teachers. By ascribing now these principles without shame or reserve to Moses, he drew him down into a society where one would expect to find any body else sooner than a man of God. The assurance with which he does this, thinking that he is thereby doing a service to religion, must often excite a smile. The grossest thing of this kind is the assertion that Moses cherished the maxim, that the end sanctifies the means, and that so far, as sometimes to have used religion itself as a means to ac complish his purpose. He speaks on this point without the least reserve, in Part I. § 13: "In the legislative wisdom of Moses, I observe in general one stroke of policy, which is not commonly used in our days, and which perhaps is really no more capable of use. Many laws are made sacred by being placed in connection with virtue and religion, and having a religious signification or direction given to them, while their real causes and reasons are concealed. Such laws obtain thereby a degree of reverence, as the violation of them is regarded as a sin against virtue itself. . . . The few remains of the political wisdom of the Egyptians with which we are acquainted, show that they also often made use of this means. . . . When it could be done without deceit (!) Moses makes use of a similar policy." In the course of the work a great number of cases are brought forward, in which Moses is made to act upon this principle. So, e. g. Part 3. § 145: "When the observance of a certain law was very important, aid was sought from vows and religion. Thus did Moses against idolatry, the prohibition of which was one of the fundamental maxims of his government; and the Roman people did the same for the safety of their tribunes. It is manifest at once that this piece of political wisdom must not be used too freely, etc." He makes religion to be used as a means even for the lowest and most trivial objects. In the religious import given to the prescribed cleanliness of the camp (Num. 5: 1-3, etc.) Moses was, according to Michaelis, “not in earnest his real object, which if it had been openly express ed, would not have been enough regarded, was, the prevention of foul smells.-Moses speaks as if he who seethed a kid in its mother's milk committed a sin against religion-the sagacious man designs nothing more by this than to induce the people to cook kids in olive-oil instead of butter, because they would taste better. Among the ostensible reasons for forbidding the eating of fat and blood was this, that they belonged to the altar, and were too holy to be eaten the real, concealed reason was, that

the eating of the fat parts and the use of fat in boiling, baking, and stewing, is injurious to a people subject to diseases of the skin, etc." See Part 4. § 171, 205, 206. This example of bad political maxims ascribed to Moses is indeed the grossest and most striking, but by no means the only one. There is another, running through the whole book, which is indeed more refined, but still, if established, calculated of itself to overthrow the belief of the divine mission of Moses, and thus that of the genuineness of the Pentateuch. Michaelis is at once an opposer of the divine right, and a defender of the unlimited power of government. Government is, according to him, a creature of the people but then, as representative of the popular will, it is to have universal sway; while every divine right is limited by him and confined to a certain sphere. This doctrine, originating in modern ungodliness, he also ascribes to Moses, and that to such an extent that the principle is made absurd and ridiculous. The law giver inspects the chambers and the pots. He takes such tender care of his subjects that he orders them to cook, not with butter but with oil, because it will taste better. "This," remarks Michaelis, Part 4. § 205," will be called by many a German reader, delicatesse, over-done, delicatesse-but it might be of use to a people going to Palestine." Health is urged by the lawgiver upon his subjects by means truly heroic. Houses for example which are infected with leprosy, he commands, through concern for the health of the inhabitant, to be pulled down. For delicate nerves he shows the most tender care-the leprous person must not dwell in the camp, must cover his face, etc., lest he should excite one's disgust by his really hateful appearance, or, frighten him by an unexpected touch. Such tenderness of police would be cruelty even to those for whose sake at the expense of others it was enforced. Who would not have his disgust excited or suffer a little fright for once, rather than feel the hand of the police always on his neck?

Michaelis shows every where the most anxious dread of forsaking the ground which he holds in common with his opponents-not because he fears they would not follow him to another, but because-and this is his strongest reason—he himself feels nowhere else at home. Hence, in regard to every thing in the law which can be defended only by reasons felt by one of deep religious feeling, he prepared the way for an easy triumph to his opposers. For all the acuteness which he manifested VOL. XI. No. 30.

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could not long conceal the weakness of the defence which he had made upon the ground of mere natural causes, and that the supernatural ground was not defensible, was now, after this concession of the very leader of supernaturalism, considered as established. Thus in part I. § 65, the sentiment that when God says, Ex. 34: 24, that during the absence of the Hebrews at their yearly feasts at Jerusalem, no one should desire their land, he pledges himself to reward fidelity on their part with fidelity on his, Michaelis sets aside by a remark too gross even for those who believe in a Providence as little as the Deists do. "Will we dare," says he, "to explain the words of Moses so as to make him promise a periodical miracle on the part of God, viz. that for three weeks in every year, all the enemies of the Israelites should be turned into blocks?" One might here almost conceive himself listening to the knight (lord) in 2 Kings vii.* Moses, in this passage, according to Michaelis, enjoins upon the people to trust in a principle of international law which he pretends was observed at that time, by which one nation respected the religious rites of the other, and suspended hostilities while a feast was celebrating. Thus he remarks in reference to the Sabbatical year, which, notwithstanding its religious exterior, had no other object according to him than to lead the people always to keep a provision of grain, "Can God have pledged himself to work such a periodical miracle (the double crop in the sixth year) which would have been, besides, entirely unnecessary if Moses had not made such a ruinous law?" What crude views of the common course of nature lie at the bottom of such remarks! How inconsistent, that he who is so impotent to see the hand of God in nature, will yet in part maintain its agency in history! Thus he denies the divine right of the Israelites to Palestine, and labors in vain, with all the art of a special pleader, to prove their human right to it. Of the essence of the theocracy he has no conception. That in which alone he finds it, viz. the decision by Urim and Thummim, the presence of the cloud, etc., belonged for the most part only to the Mosaic times, and appears, in its isolation, so singu lar, so ex abrupto, that it was immediately lost as soon as the mythical interpretation laid its hand upon it. The theocracy was "quoted in its main design only a name, a designation,

* "Behold, if the Lord would make windows in heaven, might this thing be?"

which might the easier keep out idolatry." Part I. § 35. On Ex. 19: 6, where the Israelites are called a kingdom of priests, he remarks, "This mode of speaking appears to have come from Egypt, where the priests had great privileges, owned their own lands tax-free, and were besides supported by the king." How can he who has so little conception of the Israelites as God's people, have any just conception of the God who really dwelt among them. The difference between the Old Testament religion and heathenism, is, as he understands it, the most superficial possible—that of Monotheism and Polytheism. The grand object of the law is according to him the negative one, the prevention of idolatry -the positive design, that of producing a living practical religious feeling, he entirely loses sight of. With such a low view of religion, it is therefore very natural that he should feel dislike when it advances any claims. Thus, in his additions to his Commentaries, in Ammon und Bertholdt's Journal, Th. 4. S. 356, he shows that some of Abraham's servants must have been circumcised before, because otherwise (at the first circumcision) all work must have been suspended for eight days, and the cattle could not have been fed. He thus zealously labors to find out for all severe and burdensome ceremonies, dietetical, medicinal, municipal and other objects, in order to show that while the Levites did not as servants of religion earn the revenue they enjoyed, yet that as physicians, surveyors, and learned men they well deserved it.

It is remarkable that Michaelis, thus standing as he did on the ground of mere natural causes in explaining the biblical history, yet left the miracles of the Pentateuch generally untouched, and sought an explanation from natural causes only where Clericus had done so before him. See especially Ex. xiv. This however is easily accounted for from the fact that in this respect he departed less from the older views than in most others. Had he departed here also, he must have denied the miracles and the genuineness of the Pentateuch altogether; and this, on account of education, and perhaps a remnant of early pious feeling, he could not do. Also the spirit of the age, at the time that he was in the vigor of his faculties, had still its influence over him.

Historical Skepticism.

But however close may have been the connection between the degenerate exegesis we have just described, and the denial of

the genuineness of the Pentateuch, yet there must have been some powerful causes in the last quarter of the last century, to have produced the transition from the former to the latter just at that time-a transition which from that time became more and more predominant. Without some such causes, either this dangerous but natural step would have been prevented by the mere power of orthodox habit, or a reaction would have taken place in exegesis itself. The very degeneration of exegesis shows the existence of such causes-causes which had been long silently preparing. For if that degeneration was not merely accidental-if it had its origin in the continually extending spirit of the times-a spirit which formed itself more and more into a conscious hostility to what was old, then the denial of the genuineness must not be regarded simply as a consequence of the perversion of exegesis, but is to be derived immediately from the spirit of the age itself.

The preceding ages had had a great reverence for the past, and so, for all historical accounts. This reverence was for the most part, the result of humility. To be hostile to the past, was, they believed, to be enemies to themselves. They did not wish to be cast entirely upon themselves. But here also, as always, that which was in principle good, was abused and carried to extremes. Although individuals were by no means wanting who practised historical criticism with unprejudiced minds, yet there was in general a too extravagant respect for every thing that gave itself out for history. There was a dread of beginning the work of historical criticism through a secret fear of the end to which it might lead.

In the latter part of the seventeenth century this reverence for history began gradually to disappear; at first in England, Holland and France (it is sufficient to mention the names of Bayle and Harduin), and then, after the accession of Frederick II. to the throne, also in Germany, where the love of contradiction, once worked up by that spirit of investigation which is peculiar to the nation, put on a very dangerous shape. The higher the age, in proud self-importance, regarded itself as standing above those that were past, so much the more did it feel itself allowed to do as it pleased with their monuments. It thought that at any rate there was little to lose by doing so. Its opinion of its own strength rose higher when it had succeeded in overthrowing that on which the blinded past had rested. A cry of triumph was raised, whenever an old structure fell to the