testimony of Mr. Read who stated that judge Chase observed that he had understood that a most seditious printer lived in Wilmington, unrestrained by any principle of virtue and regardless of social order. This part of his testimoney is corroborated by the testimony of judge Bedford, and the respondent himself admits that he mentioned the title of the paper. Did the judge allow the printer the benefit of those principles which his counsel now claim for him? No sir, he undertook to pronounce the man guilty without a hearing, and he surely travelled beyond the line of his duty. The judge observes in his answer that Callender be fore he undertook to libel Mr. Adams ought to have had his proofs, and when he undertook to denounce the printer in Delaware, he ought to have been in possession of such information as would justify him in what he did. How did the event justify him? After reiring to their room and searching the file of papers which the judge had caused to be procured, the grand jury could find nothing but a piece about judge Chafe himself, and which the judge declared correctly, was not indictable in that court. I will proceed to make a few remarks on the laft article. The impropriety of the conduct of the judge in this cafe, muft have ftruck the mind of every member of the court. I believe all of them difapprove of political charges. It certainly has been the practice of the judges in the United States, to deliver political charges to grand juries, and to level their artillery upon the measures of the government. But is that to justify a judge in becoming a political preacher? It is indubitably of the utmost importance that courts of juftice fhould be kept pure. Party spirit should never be fuffered to enter their walls. Provided laws are administered with justice and impartiality to every perfon, we may always look up to courts of justice for protection. So long as the courts and juries remain pure and uncorrupted, we may be confident of fafety, if innocent; but when judges undertake to evert thofe facred places into political huftings, they muft lofe their respect in the eyes of the people, and business cannot be confided in them with confidence. Will not the juries adopt political prejudices and carry them home with them, and decide more from political parties than justice. Juftice fhould be administered between man and man without any diftinction, and this conduct of the refpondent goes to prevent it. Although books have been produced, and a number of high authorities cited, to justify the delivery of political charges, I must be allowed to enter my proteft against them; but no inftance has been cited where a judge has, like the refpondent, exclaimed against the acts of the government. When we look at the charge which has been offered in evidence by him, we find him cenfuring one of the most important acts of the government. I allude to the repeal of the judiciary fyftem; in this he cenfured every branch of the government. I am not about to difpute the right of judge Chafe in his individual capacity, to exercise his talents to prevent any measure from being adopted. But that right cannot apply to the cafe before the court. He cannot be justified in delivering from the bench, denunciations against both the measures of the United States and the state in which he held the court. Nor did he stop there. He went on to declaim against citizens of the state, for being in favor of measures which he deemed improper. Every member of this court must know that state jealoufies ftill exist, and it ought to be the anxious care of every man, to fay or do nothing calculated to excite jealoufies between the United States and any individual state. Was it a part of the duty of the judge, to preach up against the acts of the legiflature of Maryland? Affuredly not. He had no right to thunder anathemas against the measures of any state. I have now gone through the articles of impeachment and will close my obfervations with one remark. From a view of the conftitution, it must appear that this mode of profecution was in ftituted more to reftore the purity of the office than to punish the officer. In this point of view I hope this court will confider it, and by their decifion will prevent the pure fountains of juftice from being polluted by the hands of impure men. I trust that they will fay that the refpondent is guilty as charged. An acquital will be a juftification of his conduct, and will be a declaration that he acted with good behaviour. With a fervent with that the Supreme Ruler of all things, will fo govern the decifion of this cafe that it may punith guilt and protect innocence; I cheerfully fubmit the cafe to the confideration of this honorable AFTER a long and able, though I fear a tedious difcuffion of this fubject, it again becomes my duty to addrefs yu. I feel perfectly inadequate to the talk of clofing this important debate, on account of a fevere indifpofition which I labor under, but I am aided by the ftrong and deep intereft which I take in the decifion of this cafe. It is an interest which I am not ashamed to avow, Strange would be my compofition, if a profecution inftituted at my inftigation, and conducted throughout by me, fhould be a fubject of difficulty or regret to me. While I fould have been much rejoiced at the acquittal of the judge, provided he had been found innocent, the next pleafure which I feel is to bring the culprit who has violated the laws of his country, to fignal and condign punishment. The able manner in which this profe cution has been supported by my worthy colleagues and right excellent friends, leaves me but a barren field to glean on. I will however attempt to prefent to the court as condenfed a view of the subject as I am capable of, endeavoring as much as poflible to avoid the ground which my friends have zrod. If guilty of a repetition of their arguments, I trust I fhall be pardoned, in confequence of my being abfent during a part of the trial. Among the causes of regret which I experience from being forced by indifpofition to be abfent, the not being prefent when the eloquent gentleman who opened the defence (Mr. Hopkinfon) fpoke is not the least. I trust in God, that merit will never be difregarded, no matter in whofe defence it is employed. Report fpeaks loudly in his praife, and I am willing to credit report and to confirm it as far as lies in my power. In the first inftance I must be permitted to fay a few words on the doctrine of impeachment. I have heard fome obfervations on that fubject fo inconfiitent with reason, and fo much at war with themselves, that were I to pass them over in filence, they would meet the fate which they merit. It has been contended, that a civil officer is not impeachable unless the offence be an indtable one. If this be correct, for what purpose was the trial by impeachment inftituted ?-The Conftitution would have declared that all civil officers might be removed from office upon indictment. This would have faved us all the trouble, anxiety and expence which is experienced in the trial of this cafe. In addition to the cafes cited by my worthy friend (Mr. Nicholfon) who spoke yesterday, and whofe arguments on this fubject were unanfwerable, permit me to adduce a few other illustrations. The Prefident of the United States is vefted by the conflitution with a qualified negative on all laws. Suppofe he should ufe this power in all questions, would it not be an abuse of the power entrufted to him? It would certainly be a grofs abufe of that power, which is entrusted to him to be exercifed only on extraordinary occafions, and under a high refponfibility, and would ren der him liable to impeachment. The prefident has the power of keeping in his poffeffion all laws which are prefented to him for his fignature, for ten days. Suppofe at a felhon fimilar to 1 the prefent which muft expire on the fourth of March, and at which the greater part of the laws are paffed within the last ten days of the feffion, he should return the laws to congrefs on the third of March, within twenty minutes of its diffolution, with his objections in writing to each of them? What would be the confequence? The yeas and nays must be called on each queftion in order to affertain, whether there was a conftitutional majority, and before they could be taken the houfe of reprefentatives must be diffolved, and the country left one year without the neceffary laws. Is there a man in existence who would not declare, that this was one of the moft grofs abufes of power an officer could be guilty of? and yet according to the doctrine of the counfel for the refpondent, the prefident would not be liable to impeachment, and fo long therefore as an officer keeps within the law, he may go to the tether of the conftitution.You, Mr. Prefident, in conjunction with the chief justice, the fecretaries of state and the treafury, and the attorney general of the United States, as commiffioners of the finking fund, have at your difpofal more than eight millions of dollars of the United States for the payment of their debt. Suppofe you were to apply it to your own ufe? This would not be an indictable offence, and yet I trust it would be an impeachable one. But the learned counsel who clofed the defence (Mr. Harper) knowing that this ground was trembling under his feet, and that the arguments of his colleagues could not be fupported, has abandoned it, but has declared, that in order to fupport an impeachment it must be an offence against fome pofitive law. Here we agree. The cafes which I have put are offences against that law which orders perfons to exercise power with found discretion. It is a miferable quibbie to cortend that the refpondent is not impeachable because there is no known law prohibiting what he has done. We contend that the oath of office of the refpondent to execute his high judicial functions with impartiality and without refpect to perfons, has been violated, and therefore he has violated the law which provides for taking the oath. And this pofition I will not furrender to our adverfaries. We charge the refpondent with having been guilty of mifdemeanors in office; that he has behaved improperly and partially, and this the evidence proved beyond the poffibility of a doubt. I fhall now proceed to make a few remarks on the first article, and here I must reiterate my regret at not having heard the gentleman who opened the defence, and who confined his obfervations to this article, and whose argument I withed much to have heard. I was however confoled by the conclufive statement of my friend who spoke yefterday on this article (Mr. Nichoifon.) The obfervations of the counfel, which I have heard on this article, are at variance with themselves and with each other. One gentleman (Mr. Martin) ftated, that no offence was committed by the refpondent, and referred to authorities in fupport of his pofition.The gentleman from South Carolina, (Mr. Harper) admitted, that an of fence was committed, but that the refpondent had a contrite heart and repented, and therefore this court ought in their mercy to forgive him. Mr. Harper. The gentleman has entirely mistaken me, I faid no fuch thing. I faid that even fuppofing an offence to have been committed, the refpondent made ample atonement for it, by his conduct on the fecond day of the trial of Fries. The Prefident. You had better fufpend your explanations until the gentleman finishes. Mr. Randolph. The words which I took down and which were used by the gentleman, were these, "that the error in reducing his opinion to writing, was corrected, the paper withdrawn, and the counfel entreated to go on in their own way until the cup of humiliation was exhausted to the demned to death without a trial. If guilty, he was tried without even the forms of law, and the prefident was obliged to fign his pardon. I hope this court will not fanction fuch conduct. The conduct of the counsel for Fries, merits an abler eulogium than is in my power to make. My gratitude as an American citizen and a friend of liberty, will never cease to flow to them, for they stood up against arbitrary conduct and oppreffion. very dregs." This plainly evinces, that the court conceived (as well as the counsel) that they had acted improperly. It is not mercy which the refpondent has demanded, nor is he entitled to it: he must have juftice, and to ufe the expreffion of the gentleman not now in his feat, (Mr. Key) fheer juf tice. I will ask if the conduct of the refpondent was correct on the first day, whence this recantation on the second day? Is any man fit to prefide in a court of juftice who by his conduct The learned attorney general of Mahad been obliged to make atonement by ryland obferved, that he trufted that proftrating and degrading his office at the hand of a lawyer might never be the feet of an advocate? Was that the polluted by any thing worfe than the character proper to difpenfe juftice? I opinion which Mr. Lewis refused to apprehend not. The man who is o- read. I hope that the hand of an adbliged to make atonement for his con- vocate will always fhrink from the duct, is not the man who is fit to pre- touch of judicial influence and corrup fide in the tribunals of juftice. I go tion. Let us now go to the cafe of farther. John Fries was either an in- Callender, and first with respect to the nocent man and ought to have been ac- overruling the objections of Baffet the quitted, or he was a traitor to his coun- juror. Here I must be permitted try, and ought to have expiated on the to obferve that the law which has gibbet the crime which he had com- been adduced refpecting jurors, has mitted. What then must have been been drawn either from decifions the conduct of the refpondent, which in civil cafes, or decifions in England induced the executive to pardon a moft notorious offender, and one to whom mercy ought not to have been bestowed, or to reduce an innocent man to the risk of death without a trial? I have understood that Fries has been reprefented by the gentleman who opened the defence, as not ignorant, friendlefs or innocent. Not ignorant or friendless faid the gentleman, becaufe he undertook to fet up his opinion in oppofition to that of congrefs, and was able to raise so many friends as to prevent the execution of a law. I am afraid that if this mode of reafoning were adopted, that the riotous mob under lord George Gordon, in 1780, would be confidered as the most learned and enlightened men of the eighteenth century, for they even undertook to expound a doctrine which arofe in the church, and which it was the peculiar province of the clergy to explain. If John Fries was innocent, then an innocent man has been con before the revolution. From StarChamber decifions, paffed in hard and unconftitutional times. These cases are now cited in fupport of the conduct of the refpondent, although he would not fuffer cafes decided in England previous to the revolution, to be cited in favor of the innocent Fries. Were these decifions to have any influence in the decifion of this cafe? I trust not fr. Not only Star Chamber decifions have been cited, but the authority of chief juftice Keelynge. Who this Sir John Keelynge was, will appear from a reference to the 4th volume of Hatfel's precedents. We find in that book, that upon complaint being made of innovations in the right of trial by jury, that a committee was appointed to inveftigate the conduct of chief justice Keelynge. This then is the authority on which the counfel for the refpond. ent rely for the vindication of their client. I do believe that the refpondcat (who has been declared to be a patriot of feventy-fix) will confent to be juftified by fuch an example. I muft believe fir, that the counfel for the refpondent in their geal to acquit him, have cited as law, what they knew not to be law. When I fee gentlemen of their talents and legal knowledge, reforting to the authority of Keelynge, I think it a conclufive argument against their client, and a full refutation of the cafes cited by the attorney general of Maryland. I must be obliged to folicit the indulgence of the court, for the imperfect view of the fubject which I fhall be compelled to take, as I have been fo unfortunate as to miflay my notes, and fhall I fear be unable to lay a correct statement of the voluminous body of report before this court. I fhall now proceed to the cafe of Baffet. The counfel have told us that John Baffet, did not object to ferving on the jury, but only fuggefted a fcruple of delicacy which it was the duty of the judge to overrule. What ever might have been the opinion of the judge, Mr. Baffet with all the ftrength of political prejudice which he fo evidently manifefted at this bar, did not think it perfectly correct and proper that he should ferve on the jury. The refpondent is charged with overruling the objection of Baffet to ferve on the jury. What is an objection? A man comes forward and deelares that he did not wish to ferve on the jury, for certain reafons. This is not a pofitive denial to ferve, but it certainly was an objection, and fuch an objection was overruled in the cafe of Callender; and to support this deeifion, we are refered to the authority of chief justice Keelynge, and Star Chamber authorities. This is the ftrongeft argument against the conduct of the refpondent. With refpect to the rejection of col. Taylor's teftimony, I fhall bottom myfelf upon the admiflions of the attorney general of Maryland, and his inability to find in all his legal researches, but one folitary cafe, which was deemed juftificatory of the refpondent, and that a late cafe in M Nally, which is not the best authority. That authority declares that although the court poffeffed the right to oblige counfel to declare what they intended to prove by their witneffes, yet it was not the practice to do it. What was faid by the chief justice of the United States, on whofe teftimony and that of Robertfon's I rely? He faid that he never knew a fimilar cafe to occur as the one in which the teftimony of col. Taylor was rejected. He felt extreme pain in being obliged to fpeak of the conduct of a brother judge. The refpondent was then the perfon who raifed the question in the cafe of col. Taylor's teftimony, which was novel in Virginia, and had never been witnessed by the chief justice, who is a man infinitely fuperior to the refpondent in every point of view. Upon the fubject of the firft fpecification in the fourth article, the learned attorney general of Maryland, has cited McNally to fhew that the court have a right to compel counsel to reduce their queftions to writing; but in reply to this, I bottom myfelf upon the teftimony of judge Marshall, who stated that where a queftion arofe on the question itself, it was customary for the court to have it reduced to writing in order to decide with more accurateness, but that he had never known it done on any other occafion. This testimony establishes beyond a doubt, that judge Chafe acted in a manner totally novel to the judges of the United States. On the fubject of the manner which the judge conducted himself towards the counfel, I only wish to rely on the tef timony of his own witneffes. While I do not wifh to rely on the testimony of the counsel for Callender, i hope it will not be confidered as meaning the fmalleft flight to them, God forbid, that I fhould fay any thing which would in the smallest degree tend to invalidate their teftimony, but they may be confidered as parties concerned, and it may be faid they were influenced by perfonal feelings; on this ground therefore, I do not mean to rely on their teftimony. What did the chief justice fay? He faid but little, but what did |