tor desiring to vote for that candidate, is afforded the opportunity of doing S0.54 An act which provides that precinct and ward committeemen shall nominate candidates for their respective parties does not violate the requirement of freedom and equality of elections, even though the committeemen had been elected prior to the passage of the act. Each member of political parties is entitled to participate in the selection of committeemen who thereby become the legal representatives in their respective parties.55 But the legislature may not deprive the members of political parties of the right to participate in the selection of party candidates for office, in case of vacancies occurring which require a special election, by giving this power to the managing committee of parties, although such a provision would probably be sustained as to vacancies caused by the death or withdrawal of candidates since lack of time would make impracticable nomination by the convention method.56 Section 19. Every person ought to find a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries and wrongs which he may receive in his person, property or reputation; he ought to obtain, by law, right and justice freely and without being obliged to purchase it, completely and without denial, promptly and without delay. Certain remedy. The refusal by the courts to entertain an action to recover damages alleged to have been sustained by the malicious institution of a civil suit, while such civil suit remains pending, is not a withholding of a certain remedy." The workmen's compensation act provided for a hearing and the payment of compensation in the case of an employee in-jured by a person other than his employer. This provision was held not a deprivation of a remedy, since the act merely created an additional remedy and, in effect, permitted an election as to the remedy to be pursued.58 This section does not guarantee a remedy for an injury to the political right to have election ballots lawfully counted since elections belong to the political branch of the government and in the absence of provision for contests by that branch, the courts have no jurisdiction. An exception to this is found, however, in the case of elections relating to the removal of county seats.60 Statutory provisions which grant to one party to a suit the right to a review which is restricted or denied to the other party, do not afford the certain remedy which this section guarantees.o1 This section does not require the Supreme Court to give a detailed opinion on every point raised or to answer every contention that may be made by counsel in the argument of a case. Right to justice without being obliged to purchase it. Statutes requiring cost bonds from litigants or the payment in advance of jury fees 54 People v Czarnecki, 266 Ill. 372 (1915). 57 Bonney v King. 201 Ill. 47 (1903). 58 Johnson v Choate, 284 Ill. 214 (1918). 59 Douglas v Hutchinson, 183 Ill. 323 (1899). Go Boren v Smith, 47 Ill. 482 (1868). 61 Hecker v I. C. R. R. Co., 231 Ill. 574 (1908); Hayward v Sencenbaugh, 235 Ill. 580 (1908). 61 Speight v People, 87 Ill. 595 (1877). 63 Gesford v Critzer, 7 Ill. 698 (1845); Casey v Horton, 36 Ill. 234 (1864). have been sustained in civil cases, as reasonable provisions to protect officers of justice against loss of compensation for their services. But the court has held invalid a law requiring a person to show he was not delinquent for taxes in order to question a tax title, and a statute requiring the payment of redemption money and interest as a condition to attacking the validity of a tax deed. 66 Section 20. A frequent recurrence to the fundamental principles of civil government is absolutely necessary to preserve the blessings of liberty. There has been no occasion for a construction or interpretation of this plain admonition to governmental authority. It has been referred to by the Supreme Court in holding unreasonable and oppressive a city ordinance which prohibits the getting on or off moving cars or trains of cars without first securing permission from persons in charge." In another case, the court held invalid a statutory provision which conferred authority upon a court to direct a commissioner owning lands in a drainage district subject to assessment, to act with other commissioners in assessing benefits upon the land in the district. One of the fundamental principles referred to by this section, the court said, is that impartial tribunals shall be provided for the adjudication of rights.68 65 Wilson v McKenna, 52 Ill. 43 (1869). 66 Reed v Tyler, 56 Ill. 288 (1870); Senichka v Lowe, 74 Ill. 274 (1874). 67 Wice v C. & N. W. Ry. Co., 193 Ill. 351 (1901). CS Drainage Commissioners v Smith, 233 Ill. 417 (1908). ARTICLE III-DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS. The powers of the government of this State are divided into three distinct departments-the legislative, executive and judicial; and no person, or collection of persons, being one of these departments, shall exercise any power properly belonging to either of the others, except as hereinafter expressly directed or permitted. In general. The powers of the three departments of government may be briefly defined as follows: The legislative, department determines what the law shall be; the executive department executes or administers the law; and the judicial department construes and applies the law. This article of the constitution does not mean that each department of governr ent is absolutely separate and distinct from the others. The spheres of activity of each department overlap to a certain extent, and the action of one department within its own sphere will be sustained even though it may, to a certain degree, exercise powers primarily within the sphere of another department. In the early case of Field v People,' it was said: "The first and second sections of the first article of the constitution divide the powers of government into three departments, the legislative, executive and judicial, and declare that neither of these departments shall exercise any of the powers properly belonging to either of the others, except as expressly permitted. This is a declaration of a fundamental principle; and although one of vital importance, it is to be understood in a limited and qualified sense. It does not mean that the legislative, executive and judicial power, should be kept so entirely separate and distinct as to have no connection or dependence, the one upon the other; but its true meaning, both in theory and practice, is, that the whole power of two or more of these departments shall not be lodged in the same hands, whether of one or many. That this is the sense in which this maxim was understood by the authors of our government and those of the general and state governments, is evidenced by the constitutions of all. In every one, there is a theoretical or practical recognition of this maxim, and at the same time a blending and admixture of different powers. This admixture in practice, so far as to give each department a constitutional control over the other, is considered, by the wisest statesmen, as essential in a free government, as a separation. This clause, then, is the broad theoretical line of demarcation, between the three great departments of government." In State of Illinois v Illinois Central Railroad Company2 the court, in considering this article, said: "The legislative, executive and judicial powers are not to be kept so entirely separate and distinct as to have no connection or interdependence. In every constitution there is a blending and admixture of different powers. "This admixture, in practice, so far as to give each department a constitutional control over the others, is considered by the wisest statesmen as essential in a free government as a separation.' In Cooley on Torts that author says: 'Official duties are supposed to be susceptible of classification under the three heads of legislative, executive and judicial, corresponding to the three departments of government bearing the same designations; but the classification cannot 13 Ill. 79 (1839). 2 246 Ill. 188 (1910). be very exact and there are many officers whose duties cannot properly, or at least exclusively, be arranged under either of these heads.' Certain administrative officers are frequently charged with duties that partake of the character of all three of the departments but which cannot be classed as belonging essentially to either. Administrative and executive officers are frequently called upon, in the performance of their duties, to exercise judgment and discretion, to investigate, deliberate and decide, and yet it has been held that they do not exercise judicial power, within the meaning of the constitutional provision." It is apparent, therefore, that one department is not usurping the powers of another department merely because that department in the performance of a certain act exercises powers similar to those exercised by one or both of the other departments. This does not mean, of course, that one department may exercise the powers that essentially belong to another department. But if a department in the performance of an act properly within its domain, must, incidentally, exercise a power belonging primarily to another department, it is not prevented from doing so by the doctrine of separation of powers. The power to regulate railroad rates is essentially legislative, but it is clear that in fixing such rates the General Assembly, in a measure, exercises judicial functions." An administrative agency empowered to issue and revoke licenses to engage in a certain business or profession, must, necessarily, exercise quasi judicial powers in determining that a license shall be issued to a certain person, or that a license already issued shall be revoked, but this exercise of a quasi judicial power is only incidental to the function of administering the law relating to the regulation of a particular business or calling.* And a court is not exercising legislative power contrary to this provision of the constitution when it makes rules to govern the transaction of its business, although there can be no doubt that the making of rules is, in a certain sense, a legislative function.5 In some cases it is quite clear that one department is encroaching upon the powers of another. In other cases, however, it is difficult to determine whether the exercise by one department of a power primarily belonging to another department is a clear invasion of the sphere of another department or merely incidental to the performance of an act properly within the domain of the first department; and in such cases, the whole problem becomes largely a question of drawing the line-a question of degree. (See discussion subsequent subheadings.) It should be noted, however, that this article provides that, "except as hereinafter expressly directed or permitted," no person or persons in one department of government shall exercise any powers properly belonging to another department. By the words "except as hereinafter expressly directed or permitted," the constitution recognizes the fact that certain exceptions are made in that instrument, itself, to the doctrine of separation of powers established by this article. A few illustrations may be of value. Section 9 of article 4 authorizes the General Assembly to imprison persons for contemptuous behavior in its presence. Section 24 of the same article provides that the senate shall hear and determine all impeachments returned or found by the house of representatives. Section 30 of article 6 gives the General Assembly the power to remove judges from office "for cause entered on the journals." All of these functions are judicial in nature but are conferred upon the legislative branch of the government by the constitution itself. The power to enact laws is clearly a legislative power. But, under section 16 of article 5, the Governor may veto any bill passed by the General 3 C. M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Public Utilities Commission. 268 Ill. 49 (1915). 4 People v. Apfelbaum. 251 Ill. 18 (1911); Klafter v. State Board of Examiners, 259 Ill. 15 (1913); People v. Brady, 268 Ill. 192 (1915); People v. Stokes, 281 Ill. 159 (1917); see, also, Spiegler v. City of Chicago, 216 Ill. 114 (1905) Block v. City of Chicago. 239 Ill. 251 (1909). |