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RIGHTS OF FYZOOLA KHÂN UNDER THE TREATY OF
1. That, notwithstanding the culpable and criminal reluctance of the President, Hastings, hereinbefore recited, a treaty of peace and friendship between the Vizier Sujah ul Dowlah and the Nabob Fyzoola Khân was finally signed and sealed on the 7th October, 1774, at a place called Lall-Dang, in the presence and with the attestation of the British commander-in-chief, Colonel Alexander Champion aforesaid ; and that for the said treaty the Nabob Fyzoola Khân agreed to pay, and did actually pay, the valuable consideration of half his treasure, to the amount of fifteen lacs of rupees, or 150,0001. sterling, and upwards.
II. That by the said treaty the Nabob Fyzoola Khân was established in the quiet possession of Rampoor, Shahabad, and “some other districts dependent thereon,” subject to certain conditions, of which the more important were as follow.
“That Fyzoola Khân should retain in his service five thousand troops, and not a single man more.
That, with whomsoever the Vizier should make war, Fyzoola Khân should send two or three thousand men, according to his ability, to join the forces of the Vizier.
“And that, if the Vizier should march in person, Fyzoola Khân should himself accompany him with his troops."
III. That from the terms of the treaty above recited it doth plainly, positively, and indisputably appear that the Nabob Fyzoola Khân, in case of war, was not bound to furnish more than three thousand men under any construction, unless the Vizier should
march in person.
IV. That the Nabob Fyzoola Khân was not positively bound to furnish so many as three thousand men, but an indefinite number, not more than three and not less than two thousand; that of the precise number within such limitations the ability of Fyzoola Khân, and not the discretion of the Vizier, was to be the standard ; and that such ability could only mean that which was equitably consistent not only with the external defence of his jaghire, but with the internal good management thereof, both as to its police and revenue.
V. That, even in case the Vizier should march in person, it might be reasonably doubted whether the personal service of the Nabob Fyzoola Khân “with his troops” must be understood to be with all his troops, or only with the number before stipulated, not more than three and not less than two thousand men; and that the latter is the interpretation finally adopted by Warren Hastings aforesaid, and the Council of Bengal, who, in a letter to the Court of Directors, dated April 5th, 1783, represent the clauses of the treaty relative to the stipulated aid as meaning simply that Fyzoola Khân “ should send two or three thousand men to join the Vizier's forces, or attend in person in case it should be requisite."
VI. That from the aforesaid terms of the treaty it doth not specifically appear of what the stipulated aid
should consist, whether of horse or foot, or in what proportion of both ; but that it is the recorded opinion, maturely formed by the said Hastings and his Council, in January, 1783, that even “a single horseman included in the aid which Fyzoola Khân might furnish would prove a literal compliance with the stipulation."
VII. That, in the event of any doubt fairly arising from the terms of the treaty, the Nabob Fyzoola Khân, in consideration of his hereditary right to the whole country, and the price by him actually paid for the said treaty, was in equity entitled to the most favorable construction.
VIII. That, from the attestation of Colonel Champion aforesaid, the government of Calcutta acquired the same right to interpose with the Vizier for the protection of the Nabob Fyzoola Khân as they, the said government, had before claimed from a similar attestation of Sir Robert Barker to assist the Vizier in extirpating the whole nation of the said Fyzoola Khân, - more especially as in the case of Sir Robert Barker it was contrary to the remonstrances of the then administration, and the furthest from the intentions of the said Barker himself, that his attestation should involve the Company, but the attestation of Colonel Champion was authorized by all the powers of the government, as a “sanction” intended “ to add validity” to the treaty; that they, the said government, and in particular the said Warren Hastings, as the first executive member of the same, were bound by the ties of natural justice duly to exercise the aforesaid right, if need were ; and that their duty so to interfere was more particularly enforced by the spirit of the censures passed both by the Directors and Proprietors in the Rohilla war, and the satisfaction expressed by the Directors“ in the honorable end put to that war."
GUARANTY OF THE TREATY OF LALL-DANG.
I. That during the life of the Vizier Sujah ul Dowlah, and for some time after his death, under his son and successor, Asoph ul Dowlah, the Nabob Fyzoola Khân did remain without disturbance or molestation; that he did all the while imagine his treaty to be under the sanction of the Company, from Colo nel Champion's affixing his signature thereto as a witness, “which signature, as he [Fyzoola Khân) supposed,” rendered the Company the arbitrators between the Vizier and himself, in case of disputes ; and that, being “a man of sense, but extreme pusillanimity, a good farmer, fond of wealth, not possessed of the passion of ambition,” he did peaceably apply himself to “improve the state of his country, and did, by his own prudence and attention, increase the revenues thereof beyond the amount specified in Sujah ul Dowlal's grant.”
II. That in the year 1777, and in the beginning of the year 1778, being "alarmed at the young Vizier's resumption of a number of jaghires granted by his father to different persons, and the injustice and oppression of his conduct in general," and having now learned (from whom does not appear, but probably from some person supposed of competent authority) that Colonel Champion formerly witnessed the treaty as a private person, the Nabob Fyzoola Khân did make frequent and urgent solicitations to Nathaniel Middleton, Esquire, then Resident at Oude, and to Warren Hastings aforesaid, then Governor-General of Bengal," for a renovation of his [the Nabob Fyzoola Khân’s] treaty with the late Vizier, and the guaranty of the Company,” or for a “ separate agreement with the Company for his defence”: considering them, the Company, as “the only power in which he had confidence, and to which he could look up for protection.”
III. That the said Resident Middleton, and the said Governor-General Hastings, did not, as they were in duty bound to do, endeavor to allay the apprehensions of the Nabob Fyzoola Khân by assuring him of his safety under the sanction of Colonel Champion's attestation aforesaid, but by their criminal neglect, if not by positive expressions, (as there is just ground from their subsequent language and conduct to believe, they, the said Middleton and the said Hastings, did at least keep alive and confirm (whoever may have originally suggested) the said apprehension; and that such neglect alone was the more highly culpable in the said Hastings, inasmuch as he, the said Hastings, in conjunction with other members of the Select Committee of the then Presidency of Bengal, did, on the 17th of September, 1774, write to Colonel Champion aforesaid, publicly authorizing him, the said Colonel Champion, to join his sanction to the accommodations agreed on between the Vizier Sujah ul Dowlah and the Nabob Fyzoola Khân, to add to their validity, - and on the 6th of October following did again write to the said Colonel Champion, more ex