Opinion of the Court.

These, in brief, were the facts which the evidence disclosed, and upon which the jury found the defendant guilty, and so far as is shown by the record, the verdict is fully sustained by the evidence.

It is also claimed, that the court erred in refusing defendant's instructions Nos. 9, 10, 11, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23. The purpose of instruction No. 9 was to inform the jury in regard to the law of self-defence. The court, however, gave defendant's eighth instruction, which was a full and comprehensive statement of the law on that subject, as follows;

"The court instructs the jury, that the law is: If a person is assaulted in such a way as to produce in the mind of a reasonable person a belief that he is in actual danger of losing his life, or of suffering great bodily harm, he will be justified in defending himself, although the danger be not real, but only apparent. Such a person will not be held responsible, criminally, if he acts in self-defence from real and honest. convictions as to the character of the danger, induced by reasonable evidence, although he may be mistaken as to the extent of the actual danger."

After the giving of this instruction, no useful purpose could be gained by a repetition of the same thing in a different form, and it was not error for the court to refuse other instructions which were substantially like the one given.

What has been said in regard to No. 9 also applies to Nos. 17 to 21, inclusive. They are all a mere restatement of what is contained in No. 8.

The tenth instruction refused by the court, directed the jury, that if they have any reasonable doubt as to whether defendant, at the time of the shooting, was under reasonable apprehension and honest fear that deceased intended and was about to inflict upon him great bodily harm, and that he fired the shots under that belief, and in self-defence, then the jury must acquit. The fact that a jury may entertain a reasonable doubt in regard to some particular fact required to be proved,

Opinion of the Court.

in order to convict a defendant of crime, will not, of itself, authorize an acquittal, as is implied in the instruction, but a reasonable doubt which will authorize an acquittal, is one as to the guilt of the accused on the whole evidence, and not as to any particular fact. Mullins v. The People, 110 Ill. 42; Davis v. The People, 114 id. 98.

Instruction No. 11 is liable to the same objection as No. 10. As to instruction No. 22, the record contains no evidence upon which it could be predicated, and upon this ground the court was justified in refusing it. The evidence fails to show that there was a challenge or agreement to fight a fair fight, as seems to be assumed in the instruction.

As to refused instruction No. 23, all that it contains, proper for the jury, is embraced in No. 8, and in one or two others of a similar import, and for this reason it was properly refused.

Objections, mainly of a technical character, have been urged against several of the People's instructions, but upon examination they will be found to be substantially correct. At all events, they contain nothing calculated to mislead the jury. Indeed, after a careful examination of all the instructions, we do not believe that defendant's case has been prejudiced by the ruling of the court on the instructions. the other hand, if any fault was to be found with the instructions, it would be based on the ground that they are more favorable to him than the facts of the case might warrant. Perceiving no error in the record, the judgment of the circuit court will be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

On

21-120 ILL

1. JOINT RESOLUTION of the two houses of the General Assembly-as having the force of law-diverting appropriations from their appointed purpose. Under our constitution, the style of all laws must be, “Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois, represented in the General Assembly." And no act passed shall embrace more than one subject, and that must be expressed in the title.

2. Every bill for an act must be read at large on three different days in each house, and printed before the final vote thereon, and can not become a law without the concurrence of a majority of the members elected to each house, and the vote must be taken by yeas and nays, on each bill separately, and after such passage every such bill must be signed by the Speaker of each house, and be presented to the Governor for his approval. These constitutional requirements are mandatory, and operate as limitations on the power of the legislature as to the mode in which laws shall be enacted.

3. But a joint resolution passed and adopted by both branches of the legislature, which commences, "Resolved by the Senate, the House of Representatives concurring herein, that," etc., providing for the purchase of books, etc., and has no title or enacting clause, and is not signed by the Speaker of either house, and is wanting in the other essentials to a valid enactment as prescribed in the constitution, is not a law of the State, neither has it the force and effect of a law.

4. The legislature is prohibited by the constitution from diverting to other uses, by joint resolution, appropriations made by law for specified purposes. Legislative appropriations for one purpose, or for two specific purposes, can not be applied to any other purpose whatever.

5. Nor can the legislature, in the absence of an appropriation for that purpose, provide by a joint resolution for the purchase of articles, whereby an indebtedness on the part of the State will be incurred, except when such debt is contracted for the purposes and in the manner pointed out in section 18, article 4, of the constitution.

This was a petition, filed in this court, asking for issue of a writ of mandamus, on the grounds and for the purposes fully stated in the opinion of the court.

Brief for the Petitioner.

Mr. E. M. HAINES, and Messrs. MCCARTNEY & CASEY, for the petitioner:

A joint resolution has the force of law. People v. Tyndale, 47 Ill. 538; Swann v. Buck, 40 Miss. 268; State v. Bailey, 16 Ind. 46; McPherson v. Leonard, 29 Md. 377; Footprints of Time, 416.

A joint resolution is the proper manner of expressing the will of a legislative assembly concerning mere temporary matters. Jefferson's Manual of Parliamentary Practice, sec. 21; Barclay's Digest of Parliamentary Practice, 1872, p. 113; Bancroft's Footprints of Time, sec. 416; 3 Lalor's Cyclopedia of Political Science, 89; Cushing's Parliamentary Practice, secs. 752, 2403; Wilson's Digest of Parliamentary Law, 161; May on Law and Usages in Parliament, 315.

Joint resolutions are not prohibited by our constitution, and the General Assembly has every power that is not specially taken from it by the constitution.

The petition in this case only asks that a ministerial body be required to perform a ministerial duty. Rev. Stat. chap. 127, sec. 1.

Legislative construction of constitutional provisions should largely prevail in governing the actions of the courts under them. Session Laws, 1871 and 1872; id. p. 796; People v. Learned, 12 Hun, 626; Trammel v. Bradley, 37 Ark. 374; People ex rel. v. Dayton, 55 N. Y. 367; Hahn v. United States, 107 U. S. 402; United States v. Recorder, 1 Blatchf. 218; Polk v. Hill, 2 Overton, 118; Love v. Hinckley, Abb. Adm. 436; United States v. McDaniel, 7 Pet. 1; United States v. Graham, 110 U. S. 219; McKeer v. Delancy, 5 Cranch, 22; United States v. Lytle, 5 McLean, 9; Railroad Co. v. Railroad Co. 53 Pa. St. 20; Morrison v. Barksdale, Harp. (S. C.) 101; Insurance Co. v. Hoge, 21 How. 35; Rogers v. Goodwin, 2 Mass. 475; Packard v. Richardson, 17 id. 104; Plummer v. Plummer, 37 Miss. 185; Bailey v. Rolfe, 16 N. H. 247; Chestnut v. Shane, 16 Ohio, 599.

Brief for the Respondents.

This question was thoroughly investigated by the judiciary committee of the Senate before the joint resolution was finally passed. Journal of Senate, 1885, pp. 785, 798, 855, 864, 875; House Journal, pp. 945, 977, 1045, 1046; Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386; Swann v. Buck, 40 Miss. 268; People v. Hatch, 33 Ill. 9; Brown v. State, 5 Col. 496; In re Manhattan, 82 N. Y. 142; Linsley v. Hubbard, 44 Conn. 109; Scanlan v. Childs, 33 Wis. 663; Solomon v. Carterville, 41 Ga. 157; People v. Allen, 1 Lans. 248; United States v. Gilmore, 8 Wall. . 330.

Mr. GEORGE HUNT, Attorney General, for the respondents: Resolutions, as expressive of the legislative will, are recognized but once in our State constitution, and then in a negative way. Art. 4, sec. 17.

Whenever legislation may be accomplished by joint resolution, it must follow substantially the same procedure required for the passage of a bill. It must receive the executive approval, where a bill would require it, or be passed over the executive veto. Const. of the United States, art. 1; Story on Const. secs. 881-891; 6 Op. Attorney General, 680; Bouvier's Law Dic. sub voce "Act;" Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 Dall. 378; State ex rel. v. Bailey, 16 Ind. 46; In re Picquet, 5 Pick. 64; Cushing's Law and Prac. sec. 2403; Boyer v. Crum, 1 W. Va. 176.

Whether a resolution is separate, concurrent or joint, must be gathered from its form. The resolution set forth in the petition has no title, and by its form or style it purports to be nothing more than a concurrent resolution, and there is no pretence that it was ever presented to the executive for his approval.

In the discussion of this question we shall no doubt be met by the proposition that the legislature is supreme as to all legislative matters, and that it can do all things within its