1. SETTING ASIDE TAX DEED-reimbursing claimant under tax deed for taxes, etc., paid-in what proceeding-prospective operation of the statute. The proviso to section 224 of the Revenue act, in force July 1, 1885, requiring any judgment or decree of court setting aside a tax deed, to provide that the claimant shall pay the holder of such deed all taxes, legal costs, etc., paid by such holder or his assignors, has no application to an action of ejectment against the holder of a tax title, but relates to equitable proceedings instituted for the purpose of setting aside tax deeds. It was not the purpose of the statute to change the action of ejectment into a chancery proceeding, or to confer any new or enlarged jurisdiction upon courts of law. 2. SAME-impairing vested rights. Nor was it the design, by that section of the statute, to change or affect the vested rights of others. The legislature has not the power to deprive a party of a vested right, or to say that a vested right, which is absolute and unconditional, shall only be exercised upon certain conditions imposed by itself. So where it has been adjudicated that a certain tax deed is invalid, and unavailing as a defence in an action of ejectment, no subsequent legislation can operate to impair the right of the plaintiff in the ejectment suit to the protection of that ruling. 3. FORMER ADJUDICATION-whether a bar to a subsequent suit, generally. A judgment upon the merits is an absolute bar to a subsequent action 120 9 136 426 120 9 141 315 120 9 156 384 120 9 164 105 120 9 168 612 120 169 251 |