The French armament lay ready for sea, in as good a state of equipment as the resources possessed by the enemy could put it. The inattention of a few hours might enable this foe, rendered almost desperate by calamity, to escape from the state of durance in which he was held, and effect considerable mischief on some vulnerable territory belonging to the allies, and friends of Britain, before sufficient discovery could be made of his route to render pursuit politic, or effectual. The unremitting attention of Sir John operated very successfully to the prevention of any such disaster, and the British commerce was consequently extended over the face of the whole Mediterranean, without experiencing any other interruption than some few casual depredations committed on vessels entirely, or at most, nearly defenceless, which the French corsairs, equipped from their petty ports, were fortunate enough to fall in with. The French Directory having, by insinuations, by threats, and other artifices of terror or persuasion, contrived, towards the end of the year 1796, to detach the Court of Spain from the alliance of Great Britain; the situation of the fleet in that quarter, under the orders of Sir John, was suddenly rendered extremely critical. Though the state of the Toulon squadron was insufficient to create any disquiet in his mind; yet the fleet at Cadiz alone, in the most perfect condition for service, more than doubled the force he commanded. The political situation of his country, at that time, rendered the greatest exertions necessary. A formidable combination was raised against her, and the fleets of her opponents, Holland, France, and Spain, had they all been permitted to unite, would have composed an immense armament, consisting of nearly one hundred Ships of the line. The internal commotions which had for some time pervaded Ireland, appeared to afford these confederated foes the greatest hopes of success, provided it were possible for them to put on shore any body of regular troops sufficiently numerous to countenance the rebellious insurgents in their open avowal Wol. IV.

F

of that treason, which owing to the insidious representations. of those among their own countrymen who possessed most influence, and were considered as the leaders of their party, had long been cherished in their bosoms. At this period it had attained an height truly formidable and alarming.

An attempt was made by France, immediately after Spain became an ally to the cause of republicanism, to carry this project into execution; and though it had completely failed, there was little reason to expect that the want of success on that occasion would so far intimidate the enemy as to prevent a repetition of it. Regarding therefore the general posture of public affairs, it must appear evident, that very urgent necessity peremptorily demanded the immediate execution. of some grand and decisive measure, which might, by its consequential success, contribute to dispel that tremendous cloud which appeared on the point of bursting over her. Of this situation, together with all the circumstances which led to it, Sir John was perfectly well acquainted but very little relief could be expected, highly as the abilities of its Commander might be estimated, from a squadron consisting often Ships of the line, which, putting the French force at Toulon totally out of the question, had to contend with an enemy of three times its own force.

This disparity of numbers was in some degree reduced by the arrival of Rear-Admiral Parker from England, who formed a junction with Sir John on the sixth of February. Still, however, his force was so very unequal to that of the enemy, that nothing but the existing case could have warranted the attack, nor any thing short of the greatest exertions in regard to professional knowledge and gallantry which the human mind is perhaps capable of making, could have rendered its event successful. Independent of that superiority which the enemy possessed in respect to force, they had the additional satisfaction of being so near to their own ports, that even in case of discomfiture, they could retire without dreading the conse

quences of pursuit, and moor in safety under the cannon of their own fortresses in a less space of time than would be required to refit the rigging of a frigate, after an hour's contest with a vessel of equal force. The magnitude of the object, a firm reliance on the intrepidity, as well as activity of those whom he commanded, and a proper confidence in his own judgment, contributed to make the British Admiral despise all the surrounding difficulties, and determined him to attempt a new mode of attack which he had long arranged in his own mind as practicable, should fortune ever favour him with an opportunity of carrying it into execution. He had long entertained very sanguine hopes it would be crowned with the most brilliant success, and the instant he received the augmentation of force by the junction of Mr. now Sir William Parker, as well as became apprised of the situation of the enemy, he delayed not a moment in making known to those whom he commanded, his resolution to engage them, and the peculiar manner in which he intended to arrange his attack. The event is known to all, and the leading particulars will be best explained by the official narrative of Sir John himself.

SIR,

Vidory, in Lagos Bay, Feb. 16, The hopes of falling in with the Spanish fleet expressed in my letter to you of the thirteenth instant, were confirmed that night by our distinctly hearing the report of their signal guns, and by intelligence received from Captain Foote, of his Majesty's ship Niger, who had, with equal judgment and perseverance, kept company with them for several days on my prescribed rendezvous, which, from the strong south-east winds, I had never been able to reach; and that they were not more than three or four leagues from us. I anxiously awaited the dawn of day; when being on the starboard tack, Cape St. Vincent bearing east by north eight leagues, I had the satisfaction of seeing a number of Ships extending from southwest to south, the wind then at west by south. At forty minutes past ten, the weather being extremely hazy, La Bonne Citoyenne made the signal that the Ships were of the line, twentyfive in number, his Majesty's squadron under my command consisting of the fifteen Ships of the line named in the mar

gin*, were happily formed in the most compact order of sailing, in two lines. By carrying a press of sail, I was fortunate in getting in with the enemy's fleet at half past eleven o'clock, before it had time to connect and form a regular order of battle. Such a moment was not to be lost; and confident in the skill, valour, and discipline, of the officers and men I had the happiness to command, and judging that the honour of his Majesty's arms, and the circumstances of the war in these seas, required a considerable degree of enterprise, I felt myself justified in departing from the regular system, and passing through their fleet in a line formed with the utmost celerity, tacked and thereby separated one third from the main body, after a partial cannonade, which prevented their rejunction till the evening, and by the very great exertions of the

COMPARATIVE VIEW OF THE FORCE OF THE BTITISH AND SPANISH FLEETS.

Ships which had the good fortune to arrive up with the enemy on the larboard tack, the Ships named in the margin* were captured, and the action ceased about five o'clock in the evening. I inclose the most correct list I have been able to obtain of the Spanish fleet opposed to me, amounting to twenty-seven sail of the line, and an account of the killed and wounded in his Majesty's Ships, as well as in those taken from the enemy +. The moment the latter, almost totally dismasted, and his Majesty's Ships the Captain and Culloden are in a state to put to sea, I shall avail myself of the first favourable winds to proceed off Cape St. Vincent, in my way to Lisbon. Captain Calder, whose able assistance has greatly contributed to the public service during my command, is the bearer of this, and will more particularly describe to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty the movements of the squadron on the fourteenth, and the present state of it.—I am, &c.

Evan Nepean, Esq. &c.

J. JERVIS. In addition to those circumstances already related, there are several, scarcely less consequential ‡, which the confined

Salvador del Mundo, 112 guns; San Joseph, 112; San Nicolas, 84; San Ysidro, 74.

+ English Officers killed and wounded.

Mr. Joseph Wixon, Master's Mate, wounded; Captain Major William Nor ris, Marines, killed; Mr. James Godench, Midshipman, killed; Commodore Nelson bruised, but not obliged to quit the deck.

Excellent Mr. Peffers, Boatswain, killed.

Culloden-Mr. G. A. Livingstone, Lieutenant of Marines, killed; Mr. Wm. Balfour, Midshipman, wounded.

Total killed and wounded on board the Spanish Ships taken by the Squadron under Sir John Jervis.

Killed, 261.-Wounded, 342.-Total, 603.

Among the killed is the General Don Francisco Xuvier Winthuysen Chef d'Escadre.

The following remarks on this splendid victory are furnished by an ano. nymous hand:

"If a daring spirit of enterprize ever manifested itself in any character, it surely never shone more conspicuous, than in the unparalleled attack made by / Admiral Sir John Jervis on the Spanish fleet on the fourteenth of February. What is, however, if possible, still more worthy admiration, is the judicious close of that glorious action, which evinces the gallant Admiral's judgment to be equal to his valour: for had the signal to bring to, been delayed even five minutes longer, our trophies must not only have remained very insecure, but possibly, with the Captain man of war, might have fallen into the hands of the ene my. Owing to the situation of both the fleets, the British Ships could not have formed without abandoning the prizes, and running to leeward, the enemy at this time having at least eighteen or nineteen Ships that had not suffered in the slightest degree by the action. At this period the Captain was lying a per