kin, the next of kin who are to take are the persons who answer that description at the death of the testator, and not those who answer that description at the death of the first taker. Gifts to a class, following a bequest of the same property for life, vest immediately upon the death of the testator. Nor does it make any difference that the person to whom such previous life interest was given is also a member of the class to take on his death."

It will be observed that this rule, laid down in all the courts of this country and England, is applicable in the case before us now, and is good authority upon which we rest our conclusion that the appellant is wrong in his contention, and that the remainder after the death of the life tenant, Mary Wooldridge, vested in the heirs of the testator living at his death; that the estate was a vested remainder and not a contingent remainder. The legacy vested immediately upon the death of the testator, but the right to future enjoyment was contingent upon the death of Mary Wooldridge, the life tenant. The law favors the vesting of estates at the earliest opportunity, and they will be deemed as vested at the earliest time, unless the contrary intention manifestly appears.

These conclusions are uniformly supported by all the authorities, some of which we cite here: McDaniel v. Allen, 64 Miss. 417, 1 So. 356; McArthur v. Scott, 113 U. S. 340-378, 5 Sup. Ct. 652, 28 L. Ed. 1015; Aldred v. Sylvester, 184 Ind. 542, 111 N. E. 914.

As to the second contention of appellants, it is not quite clear to us that an irreconcilable conflict between items 1 and 5 exists. We may reasonably say that the provisions in the two items are not in conflet, but may be read together and harmonized so as to get the real intent of the testator from the language used in the two items. It is very clear that the testator intended by item 1 to make certain provision for Thomas G. Blewett, Jr., and to expressly exclude him from taking anything

further from the estate. At the death of the testator, Thomas G. Blewett, Jr., accepted and took the estate provided for him under item 1 of the will in lieu of any other claim; and he could not accept the bequest in item 1 and also claim an interest as an heir at the death of Mary Wooldridge, life tenant, as provided in item 5. However, we shall not pass upon the question as to whether there is a conflict in the two provisions of the will, as we think it unnecessary to do so, for the reason that, even though there be a conflict in the bequests in the two items, and even though we recognize as a guide the rule that, in case of conflict in the provisions of a will, the last item shall control and annul the first provision, still the rule is that, where there is an inconsistency between two provisions in a will, one a specific and the other a general provision, the specific provision must prevail over the general provision, regardless of the order in which it stands. Item 5 of the testator's will here being a general provision, and item 1 being a specific provision, the latter must control and prevail over the former. Therefore we hold that the legatee Thomas G. Blewett, Jr., was by express provision in item 1 excluded from taking from the estate of the testator under item 5 of the will. He had already been provided for by the testator at his death, at which time the other heirs of the testator took their vested remainder in the property involved in this suit, and upon the death of the life tenant, Mary Woolridge, became entitled to the possession and enjoyment of the property in fee simple as against any claim of the appellant Thomas G. Blewett, Jr., or others claiming through him.

The appellant also urges that the heirs of the testator, including appellant, living at the death of Mary Wooldridge, the life tenant, took an interest in the property under the will, and not the heirs living at the death of the testator, for the reason that item 5 of the will provided that at the death of the life tenant, Mary Wool

dridge, the property was to be sold and the proceeds divided between the heirs of the testator, and that therefore the heirs of the testator living at his death did not take a vested interest in the remainder because the remainder was to be converted and the proceeds to be distributed to the heirs of the testator. We can see no merit in this contention. The authorities seem to hold uniformly that this character of devise vests the remainder in the heirs living at the death of the testator, regardless of any subsequent change in the character of the property as provided by the will for distribution amongst the heirs named by the testator. In Tazewell v. Smith, 1 Rand. (Va.) 313, 10 Am. Dec. 533, in passing upon the will there, the Virginia court said:

"The first question which presents itself in this case

is whether the interest intended by the will of Benjamin Taliaferro for his two sons, Richard Henry and Henry Taliaferro, were vested and continuing interests at the time of their deaths. This question presents no difficulty. It is clearly a vested interest, unless a different result be produced by the testator having left the time of selling to the discretion of the executor. In every instance of a sale by an executor, some time must, of necessity, elapse between the death of the testator and the sale; and something is almost invariably left to the discretion of the executor as to the time of selling. Yet that makes no difference where, as in this case, the direction to sell is imperative. It has never been doubted that the devisee or legatee, for whose benefit a sale is thus directed, takes by the will an immediate vested interest. Under such circumstances, the interest in the proceeds of the sale is as much a vested interest as if the land had been immediately and directly devised to the devisee."

See, also, Allen v. Watts, 98 Ala. 384, 11 So. 646; Welch v. Blanchard, 208 Mass. 523, 94 N. E. 812, 33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1; Murrill v. Wooster, 99 Me. 460, 59

Atl. 596; Fairly v. Kline, 3 N. J. Law, 754, 4 Am. Dec. 415; In re Thommon's Estate, 161 Pa. 444, 29 Atl. 85; Miller v. Gilbert, 144 N. Y. 68, 38 N. E. 979; Tienken v. Tienken, 131 N. Y. 391, 30 N. E. 109; Sayles v. Best, 140 N. Y. 368, 35 N. E. 636; Heilman v. Heilman, 129 Ind. 59, 28 N. E. 310; Bowen v. Swander, 121 Ind. 164, 22 N. E. 727; Rumsey v. Durham, 5 Ind. 71; Hawkins v. Bohling, 168 Ill. 214, 48 N. E. 95.

We also think the position taken by appellant is untenable with reference to the general rule of testamentary construction, recognized under the common law, as to the meaning of "my heirs" as used by the testator in the will. Unless it clearly appears otherwise from the plain language of the will, the class of persons described as the testator's "heirs," "heirs at law," "lawful heirs," will be deemed to be those living at the death of the testator, and not at some subsequent period. This rule prevails in Mississippi. Harvey v. Johnson, 111 Miss. 566, 71 So. 824; Dunlap v. Fant, 74 Miss. 197, 20 So. 874; Alexander v. Richardson, 106 Miss. 518, 64 So. 217; Harris v. McLaran, 30 Miss. 572; 40 Cyc. 1459. The decree of the lower court is affirmed.

Affirmed.

MAYOR AND ALDERMEN OF CITY OF VICKSBURG V. VICKSBURG SANITORIUM.

[78 South 702, Division A.]

1. TAXATION. Liability for taxes. Charitable institutions. Hospitals. Hospital or charitable institutions.

Under Code 1906. section 2451, subd. F. (Hemingway's Code, section 6878, Subd. F.), Laws 1916, chapter 100, providing that property used for "hospital or other charitable institutions" shall te exempt from taxes, the term "hospital or charitable institutions" carries with it the idea of a charity, and such exemption from

taxation applies only to such hospitals as are charitable institutions, and not to institutions whose primary purpose is to treat patients for pay.

APPEAL from the circuit court of Warren county.
HON. E. L. BRIEN, Judge.

Petition by the Vicksburg Sanitorium to the Mayor and Aldermen of the city of Vicksburg for relief from municipal taxation. Upon denial of this petition an appeal was taken to the circuit court where judgment was rendered for the petitioner, from which the city appeals.

The facts are fully stated in the opinion of the court.

Anderson, Voller & Kelly, for appellant.

We admit in the outset that the letter of this paragraph seems to sustain appellee's contention. It is found in section 4251 of the Code which declares what property shall be exempt from taxation, and after reciting different classes of property so exempt it reaches paragraph "F" which says: "Property appropriated to and occupied and used for any hospital or charitable institution."

The question then is, what does this paragraph mean? Does it mean to exempt from taxation all hospital or sanitariums even though they be privately owned and charge for treatment of their patients? Or was it the intention of the legislature only to exempt public, free or charity hospitals? Can it be held that private hospitals like this which charge its patients for treatment and which were erected and instituted as an investment like a sawmill, a mercantile establishment, a bank or any other institution created for a pecuniary profit to its owners-is exempt from taxation? Surely not. We find on investigation that in every Mississippi Code from, and including the Code of 1857 down to and including the Code of 1906 this identical provision is found. We have never heard until now that it was