In People v Deneen, the act of 1910 relating to the nomination of members of the General Assembly was under consideration. Section 11 of that act is as follows: "At least thirty-three (33) days prior to the date of the April primary the senatorial committee of each political party shall meet and by resolution fix and determine the number of candidates to be nominated by their party at the primary for representative in the General Assembly. A copy of said resolution, duly certified by the chairman and attested by the secretary of the committee, shall, within five days thereafter, be filed in the office of the Secretary of State, and in the office of the county clerk of each county in the senatorial district. In all primaries for the nomination of candidates for representatives in the General Assembly each qualified primary elector may cast three votes for one candidate, or may distribute the same or equal parts thereof among two candidates or three candidates, as he shall see fit. And the said candidate or candidates for nomination highest in votes shall be declared nominated for the office to be filled." The democratic senatorial committee of a certain senatorial district decided that the democratic party should have but one candidate for representative in the General Assembly from that district. In the primary election held subsequent to this action by the democratic senatorial committee, one Espey received the third highest number of democratic votes. The state canvassing board refused to certify his name as a democratic candidate from that district. He, thereupon, filed in the Supreme Court an original petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the board to certify him as one of the democratic nominees whose name should be placed on the official ballot at the next election. By the decision of a divided court the writ was refused. Three judges held that section 11 was unconstitutional because it was an attempt by the General Assembly to confer upon a senatorial committee the power to fix and determine the number of candidates for representatives to be nominated by a political party in a senatorial district, thus depriving the voters of their constitutional right to cast three votes for one candidate or to distribute their votes among two or three candidates. These judges were also of the opinion that, if section 11 were construed as not giving power to the senatorial committee to determine the number of candidates of the party, but merely empowering the committee to make a declaration of party policy which would not be binding upon the voters, it was void, because it would nullify the constitutional guaranty of minority representation. They held that, if the electors were at liberty to nominate a greater number of candidates than had been determined upon by the committee, and if in all districts where three candidates were voted for by the qualified electors of each political party, the names of three candidates were required to be placed on the official ballot, the practical effect would be that each political party in each senatorial district would have three candidates in the field and "if each party nominated three candidates, it would frequently, if not generally, happen that the dominant party in a senatorial district would elect three candidates and the minority party would be without representation." Being of the opinion that section 11 was unconstitutional, these judges held that the writ of mandamus should not issue. A fourth judge concurred in the view that the writ of mandamus should be denied, but his opinion was based on an entirely different ground. He agreed that if the power of the senatorial committee under section 11 was that of merely making a declaration of party policy, which was not binding on the voters, then the section was unconstitutional, because it would nullify the constitutional guaranty of minority representation. But he was of the opinion that there was no constitutional limitation on the power of the General Assembly to empower the senatorial committee to determine the number of candidates of its party in its senatorial district. He held that a political party has the right to determine the number of its candidates. "The right to cumulate his vote on the question of the election of repre sentatives in the General Assembly, is a right secured to the individual voter, while the right of minority representation is a right secured to political parties If the party decides to nominate one candidate for representative in the General Assembly and each member of such party has the right to give one candidate three votes, or if his party decides to nominate two or three candidates and he has the right to divide his three votes between such candidates he has not been deprived of any of his constitutional rights . The other three judges held that section 11 was constitutional, but that the power of the senatorial committee was only that of declaring a party policy. It was their view that if the committee decided on one or two candidates, but the voters voted for three or more candidates, then the names of the three candidates receiving the highest number of votes must go on the official ballots for use in the election, and that the effect of this would not be to nullify the plan for minority representation. These judges held that the writ of mandamus should issue. The different views of the judges makes it difficult to determine the full purport of the decision in People v Deneen. The court was definitely of the opinion that the General Assembly has no power to pass a law, the effect of which will be to nullify the constitutional provisions concerning minority representation. This seems to be the only point on which at least four judges agreed. The effect of the decision, however, has been to sustain the act of 1910. That act is still in force and nominations of candidates for representatives in the General Assembly are being made in accordance with the views of the fourth judge. (For a discussion of the history and working out of the provisions relating to minority representation, see Constitutional Conventions in Illinois, Second Edition p. 26; Constitutional Convention Bulletin No. 8). Section 9. The sessions of the General Assembly shall commence at twelve o'clock noon, on the Wednesday next after the first Monday in January, in the year next ensuing the election of members thereof, and at no other time, unless as provided by this Constitution. A majority of the members elected to each house shall constitute a quorum. Each house shall determine the rules of its proceedings, and be the judge of the election, returns and qualifications of its members, shall choose its own officers; and the Senate shall choose a temporary President to preside when the Lieutenant Governor shall not attend as President or shall act as governor. The Secretary of State shall call the House of Representatives to order at the opening of each new Assembly, and preside over it until a temporary presiding officer thereof shall have been chosen and shall have taken his seat. No member shall be expelled by either house, except by a vote of two-thirds of all the members elected to that house, and no member be twice expelled for the same offense. Each house may punish by imprisonment any person, not a member, who shall be guilty of disrespect to the house by disorderly or contemptuous behavior in its presence. But no such imprisonment shall extend beyond twenty-four hours at one time, unless the person shall persist in such disorderly or contemptuous behavior. The Supreme Court has never been called upon to construe this section of the constitution. It has been interpreted, however, by the appellate court and the Attorney General. Each house of the General Assembly is the sole judge of the qualifications of its members.52 The right to a seat in either house of the General Assembly can be questioned only by the members of that house.53 A majority of a quorum in either house may seat or unseat members as it sees fit, and its action is not subject to judicial review. This, however, has been held not to deprive a court of the power to determine whether or not a member of the General Assembly has resigned. Thus in People v Haas," a senator was elected clerk of the municipal court of the city of Chicago and entered upon his duties as clerk and the question presented was whether or not a writ of mandamus should issue against the county clerk of Cook County to compel that official to notify the Governor that there was a vacancy in the senate. The writ was awarded, the appellate court holding that, while the senate was the sole judge of the qualifications of its members, the courts could, nevertheless, determine whether or not a member of the General Assembly had resigned, and in view of the fact that section 3 of article 4 provides that no clerk of a court shall have a seat in the General Assembly, it was clear that the senator in accepting the office of clerk of the municipal court, resigned his seat in the senate. On the other hand, however, the Attorney General, in 1916, ruled that it was a matter of serious doubt whether or not the Governor had the power to determine that the seat of a senator, who was elected and qualified as a judge of the municipal court, was vacant, and that a special election to fill the vacancy should be called.56 (See discussion article 4 section 2 and section 3, subheading, "Qualifications of members of the General Assembly.") In 1915 the Attorney General rendered an opinion holding that the speaker of the house of representatives must be a member of that body.57 Section 10. The doors of each house and of committees of the whole shall be kept open, except in such cases as, in the opinion of the house, require secrecy. Neither house shall, without the consent of the other, adjourn for more than two days, or to any other place than that in which the two houses shall be sitting. Each house shall keep a journal of its proceedings, which shall be published. In the Senate at the request of two members, and in the House at the request of five members, the yeas and nays shall be taken on any question, and entered upon the journal. Any two members of either house shall have liberty to dissent from and protest, in respectful language against any act or resolution which they think injurious to the public or to any individual, and have the reasons of their dissent entered upon the journals. Adjournment. Neither house of the General Assembly can adjourn for more than two days without the consent of the other, and in the event of disagreement between the two houses as to the time of adjournment, the Governor, by virtue of the power conferred upon him by section 9 of article 5, "may, upon the same being certified to him by the house first moving the adjournment, adjourn the General Assembly to such time as he thinks proper, not beyond the first day of the next regular session." The Attorney 52 Report Attorney General 1916, pp. 135, 178, 287; People v Haas, 145 IIL App. 283 (1908). 53 Report Attorney General 1912, pp. 662, 1356. 54 Report Attorney General 1915, p. 455. 55 145 Ill. App. 283 (1908). 56 Report Attorney General 1916, p. 135. 59 General has held that after the existence of a disagreement has been properly certified to the Governor,. the latter is then the sole judge as to whether or not a disagreement exists, and his decision is not subject to review.58 In the case of People v Hatch, which arose under the constitution of 1848, it appeared that there were no entries on the journals of either house for a period of ten days, and the journals failed to show any resolution authorizing an adjournment for that period of time. The court held that in view of the provision of the constitution of 1848 forbidding adjournment by one house for more than two days without the consent of the other, it must be presumed that the General Assembly had adjourned sine die and could not again convene unless called into special session by the Gov ernor. Journals. The case of People v. Hatch, above referred to, holds that each house must keep a journal, for the reason that a legislative proceeding cannot be established without a journal. If there is no journal, there is no legislative body. The Hatch case arose under the constitution of 1848, but the provisions of the constitutions of 1848 and 1870 on this subject are similar. The constitution does not require that the officers of the General Assembly shall sign the journal or that the copying clerk shall certify to the accuracy of his work.co The journals must show that every constitutional requirement in connection with the passage of a bill, has been complied with; otherwise, the bill will be void. In some instances, however, compliance with a constitutional requirement may be inferred from a recital in the journal. (For a more complete statement with reference to this question, see discussion article 4, section 13, subheading, "Necessity for journal entries") Section 11. The style of the laws of this State shall be; "Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois, represented in the General Assembly." A joint resolution cannot have the force of a law, because it does not have an enacting clause. Thus, a joint resolution which directed the commissioners of state contracts to purchase a certain number of books for distribution among the justices of the peace and township officers of the state, was held inoperative and void.61 But an act consisting of several sections need not contain an enacting clause for each section. An enacting clause inserted just before the first section of an act, is no more a part of the first section than it is a part of the other sections.62 This section of the constitution was construed strictly by the Attorney General in 1910. In his judgment, a bill is unconstitutional if it contains an enacting clause which varies in any degree from the form specified in the constitution. Thus he held unconstitutional a bill with the following enacting clause: "Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois, represented in the Forty-sixth General Assembly". (See discussion article 6, section 33.) Section 12. Bills may originate in either house but may be altered, amended or rejected by the other; and on the final passage 58 Report Attorney General 1912, p. 73. 59 33 Ill. 9 (1863). 60 Miller v Goodwin, 70 Ill. 659 (1873). 61 Burritt v Commissioners of State Contracts, 120 Ill. 322 (1887); see Wenner v Thornton, 98 Ill. 156 (1881). 62 Pierce v Vittum, 193 III. 192 (1901). 6 Report Attorney General 1910, p. 77. of all bills, the vote shall be by yeas and nays, upon each bill separately, and shall be entered upon the journal; and no bill shall become a law without the concurrence of a majority of the members elected to each house. Yeas and nays. While the constitution requires that the yeas and nays shall be entered on the journal on the final passage of a bill, the fact that the journal fails to state that there were no negative votes, will not render the bill unconstitutional, if the journal shows that it received a constitutional majority of votes. Under such circumstances, it will be presumed that there were no negative votes.** (For a more complete statement with reference to the necessity for journal entries showing a compliance with constitutional requirements in connection with the passage of bills, see discussion article 4, section 13, subheading "Necessity for journal entries.") Separate vote on each bill. This section does not require a separate vote on each section or provision of a bill. Thus, the bill providing for a system of hard roads which authorized an expenditure of several millions of dollars, and provided for a tax to defray the expenditures so authorized, is not unconstitutional because only one yea and nay vote was had there on.65 Concurrence by a majority elected. If a bill which is passed by both houses, contains an amendment or a provision not concurred in by one house, it is unconstitutional. A bill cannot become a law without the concurrence of a majority of the members elected to each house.66 However, it seems that this rule does not apply to titles of bills. On the theory that the title of a bill is not a part thereof but a mere convenience for the purposes of legislation, bills having titles which were not concurred in by a majority of the members elected to both houses, have been sustained." For example, the house of representatives passed a bill entitled, “An Act to prevent the keeping of gaming houses." In the senate, the words, "and to prevent gaming," were added to the title. The house of representatives did not concur in the amendment to the title, but the bill was, nevertheless, sustained.es 69 What is a concurrence? It has been held that a concurrence may be had even though one house does not vote expressly on the question of passing the bill. In People v Edmands, the facts were as follows: The house of representatives passed a bill. The senate adopted certain amendments to the bill and then passed the bill as amended. The house of representatives refused to concur in the senate amendments. The senate then receded from its amendments by a yea and nay vote of 30 to 2. The vote on the motion to recede was entered on the journals. Nothing more was done by either house with reference to the bill, and the bill, as it passed the house of representatives, was acted upon favorably by the Governor. The question presented was whether or not the bill as it passed the house of representatives was a valid law. The court held that it was valid on the ground that when the senate receded from the amendments by a yea and nay vote of more than a majority of the number of senators elected, the vote being entered on the journals, it evidenced an intention on the part of the sen 6 People v Bowman, 247 Ill. 276 (1910). 66 Veto Messages, 1911, p. 16. Larrison v P. A. and D. R. R. Co., 77 Ill. 11 (1875); Johnson v People, 83 Ill. 431 (1876). es Plummer v People, 74 Ill. 361 (1874). |