requiring that they shall be public or charitable institutions, it may be claimed by a private school maintained by an individual or corporation as a business enterprise." We ask the court to note the number of states supporting this text. Appellant seems to get some consolation from the case of Adams County v. Diocese of Natchez, 110 Miss. 890, but appellee is not asking for any relaxation of the rules of construction of statutes exempting property from taxation applicable to religious and educational institutions. We recognize, however, that the supreme test is "the intent of the legislature,' but wherever there is no ambiguity in the language, its clear import will be unqualifiedly accepted as "the intent of the legislature." In conclusion, we humbly submit that appellant's contentions are without merit and that the decision of the lower court should be affirmed. Sivley Rhodes, for appellee. Is the property of the Vicksburg Sanitarium exempt from taxation under the law of this state? The answer to this question involves the construction of paragraph "F" of section 4251 of the Mississippi Code of 1906, which reads as follows: "Property appropriated to and occupied and used for any hospital or charitable institution." The rule in construing statutes was tersely stated in the case of City of Holly Springs v. Marshall County, 104 Miss. 752, as follows: "We must look to the intention of the legislature, the spirit of the law, the policy and the purpose of the same, and the legislation upon the subject and if possible a harmonious interpretation should be adopted." What does section 4251 of the Code mean? It means just what it says, that property appropriated to and occupied and used by any hospital or charitable institution is exempt from taxation. The English language could not be used plainer. The word hospital is modified by the adjective any, and therefore the word hospital includes all kinds, sizes, varieties and classes, public, private, charitable and pay. The adjective charitable modifies and explains the noun institution. It does not relate back and modify and qualify the noun hospital. Why? For the simple reason that the legislature intended to make a distinction between all hospitals and charitable institutions. If it had been the intent of the legislature merely to exempt from taxation charitable institutions the words any hospital would not have been used for the simple reason that the broad terms charitable institutions covers hospitals of every kind not being conducted for private gain. The very grouping of the phrases, the use of the words, indicates that it was the intent of the legislature to exempt from taxation every kind of hospital, and also every charitable institution. While the rules of construction might require the court to strictly construe this statute, yet this rule is subject to the limitation, that the statute should not be so strictly construed as to defeat the obvious intention of the legislature in enacting same. The intent of the legislature in this case is manifest from the choice of the very words used. "What is the purpose of this exemption and why the policy of the state in exempting from taxation ail hospitals? What is a hospital? It is merely a place where the sick are received and cared for." American & English Inc. of Law Vol. 12, page 340. From a civic and governmental standpoint, is it not to the interest of the state and the various subdivisions therefore to preserve the public health, and to see that the sick are taken care of and made well? Up to very recent years there were no charitable hospitals in this state. The state itself did not, until 1910, establish a charitable hospital owned entirely and run entirely for its own interest. Realizing the need for hospitals, and the necessity for preserving public health, the Mississippi legislature on February 2, 1857, wrote this very identical statute into the laws of this state. The purpose of the exemption is to create and establish hospitals regardless of whether they are conducted for charity or for profit. The more hospitals a state has, regardless of their nature, the more will suffering humanity be taken care of. The agreed statement of facts in this case shows that from time to time the Vicksburg Sanitarium treats charity patients. It is a matter of common knowledge that all hospitals do charity work, regardless of whether they are being conducted for private gain or not. When a patient goes to one of the private hospitals like the Vicksburg Sanitarium, if it is an urgent case, who ever heard of those in authority stopping and demanding to know if the patient was able to pay. They go right ahead and administer to the sick first, and pay is an afterthought. If the patient is able to pay, of course they expect him to pay, otherwise they do not. It is also a matter of common knowledge that in these hospitals run for private gain, nurses are trained free of charge, and in most instances are paid in addition for their services-thus do they contribute to suffering humanity in this way-by training nurses to nurse the sick. Bearing these things in mind, can it be said that private hospitals ought to be taxed like sawmills, mercantile establishments, and banks, etc. The language of the statute is plain-the letter of the law and the spirit and intent of the legislature are the same. From a careful consideration of the facts in this case, and a reasonable and proper construction of section 4251 of the Code of 1906, I respectfully contend that the public policy of this state would not be violated, but would be justly upheld by the court affirming this case. I submit that under the law of this state, the Vicksburg Sanitarium is exempt from taxation. SMITH, C. J., delivered the opinion of the court. Appellee filed its petition with appellant, praying to be relieved of municipal taxes on certain real property hereinafter described, claiming that it is exempt from taxation under subdivision (f) section 4251, Code of Mississippi (chapter 100, Laws of 1916; Hemingway's Code, section 6878), which provides that "property appropriated to and occupied and used for hospital or charitable institution" shall be exempt from taxation. Appellant having declined to comply with the prayer of this petition, an appeal was taken to the court below, wherein judgment was rendered for appellee, from which judgment this appeal is taken. The case was submitted to the court below on an agreed statement of facts, setting forth that: "The Vicksburg Sanitarium is a privately owned Mississippi corporation, with its domicile in Vicksburg, Warren county, Miss. It is the owner of the west half of lot 240 in square 40 of 'Vicksburg Proper,' upon which it has a building devoted exclusively to its purposes. The board of mayor and aldermen of the city of Vicksburg assessed for municipal purposes the lot, together with the improvements thereon, for taxes for the year 1917. The entire property of this corporation, both real and personal, is appropriated to and occupied and used as a hospital. From time to time, it treats charity patients, but care of such patients is not its principal purpose; its primary purpose is to care for and treat patients for pay. Its entire property is devoted to the care of the sick, and to those who require medical or surgical treatment. The sole question involved herein is whether such property is exempt from taxation." It may be that an institution, the primary purpose of which "is to care for and treat patients for pay," may be referred to as a hospital, but the word "hospital,' primarily and in its common acceptation, and particu larly in the connection in which it is here used, carries with it the idea of a charity, the definition thereof given in Webster's New International Dictionary, Edition of 1910, being: "An institution or place in which sick or injured are given medical or surgical care, commonly in whole or in part at public expense or by charity; also, a place for the cure or treatment of sick or injured animals.' We are of the opinion, therefore, that the legislature intended to exempt from taxation only such hospitals. as are charitable institutions. The judgment of the court below will be reversed, and the order entered by appellant dismissing the petition will be reinstated. Reversed. 1. 2. 3. NATIVE LUMBER CO. ET AL. v. ELMER. [78 South 703, Division A.] ADVERSE POSSESSION. Constructive possession. The actual possession of part of a tract of land under color of title of the whole is constructive possession of the entire tract. LOST INSTRUMENTS. Evidence. Sufficiency. Under the facts in this case, which was a suit to determine the ADVERSE POSSESSION. Evidence sufficiency. |