C. 592. See also United States v. New Bedford Bridge, 1 Woodb. & M. 401.

Ante, § 112; post, § 119.

3 People v. Hulse, 3 Hill, N. Y. 309, 319; Nash v. The State, 2 Greene, Iowa, 286; 2 Hawk. P. C., Curw. Ed., p. 456, § 52.

Rawlins v. Ellis, 10 Jur. 1039.

which the liberty of the subject is concerned, we cannot go beyond the natural construction of the statute." 1

§ 118. A legislative act may require a liberal construction for particular statutes, which, on general principles, would receive a strict interpretation. Thus in Tennessee,2 Mississippi,3 Virginia, and probably in some other States, it is provided that enactments against gaming be remedially con. strued. But the acts requiring this unusual interpretation appear themselves to be taken strictly; for they are not applied to subsequent statutes making certain kinds of gaming felony, all kinds having before been misdemeanors; 5 nor to acts for the suppression of the sale of lottery tickets. Indeed the doctrine seems to be a general one, that interpretation clauses are to be construed strictly.?

§ 119. Moreover, the construction of different criminal statutes will, as we have already intimated, be more or less strict according to the different pressures of the principles controlling them. For we should remember, that the interpretation of no law, written or unwritten, is the result of any one rule alone; but of all the legal reasons applicable to the case, combined. Now we may have one principle bearing more or less strongly in a particular direction; as, for example, a statute may be more or less penal, the consequence of which is, that the more severe the punishment it directs, and the heavier the crime, the more strict must be its

Bowditch v. Balchin, 5 Exch. 378.

McGowan v. The State, 9 Yerg. 184, 197; Howlett v. The State, 5 Yerg. 144, 152.

3

* Cain v. The State, 13 Sm. & M. 456; Seal v. The State, 13 Sm. & M. 286.

* Commonwealth v. Chubb, 5 Rand. 715.

5 McGowan v. The State, 9 Yerg. 184.

• Commonwealth v. Chubb, 5 Rand. 715, 722. See Cain v. The State,

supra; Seal v. The State, supra.

7 Sedgw. Stat. Law, 59.

8 Ante, § 112, 114, 117.