damental change like an amendment which divides the original project into three parts.95 The purchase of property at tax sales constitutes a contract, with rights and obligations which may not be taken away or abridged by legislation. Thus if by the purchase, the buyer secures the right to the title or a redemption in specie, an act which authorizes the owner to redeem in United States treasury notes is void. The contract of the sureties on a collector's bond is so materially altered by an act extending the time for the collector's final settlement as to release them from liability." The General Assembly has no power to make the purchasers of the franchise and property of a railroad corporation liable for the debts of the old corporation by a law enacted subsequently to the sale, since by the sale certain rights are obtained which cannot be taken away.98 Grants by municipalities to public utility companies giving privileges in the use of streets, are not franchises but licenses which upon acceptance become contracts which can be rescinded or revoked only for cause.99 And even where the grant is improperly given by resolution instead of by ordinance if the licensee has accepted and acted upon the grant with the tacit approval of the municipality, it is a contract not subject to revocation or impairment.1 Anticipation warrants are charges against a tax and are not contracts of the city which are protected by this section against a law which diminishes the taxing power of the city. Nor is the election and induction of a person into a public office a contract within the protection of the constitution, nor the right to participate in a police pension fund. An act passed to validate a mortgage defectively executed cannot be said to impair any contract rights since its effect is merely to make obligatory the intention of the contracting parties." When a public municipal corporation acting outside its governmental character for purposes of private advantage, has contracted with the state, its position is analogous to individuals or private corporations whose contracts may not be impaired or altered by the state. But its acts in its public or governmental capacity are performed as agent for the state and this section does not prevent complete control as to such matters by the state. Thus a grant of money for internal improvements to counties without railroads may be withdrawn by the state at any time before it has been expended,' or the General Assembly may properly direct the payment of money due school townships in other than gold and silver.s A municipality may, with the consent of the other party to a contract, set aside an agreement for service and substitute therefor a new agreement fixing new rates for service, and such action will not be subject to objection as an impairment of the contract rights of the residents of the municipality to receive service at the original rates." The contract rights of the individual, like all property rights, are not absolute but are held subject to certain paramount rights of the state and this section is not construed to secure rights under contracts at the expense of the necessary sovereign powers which protect and secure the general welfare. All contracts whether made by the state or individuals are subject to be in 95 Supervisors of Fulton County v M. & W. Ry. Co., 21 Ill. 338 (1859). 96 People v Riggs, 56 Ill. 483 (1870). 97 Davis v People, 6 Ill. 409 (1844). 98 Hatcher v T. W. & W. R. R. Co., 62 Ill. 477 (1872). 99 Chicago Municipal Gas Light Co. v Town of Lake, 130 Ill. 42 (1889); City of Belleville v Citizen's Horse Ry. Co., 152 Ill. 171 (1894); People v Central Union Tel. Co., 192 Ill. 307 (1901). 1 Village of London Mills v White, 208 Ill. 289 (1904). 3 Booth v Opel, 244 Ill. 317 (1910). 3 Donahue v County of Will, 100 Ill. 94 (1881). 4 Beutel v Foreman, 288 Ill. 106 (1919). 5 Steger v Traveling Men's Bldg. Assn.. 208 Ill. 236 (1904). People v Power, 25 Ill. 187 (1860). County of Richland v County of Lawrence, 12 Ill. 1 (1850) 8 Bush v Shipman, 5 Ill. 186 (1843). People v Chicago Tel. Co., 245 Ill. 121 (1910). terfered with by subsequent statutes enacted in the exercise of the police power. The following regulations for the operation of trains have been sustained as valid police measures though their effect was to limit or alter rights secured by charter from the state; requiring the sounding of warnings at road and street crossings,10 and the fencing of right-of-ways," the stopping of passenger trains at county seats,12 and fixing reasonable rates for transportation and preventing discrimination in rates.13 A railroad company may be compelled to secure a permit to lay a side track on its right-of-way across a street crossing." 14 With regard to ordinances relating to the operation of street railways in the city of Chicago, it was held that they constituted binding contracts in so far as their provisions related to matters other than those affecting the public safety, welfare, comfort or convenience-such as the division of net receipts with the city and an option of purchase to the city. But as to matters properly within the purview of the police power, the General Assembly retains the power to regulate and control.15 When a charter to a railroad corporation merely requires the corporation in crossing a street or road with its tracks, to restore the road or street to its former state of usefulness, the railroad corporation may not, under guise of police regulation, be made liable for the maintenance of the paving upon a street in a subway beneath its tracks.16 The exercise of rights conferred by charter on an insurance company is subject to the power of the state to enact a police measure providing for the dissolution of such company if upon examination its financial condition makes the continued acceptance of risks hazardous," and the General Assembly may provide that an insurance company failing to transact business for one year shall be deemed extinct.18 An amendment to the city charter of Chicago may operate to annul a section of the charter of Chicago University which prohibited the sale of intoxicating liquor within one mile of the institution.19 Rates fixed by municipalities by contract or ordinance may be changed by subsequent legislation since the right to prescribe reasonable rates as a part of the police power cannot be divested or bargained away.20 In a recent decision of the Supreme Court it was held that a railroad company was prohibited by the public utilities act of 1913 from furnishing free transportation under a prior contract by the terms of which the vendor of certain property was to receive free transportation as part consideration for property sold to the railroad company.21 Shortly after this decision, the court held that the public utilities act did not impair or annul a contract under which free electrical power was the consideration for the transfer of certain property.22 And in an earlier case a statute requiring railroads to fence their right-of-way was not permitted to impair rights under a contract authorized by law by which the owner of adjoining land agreed to build and maintain a fence and in the event of failure so to do, the railroad company was not to be liable for damages to stock of such owner.23 10 G. & C. U. R. R. Co. v Loomis, 13 I. 548 (1852); I. & St. L. R. R. Co. v Blackman, 63 Ill. 117 (1872); Venner v Chicago City Ry. Co., 246 Ill. 170 (1910). 11 O. & M. R. R. Co. v McClelland, 25 Ill. 140 (1860); G. & C. U. R. R. Co. v Crawford, 25 Ill. 529 (1861). 12 C. & A. R. R. Co. v People, 105 Ill. 657 (1883). 13 Ruggles v People, 91 Ill. 256 (1878); C. & A. R. R. Co. v People, 67 Ill. 11 (187); C. B. & Q. R. R. Co. v Jones, 149 Ill. 361 (1894). 14 P. F. W. & C. Ry. Co. v City of Chicago, 159 Ill. 369 (1896). 15 City of Chicago v O'Connell, 278 III. 591 (1917); (recently affirmed by United States Supreme Court). 16 People v I. C. R. R. Co., 235 Ill. 374 (1908). 17 Ward v Farwell, 97 Ill. 593 (1881); Chicago Life Ins. Co. v Auditor, 101 Ill. 82 (1881). 18 Yates v People, 207 Ill. 316 (1904). 19 Dingman v People, 51 Ill. 277 (1869). 20 Freeport Water Co. v City of Freeport. 186 Ill. 179 (1900); City of Danville v Danville Water Co., 178 Ill. 299 (1899); Rogers Park Water Co. v Fergus, 178 Ill. 571 (1899). 21 Hite v C. I. & W. R. R. Co., 284 Ill. 297 (1918). 22 Schiller Piano Co.. v Northern Utilities Co., 288 Ill. 580 (1919). Contract rights, like all property rights, are subject to eminent domain and the state may for public use and by making compensation therefor, impair and destroy rights granted by charter from the state. See discussion article 11, section 14). The state may in the exercise of its taxing power affect rights under contracts between individuals. Thus under a drainage act, assessments may be levied on property and a lien given for such taxes which is superior to the liens of existing encumbrances.25 But valid contracts made by special grants by the state or its subdivisions under the constitution of 1848 which exempted property from taxation, are protected against impairment by subsequent legislation by the provision of this section.26 (See discussion article 9, section 3, subheading, "Effect of the exemption provisions in special charters granted prior to 1870.") It has been uniformly held that a specific method of enforcing the obligation of a contract is not a part of the obligation and therefore the General Assembly may regulate or change the remedies for the enforcement of existing contracts so long as such change in the extent or nature of existing remedies does not impair the substantive rights and interests under such contracts. A change in the remedy if it goes to the extent of abridging or altering substantive rights is just as much an impairment within the prohibition of this section as a direct violation of the contract.27 A law which requires that property sold under mortgage foreclosure be appraised and sold for at least two-thirds of the valuation fixed was sustained as to rights accrued under prior contracts by the Illinois Supreme Court,28 but the decision was reversed by the United States Supreme Court." So an act which takes away all existing remedy leaving no redress impairs the validity of an existing contract as much as if it changed the terms.30 The following measures have been held to change the remedy or procedure only and, therefore, to be valid even as to prior contracts: a law permitting a creditor of a bank to proceed to judgment against a stockholder without waiting for execution against the bank; 31 the burnt records act which abolished a presumption as to the regularity of proceedings essential to the validity of tax deeds; 32 a statute permitting redemption from sales under decrees to enforce mechanic's liens; 33 a statute establishing a rule of evidence that the statement of the county collector in applying for judgments for taxes shall be prima facie evidence of the regularity of the assessment and levy of the taxes; a statute making unnecessary the establishing a devastavit before bringing suit on a guardian's bond; 35 a requirement as to certain steps to be taken by tax purchasers in giving notice to the owners of property sold;36 a law giving to owners assessed for local improvements the right of jury trial on question of benefits; a statute permitting the forfeiture of a lease by service of a simple demand notice instead of the common law method of forfeiture; and a statute changing the procedure for condemnation of property by a railroad company.39 Statutes limiting the time within which the obligations of a contract may be enforced or changing the limita 38 34 24 Mills v County of St. Clair. 7 Ill. 197 (1845); I. & M. Canal v C. & R. I. R. R. Co., 14 Ill. 314 (1853); M. C. Ry. Co. v C. W. D. Ry. Co., 87 Ill. 317 (1877). 25 W. E. Ry. Co. v Commissioners of Drainage District, 134 Ill. 384 (1890). 20 Parmelee v City of Chicago, 60 Ill. 267 (1871); People v Soldiers' Home & Baptist Theological Union, 95 Ill. 561 (1880); Northwestern University v People, 99 U. S. 309 (1878); reversing Northwestern University v People, 80 Ill. 333 (1875). 27 Fisher v Green, 142 Ill. 80 (1892). 28 Williams v Waldo, 4 Ill. 264 (1841); Delahay v McConnel, 5 Ill. 157 (1842). 29 McCracken v Hayward, 2 Howard (U. S.) 608 (1844). 30 Bruce v Schuyler, 9 Ill. 221 (1847). 31 Smith v Bryan, 34 Ill. 364 (1864). 35 Winslow v People, 117 Ill. 152 (1886). 36 Gage v Steward, 127 Ill. 207 (1889). 37 Palmer v City of Danville, 166 Ill. 42 (1897). 38 Woods v Soucy, 166 Ill. 407 (1897). 39 C. B. & Q. Ry. Co. v Abbott, 215 Ill. 416 (1905). tion period have been sustained as to existing contracts or causes of action so long as a reasonable period is afforded for the assertion of the right before the action is barred.40 A law which takes away the right to sue on causes barred by limitation statutes in the state where they accrued, does not violate the constitutional provision since the obligation of such contracts is already gone by force of the foreign limitation statute."1 42 Irrevocable grants of special privileges or immunities. Section 22 of article 4 provides that "the General Assembly shall not pass local or special laws granting to any corporation, association, or individual any special or exclusive privilege, immunity or franchise". The prohibition is directed expressly to the General Assembly and it has been held that it does not apply to licenses or contracts created by municipalities. Section 14 of article 11, however, says that "no law impairing the obligation of contracts, or making any irrevocable grant of special privilege or immunities, shall be passed." The prohibition against "impairing the obligation of contracts" has been applied to both municipal and state action. But the same word "law" with its second qualifying phrase, "making any irrevocable grant of special privilege or immunities," has been construed not to apply to municipalities.43 The court erroneously cites the decision based on section 22 of article 4. But the court, in holding that the municipal ordinance in question is not a law which makes an irrevocable grant of special privilege or immunities, does not base its opinion wholly on the construction of the word "law" but also on the ground that the grant, although not for a definite term, was limited to the life of the corporation receiving it and was therefore not an irrevocable grant. The prohibition against an irrevocable grant, according to the construction placed upon it by the court, forbids a grant in perpetuity but not a grant for a limited term of years incapable of being revoked by the state." Section 15. The military shall be in strict subordination to the civil power. The calling out of the militia to quell riotous conditions does not suspend the functions of the civil authorities but the military authority is merely in aid of the civil authorities. Consequently civil officers retain all their customary powers and duties.45 When it becomes necessary for the state to send aid to the civil authorities to suppress violence and execute the law, the civil authorities, acting as the representatives of the state and exercising governmental functions, are supreme. Their authority over the militia, however is not absolute but is limited to directing specific acts to be performed. As to the mode and manner of accomplishing the act ordered to be done, the militia acts independently of the civil authorities and is answerable to the Governor.46 It has been held by the Attorney General that a member of the state militia is subject to arrest by the civil authorities for treason, felony or breach of the peace, even when engaged in active service for the state and the fact of court martial and punishment by the military authorities does not bar 40 Bradley v Lightcap, 201 Ill. 511 (1903). 41 Hyman v Bayne, 83 Ill. 256 (1876). 43 Chicago City Ry. Co. v Story, 73 Ill. 541 (1874). 43 People v Central Union Tel. Co., 232 Ill. 260 (1908). 44 St. Clair County Turnpike Co. v People, 82 Ill. 174 (1876); People v Central Union Tel. Co., 232 Ill. 260 (1908). 45 County of Christian v Merrigan, 191 Ill. 484 (1901) a civil trial for the same offense." (For the constitutional provisions relating to the organization of the militia, see article 12.) Section 16. No soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in any house without the consent of the owner; nor in time of war except in the manner prescribed by law. Section 17. The people have the right to assemble in a peaceable manner to consult for the common good, to make known their opinions to their representatives, and to apply for redress of griev ances. Section 18. All elections shall be free and equal. This provision applies to all elections held under authority of law at which qualified electors may vote, including primary elections.48 Reasonable safeguards designed to maintain the purity of elections from fraud, such as requiring an unregistered voter to furnish two affidavits in support of his right to vote do not abridge the elective franchise or violate this section.40 The constitutional requirement of freedom and equality of elections prohibits intimidation and improper influences and requires that the vote of every elector shall be equal in its influence on the result to every other vote, but it does not demand absolute uniformity of regulation in all parts of the state.50 But a law which permits the voting of electors who have resided thirty days in some election districts but not in other portions of the state destroys the freedom and equality of elections.51 So distinctions applying to Cook County alone not justified by the difference in population, such as prohibiting an elector from voting at a party primary if he has voted at another party primary within two years but outside Cook County merely requiring him to state his party affiliation, are violative of this section and void.52 Freedom of elections also means that the voters shall be free to exercise the elective franchise for any eligible person of their choice without unwarranted restrictions and hindrances. Thus reasonable regulations such as requiring a candidate to file a petition with a proper percentage of voters, may be imposed but not a requirement for the payment of a fee so large as not to be intended as compensation for services rendered in filing the papers.53 A statutory prohibition against a candidate's name appearing more than once on the ballot does not prevent freedom of elections since any elec 47 'Report Attorney General 1915, p. 229. 48 People v Election Commissioners, 221 Ill. 9 (1906). 49 Byler v Asher, 47 Ill. 101 (1868). 50 People v Hoffman, 116 Ill. 587 (1886); People v Wanek, 241 Ill. 529 (1909). 51 People v Strassheim, 240 Ill. 279 (1909). 53 People v Election Commissioners, 221 Ill. 9 (1906). 53 People v Election Commissioners, 221 Ill. 9 (1906). |