and weight amongst thofe with whom we converfe; our example by being obferved may incite others to imitate us; our reputation may be profitable to our pofterity; it may be both an advantage and an honour to them to have defcended from us, and for our fake they may meet with kindness. We may obferve farther in behalf of reputation, that to efteem it seems to argue a good temper and a benevolent difpofition towards mankind. We pay refpect and civility to our fellowcreatures when we defire their approbation, and take fome pains to acquire and preferve it, and fet fome value upon it. It is a fign that we honour them, when we are willing that they should honour us. On the contrary, they who flight reputation, are ufually perfons who have no defire of excelling, no industry, no fhame, and whom it would be no credit to refemble. It must be acknowledged that there have been philofophers, wife and virtuous men, recorded in hiftory, who have profeffed a great contempt for the praife and good opinion of others. But either their meaning was, that a man fhould perfift in his duty, and defpife the cenfures of the ignorant and vicious multitude: Or by condemning the love of praise they intended to condemn an immoderate love of it, and a flavish regard to it in all our actions: Or they had, amongst many good qualities, a little pride and fingularity, they defpifed too much the bulk of mankind, and therefore defired not their approbation. Or perhaps they expected to be admired on that very account, and to find efteem by fhunning it; as indeed it often happened to them, for reputation will fly from thofe who purfue her in an improper manner, and will purfue those who seem to fly from her, if they deferve her favour: Laftly, they owned, that, although the applaufe of the populace was of no value, yet the approbation of the wife and good was a thing defirable. Thefe few perfons excepted, the reft of the defpifers of reputation have been fuch as had no reputation to keep or to lose. But, The Stoics, a very worthy fect, but fomewhat rigid and morofe, refused to give fame and glory a place amongst good things. Yet, I think, they did not flight the esteem of good men. They were remarkable for logical subtilties, and, as it happens to over-acute peafons, they fometimes made a diftinction without a difference : upon this fubject, they perhaps diftinguifhed well enough. They faid, that there were two forts of reputation; the first was to be commended of many, a thing of no value; the fecond was to be commended by wife and good men, and this was what a wife and good man might willingly accept. Another obfervation not to be omitted is, that in the facred writings a good name both during our lives and after death is reprefented as defirable, and promised as a reward. God, with great goodness and condefcenfion, makes ufe of various motives to excite our obedience, fuited to the various difpofitions of men. Of these motives to righteoufnefs the lefs excellent are those which work upon our fears, as the threatenings of prefent and future punishment; the more noble which are adapted to better tempers, are peace of mind, everlafting life, and the beauty and dignity of virtue. Of a middle nature between these two forts of motives, is the promise of temporal bleffings, a motive very well fuited to perfons who have made a moderate progrefs in goodnefs, and defire to improve yet farther. Temporal bleffings are health, length of days, the conveniencies of life, liberty, peace, the profperity of our families; and, laftly, honour, praife, reputation, which are often propofed in the Scrip-, tures tures of the Old Teftament, as a reward of well-doing, and an encourgement to it: And our Saviour declares concerning the woman who anointed him, that what he had done fhould never be forgotten. Judas Iscariot cenfured her for wafting the ointment, which, faid he, might have been fold for much, and given to the poor. Our Lord, who knew the difhonefty of the one, and good difpofition of the other, immediately took her part, and kindly defended the action: Why trouble ye the woman? She hath wrought a good work upon me. For ye have the poor always with you: But me ye have not always. Verily I fay unto you, wherefoever this gofpel fhall be preached in the whole world, there fhall alfo this, that this woman hath done, be told for a memorial of her.' Her action discovered a generous and a grateful mind; and therefore our Lord gave her a fuitable reward, a reward very acceptable to persons of fuch a temper, reputation and praise, an honourable mention from his own facred mouth, which should fpread itself far and wide, and be tranfmitted down to the latest pofterity, From these obfervations concerning praife we may conclude, that the love of it, if it be not immoderate, and leads us into no faults, is lawful; for fince this love is natural to us, fince the common intereft requires that it fhould be encouraged, and thofe nations have flourished most in which praise and honour have been judicioutly beftowed, and generally pursued; fince the poffeffion of it may prove beneficial to ourselves and to our friends, and to our pofterity, and hurtful to none; fince a defire to ftand fair in the opinion of others is a respect and civility paid to our acquaintance, to our fellow-citizens, and to human nature; Aince a contempt of reputation appears blameable, and often proceeds from very bad causes; fince the holy Scriptures condescend to comply with our, inclinations for it, and permit us to feek it, and propose it sometimes as an incitement to virtue; fince our Lord conferred it as a reward upon a grateful and a generous action, it seems to follow, that it may be ranked, if not amongst thofe things which strictly and truly deferve to be called good, yet, at leaft, amongst those things which are convenient, which may be in fome degree efteemed without any difgrace to our reaton, or injury to our religion. They therefore may be faid to have gone into extremes, who have called the love of reputation a diftemper of the foul, and a weakness which it ought entirely to shake off. They had done better, if they had reprefented the bad confequences of indulging it too far, and the neceflity of keeping it in due bounds, II. I fhall then, fecondly, endeavour to fhew, that there is an immoderate love of praife, which on many accounts we ought to avoid or restrain. The love of reputation is a paffion, and as fuch it may be carried to excefs; but, of all the paffions, it is perhaps the least apt to mislead us. A defire to be efteemed by good and worthy perfons incites us to imitate thofe whose approbation we seek. The love of riches, the love of fenfual pleasures, the love of idlenefs and of everlasting amusements, the love of arbitrary power and dominion, thefe are the inordinate affections, and thefe the objects which feduce men from their duty, and from the way to eternal happinets, and they lofe the race, whilft they stoop to gather up thefe golden apples. But we must take care that our love of reputation be discreet and moderate, free from pride, affectation, vanity, forwardness, conceit, envy, detraction, and hypocrify. 1. We must not love the praife of the world too much, because we may not be able to acquire it. It is one of the temporal rewards of virtue; it is therefore, like other recompenfes of this kind, not univerfally bestowed upon thofe who deferve it; it is ufually, but but not conftantly, given to the righteous; it naturally refults from a laudable behaviour, but it may by interpofing causes be stopped and prevented. Reputation is faid to accompany goodnefs, as its thadow; but the day may be overcast, and the fhadow may dif appear. Whatfover is fo far precarious that after all our endeavours we may never obtain it, fhould not be permitted to poffefs the best place in our heart. Now reputation is to be ranked amongst these precarious things: With many virtues we may live and die almoft unknown to the world. We fhould therefore fet no high value upon the esteem of men, we fhould be contented if they neglect us, we should bear without uneafinefs thofe flights which our betters in all ages have experienced. We should remember that thofe good things alone are to be greatly prized, and deserve our fincerest affection, which if we diligently feek, we fhall certainly find, and which we can never lofe, except by our own perverfenefs and misbehaviour. Such are, for inftance; the favour of God, and the approbation of our own confciente. As they are infinitely fuperior to reputation, fo they offer themselves to every one, and may be eternally poffeled by those who enjoy them: They lie out of the reach of envy and malice, of time and the world. 2. We should not be overfond of praise, because we may fuffer in our reputation undefervedly, and ought to bear it patiently. It is indeed scarcely poffible, that an honest and worthy perfon fhould be generally disliked; but his good qualities may be known and efteemed by only a few friends, which is not what we commonly call reputation, whilft he may be expofed to flander, mifreprefented by the envious, and ignorant, the credulous, the injudicious, the ambitious, the selfish, and the cenforious. 3. Praife is often fo ill beftowed, that even upon this account, it is lefs valuable than it would elfe be. Prife or 1 blame would lefs please or displease us, if we gave ourselves leave and leifure to confider what fort of judges they often are, whofe good opinion we fo paffionately defire, and what fort of perfons have their etteem, and how ufual it is to pay more regard to noife than to fenfe, to fancy than to judgment, to vivacity than to reafon, to boldness than to modefty, and to fatyrical and calumniating wit, than to candour and good-nature. 4. Add to this, that it is almost impoflible to enjoy reputation in its full extent. He poffeffes a great reputation, who is known to many, and efteemed by all to whom he is known. Now, this is an advantage fo uncommon, that to expect it is folly: And yet this is what every person who is greedy of honour will defire; but he may know, if he takes the pains to inform himself about it, that, if there are many who fpeak well of him, there are thofe who defpife or cenfare him; and as they who covet applaufe, have a quick fenfe and refentment of calumny or contempt, the reproaches even of a few may give him an uneafinefs fuperior to the fatisfaction which he finds in the approbation of his friends and well-wishers. 5. Reputation may be hurtful to those who poffefs it. In bad times, and when they who are in high ftations are greatly corrupted, and wicked men bear rule, it is a dangerous thing to be beloved by the public, and to deferve it, and history will inform us of not a few, who have fuffered upon that account. Even in happier ages, and better ordered governments, he who remarkably excels in any thing that is commendable, muft expect as much envy as praise. Now, envy, hatred, malice are more active than approbation and efteem; and the most inconfiderable perfon, who could do us no fervice, if he were difpofed to affift us, may be able to do us a mischief. We may be injured and hurt by fpiteful adverfaries, whilft they who favour us, give us nothing befides befides good words and good wilhes, and ftand quietly by, and fay that it is pity, and that we deferve better ufage. 6. We should not be too fond of reputation, because we may not only be difappointed and little esteemed, but God may permit it in very kindnefs to us, and for our benefit, either to chastife us for fome faults which we have committed, and to mortify in us pride and vanity, or to keep from us a reward which would spoil our best difpofitions. There have been perfons, who have fought reputation by laudable actions, who have obtained it, and by poffefling it have loft in a great measure those commendable qualities to which they owed it, in the place of which have fucceeded intolerable pride, conceit, and infolence, till at laft they have outlived both their virtue and their character. 7. If, by an exceflive fondness of reputation, we make it the principle and the end of our actions, it will certainly mislead us, and probably give us much uneafinefs. Such a perfon, when he behaves himfelf well, does it only that he may be praised. He acts therefore, upon mean and narrow views, without due regard to the will and approbation of God, or to the benefit of mankind, or to the decency of virtue, or to his own improvement, and future happiness. He who is guided by no better motives, will abstain from thofe good actions which conduce not to his reputation, or may hurt it. There are duties, which fometimes through the perverfeness or ignorance of the public are out of fashion, and produce contempt or hatred. He who is greedy of applaufe, will often neglect fuch duties, and fall into reputable vices; he will never have the courage, and the greatnefs of mind to purfue what is right through good report and through evil report. This was the cafe in the time of our Saviour. Many there were who believed on him, but, because of the VOL. XI. Pharifees, they did not confefs him, left they fhould be put out of the fynagogue; for they loved the praife of men, more than the praise of God, Others there were, on whom this paffion had ftill a worse effect, whofe deplorable condition our Lord reprefents, and tells them the cause of it in thefe words: I know you, that ye have not the love of God in you. How can ye believe, who receive honour one of another, and feek not the honour that cometh from God only? Therefore he declares the lofs of credit in a good caufe to be great gain : 'Bleffed are ye, when men fhall revile you, and thall fay all manner of evil against you falfely, for my fake. Rejoice, and be exceeding glad, for great is your reward in heaven, for fo perfecuted they the prophets, which were before you.' An exceffive defire of praife, joined, as it often is, to a fear of ridicule, or to falle notions of honour, hath done inconceivable mischief in the world. It hath kept multitudes from receiving or profefling Chriftianity, where other religions prevailed. It hath stirred up the ambitious vanity of Princes and Generals to wage unjust wars, and to spread ruin and defolation far and wide; nor have there been wanting fools or flatterers to call it valour and heroifm, though it deferves no more applaufe than a peftilence, a famine, a fire, an inundation, and an earthquake. It hath forced many perfons to engage in duels, who, though they knew that it was not confiftent with Christianity, and that a thousand bad confequences attended it, yet were weak enough to facrifice all to the fenfelefs tyrant called honour. It hath been the caufe why many a young perfon hath pretended to be worse than he really was, hath talked flightly of religion, hath grown negligent of his duty, and fo hath made an unhappy progrefs in all profanenefs and immorality, because he fell into bad company, and took his notions of politenefs from them, and feared their con tempt, and was defirous to pafs, with them, for a man of wit and tafte, and freedom of thought. He who hath his reputation principally in view, lies often under temptations to play the hypocrite, and to pretend that he poffeffes every excellence by which he fees others obtain honour. By this vanity he may be induced to undertake things for which he hath no abilities, and to expose himself to inconveniencies, to Thame and contempt. He indulges a paffion which may deftroy his peace and quiet, and perhaps treafureth up to himself difappointment and uneafinefs. Praife is to him food and raiment, and for it he muft rely upon the charity of others. He puts it in the power of a few fpiteful or injudicious perfons to deprive him of fatisfaction, and then may have leifure to repent that he did not fet his heart upon better things. A violent defire to be obferved and commended will fhew itfelf in his difcourfe and behaviour, and break out in little follies and indecencies, which others will not be inclined to overlook and excuse. He who loves flattery muft be very fortunate if he finds one to counsel him, and very poor if he finds not one to delude him. He will confine his favours to his flatterers, that is, to thofe who may be fecret enemies, but cannot be true friends to him; he will fhun and fear and diflike thofe from whom he might receive the moft benefit; fincerity and plain dealing will be unacceptable to him, reproof will offend him, and good advice will be thrown away upon him. He will think and fpeak ill of those who take no notice of him, or who are his equals or fuperiors in ufeful qualities, or in reputation. The love of praife, when it is difcreet and moderate, is always attended with emulation, and a ftrong defire of exceling; and, fo long as we can flop here, there is no harm done to ourfelves or others; but emulation eafily and infenfibly degenerates into envy and cenforioufnels. The world, with all its faults, is feldom fo bad as to applaud vices; and St. Paul exhorts Chriftians to follow not only whatfoever things are right, but whatfoever things are of good report; the love of reputation, therefore, if it be not joined to a bad difpofition, will fcarcely of itself lead us to immoral actions. Yet the things which the world ufually admires and praises moft, are not the things in their own nature the most valuable; they are thofe bright abilities, and fair endowments, which are exercifed about temporal objects, which relate to the prefent life, and terminate with it. Commendable as they are, they are not the one thing needful, they have no immediate connection with heaven and happiness; it is well if they be no impediment in the way to it. On the contrary, Chriftian virtues are often of a more filent, modeft, and retired nature. God and good angels approve them, but the bufy world overlooks them. So that he who principally affects popular approbation, runs fome danger of living and dying well known to others, and little known to himfelf, ignorant of the ftate of his foul, and forgetful of the account which he has to render up to God. From the foregoing remarks we may make this conclufion, that reputation may be numbered amongst the things which are defirable and advantageous. We may ufe all lawful means to acquite it, and to fecure its continuance; and, if we be careful and induftrious in ufing the proper means, we have commonly a fair profpect of fucceeding. The caprice of the great and powerful cannot deprive us of this reward at leaft. They can neither give it, nor take it away; and it is very well for the world that they cannot. love of reputation, when directed by reafon, is allowable; but reason must govern, and not be governed. The Our |