CONTAINING

Will.
II. DISSERTATION CONCERNING THE END

FOR WHICH GOD CREATED

WORLD.
III. DISSERTATION ON THE NATURE OF

True VIRTUE.

1. INQUIRY INTO THE FREEDOM OF THE IV. DOCTRINE OF Original Sin DEFENDED.

V. MISCELLANEOUS OBSERVATIONS CON-

CERNING THE DIVINE DECREES IN
GENERAL AND ELECTION IN

TICULAR.
VI. REMARKS ON EFFICACIOUS GRACE.
VII. OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING FAITH.

THE

PAR-

NEW-YORK:
LEAVITT, TROW & co., 194 BROADWAY.

LONDON :
WILEY & PUTNAM.

MDCCCXLIV.

8

SECT. 1. God's moral Excellency necessary, yet virtuous and praiseworthy

CONTENTS OF VOLUME II.

1. A CAREFUL AND STRICT INQUIRY INTO THE PREVAILING NO-

TIONS OF THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL.

PAGE

PART 1. Wherein are explained and stated various terms and things belong-

ing to the subject of the ensuing Discourse

1

Secr. 1. Concerning the Nature of the Will

ib.

11. Concerning the Determination of the Will

3

III. Concerning the meaning of the terms, Necessity, Impossibility, Inability,

&c., and of Contingence

1v. Of the distinction of natural and moral Necessity, and Inability

13

Concerning the notion of Liberty, and of moral Agency,

17

| PART 11. Wherein it is considered, whether there is or can be any such sort of

Freedom of Will, as that wherein Arminians place the essence of the Lib-

erty of all Moral Agents; and whether any such thing ever was or can be

conceived of

20

SECT. I. Showing the manifest inconsistence of the Arminian notion of Liberty

of Will

, consisting in the Will's self-determining Power

ib.

11. Several supposed ways of evading the foregoing reasoning, considered 22

III. Whether

Event whatsoever, and Volition in particular, can come to

pass without a Cause of its existence

26

IV. Whether Volition can arise without a Cause, through the activity of the

nature of the soul

30

. Showing, that if the things asserted in these Evasions should be supposed

to be true, they are altogether impertinent, and cannot help the cause of

Arminian Liberty; and how, this being the state of the case, Arminian

writers are obliged to talk inconsistently.

32

VI. Concerning the Will determining in things which are perfectly indifferent

in the view of the mind

vil

. Concerning the notion of Liberty of Will, consisting in Indifference 39

VIII. Concerning the supposed Liberty of the Will, as opposite to all Necessity 45

IX. Of the Connection of the Acts of the Will with the Dictates of the Under-

X. Volition necessarily connected with the influence of Motives: with partic-

ular observations of the great inconsistence of Mr. Chubb's assertions and.

reasonings about the Freedom of the Will :

52

X1, The evidence of God's certain Foreknowledge of the Volitions of moral

61

111. God's certain Foreknowledge of the future volitions of mora, agents, in-

consistent with such a Contingence

those volitions as is without all Ne-

73

InWhether we suppose the volitions of moral Agents to be connected with

or not, yet they must be necessary in such a sense as

81

PART III. Wherein is inquired, whether any such Liberty of Will

bold be necessary to Moral Agency, Virtue and Vice, Praise and Dis-

praise&

83

86

yet truly virtuous, praiseworthy, rewardable, &c.

any

35

standing

48

cessity

any thing antecedent,

to

as Arminians

ib.