three angles, is called a triangle; but we may draw another figure bounded by three straight lines, which shall differ very much from the first in the absolute and the relative lengths of the sides; yet still we call this figure a triangle, for it is bounded by three sides and contains three angles: hence we form the abstract idea of a triangle, corresponding to the definition which limits or defines this species of form. And so on to other cases of geometrical form and magnitude. like manner we arrive at a knowledge of the various properties of bodies.

In

We see a lot of balls,-we count them by ones, —they make up a certain number; but they may be grouped in different ways, and the total number will be made up of the number in the different groups put together; thus, for example, if there are five balls, we may put them into two groups, one of which shall contain three balls and the other two; then we arrive at the fact that three balls and two balls make five balls; but we may count, in the same manner, with buttons, or with any other objects; hence we form the abstract conception of numbers and the properties of numbers, without regard to the particular objects which represent them, whether they be balls, or buttons, or cubes, or anything else. The results thus attained, expressed in language, become established truths or propositions, and we remember them as such.

In all these cases we exercise the faculty of ABSTRACTION, which at the same time involves those of CLASSIFICATION and GENERALISATION. By the faculty of abstraction, therefore, we arrange objects into classes, genera, and species. Thus we observe that some objects have certain common properties, by which we distinguish them from other objects; hence we classify them and call them by some name indicative of the class: thus we soon distinguish a horse from a cow, &c.; hence also we generalise, that is to say, we take a comprehensive view of a multifarious collection of facts, by selecting one which is common to them all.

Co-existent with this stage of intellectual develop

ment certain appetites and passions exhibit themselves. The taste of a sweetmeat affords us PLEASURE, the taste of a drug is UNPLEASANT; we LOVE and DESIRE the one, while we DISLIKE and AVOID the other. Some sensations and ideas are accompanied with pain, others with pleasure; we love the person that is kind to us, because his kindness affords us pleasure, and we HATE and FEAR the person that treats us with cruelty, because his cruelty gives us pain.

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The sentiment of taste. the sense of the sublime and beautiful early develops itself. We admire a beautiful object, because the sight of it affords us pleasure,— the flowers with their varied forms, and colours and scents, the green fields and woods, the bright sun, lighting up the wide earth with life and joy,-the silver moon, as she sheds her soft and balmy light over the slumbering world, the stars, as they twinkle in the depths of the azure canopy of night, all are beautiful to us all are charming to us - because they all awaken within us the sentiments of love and admiration. But the contemplation of the sublime, not less than the beautiful, affords us pleasure the snow-clad mountain, -the deep ravine, -the boundless expanse of field and forest, -the vast ocean as it swells and foams and responds to the moaning winds, the rolling thunder and the flashing lightning, -all are sublime— all fill our souls with the sentiments of AWE, VENERATION, and WONDER, and impress us with the ideas of vastness, power, immensity, and infinitude. Above all, and over all, we adore and love the Great God, who made the world and all its fulness, and enthroned Himself amid its riehes and goodness.

We love knowledge in all its forms, because its acquisition affords us pleasure. Not satisfied with what we already know, we seek to know more; hence that insatiable appetite for knowledge-that ceaseless CURIOSITY, which is ever craving for knowledge, but is never satisfied, and which forms one of the most remarkable features of the infant mind. We love approbation, and the consciousness of mental power affords us

pleasure. We eagerly strive with our companions in the race of improvement; hence we are said to possess the principle of EMULATION.

We also soon distinguish between what is good or bad in conduct: the SENSE OF THE BEAUTIFUL is closely related to and connected with the MORAL SENSE, or that faculty whereby we distinguish what is good and beautiful, and therefore praise-worthy in our actions, from what is bad and displeasing, and therefore blameworthy. The inherent conviction of our moral responsibility leads us to follow the one and avoid the other. We see that self-indulgence, if carried too far, is injurious to ourselves and often detrimental to the happiness of others; we hence recognise two distinct principles, or rather two distinct classes of emotions in our nature, -the one class has been called the SELFISH EMOTIONS, the other the BENEVOLENT EMOTIONS; the one seeks the gratification of self, the other seeks to promote the happiness of others. The principle of SYMPATHY leads us to adopt the golden rule of conduct, viz., to do unto others as we would that they should do unto us. We PITY those that are in pain or distress, -we sympathise with them, that is, we in a certain sense make their misery our own, and thus we are led to relieve them. But our instincts are not all for good we suffer injuries or injustice from others; those injuries excite within us the emotions of HATRED and REVENGE, and other MALEVOLENT PASSIONS; but we cannot indulge these passions without causing misery to ourselves as well as to others; hence arises the necessity of SELF-CONTROL. We tell LIES-FALSEHOODS-to screen ourselves from the consequences of our follies, or it may be to gratify our VANITY; but our conscience raises its voice against the violation of TRUTH. We take the property of others, or seek to indulge ourselves at the expense of others; but the golden rule tells us that theft, injustice, &c., are wrong, and that honesty, justice, &c., are right. The love of approbation frequently engenders VANITY, and the consciousness of power produces PRIDE and CONCEIT. Education stimulates the development of our virtu

ous emotions, and checks the development of those that are evil. Scripture, the revealed word of God, lends its all-powerful aid to inculcate what is good, and to denounce what is evil. We are there informed, that God is holy as well as good, just as well as merciful; as judge of all the earth, therefore, he will punish the wicked and reward the righteous in the world to come.

Of all our intellectual faculties, imagination, reason, judgment, and invention are the latest in attaining their full growth and development.

Out of our impressions of actual scenes and events, we imagine, or, as it were, create fictitious scenes and events, and invest them with all the vividness and warmth of reality; hence we are said to possess the faculty of IMAGINATION. We separate facts or general principles from each other, and throw them into new combinations with the view of deriving some new result or fact; in this case we are said to exercise the faculty of INVENTION, which is obviously very nearly allied to that of imagination.

We analyse facts, compare them with each other, observe their relations, and deduce from these relations certain general facts or principles; we compare our mental impressions with external things, draw conclusions, and establish certain principles of belief; in all these cases, we are said to exercise the faculty of REASON, or it may be that of JUDGMENT. By reason we investigate truth, and determine the laws of evidence and belief. Reason is the highest faculty of our nature, and admits of an indefinite degree of cultivation.

A more exact analysis of the mind, with a classification of its faculties, is given in Chap. III., Part I., of this work.

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CHAP. II.

CULTIVATION OF THE INTELLECTUAL FACULTIES. CULTIVATION OF THE PERCEPTIVE FACULTIES AND OF THE FACULTIES OF PRIMITIVE JUDGMENT, CONCEPTION, IMITATION, ABSTRACTION,

AND LANGUAGE.

OUR first knowledge of the existence and properties of the material world is derived through our senses; hence it follows, that our knowledge of the properties of material bodies is limited by the number and acuteness of our senses. It is generally believed that we have five senses, sight, hearing, taste, smell, and touch; but to these has been added the sense of muscular effort, or the sense of resistance to muscular action.

Some properties are cognisable by one sense only; but in general our knowledge of the external world is derived from the combined action of several senses. Thus colour can only be known to us by the sense of sight, sound by the sense of hearing, taste by the sense of taste, cold or heat by the sense of feeling, odour by the sense of smell, and weight or force by the sense of muscular effort; but the properties of form, size, number and texture, are cognisable by at least two of our senses, viz., sight and touch; the ideas of number and succession may be conveyed to the mind by any of our senses ; thus a succession of sounds, tastes, &c., may impress us with the idea of number as perfectly as a series of objects placed before the eye can do. Our impression of solidity, roughness, or smoothness, is derived from touch combined with muscular action. And so on to other

cases.

The first notions derived from our senses, however, seem to be limited and imperfect. Our real knowledge is only acquired by experience, in the course of which, the impressions derived from one sense are used to supply the deficiencies and correct the errors of the impressions derived from another sense, and by the mind acting upon the impressions derived from all the senses. Thus,